The book examines some of the dilemmas surrounding Europe’s open borders, migrations, and identities through the prism of the Roma – Europe’s most dispersed and socially marginalised population. The volume challenges some of the myths surrounding the Roma as a ‘problem population’, and places the focus instead on the context of European policy and identity debates. It comes to the conclusion that the migration of Roma and the constitution of their communities is shaped by European policy as much as and often more so than by the cultural traits of the Roma themselves. The chapters compare case studies of Roma migrants in Spain, Italy, France, and Britain, and the impact of migration on the origin communities in Romania. The study combines historical and ethnographic methods with insights from migration studies, drawing on a unique multi-site collaborative project that for the first time gave Roma participants a voice in shaping research into their communities.

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Open Borders, Unlocked Cultures
Romanian Roma Migrants in Western Europe

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The research leading to the present publication results from MigRom – ‘The immigration of Romanian Roma to Western Europe: Causes, effects and future engagement strategies’, a project funded by the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme under the call on ‘Dealing with diversity and cohesion: the case of the Roma in the European Union’ (GA319901), 2013–2017.

The editors and contributors wish to thank the consortium’s management staff: Charlotte Jones, Hazel Gardner, Alex Robertson, and Chris White for their invaluable support; Ramona Constantin, Henriett Dinók, Florin Nita, Cayetano Fernández Ortega, Mirela Steel, Claudia Iancu Stoian, Daniel Stoian, and Leo Tanase for their contribution to data collection, archiving, and assessment and to the project’s outreach work; Elaine Mills, Keiran Barnes, and Robert Rustem for their contribution to shaping the project’s impact and public engagement agenda; Marianna Agoni, Jenni Berlin, Leonie Gaiser, Francesco Fattori, Suzana Jovanović, Anna Lowenstein, Anna Maria Meneghini, Nuria Morales, Francesca Pagura, Natalie Parr, Juan Pérez, Angela Petre, Eva Rizzini, Daniel Tomescu, and Sabrina Tosi Cambini for their input into the data evaluation process; Ilsen About, Carmen Castilla, Dana Diminescu, Sylvie Gan-gloff, Francisco Jiménez-Bautista, Olivier Legros, Ester Massó, Arturo Álvarez Roldán, Augustin Țărău, and Tommaso Vitale for sharing their expertise in specific fields; Elisabeth Tauber for her role as the consortium’s ethics advisor; the county archives of Tulcea, Cluj, and Oradea for enabling access; and Marie Ramot, Monica Menapace, and Raffaella Greco-Tonegutti, who served as the project’s contact persons at the European Commission. We also thank Jack Cox, Margalit Chu, and Nora Scott for their help with translation, and Amelia Jane Abercrombie for copy-editing support in preparation of this manuscript.

In the following chapters, Romani words are usually presented in the normal transliteration conventions of Romani linguistics; names of Romani groups follow Romani transliteration conventions or Romanian spelling (for labels that are meaningful in Romanian); names of settlements and institutions in Romania are generally presented in Romanian spelling.

Names of individuals recorded in fieldwork notes have generally been altered to protect anonymity. Some authors have also chosen to alter the names of
Preface

Romani groups and family networks and the names of fieldwork locations, while others cite the actual names. As a result, it is possible that the same groups or locations may be referred to by different names in different chapters.

The Editors
1 How open borders can unlock cultures

Concepts, methods, and procedures*

Daniele Viktor Leggio and Yaron Matras

Who are the Roma?

Ethnicity vs. ‘nomadic lifestyle’

In March 2014, the e-mail list of the European Academic Network on Romani Studies hosted a discussion on definitions of the population known as ‘Roma’. It began when one of the subscribers to the list – which at the time brought together some 350 academics who specialised in Romani/Gypsy studies – asked for reactions to two generalisations which she came across while preparing a legal review of a document on cultural rights: (1) that all Roma speak a variety of the same language, Romanes; and (2) that Roma generally consider themselves to be a nation. Some two-dozen scholars posted their reactions, which together offer a fairly exhaustive summary of contemporary views on the subject (for a full documentation, see Friedman & Friedman 2015: 186ff.).

Problems surrounding the definition of Roma/Gypsies are often attributed to the mismatch between internal labels and understandings of community boundaries among the populations concerned, and the prevalence of external definitions and popular imagery, which postulate a wholesale and much less differentiated category of ‘Gypsies’ (see Matras 2004, 2015a: 15–31). Some respondents to the e-mail discussion addressed the principle of individual self-ascription: A ‘Romani’ or ‘Gypsy’ person is one who identifies as such. Yet it was acknowledged that ‘Roma’ depicts an ethnic and therefore a collective identity, and so individuals’ self-ascription as ‘Roma’ is only credible if legitimised through descent. That, however, merely shifts the reference point back in time, for if descent is to be added to the definition, the question ‘descent from whom?’ cannot be avoided.

Some social scientists embrace the concept of ‘commercial nomads’ or ‘peri-patetics’, first developed in a modern comparative perspective and applied to different societies by Rao (1987, see also Berland & Rao 2004). Here the focus is on endogamous population groups that occupy a particular socioeconomic niche in diverse societies around the world, specialising in a mobile, family-based service economy that often features a flexible portfolio of trades. Such communities are sometimes regarded as having a ‘contrast culture’, one that is
dependent both culturally and economically on sedentary society but which cultivates its own particular identifiers in the form of both external emblems and appearance, and internal practices (cf. Streck 2008).

This approach is broadly aligned with popular notions of ‘nomadism’ that are associated with ‘Gypsies’ in literary and artistic depictions, as well as, punctually, in policy measures adopted at different times by various authorities and administrations. Policies toward ‘Gypsies’ in Europe ranged from late medieval edicts targeting all sorts of groups deemed to be non-sedentary ‘strangers’, through measures of control and surveillance during the eighteenth century that did not distinguish between individual ‘nomadic’ groups (cf. Lucassen 1996), to the Nazi view of ‘Gypsy’ as a genetic pre-disposition to criminality and anti-social behaviour, and, on the positive trajectory, to Council of Europe initiatives to set up camping and housing facilities for ‘populations of nomadic origins’ in the late twentieth century.²

It is interesting to note that in the early 1980s, the Council of Europe included both Romanies and Sami under its definition of ‘nomadic populations’,³ while contemporary definitions of ‘Roma’ in European policy documents tend to view peripatetics as commercial rather than pastoral nomads. As a definition of ‘Gypsy’, the plain attribute ‘nomadic’ is clearly problematic. It cannot explain why the Luli beggars of Uzbekistan are regarded as ‘Gypsies’ but not the Kyrgyz herders of Kazakhstan, and it fails to differentiate between the Dom (Gypsy) tent-dwellers of Jordan and the (non-Gypsy) Bedouin tribes of the Sinai. It also conflicts with the self-perception of groups such as the Sinte of Germany, who speak the Romani language and practise seasonal travelling for the purpose of work as well as social gatherings but who strongly resent being depicted as nomads. A definition of ‘Gypsies’ as ‘historically nomadic’ or ‘nomadic by descent’ might include the sedentary Roma of the Burgenland in Austria, who are regarded as ‘Gypsies’, but not the Karaim of Lithuania, who are not seen as such. The concept of ‘service economy’ that is associated with ‘commercial nomadism’ fails to capture the difference between the Halab blacksmiths of Sudan (Streck 1996) or the Kelderash coppersmiths of Bulgaria, both considered ‘Gypsy’ populations, and the Jewish goldsmiths of Yemen, who are not associated with that label. These comparisons, as well as the ‘branding’ (cf. Matras 2015a) and marketing of certain social and cultural attributes through the term ‘Gypsy’, testify to the way in which the term widely evokes associations with a particular ‘lifestyle’ as well as a very particular social stigma. It is therefore tempting to generalise that ‘Gypsies’ are ‘those who are defined by others as Gypsies’ (cf. Ries 2008), yet that notion contradicts self-ascription as well as, potentially, descent. Explicitly linking lifestyle with self-ascription, on the other hand, risks essentialising ideas of cultural heritage and behaviour and denying that Romani/Gypsy society, like any other, is permeable, potentially porous, and subject to constant change and development.

Matras (2004) identifies two distinct uses of the term ‘Gypsy’, which represent realities that overlap only partly or historically. The first (‘Gypsy 1’) focuses on social status and socioeconomic profile. It captures both external
attitudes and self-depictions, and the objective reality of relations and patterns of interaction with majority society. Each individual population in this category can be regarded as an ethnicity in its own right to the extent that group membership is (barring individuals) principally by descent rather than through the acquisition of a ‘lifestyle’. Yet, there is no overarching relationship among these different populations save occasional manifestations of mutual solidarity during casual encounters, or else, when mobility or migration lead to more intense contact and convergence (not unlike those that exist among co-territorial sedentary populations such as ethnic Germans and ethnic Poles in pre-war Silesia). Populations belonging to ‘Gypsy 1’ constitute a ‘nation’ only in the very metaphorical sense of the term, as groups that might be seen as having a similar ‘destiny’ in regard to their individual relationships with their respective majority (sedentary, or ‘host’) societies.

A separate category (‘Gypsy 2’) pertains to the very specific population whose language is or was a dialect of Romani. These populations tend to use the term ‘Rom’ or a word that is derived from it (e.g. Romnes, Romnichal) as a meaningful signifier of in-group identity, either with reference to the group as a whole, or specifically to its language, or sometimes just to denote a ‘man/woman in-group member’ or the family role ‘husband/wife’. The majority of the Romani population (so defined) lives in eastern Europe, often in century-old, established and segregated settlements, where they maintain family networks, the Romani language, and to some extent separate traditions, while others have relied until recently on commercial mobility and may in that sense, be regarded broadly as ‘nomadic’. In western and northern Europe, by contrast, Romani settlement has been sparse; groups of Romani origin have tended to maintain itinerant traditions, they have tended to mix with indigenous peripatetic populations of non-Romani origin, and they have often lost command of the Romani language (save a limited Romani-derived vocabulary that is embedded into in-group interaction in the majority language). There is therefore some degree of historical overlap between the Roma (‘Gypsy 2’) and the various ‘nomadic’ populations (‘Gypsy 1’), especially if one subscribes to the view that the historical origin of the European Roma is in the caste-like ḍom-communities of India (cf. Matras 2002, 2015a); yet the contemporary category ‘Roma’ cannot be taken to be synonymous with commercial nomadism, and so such overlap is only partial.

Policy-related definitions

The distinct realities of Romani presence in western and eastern Europe (broadly speaking) have given rise to distinct points of emphasis when it comes to defining and describing Roma both in academic traditions and in policies. Marushia-kova and Popov (2015) regard eastern European approaches as having been more willing to accept a concept of Romani ethnicity, while western approaches are said to have tended to emphasise Gypsy nomadism. In reality, government initiatives in Finland, Sweden, and Germany, for instance, recognised Roma/Sinti as a cultural minority long before 1990, while by contrast measures in
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and other Eastern Bloc countries were often repressive and directed precisely against the so-called nomadism of Romani populations. Such contradictions also appeared in academic traditions on both sides of the pre-1990 political divide. The emergence in the late 1960s of an international discussion context of Romani activists, pitched around an emphasis on shared language and historical origins (based on the proven connection between the Romani language and the Indo-Aryan languages of the Indian subcontinent) introduced a challenge to the political discourse. It framed ‘Roma’ as a nation without a coherent territory or territorial aspirations but with a claim nonetheless to some form of political representation, and demanded acknowledgement of the term ‘Roma’ as a unifying self-appellation. European political institutions have since tried to respond to this challenge while embedding it into continuing initiatives in support of diverse populations of ‘nomadic origin’. The resulting vagueness has allowed these institutions to construct a politically correct concept of ‘Roma/Gypsies’, while at the same time, linking it to the traditional imagery of nomadic lifestyles, legitimised through an accompanying expert discourse that speaks somewhat poetically of a ‘mosaic of small diverse groups’ (Liégeois 1986: 49–50).

With growing attention to Roma in response to east–west migrations following the collapse of the iron curtain and subsequent EU enlargement, European institutions took to defining ‘Roma’ even more explicitly as an ‘umbrella term’ that included both Romani-speaking populations such as the Sinte of Germany or the Kale of Finland in the West, along with the Roma minorities of eastern Europe, as well as sedentary populations of assumed nomadic and/or Romani background such as the Beaš of Hungary or the Ashkali of Kosovo, and non-Romani populations that maintain nomadic traditions such as the Gens du Voyage of France, the Travellers of Ireland, and the Woonwagenbewoners in the Netherlands – all referred to as sharing, supposedly, ‘cultural characteristics’ (see Matras 2013). Such use of ‘Roma’ in the European political discourse has been criticised not just for its lack of accuracy but also for its tendency to be linked to generalisations about poverty and deprivation, thereby running the risk of ‘ethnicising’ economic deprivation among Roma populations or even linking it explicitly to culture (see, e.g. Vermeersch 2012; Magazzini 2016). As Surdu and Kovats (2015) show, such policies not only seek confirmation from, but also reinforce and often directly commission expert discourses that purport to be able to identify Roma as a particular problem population. The aftermath of the launch of the EU’s National Strategies for Roma Inclusion in 2011 has seen a further proliferation of expert initiatives addressing ‘Roma health’, ‘Roma education’, ‘Roma unemployment’, and ‘Roma housing’, all framed as issues that are particular to a (vaguely defined) population of Roma.

Defining Roma communities

In this volume, we use the term ‘Roma’ specifically to refer to those populations that employ that label as their community-based self-ascription, irrespective of
lifestyle, social status or occupational patterns, or who otherwise self-identify explicitly as belonging to communities whose members self-ascribe as Roma. In practice, this definition is strongly aligned with the use of the Romani language either synchronically or historically, that is, either as the active language of the home or the wider kinship group and affiliated families, or else as a language that is the subject of collective memory having been the vehicle of communication of recent generations (parents or grandparents). As described below, the MigRom research targeted families who were Romani speakers as well as families who interacted with Romani speakers and were referred by them, and referred to themselves, as ‘Romanianised Gypsies’ (ţigani românizaţi), entertaining a collective memory of having lost the Romani language and having shifted to the majority language, Romanian, yet having retained an awareness of a distinct ethnic identity and a sense of affiliation with Romani speakers.

In connection with this, it is important to emphasise that Romani is a language just like any other: it shows variation in pronunciation, vocabulary, and grammatical inflections on a par with dialect differences in other European languages that show regional variation, such as Dutch, German or Italian, and which therefore does not justify a plural classification as ‘Romani language-s’ any more so than Dutch, German or Italian dialects might be regarded, respectively, as distinct languages. Indeed, the characterisation in the plural, which is often used by non-specialists with reference to Romani, is itself derived from the vagueness of the ‘mosaic’ concept (Liégeois 1986), that is, from the notion of ‘Gypsy’ as a lifestyle and of ‘Roma’ as a cover-term that captures all populations with a supposedly similar lifestyle, irrespective of their language. Those who speak of ‘Romani language-s’ intend to refer, at least implicitly, to any mode of speech, be it a form of English, Dutch or another language, that is used for communication among ‘Gypsies’ in the sense of commercial nomads (‘Gypsy 1’). We follow the convention of specialised academic discourse and the practice of Roma who are speakers of Romani and use the term to refer exclusively to a very specific language, clearly defined in terms of its diachrony and synchronic structures including its internal dialect differentiation (see Matras 2002).

The absence of territorial concentration, varying cultural practices, lack of a political entity or legal categorisation, and indeed different degrees to which the Romani language is actively maintained, create potential ambiguity in identifying the boundaries of Roma ‘communities’. This is partly reflected by the reality of multi-layered internal labels or self-appellations. Alongside the use of Rom as a meaningful in-group signifier, self-appellation labels may capture the so-called ‘clan’ or wider kinship network who are descendants of the same ancestor (see Chapter 4), or a wider category that represents historical occupation groups (see below), or a region or country of previous settlement, religious affiliation, or a majority population among whom the particular Roma community lives (for an overview of such labels and concepts, see Matras 2015a: 283ff.).

We follow a practical definition of a Roma ‘community’ that takes into account those dimensions and demarcations that prove to be of relevance to the
actors who self-identify as Roma in the sense described above. These may follow family networks (see Chapter 4), which may or may not overlap with physical boundaries within segregated settlements (cf. Jakoubek & Budilová 2006); patterns of intermarriage and shared institutional practices such as conflict resolution, which are in principle permeable and subject to re-negotiation especially following relocation (a process referred to as ‘segmentation vs. consolidation’ by Marushiakova & Popov 2004); shared faith and religious practices and alignment with contiguous non-Romani populations; shared place of settlement in migration and the development of networks of mutual dependency (see Chapter 6, cf. Solimene 2011); the punctual coming together within shared households and support networks of family groups that speak Romani and others who do not speak the language but descend from Romani speakers; as well as, albeit marginally in our discussion, shared ideological affiliation and activism that bring together Romani individuals.

Migration studies and the east–west migration of Roma

Migrations of Roma populations across Europe are documented from the fourteenth century, when groups of Roma left the Balkans possibly in connection with the advancement of Ottoman armies and the collapsing Byzantine Empire. The eighteenth century saw migrations of Roma from the Romanian principalities into Serbia, and of Romani-speaking Sinte who followed German settlers to colonies in eastern Europe, while political upheavals in the nineteenth century triggered a large-scale emigration of Roma from the Austro-Hungarian territories of present-day Romania (Transylvania and Banat) into central and northeastern Europe and eventually to the Americas. Some Roma were displaced or migrated from central and eastern Europe in the aftermath of the Second World War. Yugoslavia’s open border policy allowed Roma to join the movement of labour migrants into western European countries from the 1960s onwards, while restrictions on labour migration later imposed by the receiving countries prompted Roma migrants from eastern Europe to apply for political asylum from the early 1980s. Like these historical migrations, the movement of Roma from eastern Europe to the West, since the fall of the iron curtain in 1990, has been motivated by sociopolitical changes and the search for better livelihood opportunities and for safety and security amidst social marginalisation and hostility in the origin communities. The ‘migration’ of Roma has thus always been distinct from ‘nomadism’ (cf. Matras 1996, 2000). This important distinction, however, was often blurred as administrations at different times and in different places cited ‘nomadism’ as a justification for denying claims for refugee status (cf. Sigona 2003; Joskowicz 2015).

Post-1990 migrations

Interest in post-1990 migrations of Roma emerged initially within the context of policy discussions aiming to understand the reasons behind Roma mobility and
to draft long-term policy approaches that might curtail such mobility and alleviate the hostile reactions that it triggered in Western public opinion. A number of policy reports commissioned by international organisations such as UNHCR (Braham 1993), OECD (Reyniers 1995), the Council of Europe (Matras 1996), and the European Union (ICMPD 2001) identified anti-Roma sentiments in eastern Europe and the eruption of overt and often unconstrained marginalisation following the collapse of the Communist regimes as a major push-factor that motivated Roma to seek settlement opportunities in the West. These reports played an influential part in the shaping of a new policy that sought to address east–west migrations of Roma not just through measures such as border controls and repatriation, but also through long-term improvement of their living conditions, the removal of economic and social deprivation, and social and political empowerment in the origin countries.

Following from policy reports, academic analyses acknowledged marginalisation in the countries of origin as a principal push-factor for Roma migrations but drew attention also to pull-factors such as economic opportunities opened up by the dependency of Western labour markets on migrant workers (Sobotka 2003), and to facilitating factors such as asylum policies and the presence of co-ethnics, particularly when organised in NGOs that could assist migrants (Matras 2000). Matras (2000) points out that Roma migrations seldom involve individuals or nuclear families but tend to comprise instead extended families and even multiple family networks. Amidst victimisation, criminalisation, and marginalisation that are reinforced by deeply entrenched negative images of ‘Gypsies’ in the receiving countries, such support networks allow Roma migrants to take risks, which often result in a vicious circle, making Roma more vulnerable to exploitation on the job market and more inclined to accept sub-standard housing conditions. Views on Roma cultural particularities were also used to justify targeted measures to remove Roma migrants in the early 1990s. Various other studies continued to give attention to the interplay of motivations to leave and the difficulties encountered by Roma in light of public and policy reactions in the receiving countries, including targeted measures of registration, containment, and expulsion (e.g. Guy, Uherek, & Weinerová 2004; Sigona & Zetter 2010).

The social network approach in migration studies

From a theoretical perspective, the emphasis on push-factors as determinants of cross-border migrations in the countries of origin, and on the incorporation of migrants in the destination countries, has been criticised as ‘methodological nationalism’ (cf. Wimmer & Glick Schiller 2002) – the framing of migration processes within the isomorphism of people, sovereign and citizenry; between people and nation; and between people and solidarity group. It has been argued that the focus on migrants’ inclusion pays insufficient attention to the historical causes of migrations, while the focus on the determinants of migration overestimates the explanatory value of capital interests in shaping migrations (cf. Castles
Grounded in reflections on the changes brought about by globalisation (cf. Augé 1995; Appadurai 1996, 2013; Urry 2000; Vertovec 2007), a new approach calls for an ethnographically grounded analysis of migration that shifts the focus away from the structural factors that shape migration, to the agency of migrants and the socioeconomic and cultural changes that they experience. Since processes of cultural and economic change occur in specific locations that are characterised by particular social dynamics, Glick Schiller and Çağlar (2009) chose to study migrant networks at the level of cities-localities rather than nation-states.

This approach has shown how social networks, created by the movement and contact of people across space, help sustain migrations over time (Portes & Böröcz 1989) and offer migrants opportunities to obtain resources from other individuals (Portes & Rumbaut 2006). Successful networking relies on a balance between ties with fellow migrants, who provide stability through solidarity, and ties with people outside the kinship or co-ethnic group, which offer opportunities for social mobility (Portes 2014). This means that migration is invariably characterised by diverse processes and diverse outcomes: policies that target particular migrant groups, and the host society’s attitudes toward particular groups of migrants, can either limit or support the opportunities created by social networks, leading to varied degrees of social mobility among different migrant groups or even within a single group (cf. Portes & Rivas 2011). Moreover, by embracing new cultural practices, migrants are able to claim membership in different contexts (e.g. nation-states, transnational religious congregations, cultural organisations), transforming their individual and community identities and opening up opportunities to expand their social networks (Glick Schiller et al. 2004). Portes and Rivas (2011) have noted how such cultural differentiation within a single migrant community can result in intergenerational tensions, as younger migrants reject elements of the parental culture in order to become members of mainstream society. Alongside the transformations within the community of actual migrants, migration studies have taken an interest in the impact of migration on the locations of origin – both through social and financial remittances and the effect of returnees as drivers of social change in the locality as a whole (cf. Binford 2003; Portes 2010; Levitt & Lamba-Nieves 2011), and through the sharing of ideas and stories about migration and movement, or ‘cultural imaginaries’ (Salazar 2010), which are able to spread through migrant networks thanks to innovations in communication technologies.

**Current trends in the study of Roma migration**

This paradigm shift in migration studies has since inspired new approaches to the study of east–west migrations of Roma. Attention has been given to the individual capital that facilitates migration, such as the role of sharing experiences with people who have migration experience (both Roma and non-Roma) in shaping decisions to migrate (Grill 2012a), and the degree of socioeconomic integration (prior to the fall of communism) and its effect on the availability of
economic resources that enable migration in the first place (Vlase & Voicu 2014). In this regard, Pantea (2012a) distinguishes between ‘migration-poor’ Roma communities, which are unable to rely on pre-existing migrant networks, and those that are ‘migration-rich’ and are able to draw on ties with other individuals in selecting destinations and obtaining material support.

Interest in social networks has also drawn attention to the strategic focal point of social organisation and identity re-configuration in migrant Roma communities. Both Benarrosh-Orsoni (2016) and Reyniers (2016) note how family networks remain the main point of reference for Roma migrants, yet individuals also negotiate across and beyond family networks and directly with the surrounding community in order to secure access to housing (Cingolani 2016) and to achieve upward social mobility (Benedik, Tiefenbacher, & Zettelbauer 2013). In order to tackle housing needs, Roma migrants sometimes rely on non-Roma NGOs (Maestri 2014; Cingolani 2016), which in turn can play a role in mobilising Roma migrants (Bergeon 2016). Sordé Martí, Munté, Contreras, and Prieto-Flores (2012) observe how NGOs run by long-established Roma minorities in Spain have supported campaigns for the rights of Roma migrants, while Roman (2014) discusses how, by contrast, established Finnish Roma distance themselves from Roma migrants for fear that dedicated state resources might be diverted to them and that negative images against migrants might be turned against indigenous Roma, an observation already made in connection with attitudes of established Sinti organisations toward Roma migrants from southeastern Europe in Germany in the 1980s (Matras 1998).

Identity negotiations and geographical mobility may trigger cultural changes that redefine values such as work ethics (Tesár 2015; Grill 2016), a sense of belonging to particular Roma sub-groups (Tesár 2015; Lièvre 2016), and boundaries among Roma communities (Dahhan 2016). Traditional gender roles are especially affected by migration. While Pantea (2012b) describes how Roma women are challenged to strike a balance between achieving personal success and community internal pressures relating to motherhood, Humphris (2017) shows how western governments resort to scrutiny of motherhood as a way of policing Roma’s access to services. Changes in values can also impact on the origin communities, accompanying the economic benefits that migration brings to those who remained behind. The transformative potential that migration has for the locations of origin is embodied by Roma returnees and their relatives, who often engage in conspicuous consumption of goods that are brought back from the destination countries as well as in the construction of new houses, normally outside the traditional mono-ethnic, segregated Roma neighbourhoods (Benarrosh-Orsoni 2015; Tesár 2016). The availability of capital from remittances also supports local development, including the creation of infrastructure (such as landlines in previously deprived areas), which in turn help maintain tight communication links between Roma migrants and their relatives who have stayed behind (cf. Benarrosh-Orsoni 2016).

Attitudes towards Roma migrants continue to draw attention from researchers. In UK cities, negative images of Roma culture and debates about the impact
of Roma migration on the welfare state have led to conflict between Roma migrants and local residents, particularly in deprived areas that are already struggling with the consequences of austerity and cuts to local authority budgets (Grill 2012b; Clark 2014). In Italy, such debates have led to the institutionalisation of segregated housing practices for Roma migrants (Picker 2011; Picker & Roccheggiani 2014). In France, Roma migrants have experienced difficulties in accessing mainstream services (Nacu 2011; Lurbe i Puerto 2016) and have often been the target of hostile statements from political parties (Nacu 2012), while in Belgium and the UK concerns over integration in the education system have sometimes led to special interventions that target the children of Roma migrants (Hemelsoet 2015; Matras, Leggio, & Steel 2015).

Some of the particular interventions that target Roma migrants have been described as a trajectory of an ideology of ‘securitisation’, which is said to have escalated approaches to Roma from the level of social policy to the domain of security (Sigona 2011). It is argued that this trend goes hand in hand with the general strengthening of ‘securitarian’ ideologies across Europe, which amplify public fears as a way of justifying increased control measures, especially those that target ethnic and religious minorities (cf. McGarry & Drake 2013; Vermeersch 2013; van Baar 2016). Unlike the new paradigm in Roma-related migration studies, research into these questions is not generally based on empirical observations among Roma migrants but rather on an analysis of media and policy texts, which aims at assessing the way in which policy and law enforcement practices such as surveillance and expulsion (of EU citizens) tend to reinforce negative images of Roma among the public, practitioners and policy-makers alike.

**Co-production and Roma involvement in research**

Ethnographies of Roma communities (e.g. Sutherland 1975; Stewart 1997; Gay y Blasco 1999; Engebrigtsen 2007; Silverman 2012) have tended to acknowledge the role of individual Roma as facilitators of access, as interlocutors in the analysis of data, and as friends. Despite these crucial roles, Roma have rarely, if ever, participated in the actual writing of studies about them. Hancock (2002, 2010) criticises this lack of participation as a wilful attempt by researchers to exclude the Roma and to confine them to the role of subjects of research. Gay y Blasco and de la Cruz Hernández (2012), in a rare example of joint writing by a non-Roma anthropologist and a Romani informant (Spanish *Gitana*, to be precise), address the issue of Roma involvement in research within the broader context of ethnography and note that ‘although ethnographies deal with the lives of informants, informants are kept out of the conversation of ethnography’ (ibid.: 1). It might be argued that, just as in ethnographies about any other group of people, Roma do have a key role in shaping research about them, even if they only participate as informants, yet that role is not properly acknowledged in the conventions of academic writing and dissemination.

The recent demand by funding bodies such as the EU and national research councils to involve the target populations in research and for research outputs to
have direct policy impact is, however, opening up new opportunities for Roma to be directly involved in the design and production of research. The WORKALÓ and INCLUD-ED projects, funded under the EU’s 5th and 6th Framework Programmes, respectively, in Spain, saw the direct involvement of Spanish and Catalan *Gitanos*. The two projects investigated the involvement of *Gitanos* in the job market and in education and aimed at producing recommendations to change policies in those fields. They followed a critical communicative methodology (Munté, Serradell, & Sordé 2011) in the design and implementation of research activities. Through this methodology, ‘researchers bring the academic knowledge and the “researched” bring interpretations based on their lived experiences’ (Flecha 2014: 247). This was achieved through the creation of an advisory committee for each project, comprising researchers and members of the groups to be studied. The research participants were recruited from NGOs that are active in the local Romani movement, with which some of the researchers had links. The advisory committees designed the research tools (interview guides and questionnaires) and discussed the data. The *Gitano* members of the advisory committees also conducted interviews and focus groups and contributed to the dissemination of research findings together with the researchers.

Although the *Gitano* members of the advisory committees did not contribute to the writing of academic articles, their involvement in the two projects changed ‘the ways their participation has been tackled in various domains, especially in politics’ (Munté et al. 2011: 264). Findings from the WORKALÓ project, in particular, had a decisive impact on the development of the *Comprehensive Plan for the Gitano Population in Catalonia*. As the very first organic policy adopted by a parliamentary assembly to tackle Roma inclusion, the Plan has been regarded as an example for other European governments to follow (for a critical assessment of its implementation, see Bereményi & Mirga 2012).

There are, of course, countless examples of collaboration between researchers and Roma community members as well as between researchers and Romani organisations which have not been thoroughly documented or have not necessarily been flagged explicitly as co-production enterprises. To name but one, Matras’ (1996) policy report for the Council of Europe on the east–west migrations of Roma draws on the author’s work within a Romani NGO, the Rom & Cinti Union (RCU), better known by its international label, the Roma National Congress (RNC), as media relations officer and editor of its international news bulletin *Romnews*. The RCU/RNC led influential campaigns in support of Roma migrants and asylum seekers from eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and in 1989, it was the first organisation to bring the issue of east–west migration of Roma to the attention of the Council of Europe. Matras’ report from 1996 later formed the basis of several academic articles (Matras 1998, 2000, 2013, 2015b) that deal with reactions to Roma migrations among policy-makers and the Romani political movement. This experience, along with a short-term co-production partnership that emerged in 2008–2009 between local actors in Manchester, UK and the Romani Project at the University of Manchester, set the background for the MigRom project.
The MigRom project

The presence of Romanian Roma in western European cities was already triggering considerable public debate in the period following 1990, and this increased following Romania’s accession to the European Union in 2007. Hostile press reports were accompanied and partly fuelled by an emerging securitisation discourse that accused Romanian Roma migrants of exploiting favourable attitudes in the West through begging and petty crime, and of exploiting the system of welfare benefits for personal gain, or even on behalf of organised criminal networks. In the UK, Operation Golf was launched in 2007 by the London Metropolitan Police, in partnership with the Romanian police and with EU funding, to tackle what were alleged to be human trafficking networks led by Romanian Roma operating to exploit vulnerable Roma for profit. Media reports displayed images of extravagant houses that were being built by Roma in Romanian towns, financed allegedly by the proceeds from criminal activity. It is noteworthy that this large-scale police operation made 130 arrests over a period of five years but secured only eight convictions.

Such reports sparked radical reactions on the part of authorities at various levels. In France, mass expulsions of Romanian Roma migrants were ordered by the central government in 2010. They were condemned by the European Commission, which, faced with its failure to impose one of its key treaty principles, that of free movement of people, on a founding member state in respect of a vulnerable minority, reacted by introducing a new policy framework, the National Strategies for Roma Inclusion, in 2011. In Manchester, UK, the local authority was confronted with a petition against Romanian Roma migrants in 2009 and set up a dedicated high-level Roma Strategy Group to respond to public concerns (see Chapter 7).

MigRom (‘The immigration of Romanian Roma to Western Europe: Causes, effects and future engagement strategies’) responded to the 2011 call on ‘Dealing with diversity and cohesion: the case of the Roma in the European Union’ (GA319901) under the European Commission’s Seventh Framework research programme with a bid for a four-year research project (2013–2017) involving academic partners based in: the UK (University of Manchester); France (Fondation Maison des Sciences des Hommes); Spain (University of Granada); Italy (University of Verona); and Romania (Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities, Cluj-Napoca), and the non-academic partners Manchester City Council and the European Roma and Travellers Forum, which at the time of the bid was the only Romani NGO that held consultative status at a European political institution (the Council of Europe). Aiming to apply the new paradigm in migration studies to the study of Romanian Roma migrants, the project set out to deliver a much needed and, at the time still missing, ethnography of Romani migrations. It aimed to investigate the internal socioeconomic organisation of Roma migrant communities and the development of transnational social networks, as well as the public and political reactions to the settlement of Roma migrants at a local level. The objective was thus to gain insights not just into the
social organisation of Roma migrants, but also into the impact that distinct local policies and interventions had on them and the factors that shaped those interventions. The project would utilise a cross-disciplinary approach to assess the interplay of historical and sociocultural factors and human agency in shaping migrations and employ a multi-sited, transnational comparative perspective in order to understand how migrations are shaped within specific local contexts.

The consortium assembled a unique project team with expertise in history, anthropology, sociology, and linguistics. It included researchers at various levels of seniority (including three academic researchers of Romani background), most of whom were fluent in the Romani language, all of whom specialised in the study of Romani communities and of policies directed at Roma and who had in addition, a track record of public engagement and knowledge exchange in this field. They were supported by Roma research assistants who were members of the communities that were studied. They facilitated contacts, data collection, and interpretation; they helped design and lead the project’s public outreach activities; and they contributed to some of the project’s academic outputs. With a grant of €2.5 million and a team comprising altogether 35 full- and part-time researchers and research assistants, MigRom was in all likelihood the largest international research project in Romani/Gypsy studies thus far, and the first to adopt a multi-sited cross-disciplinary and co-production agenda on such a scale.

The project’s lifetime coincided with the lifting, in January 2014, of restrictions on the employment of Romanian citizens, which had been imposed in several countries, and, towards its end, with the outcome of the UK referendum on EU membership, both of which were to have a major impact on the project’s target group (the long-term impact of the latter is yet to be observed and assessed, but it has already had a short-term effect on the community of Romanian Roma migrants in the UK and consequently also on their family relations elsewhere). We present here a brief outline of the project design, which will highlight its key aspects: the coordination of a multi-sited investigation, the longitudinal observation and research methodologies, and the embedding and piloting of research co-production and public engagement.

**Multi-sited investigation**

The research sites in the UK, Spain, France, and Italy were selected to represent those countries that had become the principal target for Romanian Roma, and which in turn displayed a variety of public discourses and policies toward Roma migrants. These resulted in a disparity of conditions and circumstances surrounding housing, especially, and as a consequence, access to public services, different employment opportunities, and exposure to a variety of different voluntary and public sector interventions. The research also extended to the migrants’ origin communities in Romania, where both the motivations to migrate and the effects of migration on the sending communities were investigated.

In Spain, research was conducted with members of seven family networks residing in Granada, Malaga, Seville, and Cordoba, and originating from several
different Romanian counties including Alba, Bistrița-Năsăud, Brașov, Bucharest, Călărași, Cluj-Napoca, Constanța, Dolj, Hunedoara, Ialomița, and Timiș. All migrants identified themselves as Roma or as țigani românizați (‘Romanianised Gypsies’) and all except the members of one network spoke Romani as their family language. Building on previous research (Beluschi Fabeni 2013) a network of Korturari from Transylvania, the Jonesči, became the focus of most of the ethnographic work.

The team in the UK focused mainly on families residing in South Manchester, building on earlier research (Matras, Beluschi Fabeni, Leggio, & Vránová 2009). This network comprised Romani speakers mostly from Ialomița county in southeastern Romania (Kangljari, ‘comb-makers’) but also from various localities in central Romania and Transylvania (some of them belonging to the Jonesči network) as well as a group of Romanian speakers from Mărășești in northeastern Romania, self-ascribing and referred to by the Romani speakers as țigani românizați (‘Romanianised Gypsies’). These groups shared similar patterns of residence in rented houses in a multi-ethnic, working class area, and, in the case of the Kangljari and țigani românizați, they belonged to a Romani Pentecostal church run by a Kangljari pastor.

The French team conducted its research among various groups of Romani speakers and țigani românizați who shared makeshift residence facilities in the Samaritain camp in La Courneuve suburb of Paris. Formed around a Pentecostal church in 2008, the Samaritain was the oldest encampment in the Île de France region and an example of the communities targeted by government repatriation policies in 2010. The French team supplemented their on-site ethnographic research with archival research in Romania, tracing the history of individual families as well as the history of policy measures that targeted Roma in the respective districts in Romania from which the migrant families had originated.

The Italian team addressed socioeconomic and policy differences in northern, central, and southern Italy and their effects on Romanian Roma migrants. They conducted their research with families of Romani speakers from the province of Oltenia in western Romania, residing in Milan (northern Italy) and Bari (southern Italy), and with a network of țigani românizați from the Romanian province of Dobruja living in Florence (central Italy).

The Romanian team conducted its research in some of the origin locations identified by the other consortium partners, balancing rural and urban settings in order to assess differences in both the causes and consequences of migration. They selected urban sites in the counties of Ialomița (southeastern Romania), Cluj (Transylvania), and Bihor (western Romania); and rural sites in Brașov (central Romania) and Sălaj (northwestern Romania), and included in their survey both Romani speakers and țigani românizați.

Most of the family networks identified in each country were linked to each other, and this allowed the teams to observe differences across the various locations, with local observations being supplemented by field trips to the other countries arranged with the support of the local colleagues.
Longitudinal study and research methods

The coordination of such a diverse team across five different countries was achieved through a regimented schedule of research cycles. Three consecutive stages of research – a Pilot Survey, an Extended Survey, and a Follow-up Survey – were designed to capture developments and changes of attitudes and activities in the communities. Annual project meetings were used to coordinate methodologies and to share and evaluate data and analyses as they emerged from the fieldwork.

Before launching the pilot stage of the research (September 2013–March 2014), the partners agreed on a detailed but open-ended interview guide that combined their different interests and aimed at eliciting both quantitative data (demographic profiles of households, levels of qualification, employment, access to services, housing, education) and qualitative data (migration history, relations with local institutions and neighbours, motivations, problems, and aspirations). This interview guide was used to complement the ethnographic (and in some cases participant) observations that were carried out by each team. The pilot survey produced an overall picture of Romanian Roma migrations that, for each community, highlighted macro-factors that shaped and sustained migration communities (policies, attitudes of non-Roma, media representations) as well as meso-factors (community structures and demography).

While these data allowed for a synchronic comparison of the different communities, they did not shed enough light on the micro-level (individual, personal) factors or on the history of each community. For the Extended Survey (September 2014–March 2015), it was therefore agreed to complement participant observation through life history interviews with individual migrants (for a review of the method, see Peacock & Holland 1993; Goodson 2001). In addition, the partners in Romania, and in some cases colleagues visiting Romania, conducted archive research in order to complement and verify the historical picture emerging from oral testimonies. The French and Italian partners also made use of digital tools to map online reports on Romanian Roma migrants in connection with election campaigns, while the UK team relied heavily on the analysis of policy documents from the macro-level (local authority reports and minutes of committee meetings, and School Census data) and the meso-level (memos, reports, and funding applications produced by voluntary sector actors; memos, pupil registration data, and classroom observations in local schools, complemented by interviews with relevant actors).

A uniform template was adopted for the Extended Survey reports, which were published online in June 2015, offering a systematic comparison among the locations in regard to the project teams and research methodology, the profile of the community, evidence of the impact of migration on the origin communities (such as returnees, transfer of resources and visits to the origin locations), networks and migration history, changes to family structure since migration (including generation profile and reproduction patterns), local policy targeting Roma migrants, and indicators of social inclusion (employment and access to services, education, and community representation structures).
Alongside the comparison, the reports also present the individual teams’ particular research interests and specialisations, as well as the particular characteristics of individual settings. The Paris report contains a focus on some of the historical developments in Romania, especially the consequences of agrarian policy reforms and state-run industrialisation, based on life history interviews and archive research (see Chapter 2) and a discussion of eviction policies, the activities of local NGOs, and local Roma leadership (see Chapter 6). The Manchester report contains an analysis of local authority interventions that targeted Romanian Roma, as well as a discussion of attitudes to and experiences of Romanian Roma pupils in local schools; and an assessment of the impact of a local partnership between a single local authority department, a voluntary sector organisation, and commissioned expertise (see Matras et al. 2015). It also incorporates a pilot study of birth rates in the local community. The Granada report has an emphasis on changing fertility patterns in addition to a detailed analysis of transnational family networks (see Chapter 4). The Verona survey identifies migration trajectories and presents a detailed comparison of residential policies in different Italian cities, as well as a network assessment of the online diffusion of discussions of the ‘Roma issue’ in the political web arena (compiled in conjunction with the Paris team), while the Cluj report presents the results of a questionnaire-based survey of households relating to the local impact of migration, along with ethnographic observations from one of the sending communities (see Chapter 3). The Extended Survey report thus provides the empirical grounding for much of the content of the present volume.

The Follow-up Survey (May–December 2015) offered an opportunity for each of the teams to fill gaps in the coverage on individual or specialised questions and was thus conducted variably. For example, the Spanish team completed quantitative data collection on birth rates, the French supplemented archive research in Romania, and the UK team carried out a survey with Roma school leavers.

**Research co-production and public engagement**

The project included a local authority, Manchester City Council, and a Roma NGO, the European Roma and Travellers Forum, as full partners. The participation of Manchester City Council allowed the project to draft, test, implement, and assess measures for advice and support, capacity building, and consultation offered to the Roma migrant community, and to have direct input into City Council reports and committee meetings. The Manchester team set up a local project Steering Group, which included City Council representatives and which set the project’s outreach and capacity building strategies and encouraged and supported the creation of consultation structures in the Roma community. The European Roma and Travellers Forum provided feedback on the survey design and then, regularly, on the content of public policy briefings arising from the research, and took on the responsibility for the dissemination of these policy briefings among an international audience of policy-makers and NGOs.
The project’s public engagement was not limited to the dissemination of research results. Academic partners also organised training sessions for local authority officers and public service providers in social services, health care, police, and education including schools, and provided input into media debates via key national outlets such as daily newspapers and television and radio broadcasts on issues such as the lifting of employment restrictions on Romanian citizens, evictions, targeted interventions by authorities, educational segregation measures, public statements by politicians about Roma migrants, and more. While the consortium did not adopt a unified position on any of these issues, it encouraged its members to partake in debates on European, national, and local policy on Roma. Several partners and members of the consortium’s advisory board also served on the preparatory and subsequently on the elected Scientific Committee of the European Academic Network on Romani Studies from 2011–2015, which organised international events, awarded grants to early career researchers, and engaged in efforts to forward knowledge exchange with policy bodies at national and European level. Project staff were regular contributors to local policy events and some engaged regularly with social media to disseminate project findings as well as contributions to policy-related debates. The consortium thus adopted a literal reading of the project’s sub-title ‘Causes, effects, and future engagement strategies’, placing an emphasis as much on developing a policy vision for future engagement together with relevant stakeholders at various levels as on analysing historical and contemporary circumstances. For this the project earned the respect of stakeholders and sponsors, but inevitably also the occasional critique from those whose positions and actions came under scrutiny through the consortium’s combined approach of evidence-based analysis and public dissemination of policy evaluations and recommendations.

All academic partners engaged Romanian Roma as research assistants. In most cases, these were members of the communities in which the research took place. They participated in project meetings and contributed to the research design, received training in fieldwork methodology and data protection protocols, facilitated and supported interviews and the archiving of interview materials in the Romani language, and provided their insights and interpretation into the data evaluation process, acting as co-authors of some of the reports and in some cases also of academic outputs. They took an active part in the consortium’s public engagement activities. In Manchester, the project delivered a three-year community outreach programme providing Roma-led advice and support in partnership with the City Council, and the Roma assistants and outreach workers were entrusted with designing and implementing an outreach programme, as well as initiating a forum that led to the emergence of a local Romani advocacy group. The project thereby facilitated both a new model for research co-production with Roma and a lasting contribution to capacity building and empowerment.
The present volume

The contributions to this volume focus on selected themes arising from the overall four-year research programme. They are arranged in a historical sequence, starting with an assessment of key aspects of the history of Roma in Romania, on to the background of present-day migration to the West and its effect, continuing with the networks that enable and sustain migration, the effect of local policy on Romanian Roma migrants and the emergence of future aspirations, self-reliance, empowerment, and spokesmanship within the community.

In the first of the following chapters (Chapter 2, ‘Romania’s Roma: a socio-historical overview’), Asseó, Petcuţ, and Piasere draw on archive material and the testimonies of elderly Roma, showing how various Roma groups adopted mobility as an economic strategy in reaction to the workforce needs of the Romanian agrarian economy, which required large sectors of the population to be mobile from the late nineteenth century onwards. They discuss how former slaves from the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia engaged in forms of regional mobility, while Roma who had been freemen in the Habsburg territories of Transylvania and Banat engaged in cross-border mobility as borders changed around them. The authors dispel a commonly cited myth about a supposed link between the abolition of slavery and West-bound (including transatlantic) Roma migrations, while showing how the Roma’s integration into the mobile agrarian labour market was made possible by their ability to organise large work brigades around family ties. This strategy, while essentially turning the Roma into a social group that specialised in particular economic activities, also allowed them to maintain their own internal community organisation and a distinct ethnic identity, and to continue to follow similar patterns as they progressively adopted, or were forced into, a sedentary lifestyle. Following the economic transition of 1993 and the collapse of agrarian production modes, the same family ties that underpinned the creation of work brigades were activated by the first Roma groups to leave Romania.

The chapter by Toma, Tesăr, and Fosztó (Chapter 3, ‘Romanian Roma at home: mobility patterns, migration experiences, networks, and remittances’) draws a comparison of the effects of migration in various localities across the country. The authors show how the pioneers of Roma migrations were generally integrated into the socioeconomic fabric of communist Romania but experienced ethnic conflict with the majority population and were affected negatively by the economic restructuring of the 1990s. Those who had established closer work relationships with non-Roma and were able to better cope with the post-socialist restructuring only started migrating in the early 2000s as the economic situation worsened even further. In these cases, family ties appear to be less relevant than ties with the non-Roma in shaping migration trajectories. Roma migrants invest in the construction and improvement of houses, tending to move outside traditional, segregated settlements and towards the town and village centres. Such processes of desegregation and the new skills and know-how brought back by Roma returnees are viewed positively by the surrounding majority population.
How open borders can unlock cultures

and provide an indication that transnational mobility is leading to changes in the social dynamics of ethnically mixed communities.

This tension between continuity and change is also the subject of the chapter by Gamella, Beluschi-Fabeni, Gómez Oelher and Muntean, in their description of the family structures of a large transnational network of Roma migrants, the Jonesčići (Chapter 4, ‘Founder effects and transnational mutations: the familial structure of a Romani diaspora’). The authors show how cooperation and assistance from relatives has allowed the Jonesčići to recreate and maintain their own institutions and community bonds and to adapt to the socioeconomic situations in different migration contexts, but the dependency on family ties has also constrained links with outsiders and limited employment opportunities. These limitations affect women more so than men. As women’s chances of educational and professional attainment are curtailed by family obligations, Jonesčići children might be expected to lack key stimuli to develop their social capital, yet the authors show that migration and diasporisation are helping the community to break barriers of exclusion, both in the destination countries and in the origin locations.

In her comparison of the impact of local policy measures on Roma family networks from Oltenia (Chapter 5, ‘Romanian Roma migration to Italy: improving the capacity to aspire’), Pontrandolfo discusses how Milan’s securitisation approach denies Roma the status of political subjects, while in Bari a multicultural agenda (albeit not free of stereotypical assumptions about Roma culture, and still imposing segregated residence) recognises Roma as interlocutors. These different policies have had an impact on the Roma’s opportunities for employment and access to services as well as their motivation to engage in political debate. In both locations, Roma clearly express a desire to be ‘like everybody else’, but while in Milan they articulate such desire strictly in material terms, in Bari, where stable access to housing and public recognition has allowed them to access services and secure some form of employment, they demand to be treated as equals and, in more markedly political terms, they challenge culturalist representations of their migration as ‘nomadism’.

There are strong parallels between the case described by Pontrandolfo and the book’s final two chapters. In a study of the Samaritain makeshift settlement in La Courneuve in Paris (Chapter 6, ‘Life and death of a French shantytown: an anthropology of power’), Cousin describes how, faced with the constant threat of eviction, Roma delegated the economic and infrastructural management of their settlement to a self-appointed headman. This arrangement allowed residents to constitute themselves as a community, bound by their common affiliation to the Pentecostal faith. The lack of formal recognition by the authorities, however, denied the community the opportunity to negotiate their presence in the location with local institutions. The absence of a channel for dialogue and the authorities’ insistence on the illegality of the settlement, which ultimately led to its demolition and the dispersal of its residents, prevented any form of genuine participation in French society.

Contrasting with this experience, Matras and Leggio (Chapter 7, ‘Community identity and mobilisation: Roma migrant experiences in Manchester’) describe
how Roma migrants had easy access to housing in deprived, ethnically mixed areas, rented primarily from landlords with a South Asian background. Combined with low-skilled but formally regulated self-employment, this enabled access to services like health care, education, and welfare support, placing Roma migrants in a very similar position to that of their neighbours of other backgrounds. Yet, when a discourse about ‘early marriage’ and ‘safeguarding’ issues in the Roma community emerged within the local authority and voluntary sector organisations, a group of young Roma decided to challenge these representations, which they regarded as interfering with their desire to be ‘like everybody else’. The authors argue that this particular approach, based on a demand for the re-privatisation of discourses on Romani identity and equal opportunities rather than a demand for public recognition of cultural rights, offers a new perspective on dilemmas of identity politics and ethnic mobilisation.

Notes

* The research leading to the present publication results from MigRom, ‘The immigration of Romanian Roma to Western Europe: Causes, effects, and future engagement strategies’, a project funded by the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme under the call on ‘Dealing with diversity and cohesion: the case of the Roma in the European Union’ (GA319901).


3 Ibid.


5 See http://migrom.humanities.manchester.ac.uk/firstyearreports/.

6 See http://migrom.humanities.manchester.ac.uk/secondyearreports/.


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2 Romania’s Roma
A socio-historical overview*

Henriette Asséo, Petre Petcuț, and Leonardo Piasere

Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the centuries-long integration of the Roma into Romanian society. A critical examination of historical records dismisses any possible impression that Romani communities can be seen in terms of their supposed ontological strangeness, instead re-establishing them as social actors in their own right. This makes it possible to describe the social transformations which determine the current situation in Romania and which shape emigration from this country.

The approach taken in this chapter is informed by the framework known as ‘new social history’, and by historical anthropology (Aresu & Asséo 2014; Wachtel 2014). The goal of this is not to criticise existing studies of Romanian Roma but rather to bring them into a general, analytical framework of nineteenth- and twentieth-century social history. It is necessary to acknowledge the diversity of case studies and look beyond ethnic identities, and to insert the past and present experiences of Roma into their overarching social and political context. In order to do this, we have chosen to draw on existing historiography and to compare it with unpublished materials, interviews, and archives; the result of investigations undertaken by the MigRom teams. We conducted 55 interviews in the Romani language in France and Italy. We chose the interviewees from three large emigrant bases: Crișana in Transylvania; Dolj in the Old Kingdom; and from the historical region of Dobruja. These three areas allowed us to examine hypotheses regarding the impact of the historical embedding of these regions within contemporary Romania on Roma communities, and to examine issues surrounding the creation of common space, movement for employment, interior colonisation, and ethnic competition.

We interviewed older members of families in order to collect four kinds of information from their life stories: the oldest forms of family ties; how families know one another, marry, and interact with one another; the nature of and the reasons for their movements in the interwar period and under Communism; and their social conditions under Communism.

We have attempted to determine how the nature of economic activities from the interwar period up until the post-socialist transition has led to structural
changes influencing individual lives. The programme’s other original contribution to the field has been to back up oral testimony with archival research, and to compare the information gathered in both cases. We then undertook a regressive historical investigation in the sense that we turned the usual historical problematic upside-down; instead of first working on the archives, then illustrating the results with interviews and life stories, we searched in the archives for evidence of the possible context from which to generalise the information given by the interviewees. We used the collection of the Tulcea prefecture for the regularisation of itinerant movement between the wars; the archives of the județ (county) of Craiova for the Roma of Dolj and their agricultural activities in the royal domains; and the Cluj and Oradea archives for stories of the Roma of Bihor about constraints on the Romanian-Hungarian border.

The archival investigations were primarily decided on the basis of the Romani groups interviewed in France, as well as a small number interviewed in Romania. The reconstruction of the histories of these communities in the interwar period was carried out through research in the archival collections of the Interior Ministry for the județ of Bihor, Cluj, and Tulcea, and collections of the Royal Domains in the archives of the județ of Dolj in Craiova. The National Archives in Bucharest contain information on the general movement of people within the country for the second half of the nineteenth century.

We have also taken into account the documentation supplied by Romanian historians. The first historical studies of the Țigan ‘Gypsies’ were conducted by legal historians during the interwar period (Peretz 1931; Gebora 1932; Scurtu-lencu 1938). However, systematic archival investigations (Panaitescu 1928, 1939; Bulat 1933; Potra 1939) were only carried out sporadically during the period of Communist rule (Cicanci 1967; Grigoraș 1967, 1968). Important historical investigations did not get under way until after the political change of the 1990s. Since the pioneering work of Vi. Achim (1998), historical research based on abundant but previously untapped primary sources has continued to grow. Over the past 25 years, this historiography has involved several kinds of work: synthesis (Vi. Achim 2004a), document collections (Năstasă & Varga 2001), and case studies by a new generation of historians (some of them involved in the project of Romani political organisation: Matei 2011; Sirbu 2014; Petcuț 2015). These investigations, together with ethnographic studies conducted by a new generation of anthropologists in Romania and abroad (Berta 2007; Hașdeu 2007; Stoichița 2008; Fosztó 2009; Olivera 2012b; Tesár 2012; Bonini Baraldi 2013; Beluschi Fabeni 2013; Dion 2014; Benarrosh-Orsoni 2015), combine social anthropology and history to link the present and the past, and make it possible to reconsider the social history, cultural specificity, and diversity of Romanian Roma communities (Olivera 2009; Jacobs 2012). On the other hand, the current and highly dynamic school of Romanian history (Verdery 2003; Roger 2003; Iordachi & Dobrinçu 2009; Kligman & Verdery 2011) neglects the Roma: within this, Codarcea’s (2002) work is a positive and rare exception.
Unfinished emancipation (1843–1920s)

From the Middle Ages to the end of the nineteenth century, changes in the condition of Romanian Roma followed the lines of a fundamental asymmetry between the laws of the Old Kingdom and those of the territories that later made up the nation as it exists today. The Danubian Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia together formed the only Christian country in Europe to have kept up a system of Ţigani servitude, alongside a traditional feudal relationship with the peasantry. The Roma belonging to the territories beyond the Carpathians were not subject to slavery. Consequently, these inhabitants of the Old Habsburg and Russian Empires brought to the annexed territories of post-First World War Romania a different heritage: their status as freemen. Such a double heritage influenced the process of emancipation in both its phases in a country that was, and remained, almost exclusively agricultural. The juridical emancipation of the slaves in the Danubian principalities in the second half of the nineteenth century and the agrarian reforms of the 1920s, were an attempt at homogenising the extended territory of Greater Romania. Emancipation was no more thoroughly accomplished for the Roma than it was for the rest of the peasantry. The structural agrarian crisis determined social relations and ethnic competition.

Juridical emancipation of the Ţigani in the Old Kingdom

Wallachia and Moldavia were governed throughout the Middle Ages, and modernity, by Christian princes under Ottoman tutelage. These princes, voivodes later hospodars, were given authority by the sultan of Constantinople to not only grant the local landowning gentry and the Orthodox monasteries lordship over the peasantry, but also to exploit the part of the population reduced to slavery. The enslavement of the Ţigani in the principalities lasted five centuries before it was abolished with the final emancipation acts in 1856. It was rooted in a vast network of ‘white’ Christian slave traffic, which had persisted since the Middle Ages. This network had as its central marketplace the Republic of Ragusa (Dubrovnik), a Venetian vassal city-state, with Venice itself paying tribute to Constantinople (Verlinden 1955, 1977; Cottias, Stella, & Vincent 2006). Upper Danubian slavery was a cornerstone of social organisation that as such did not conflict with Ottoman social stratification (Erdem 1996; Toledano 2014). The slave trade also created revenue for Ottoman merchants when they resold Ţigani escapees on the markets of the cities forming the military front lines along the Danubian border (Gubogiu 1960: 31, 40). This border trade remained nonetheless rather marginal compared with the internal market fed by the demographic management of the slaves and continuous introductions of people into Romanian territory.

No other European country in this period maintained slavery alongside serfdom, something that required a large recruitment base. Aside from the slave trade, one can find centuries-worth of voluntary or forced entry, from the south to the north of the Danube, of small groups of previously protected
mixed Christian and pagan populations. Wallerand de Wavrin, the commander of the Burgundian fleet at the Battle of Varna in 1444, noted that at the request of the Wallachian lord, Vlad Dracul, he helped 12,000 Bulgarian men, women, and children cross the Danube and so escape from Ottoman slavery, remarking, ‘and those who saw them said they were men who looked like Gypsies’ (Holban 1968: 112–113).

The continuity of this system over the centuries transformed domestic slavery into a state institution. In the countries of Old Romania, the princes inherited from Roman Imperial law the right of *dominium eminens*, ‘eminent domain’, of both land and people. A prince could grant two kinds of concession to the landowning gentry and the monasteries: the concession of land including the people on it (serfdom) and the concession of families independent of land (*Ţigani* slavery). Every Gypsy who entered the country became a subject of the Crown. The prince’s steward, the *globnic*, would travel the country identifying Gypsies without masters and entering them into the lists of *catagrafie de ţigan*, which provided a basis for a poll tax (Petcuţ 2009). The reactivation, in the mid-seventeenth century, of legislative codes inspired by the Byzantine system reinforced this practice. The transfers of property by a prince to a boyar or a monastery automatically transformed a Gypsy into a slave. At this point, a Gypsy lost all individual juridical personhood (Codarcea 2002; Constantin 2012). The attainment of individual freedom through an act of emancipation was exceptionally rare. As for the monasteries, they did not have the right to sell or free their slaves.

A notable exception within this general framework was the separate nomadic groups patronised by the prince. The letters of safe passage, passports, and safe-conducts they carried with them allowed them to move about freely and independently. As late as 1802, a charter (*hrisov*) established by a prince with the *vătaf*, or court judge for Gypsy cases, stated that the very numerous (‘from time immemorial’) *Lingurari* and *Ursari* were fiscally useful to the Crown and that their privileges were to be respected. Following the loss of their titles in the preceding years, most of them had fled to the neighbouring Russian or Austrian Empires out of fear of falling into slavery (Peretz 1931: 76). For the nomadic groups alone, collective interior mobility was normal and accepted by all those in power.

The early modern period saw this slaveholding society undergo a structural crisis. War, famine, and death caused a severe drop in the population. From 1595/1596, when Michael the Brave decreed the non-transferability of peasants between landed estates, the Roma became the only moveable labour force available for enhancing a landowner’s property. The slaves’ monetary value rose accordingly, as demand on the part of the boyars increased over the centuries. The average price for a slave rose from 366 grams of silver in 1593 to 1,299 grams in 1653 (Petcuţ 2015: 105). In addition, the recruitment base progressively dried up, as the Austrian, Ottoman, and Tsarist authorities gave protection to every arrival from the Romanian Territories who asserted his rights, not excluding Roma. In the eighteenth century, a group of Austrian *Aufklärer*
scandalised by the brutality of the boyars, created an emancipation movement, not without expansionist overtones (Steiner 2014).

The political decisions relating to emancipation appeared then as part of the vast European abolitionist current of the nineteenth century. As well as the Anglophone campaign which focused on denouncing slave trafficking, France was a leading influence in Europe, particularly after Lamartine and the French revolutionaries’ address to the Nations in 1848. The Romanian constitutional movement, joined by a chorus of foreign voices, campaigned to bring Wallachia and Moldavia together into a nation state. Unification was to be a necessary step towards the modernisation of the state that would render slavery obsolete. As the princes had created the system of slave concessions, it fell to them to set the terms of compensation. The opposition of the boyars came to a definitive end in December 1855 in Moldavia and then in February 1856 in Wallachia. At the time of unification in 1859, the United Principalities included a population of four million. In Wallachia, emancipated Gypsies made up 7 per cent of the population, or 33,267 families (166,335 people) (Vi. Achim 2004a: 94–95). In Moldavia, according to Venera Achim (2005: 118), the same percentage would have amounted to about 100,000 people.

The Roma found themselves subjected to a collective status that would frame the way their social life and their ethnic reproduction was to play out up until the present day. Historical methods provide a means for overcoming an anachronistic view of past societies and even offer the opportunity to reconsider the nomenclature of Ţigani, stripping retrospective interpretation from our readings of the documentary evidence. Such an approach does not make judgements about the social identity of a group reconstructed from archival records before demonstrating the nature of their rootedness in the here and now. But the abundant records left by archivists, the Church, and the upper and lower tiers of the nobility continue to be underused, subject at best to sporadic and partial enquiry. There is a need to further pursue their analysis in order to refine our interpretation of administrative nomenclature. In a hierarchically organised society, such brutal submission could have caused the total disappearance of the Gypsies’ Romani ethnicity. However, this was not the case at all: Chancellery archives, published up to 1656 in the collection Documenta Romanae Historica, have made it possible to draw up a table showing the distribution of state-owned Gypsy slaves offered in concession to agricultural production, households, and the courts of the nobility. One can see there, the range of employment undertaken by the Gypsies, covering the entire gamut of the estate economies and including itinerant employment. The huge variation in their forms of employment explains an apparent heterogeneity among the groups. Moreover, between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the state assimilated Gypsy groups into the corporatist system it favoured at the time. As a result, no attempt was made to eliminate the specificities of certain Gypsy groups, whether the Aurari, present in the territory from the beginning, the Lingurari, the Čokanaši salt miners working for the state salt monopoly, or the urban companies of Lautari musicians created in the eighteenth century, with each group being registered separately.
Can the ethnic-professional nomenclature of the archives be read as corresponding to ethnic identities? Tigani coexisted with the peasantry for four centuries without the State or the nobility showing much concern for their interrelations. The strengthening of feudalism brought peasants dispossessed of their leaseholds closer in status to the Tigani. Non-Gypsies could become slaves, for instance through marriage, their children taking on the status of Tigani from their parents. But from the eighteenth century, as the first measures were taken towards abolishing serfdom, the princes imposed a drastic physical separation between the Tigani and the peasants. Mixed marriages were banned, the perpetrators subjected to fines and immediate forced separation. In Moldavia in 1741, the marriage tax prohibiting mixed marriage under pain of servitude went hand in hand with the decision to emancipate the serfs in 1749.

With emancipation, the Tigani acquired a citizenship that in principle made them indistinguishable from other Romanians. Administrative language replaced ethnic classifications with the generic term of ‘emancipated Romanians’. Tigani, from both private and church domains were labelled ‘emancipated peasants’, and in the interwar period, the administration used the term ‘emancipated agricultural workers’, often together with the word Tigani, which removes any possible ambiguity. The majority would come to form the undifferentiated group of rural Roma still visible today. On the other hand, the administration kept up the use of traditional terms for the close-knit and much less numerous groups of nomadic Roma, who kept their specific names even if the crafts these names referred to had long since ceased to be their means of employment. In this way, a new structural phenomenon appeared, with a form of administrative invisibility conferred on the Roma of rural communities and urban environments, and the maintenance of a high level of administrative visibility for close-knit, nomadic groups, even when they had themselves settled in rural communities.

The new emancipatory phase would indeed only shift economic and identity problems, rather than resolve them. Beginning in the 1880s, Romania, along with other central European and Balkan countries, underwent an agrarian crisis that led to an explosion in the numbers of rural proletariat. Romania’s slow entry into the agricultural revolution deepened tensions and differentiations in the heart of village communities, and in Romani groups. Some 80% of the population would remain agricultural until the end of the 1950s. The reforms of the 1920s, in principle more egalitarian, allowed only the smallest number of peasants to become landowners. Until the abdication of the king in 1948, the development of the wage system supposed to replace the corvée on the great estates changed nothing in the way the Roma were recruited. Most Roma belonged to rural communities and shared similar new working conditions, but despite having become a close-knit part of rural communities, they were not considered members of village society in their own right. These Roma compensated for the lack of integration into agrarian communities through a contractual employment mechanism, which was maintained all the way through to the post-Communist transition, and the belated mechanisation of agriculture. This employment mechanism was the workers’ brigade, united by the ethnic characteristics of its members and requiring collective responsibility.
The archives of Segarcea and Sadova, two large agricultural estates belonging to the Crown in the major agricultural zone of Romania’s south (archives accessible in the archive of the județ of Dolj), contain documents that show the social conditions of rural Roma at the time and make it possible to understand how collective employment contracts maintained the existence of familial and ethnic groups (Cousin & Petcuț 2016). After analysing the Domeniile Coroanei Segarcea archive, we found ten files covering the period from 1915 to 1945, which were principally concerned with collective work contracts (lists of Romani workers) and the living conditions of the Roma of the estate villages and the city of Segarcea. Analysis of the Domeniile Coroanei Sadova archive produced seven files from the period 1919–1946 containing similar information. An interview we conducted in October 2005 in Ivesți, in the județ of Galați, with Iorgu Stanescu, former bulibașa, (‘headman’, ‘mediator’, or ‘facilitator’), of the Kelderari, born in 1912, demonstrated the involvement of nomads in the economy of the Royal Estate of Domnița. The archive belonging to the estate administration has not yet been consulted.

The steward for the Crown Land of Segarcea systematically employed 300–400 local Romani families. To them, he added Romanian peasants and villagers ‘of Hungarian ethnicity’ from the country’s central region. The Roma, members of the city of Segarcea and a few of its surrounding villages, were entered into the archival documents as ‘emancipated agricultural workers’. They were also simply referred to as Țigani, without either receiving or requesting any other particular form of professional or ethnic qualification. With the help of the archives, it is possible to reconstruct the series of employment contract registers from 1915 to 1948. The contracts were drawn up between the steward and the Romani chiefs, and listed the cash payments made to each worker, together with the worker’s name. The estate administrators changed the terminology of these employment contracts in the 1940s, so that ‘emancipated agricultural workers’ became ‘Gypsy workers’.

In the Crown Domain of Sadova, adjoining Segarcea on its southeast side, village-dwelling groups of one-time Ursari nomads, most of them living in Sadova itself, made up the largest contingent of agricultural and vinicultural workers. The names listed in the agricultural contracts make it possible to reconstruct groups and families for the entire interwar period. The third group, the Kelderari Roma from Liești in the județ of Galați, were also employed by the King for seasonal agricultural work. In his interview, 393-year-old Iorgu Stănescu, the group’s former bulibașa, described their activities during the interwar period. Every summer the king would assemble Kelderari on his property at Domnița (in Buzău, formerly județ Râmnicu Sărat), and give them work and food for the harvest and hay-making time. During the rest of the year they continued to engage in the itinerant production and sale of leather objects.

Whether sedentary (Segarcea Țigani), former nomads (Sadova Ursari) or still nomadic (Kelderari in Buzău), the Roma were a part of the labour force employed in agricultural production. The first group were former village slaves, the second had been tied to the peripheries of certain villages since the end of
slavery, while the third circulated between village communities without being integrated into any of them. Evidently, agricultural work and mobility were not incompatible, and the Gypsies’ situation was generally improving. Nonetheless, a peasant who had received land in 1921 earned twice as much as a peasant working under an agricultural contract (Scurtu & Buzatu 1999: 59).

The phases of agrarian emancipation, producing a fundamental social mutation across the whole of southeastern Europe, led to a reconfiguration of internal and external mobility. Within the Principalities, according to the reports by the County Prefectures, emancipated Roma were forced to leave their former masters from 1860 onwards. They looked for opportunities in the villages where their knowledge of agriculture, smithing, and other trades was valued. They also entered urban life as craftsmen, builders, and household servants (Petcuț 2015). In Moldavia, Romani villages were established after emancipation. Romania remained a territory of immigration and the authorities were particularly keen to prevent the entry of Hungarians, Jews, and Gypsies.4

The question of the international emigration of the Roma in the nineteenth century remains an open field of research. Numerous authors have linked the emancipation of the slaves in the principalities to what they call the ‘second wave of Gypsy migration’ (in reference to a first wave that took place in the Middle Ages; cf. the authors cited by Fraser 1992: 132). Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, this movement has resulted in the spread of large groups of Roma speaking so-called Vlax dialects (see Matras 2013) over five continents.

The totality of currently available archival information fails to confirm the thesis of a massive and rapid emigration. On the other hand, the archives do conserve the trace of diffuse movement over a long period of time. Entire companies of nomadic Roma, who for centuries had enjoyed a high level of freedom, periodically moved between Wallachia and Moldavia in Transylvania. These long-established patterns of movement (Stahl 1976: 327–328) explain the presence of Vlax Roma or Romanian-speaking Rudari/Beaș in all the border territories, including Serbia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Ukraine, and Russia. It is just as certain that the cross-border movement between the Old Kingdom, Banat, Bucovina, and Transylvania – the latter all annexed by Romania after the First World War – developed during the second half of the nineteenth century as an effect of the dissolution of feudal ties in both the Austrian Empire and Romania. Additionally the Austrian imperial administration developed a system of passports for controlling and identifying those who travelled within and across the borders of the empire (Becker 2010).

Increased border surveillance produced an unprecedented level of visibility of the movements of Roma. Indications of an apparent mass migration can be extrapolated from the demographic data collected at the time by the Hungarians (Hoóz 1992: 21). But in an analysis of Romani migration to Hungary based on the same documents, Kemény writes:

most of the Roma population living in 1893 on territory that today still belongs to Hungary were descendants of earlier immigrants: their forebears
had arrived in the country neither after 1850 nor during the 50 preceding years but during even earlier periods.  

(Kemény 2005: 22–23)

The minority groups of Vlax Roma, on the other hand, ‘had immigrated from the Slav region to the south’, that is, from Serbia and Banat (ibid.).

Transylvanian Roma and those from Banat had never known slavery and had always moved freely within the Habsburg Empire. It was only at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century that they began to migrate throughout Europe and beyond, generating curiosity in their wake (About 2014). This Romani emigration merged with the successive waves of Europeans who were making their way to the New World (Sutre 2014).

Different sociocultural legacies in Greater Romania

Census records and other archival material from the Austro-Hungarian Empire show a totally different situation to that of the Old Kingdom. For instance, the Transylvanian Roma incorporated into the New Kingdom had been free-men, the descendants of groups whose status was the result of privileges and exemptions. Beginning in the sixteenth century, in Transylvania, Hungary, and Banat, Gypsies were invariably listed among the nations inhabiting the country, a collective status based on the principle of an assembly of free-men enjoying privileges recognised by the Princes (see Toppeltinus 1667; Kelp 1684; Otrokocsi 1693; Benkő 1778). The Roma saw the degradation of their collective statutory affiliation during the eighteenth century. In a 1932 law thesis, Adalbert Gebora (1932: 31–45) described the contradictory situation in Transylvania. On one side were the large companies of nomadic Romani artisans and semi-itinerant Rudari, who travelled the riverbanks in search of gold, and who were economically independent and to a great extent legally autonomous (Zoltán 1996). On the other were the Roma forced to offer themselves as slaves to the local nobility in the border zone with the Danubian provinces (Boia 1938).

Bessarabia, administered by the Russian Empire since 1812, and the area of South Dobruja taken from Bulgaria in 1913, constituted another site of violent contrasts. Bessarabia was subject to a colonial political programme. Tsarist records of investigations enable us to see a fuller picture of the insertion of homogeneous Roma into villages, making the situation suitable for the maintenance of identity. A 1907 survey conducted with the help of teachers and priests provides the ethnic make-up of each rural locality. Its instigator, Butovitch (1916), mentions for instance that the Gypsies of the Hotin district speak the Romani language but in the Orhei district, he claims they have lost their mother tongue. In the district of Kichinev only, he indicates 469 people in Kunila-Ursari, 615 in Gozum, and 389 in Kyrlan. The total of 11,567 from the 1907 census for the entire Moldavia thus seems far too small (Murgoci 1920: 44). It already illustrates the aphorism later recorded by the Russian ethnographer Andronikova: ‘Gypsies! Beware of the census. Whether true or false, all the sins will be attributed to you’ (Sîrbu 2012: 123).
After the First World War ended, the movements of the Roma became a focus of a Romanian nationalism, incensed by the minority question. In the conflict-ridden reorganisation of Europe, Romania saw its territory and its population double in size. Romania became Greater Romania. The areas of Transylvania, Crișana, Maramureș, Banat, and Bucovina, taken from the Austro-Hungarian Empire, had a long history of both separatist and unification movements, and even though they were centralised at an administrative level in 1925, the old Danubian principalities and the annexed provinces were opposed to them in every respect.

Social ostracism and ethnic denial regarding the native-born, ‘former slaves’ became bound up in a new obsession with ‘foreign’ menaces. As a site of polarisation over the question of cross-border mobility, this obsession confirmed the incorporation of the Gypsies into a logic of political suspicion at the point of the border which could be observed as early as the end of the nineteenth century. On the new Hungarian border, the circulars of the Ministry of the Interior for the border prefectures stipulated non-passage for all Jews and Gypsies, without exception (Nemes 2013: 223). The rupture was a brutal one: even Béla Bartók had to put a stop to his project for collecting folk songs in Bihor, including those of the itinerant Romani Zigeunermusikanten (Bartók 1931: 13).

When comparing surveys compiled a century apart, the change of scale has to be taken into account. Officially, the Roma of the Old Kingdom were no longer distinguished from other Romanian citizens. With the incorporation of new territories, the government was obliged to admit the presence of new minorities. Accordingly, the 1930 census took nationality into account and offered, alongside other nationalities, a category specific to the Roma (Țigani). A total of 262,501 Gypsies were declared, among whom 161,015 declared that they spoke Romanes as their first language (Manuilă 1938: XXXII–LVI). This number matches that of the emancipated slaves of 1856, and if one takes into account both demography and the addition of new territories, it is evidently greatly underestimated. At the time, the General Union of Roma proclaimed a million members. It is again surprising to see such a large gap between these figures. This indicates the general level of governmental denial, despite a few voices at the time having made a more reasonable estimate of 500,000. However debatable, the results of the 1930 census emerged from a new political perspective, in which the ethnicity of the Roma had once again been given a place. Emerging Gypsy associations showed for the first time the desire to promote the use of the generic term ‘Roma’. This was not only to counteract the highly negatively charged connotations of the word ‘Țigani’, but also to affirm, through a form of supranationality, the desire of the Roma from the territories acquired by Romania following the Paris Treaties to join the movement for political organisation.

**Nationalism, assimilation, or elimination (1930s–1944)**

The hopes of democratisation raised by the constitution of Greater Romania came to a tragic end with the deportation of Roma to Transnistria during the Second World War.
Nationalism and political emancipation

Beginning with the new democratic constitution in 1923, urban Romani society experienced an unprecedented liberalist momentum. It was the Roma themselves, who wished to acquire political rights, who led the second phase of emancipation. Historians have largely ignored the growth of associations and the union movement, its large memberships and its successes. However, the movement experienced real mass recruitment. The government supported the Roma movement, hoping to control at the source the growing GURR (General Union of Roma in Romania), and accordingly allowed the Union to include the Roma of the newly incorporated territories. In Cluj, on the 21st of June 1934, the Central Committee sent Zima Andrei, an architect from Blaj, to organise committees throughout the județ. He declared that the aim of the Union was ‘cultural, social, and spiritual’ (Năstasă & Varga 2001: 135) rather than part of an attempt to get Romani deputies elected.

The first national scale organisation was created in 1933 on the initiative of the Uniat priest, Popp Serboianu. By the end of the 1930s, the GURR counted 784,493 members with 40 sections grouped into 454 bureaus (Vi. Achim 1998: 129). It was active until 1947 but subject to restrictions from 1938 onwards. The leader was the Romani journalist and graduate in economics Gheorghe Lăzurică, trader and advisor to the Labour Ministry, soon to be removed by Gheorghe Niculescu. The Association of Roma from the Old Kingdom attempted to incorporate the Roma from Transylvania, Banat, and Bessarabia. The musicians’ union was the spearhead for enlarging recruitment in the new provinces. The Lautari already had a solid, century-old background in professional association (Năstasă & Varga 2001: 93). In its internal records, the Union made note of more than one million Roma living in Romania (Năstasă & Varga 2001: 165). It showed an intense level of militant activity. On the 15th of November 1934, it began publishing its own journal, Glasul Romilor. The journal’s widespread distribution testifies to the success of the movement. The edition of 8th June 1937 announced 43 subsidiaries with 257 sections and 454,000 members. In 1941, just before its disappearance in April of that year, the journal reported a membership of 800,000. The journal’s headings reflected the royalist spirit of the Romani intellectuals of the time: ethnographic articles, details of social works, but also historical articles popularising the work of the historian George Potra (1939), a sympathiser with the GURR. By reconstructing the characteristics of Romani slavery in Wallachia and Moldavia, he reminded nationalists of all stripes that the ‘glorious Romanian nation’ was not as one-dimensional as it claimed to be at the time. The hope for political integration was quickly routed. The Romani elite’s loyalty to the monarchy explains why such a high level of organisation was ultimately unable to counteract the rising danger at the end of the 1930s. Social dissent was aggravated by ethnic and social competition internal to rural communities. As the minority question hardened, the active revisionism of those who preferred to see themselves as Hungarians met with resistance from a Romanian nationalism that thus became a vector for the resentment of Hungarians but also of Jews and Gypsies.
Historiography can bring different points of view to bear on the rise of anti-Gypsy feeling in pre-war politics. For Matei (2011), the Roma in the interwar period are contested neither quantitatively nor qualitatively; they were an 85% rural population that did not compete directly with other Romanians. Their apparent number constantly decreased as they became increasingly assimilated. The country’s intellectual elite, who shared in the assimilationist disrespect that considered the Roma to be in need of civilisation, did not push for specifically Roma-orientated policy. There was a small eugenicist current that the wider intelligentsia considered unimportant. According to Matei, the two principal far-right parties, the Legionnaire Movement and the National Christian Party (NCP), supported the creation of the GURR (the journal Țara Noastră put out a special Sunday edition during the summer of 1937 under the direction of Serboianu and Lăzurică dedicated to the Romanian Roma). Instead they concentrated on denouncing Jews and Hungarians, and in Transylvania they tried to rally the Roma vote out of opportunism and clientelism. One of the major journals published a special edition on the Gypsies, and the journal of the Peasants’ Party published a weekly edition on them.

What is lacking in this account is an analysis of deeper, long-term causality, which can be found if one traces manifestations of ethnic competition all the way back to emancipation, when what had until then been non-monetary economic relations became paid, and Romani labourers were given legal rights. Assimilation then became the only way to climb the social ladder. However, it was also the expression of a society that did not allow emancipation outside of the framework of the Romanian nation state.

The ideologues of the Great Romanian Nation sandwiched the Roma of the annexed territories between new forms of biologist scientism, and descriptive ethnography. In the anti-Semitic and aggressively nationalist atmosphere of the interwar period, ancestral, patriotic attachment was not enough to convince the ideologues. Between 1925 and 1936, the School of Rural Sociology founded by Dimitrie Gusti (1880–1955) undertook powerful ‘monographic surveys’ in villages in Oltenia, Muntenia, Moldavia, Bucovina, Transylvania, and Bessarabia. Gusti’s ultimate ambition was to conduct colossal surveys that would make it possible after about ten years to study each of the 15,000 villages present on the territory, with a view to the construction of a ‘science of the Romanian Nation’ (Gusti 1937). Studies of the Romanian Țigani were also conducted within the framework of these massive research programmes whenever they were present in the villages where the study was being made. This was the case with the Țigani of Cornova, a village in Bessarabia studied by a team in 1931 and then written about in a study by Păun (1932), as it was with the Țigani of Șanț, a village in Transylvania visited between 1935 and 1936 by a team including Aurel Boia (1938). But it was above all Ion Chelcea who would become the ‘Gypsyology’ expert of Gusti’s school. Influenced by the Nazi ideology of Traian Herseni (incidentally one of Gusti’s favourite students), Chelcea (1944: 100–101) also supported the sorting principle, as well as that of sterilising and deporting Gypsies to Transnistria.
The Bugo: deportation to Transnistria and the border question

During the Second World War, the loyalty of the Romani movement to the nation did not save it from the Antonescu regime’s attempt at liquidation. In the Second World War, Romania was a complex actor, with a tendency to rally opportunistically to various causes. Once it had, after a series of about-faces, declared war on the Soviet Union, Romania occupied the area of Transnistria in Bessarabia. This was known to the Roma as the Bugo, after the Bug river, which passes near to the area they were eventually deported to. The Russian victories in 1943–1944 placed Romania in a difficult situation. The Soviets let it be known that they intended only to recover Bessarabia and North Bucovina.

General Antonescu took power with the aim of regenerating a Romanian Nation under threat from abroad but also, according to him, from ‘foreign’, ‘undesirable’ elements within. The hazy nature of the decisions taken throughout the war to cleanse Romanian society, and for ‘national regeneration’ were essentially due to the reliance on state administration, seen as the most capable existing body for efficaciously and rapidly conducting identifications and arrests without mistaking its targets. Antonescu was convinced he had the right selective criteria as far as the Gypsies were concerned. It included two deportable categories: ‘nomads’ and ‘problematic sedentary Gypsies’. He clearly stated:

if we don’t take advantage of the international and European situation to purify the Romanian people, we will lose the last chance history is going to give us. And me, I don’t want to lose it, because if we lose it, future generations will blame us, even if I recover Bessarabia and Transylvania. If I don’t purify the Romanian people, I will have done nothing, because the power of a people is not in its borders but in the homogeneity and the purity of its race.

(Ciucă & Ignat 2001: 8)

Throughout the twentieth century, the technique of deporting an entire people to a border was among an arsenal of genocidal ‘depopulation techniques’. It was widely practiced by the Ottoman Empire, and then by the Republic of Turkey, as well as by the Soviet Union. Beginning with the Barbarossa offensive in June 1944, the Nazis conceived of their ‘general plan for the East’ as a radical undertaking for the reshaping of the Eastern territories through the total destruction of Jewish and Romani families, but also through the displacement of 25 million people and the transferral of 11 million to concentration and forced labour camps. For their Romanian allies, the genocidal processes of the deportation of the Roma would combine two types of ideological logic: the supposed opposition between ‘nomads’ and ‘sedentary Gypsies’, which was, as we have seen, a perennial construction, and the supposed ‘alien’ character of the Roma from the annexed territories like Transylvania, already a part of the Kingdom for more than 20 years, who were to be deported, along with the Jews, to Transnistria.
Recent historiography on the subject has made it possible to gain a more precise idea of the truly Romanian ideological tenets in the general will to destroy the Jews and the Roma (Ioanid 2000; Wiesel 2004; Achim & Iordachi 2004; Solonari 2010; Tyaglyy 2013).

Initially, Antonescu envisioned the transfer of the Roma to Bălăgan. The recapture of Bessarabia and the acquisition of the territories to the East of the Dniester, allowed him to treat these territories as an ‘ethnic dump’ (Turcanu 2007: 141). By choosing to deport Jews and Gypsies beyond the limits of historically Romanian territories, Antonescu’s politics changed in nature, becoming a fully-fledged racial politics aimed at their disappearance. No one entertained the hypothesis of a return of the deported families. The general census of the 6th April 1941 gave particular attention to the Gypsies. Information concerning their work in agriculture and industry had to be supplied quickly in order to make it possible to estimate the impact of their labour on the national economy. Nonetheless, when the moment for deportation came it had still not been processed. The 1930 census was used for a general picture of the distribution of the Gypsy population in the country. A new report by the Central Institute for Statistics estimating the number of Gypsies on Romanian territory in 1941 claimed that the 262,501 of 1930 had been reduced by territorial losses to 203,700. A total of 84.5% lived in the countryside and 15.5% in the city, with most of these in Muntenia. In Transylvania, ethnic divisions were less visible than in the Old Kingdom, as the Gypsies there were closer to the peasantry. This allowed for a mixing of the two categories and a good number of them would have passed unrecorded.

Based on information gathered in a census conducted on the 25th May 1942, the deportation of the nomads began on the 1st June 1942. In total, 11,441 nomads were deported. The evacuation of 13,176 sedentary Roma was undertaken with nine trains between 12th and 20th September. Their goods were confiscated, inventoried, and turned over to the National Office of Romanianisation. Another 18,000 sedentary Roma included in the Ministry of the Interior’s plans lived for the most part in a sort of hut called bordei. The Minister of the Interior, Vasiliu wanted to deport them in order to clean up the countryside. In order to understand this choice and evaluate its consequences, one needs to investigate the situation at its different local levels. Police units were given the task of drawing up lists of individuals corresponding to the criteria of one of two categories: nomads or ‘problematic sedentary populations’. It was in the officers’ power to differentiate between unemployment and traditional occupations. They could choose to send wives or husbands. The delay between the census and the arrests meant that the police took people even when they were not on the lists, in the absence of those who were, in order to satisfy their superiors. Children and the elderly, insofar as they were set down as ‘without occupation’, were deportable by definition, which explains why half the deportees were children. Bordei Gypsies were lured onto the train with the vague promise of agricultural lands. In the end, the authorities deported 25,000 Roma, fewer than they had planned, because of Romanian organisational limits, with the war effort restricting the
availability of trains. The waves of deportees that were supposed to follow were never sent, as the Axis armies began to retreat. There were cases of resistance to the deportations and an instance on the Crown Land of Segarcea demonstrates the level of social embedding in rural areas (Cousin & Petcuț 2016). But another example gives an idea of the tension that existed in factories between the desire to maintain a useful labour force and the ethnic cleansing programme. In Bucharest, the autonomous commander of the railroads asked for exemption from deportation to Transnistria and the status of mobilised workers for its 150 workers ‘of Romani ethnic origins’ (Năstasă & Varga 2001: 445), both the skilled labourers and the ‘almost irreplaceable’ supervisors. Such cases demonstrate that the decision to deport defied any logic of either economics or national security.

A very large number of testimonials to the sufferings of the deportees exist and it is not possible to re-examine them all here. As such, we only show the devastating effect deportation had on the survivors (Matei 2001; Abakunova 2012; Moutier 2016). The letters addressed by the Roma to the authorities show their patriotism, their loyalty, and their incomprehension. On 16th September 1943, following a first, terrible winter, the mayor of the Gypsies of Tândărei (district of Ialomița) wrote to the governor of Transnistria to say that 489 Gypsies, originally from Tândărei, had worked for two months in the commune of Tarnovato, județ Berezovca, and since July had been working on the state-owned farm Suha Balca. What they lacked above all were clothes and housing for the winter. That their death should have been part of the plan remained inconceivable to them. All the men had completed their military service, and their sons were currently on the front fighting: ‘we are Romanians who have shed blood for the country’ (Vi. Achim 2004b: 314). The absence of housing for the winter is noted throughout the records. The prefecture of Golta, which contained a large Jewish ghetto designated for extermination, solicited the Transnistrian government’s Direction of Works for materials needed to build bordei for the 10,000 Gypsies in the județ (Vi. Achim 2004b: 316). Many deportees, including Iorgu Stănescu (see above), have spoken of the building of hundreds of bordei for thousands of people, and Stănescu has said that by the end of the first winter, 3,500 had died from hunger and exposure, and that the victims were thrown dead or alive into mass graves. Those Roma still able to work had to cut wood for the governor in an ancient forest and the 100-year-old trees crushed the convicts as they fell. Stănescu recalled that the forest had been planted on the orders of Tsar Nicolas I. Aside from their capacity to communicate something of the amplitude of the catastrophe, the letters show us people who thought of themselves as citizens like everyone else, recalling their loyalty to the royal family since time immemorial. In the chaos caused by the retreat of the Axis armies and the encroaching Red Army, some of the survivors of deportation managed to flee. For the others, on the 15th March 1944, a coded telegram gave the order to evacuate ‘Romanian citizens without distinction of origin’ (9,916 Jews and 12,083 Gypsies) from Transnistria.

The Gypsies who had escaped from Transnistria were stopped and prevented from moving about. They were given provisional housing, subjected to sanitary
controls, had their names recorded, and were separated into groups for working on farming estates. Those who disobeyed were punished. A circular from the 19th April 1944 declared that Gypsies were not permitted to travel outside of the județ in which they had been found (Năstasă & Varga 2001: 580). Iorgu Stănescu was liberated on the Romanian border, on the right bank of the Bug, and went on from there with his wife and two children, but the children were unable to keep up. He separated from them and never saw them again. He crossed Bessarabia in July with other Roma and once they had reached the bank of the Prut, the Romanians prevented them from entering Romania. They put them under house arrest, where they had to work the harvest on a farm in exchange for food. As the Russians approached, a captain let them into Romania, as far as Râmniciul Sărat. Stănescu was able to recover the gold he had buried in Păulești. At Galați, only 19 out of 60 residents were able to work, as the rest were children and old people. They set up camp outside of the villages. The landowners expelled them and they risked dying of hunger. Some of them still had wagons with horses that the government considered to be state property. Further west, in Craiova, refusal to work was penalised with a ban on begging and the removal of the possibility of earning a living by means other than that of authorised employment. A lack of housing and seasonal work meant that the cheapest labour force living in the bordei remained in this precarious situation up until 1945–1946. They had lost their roots, and were condemned to the outskirts of the villages where they were seen as a labour force easily placed under the corvée. The new government busied itself with plans for the improvement of their situation while denying them any form of ethnic recognition and taking no account of the persecution they had undergone.

**The reshaping of society by Communism (1948–1989)**

Suddenly able to operate openly, and benefiting from the presence of the Red Army on Romanian soil, the Romanian Communist Party still numbered less than 1,000 when it came to power. The extremely small party was obliged to ally itself with other forces. A short political transition ended in 1948 and left the Romanian Communist Party in complete control. Beginning in 1965, the dictatorship of First Secretary, later President, Nicolae Ceaușescu lasted until his fall in December 1989. The Communist Party initially held an ambiguous ideological position on minorities. On the one hand, having become sole master, it no longer needed expedient allies. Its attitude towards the associative Roma movement bears witness to this. The General Union of Roma of Romania had been heavily weakened by the deportations to Transnistria and the persecutions of the Antonescu regime. Nonetheless, it recommenced its activities and attempted to collaborate with the government (Vi. Achim 2009). But on the 25th January 1949, the Ministerial Council decided purely and simply to put an end to the GURR. Unrecognised as a ‘cohabiting nation’, the Roma could not be represented as an ethnic group by the members of the GURR.

On the other hand, conscious of its initial weakness, the Communist Party exploited ethnic rivalries by filling key posts with members of minorities that
they felt could be circumvented. The new regime nonetheless distrusted the Romani politicians. A new association, The Popular Union of Roma of Romania, was not tolerated for long. A 1949 blueprint speaks eloquently of the position of the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers’ Party (Tismăneanu 2006: 547). The ‘Gypsy question’ was, in its phrasing, a ‘social problem’ (Point No. 1). The assimilated Gypsies who had abandoned their language and were employed were not a problem and the State was to improve their level of culture. The other points insist on the struggle against bourgeois nationalism, which ‘hinders the process of fraternity between this population and the other nationalities of Romania’ (Point No. 2). They also insist on the need to study the situation of Gypsies having received land (20,000 according to the document) (Point No. 3). Point No. 4 foresees a statistical report on ‘Gypsies who are not working’ and on ‘nomads’ in general. Point No. 5 drives this point home: the principal problem comes from ‘nomadic Gypsies’, ‘tent-dwelling Gypsies’, and ‘semi-nomads’. The application of measures dictated by the Soviet example would free them from the ‘despotic influence’ of the bulibaş and the vătăfi.

Hence the Party returned officially to a policy of assimilation, with a simplified doctrine: the Roma were recognised as autochthonous – less numerous than might have been thought – and their integration into collectivist structures would solve the problem of their emancipation. Education and health would do the rest. Accordingly, the Communists subordinated the Roma movement’s national elites but left the local elites in place. This was because the local leaders defended the interests of their own communities with the local authorities. Such a division explains the subsequent fragmentation of groups and the creation of a ‘localist’ communitarian identity that has kept its hold on the ethnic vocabulary of difference to this day, each group considering itself to be the true guardian of Romani values (Olivera 2012a). The Communists only reinforced the collective dependency of the Roma on the clientelism of the local Romani and non-Romani leaders. The Communists destroyed the Romani movement’s previous efforts to create a common identity based on inter-group ethnic solidarity and only tolerated a purely folkloric usage of Romani culture.

Beginning in the period 1947–1949, the refusal to respond to the ethnic specificity of the Roma by giving them the status of a minority, together with the Roma’s mistrust of all forms of documentation, influenced the population counts. The census of the 25th January 1948, recognised Roma on the basis of their mother tongue: the results gave only 53,425. This linguistic definition indicated the path that would follow: these few tens of thousands of Roma would no doubt assimilate themselves into the majority. The 1956 census employed a wider base and produced the figure of 104,216 declared Roma, of whom 66,882 spoke Romani as a first language. In total, with an official percentage of 0.3 in 1948 and 0.6 in 1956, chronic underestimation meant it was possible to under-represent the Roma in order to justify their social and ethnic non-representation. The continuation of rural sociological studies with hygienist connotations is also evocative of a certain ideological continuity between the interwar period and Communism. The Rudari, mentioned above, who
Romania’s Roma: an overview

suffered heavily from illnesses, were studied again in 1948 as part of a medical campaign for treating goitre, which was affecting two of their villages. Paul Henri Stahl (1992: 65) made ethnographic surveys for the occasion. He underlined how strongly the Rudari wished to have land of their own. The new Communist regime had of course distributed land to some of them, but only to those who lived in cabins, not to the ‘rich’ who lived in houses, even if, in reality, the living conditions there were miserable.

In a country in which 80% of the population worked in agriculture, agricultural relations remained determining. At the end of the war, the Communists had opportunistically supported Agrarian Law 187 (23rd March 1945) for the transfer of a million hectares from the great estates to the full ownership of 800,000 families (Roberts 1951: 51). Being among the 90,897 of those noted as belonging to minorities, 19,559 Roma received a total of 35,496 hectares (Vi. Achim 1998: 65). Beginning in 1948, the Communist Party turned the economy towards the socialisation of the means of production, abandoning the peasants’ claims of legal rights, and the division of land ownership. No part of rural society was spared the brutality of collectivisation.

The Communist Party showed no particular solidarity with the great mass of rural, bordei-dwelling Roma. One might have expected to see them promoted to the rank of the new proletariat, spearhead of the class struggle setting the poor peasantry against the apparently rich peasantry, the Romanian ‘kulaks’, the chi-aburi (Dobrinecu 2007; Țărău 2009). But this was not the case. Beginning in 1948, in order to create an inventory for the collective organisms, the Communists confiscated tools, which contributed to making the Roma dependent on the state. The small minority of Roma who owned land saw it expropriated like the rest of the peasantry. Beginning in March 1949, the Communists began a general expropriation from the peasants, artisans, and small tradespeople. The whole network of exchange was dismantled in favour of the new statist model. Nor did they spare the tiny artisans’ shops, peddlers, and itinerant trades, which were once very useful for opening up the countryside, from gradually sliding to a level which was insufficient for subsistence.

The levelling of the agrarian community was supposed to put everyone on the same footing, but the official doctrine of assimilation also had, as its goal, to erase all the ethnic and cultural particularities of the Roma. However, in Romania, collectivisation did not cause the Roma to disappear. One cannot rely only on official documents to measure the social transformation that took place in the worlds of the Roma. The Central Committee’s peripheral interest in the matter and the small number of directives relating to it do not mean that the Roma were not a part of agrarian policy. The Communists’ objective was certainly to transform the Roma and other social classes, particularly in the country, into worker-peasants. This was to be achieved in a double movement: integration of poor, bordei-dwelling Gypsies into the existing rural habitat, and the socialisation of the Roma in the cooperatives under construction.

It becomes possible then to distinguish a number of different periods. In the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, inclusion in collective structures did not
destroy Romani communities as much as it destroyed communal relations. While the peasants balked at giving up their land to the *Cooperativa Agricolă de Producție*, ‘Agricultural Production Cooperatives’ (CAPs), the Roma were among the first to contribute to their construction. Constructing collective buildings required skills and considerable manpower. In addition, the Communists favoured initiatives for dynamiting the entrenched social order of the peasantry, including nominating a landless Gypsy to the head of a CAP. Fürtös and Bârlea (2009: 351) for example, describe how during the collectivisation of Maramureș in the village of Vadu Izei, a Rom was designated as head of the CAP and how Romanian peasants resented having to take orders from a previously landless ‘Gypsy’. Roma families accepted this change in the state of affairs. Work became constant, food, though still frugal, was more reliable, their housing improved, and – an essential point – none of these changes obliged the individual to leave his group. At the beginning they were integrated without much resistance from the community.

The agrarian aims of the programme of ‘complete socialisation’ were effectively achieved with 91% of the peasantry, willingly or unwillingly, brought into two types of institutional structure: the CAPs, and the state-owned agricultural companies, the IASs. The application of principles of ‘Marxist-Leninist collectivist ethics’ was supposed to lift the peasantry and the Roma out of the network of diffuse reciprocal obligations that regulated the exchange of services in a gift economy. If the Communists managed to destroy the economic foundations of agrarian communities, they did not manage to get rid of the old contractual forms of work for all those who did not own land. For instance, the work teams returned to a pre-war model: between 25 and 30 cooperative peasant workers (țăran cooperatori) made up a work team (echipa de muncă). Three teams together formed a brigade (brigadă). Their members worked the collective lands together and had their own plots (loturi în folosință) (Roger 2002). The peasants whose lands were confiscated were trapped by their own immobility. The more mobile Roma were capable of creating work brigades controlled by themselves and as such integrated into the collectivist structure.

In Segarcea, interviews done by the MigRom team show how the family-directed Romani brigades adapted to the new system. A husband signed a contract with the IAS engineer and recruited his own team. His wife would cook for the entire team, so in this way the head of the brigade was responsible for feeding its members. On pay day, the brigade chief along with the engineer would call the Roma one after the other and the engineer paid them according to what was written in the ledger. The head of the brigade remained a simple foreman, responsible for recruiting and taking charge of the workers but he was not the one who paid them. The existence of these foremen were a response to the need for labour on the state-owned farms, and were justified by a misunderstanding of Roma, and of the difficulties in recruiting within the communities.

One example shows how proletarianised employment and mobility could complement one another. This is the case of M. P. Gh., resident of the Champlan Platz, who lived in the village of Calopăr, next to Segarcea, and whose family
had worked on Crown land. He and his wife had no land to give up to collectivi-
sation and worked as agricultural workers for the Calopăr CAP for 26 years.
Like other Roma, they undertook all kinds of agricultural employment, including
rearing pigs and chickens, and were paid a minimal sum of money, with the rest
paid in kind. His whole family, including his mother, father, and wife all worked
at the CAP. He travelled the country looking for IAS contracts. Like other
Romanians, he signed up Roma from the villages. He did this in his capacity as a
foreman hiring for the IAS, as the local CAP could not offer employment to
everyone, and these Roma would then receive wages from the IAS. Once, during
his travels, he was arrested in a train station and served a four-month prison sen-
tence for infringing the law against ‘idleness’. He was asked how many children
he had. He said four, and the judge gave him four months of prison. Half the
Calopăr Roma worked for the CAP and the other half were musicians. The musi-
cians performed with the local director in other villages. They were known by
the local militia and could produce certificates.

Not everyone was employed by the CAPs. Other Roma had to find employ-
ment on the state-owned farms and companies. Once they were employed by
large factories, most artisans became aware of the material advantages when
compared with their previous conditions. Despite the steamrolling of rural
society, Romani groups remained close-knit and the new, mobile, multi-tasking
framework gave them a new lease of social life. The Roma of the great estates
once again had a form of economic mobility, which they combined with migra-
tion. In the period between 1860 and 1947, their movements were determined by
seasonal agricultural contracts; after collectivisation, the Roma employed by the
CAPs made up the stable part of the population. Finally, the Roma given con-
tracts with the IASs, who unlike the employees of the CAPs were paid wages,
made up the largest part of a new, mobile workforce moving from contract to
contract. They made up the largest mass of migrants in the 1990s, as the turn-
over in employment in the IASs led to an increase in the movement of workers’
brigades when compared with the interwar period. Moreover, their movements
went from being local to national, helped by the development of transport and
the increasing number of state-owned farms. The Keremidari were one instance
of this, employed by public works companies in the 1960s and 1970s and paid
according to the number of bricks they produced. The CAP buildings were built
with the bricks made by the Keremidari. One can see then that the new social-
ised relations of production were not incompatible with the economic mainte-
nance of close-knit communities, and the existence of foremen can be explained
by the maintenance of their role as intermediaries.

While the Romani communities of the cities and villages were levelled
without any great, specific effort on the part of the government, the offensive
against the nomads stood out for its unremitting nature and its duration, which
continued as long as the Communist regime itself. This began with the measures
taken to eradicate nomadism, followed by the confiscation of gold. From the
1960s onwards, those who were still travellers were made to settle in a place of
their choice. The tradition of stockpiling came into conflict with Law 284,
proclaimed on the 15th August 1947, which decreed the confiscation of every citizen’s assets for the national bank. In principle, the Roma received a receipt written out in the name of the bulibaş who whose role was to collect personal gold and jewels. Strehaia, in northwest Craiova, was a city that included numerous Kelderari families returned from Transnistria after 1944. They were copper-smiths and they sold their wares cheaply in a poverty-stricken country. Their profits were converted into gold. From 1978, Law 244, which remained in place until 2001, allowed the police to confiscate such assets. The gold stock was usually pieced together through exchanges with Serbian and Hungarian Roma. When the Communists increased the pressure, Kelderari chiefs tried to find a solution outside of the country. The bulibaş from Bălteni claimed that the militia had accelerated their confiscations in 1988 and that the leaders from Romania had met with the Hungarians with an aim to the latter receiving the Gypsy chiefs on their territory with their gold and a guarantee of their freedom.\(^5\) Aside from the confiscation of their assets, the nomads were targeted as ‘parasites’. This was intensified by the failure to recognise traditional employments as ‘work’, and the limitations placed on their production as well as their ability to travel, as their wagons and horses had been confiscated in the drive for of collectivisation.

Thus, the regime forced the nomads to establish themselves on the peripheries of the villages and cities. In the end, this new, stable domestic situation did not stop them returning to their trades, and gave better security to their families. A number of objects were produced for the local market by the village Kelderari, including those banned by law (such as stills for producing home-made alcohol). In the meantime, people became more mobile, wagons became lighter, and cars appeared, accelerating their movements. The centuries-long historical gap that had separated sedentary society from the world of the nomads to a large extent disappeared.

Romani society was proletarianised through special forms of industrialisation and urbanisation. Gypsy neighbourhoods have long been present, since the Gypsy districts – Ţigănie – of the archbishoprics and the metropole were first constituted. At the time of emancipation, a part of the population of slaves working on ecclesiastical lands remained where they were. This establishment of an urban presence helped with rural–urban relations in the interwar period. The systematisation and industrialisation undertaken by Ceauşescu in the 1970s and 1980s brought peasants and Roma into large, concrete suburbs, into cities full of Stalinist architecture, and into industrial ‘barracks’, but this only prolonged their history of living together. It made it possible for traditional activities to be continued in the largely Gypsy-populated suburbs, transformed into workers’ suburbs, but with an old ethnic physiognomy. The Communists did not try to disperse groups as part of their rehousing and city-sanitation programmes. The Gypsies of the historic centre of Bistriţa are an example of this rather widespread phenomenon. A document from the 28th June 1952, addressed to the Ministerial Council, bears witness to the situation of this community of 5,980 members:
In general they live in houses and huts and only a small number in tents. They are concentrated around the localities’ periphery…. The most prized occupations are in the villages: Fierari, Keremidari – most of them, Džambaši, forest workers, agricultural workers and a few musicians. In the cities they are waiters, musicians, sweepers.

(Gazeta de Bistrița 2014)

The rehousing of the Roma was discussed at the level of the Județean Committee of the Communist Party, the Județean Bistrița-Năsăud Council, but also at that of the Mayor’s Office. The mayor and the Communist authorities wanted to transfer the Roma with the rest of the population into the newly constructed housing blocks. One attempt at relocation having failed, the Roma remained in the houses in the centre of the city of Bistrița formerly occupied by ethnic Saxons who had emigrated to Germany.

The levelling of society during the period of collectivisation in the 1950s–1960s did not lead to the intended homogenisation, either between the Roma and other Romanians, or between Romani groups. Most sedentary Roma were transformed into peasant workers. One can nonetheless observe the maintenance of well-structured ethnic Roma communities and a loss in collective representation. An agrarian society ‘under siege’ was forced to develop ingenious tactics for avoiding absurd injunctions and it is indeed at the local level that it is possible to observe the gap between the official ardour to destroy all old social forms and the negotiations carried out with the local ‘cadres’, often opportunistic and susceptible to offers of ‘gifts’.

But beginning in the 1970s, the government increased its awareness of the growing number of unassimilated Roma still living within close-knit communities. This was seen as a challenge that reignited the ideology of social peril. A document produced in 1977 by the Central Committee entitled The Problem of the Gypsies in the RPR® reproduced the usual refrain about ethnic and social backwardness. Yet the same report noted that 85% of Roma were in regular employment. The report proposed a series of measures concerning integration into the workforce and society, including registration and sedentarisation, management in the workforce, housing conditions, health, social assistance, culture and education, and addressed organisational problems. The recommended measures were to be applied by the Ministry of the Interior. This new awareness led to a modification in the attitude of the Party regarding the Roma elite. It was the first time the Communists became interested in the question. As an ‘ethnic archaism’, nomadic groups attracted all the doctrinal thunderbolts while for the Gypsies, the Gypsy question amounted to a problem of moral poverty and social marginalisation. Point No. 10 of the 1977 document forbade Gypsies from travelling by wagon with their animals and decreed that train carriages were not to be put at their disposal for transporting their wagons and animals.

Some of the Roma would adapt, so as to balance tradition with the requirements of the Party. During a MigRom interview in Poiana Mare, in August 2015, Tănase Mihai, Kelderari, aged 93, and a former Transnistrian deportee, said that
as a member of the Communist Party, he participated in all the meetings of his departmental section, braving the irony of his fellow Romanians. Half-sedentary, half-nomad, he legitimised his movements during police checks with the need to convince his Roma to cut their hair and dispose of their tents: ‘I’m going to help my Roma to civilise’, he said. At the end of the 1970s, some Romani intellectuals, benefiting from universal education, escaped from the assimilationist steamroller and laid the foundations for a Romani civic movement, in close association with the traditional leaders, and inspired by the new international Romani movement. The potential for an ethnic and political organisation that would at last be organised on a unified, national level developed, pushing the authorities to take a fresh look at a population in the midst of shedding their social ‘marginality’, and becoming an ethnic minority. This movement, initiated by the Communist cadres and developed along the lines laid down in the 1977 plan of action proposed the organisation of cultural activities through which the Roma’s level of education and worker’s consciousness were to be improved. After 40 years of regression, the Roma movement returned to the levels of consciousness it had enjoyed in the interwar period. The change in the paradigm surrounding the Romani population in Romania after 1980 is evident in the way the Securitate (Secret Police) began to treat their subjects compared to the way it had in the past. The emergence of informal leaders from Roma communities was not new but rather historically inherited.

The transition of 1990 and its consequences

A lack of historical distance is an obstacle to understanding the transformations that took place during the transition to democracy that began in 1990. A temptation to analyse the conditions of the Roma through the prism of ethnicity alone arises, which would in turn provide justification for their cross-border movements. In fact, if the fall of the Communist regime on the 22nd December 1989 was surprisingly rapid, the social crisis, in particular food shortages, had been ongoing since the 1980s. The fall of Communism did not resolve a single structural problem and in two years’ time, the country saw its purchasing power fall by half. Within a context of general impoverishment across Romanian society, Romani communities were once more marginalised. They became victims of assault fuelled by ethnic hatred, for instance with the protests of the Gorj miners, who had been subject to political manipulation (Kideckel 2011). Their houses were burned in Mihail Kogălniceanu in September 1990, in Bolintin Deal in 1991, and in Hădăreni in 1993 (Toma 2012).

Agrarian ‘decollectivisation’, beginning in 1990 and ending in 2005 with the privatisation of 95% of agricultural land, did not favour access to private property for rural Roma (Vincze 2015). It did not allow them to settle the question of the insecurity of their homes, with property titles guaranteed by law (Vultur 2002: 128–129; Verdery 2003). The transferal of the collectivist means of production to the private sector was based on the return of property to its 1949 owners (Verdery 1996: 133–167). Public action then privileged the reinstatement
of old landowners over simple redistribution. Rather than removing inequalities, it caused latent social conflicts to re-emerge. For instance, Law 18/1991, known as the Law on Agricultural Land Resources (Legea fondului funciar), organised the return of landed property, the dissolution of the CAPs, and the setting up of private property. Article 8, paragraph 3 of Law 18/1991, endowed each cooperative member with half a hectare, and each agricultural worker with a maximum of ten hectares. The old CAPs and IASs were transformed into associations and private companies. Those who were not members of the cooperative but who had been employed for the three preceding years in the CAP could receive land if they had an established presence in the area. The attribution of land was made on personal request, by individuals, within 30 days of the publication of the law (Lhomel 1995). There has been no large-scale study to estimate, on a national scale, the number of Roma who applied for a land grant.

Questions of attribution aside, the problem of the viability of agricultural production remains pertinent (Cartwright 2001). A total of 46% of the rural population, including three million peasants (an enormous number for a European country) went back to the pre-war state of agrarian dualism, with large properties dedicated to an export market and owned by foreign investors or Romanian consortia, and a simultaneous return to tenant farming and unprofitable micro-structures around villages (Velcea 1967; von Hirschhausen 1997). Land return renewed problems already observed in the interwar period tied to forms of micro-farming that failed to even provide for subsistence. The end of opportunities to undertake a variety of activities within a rural community was a motivating factor behind emigration. The Roma had initially worked as day-labourers for the peasantry. But when the peasants were obliged to give their farms over to single investors, the Roma left their bordei on the edge of the villages, to try to earn a living abroad. Those who stayed behind fell victim to a more severe poverty than had been known under Communism. With a lack of landed property, and housing so rudimentary that they could not, unlike other Romanians, hope to house grandparents and children, entire families were forced to follow in the wake of one of their own who had ventured out in search of a better option. The only available source of work for a while were the old IASs, converted into ‘commercial companies’, where, at the cost of increased mobility, Romani labourers could reproduce the old work-team model. One finds the same circumstances in industry, with the same results. Unlike in the USSR, Romanian industry combined mines and small artisano-industrial companies, creating a network of large, combined, peasant and worker towns. Decollectivisation destroyed this network and left the factory-working proletarian Roma out of work. This was also the case for the mining zone Borod–Şuncuiuş–Dobreşti–Vadu Crişului (Bihor judeţ), and it is somewhat ironic to see official documents from 1999 onward refer to it as a disadvantaged zone, given it had been promoted as an exemplar by the Soviet economic press. Some Kelderari managed
to take advantage of the dismantling of factories and agricultural equipment. They recuperated materials in agreement with the local authorities and shared the profits. They built houses closer to the centre of the village and gained the status of new rural elites.

The opening up of the country in 1999 favoured exchanges and the movement of people between Romania and its neighbouring countries. Throughout the Communist period, foreign travel required a passport that gave the Ministry of the Interior complete control over mobility. Clandestine immigration to the West, both risky and costly (2,500 Marks for passage to Germany), could only be attempted by a small number of people. The opening of the borders and of a relationship with Turkey remained tied to an economy of scarcity (Diminescu 2003). For instance, traders (bişniţari), partly including village Roma, imported small-scale consumer goods. From south Romania and from Moldavia, they would travel to Istanbul to stock up on merchandise. The Transylvanians, in particular the Hungarian-speaking Roma, travelled to Hungary for the same reason. Up until the war, Romanians and Roma from different countries formed working groups for agricultural employment in Yugoslavia. Early migrations were thus to neighbouring countries, with few leaving for the West because of the obstacles to obtaining the necessary visas (Reyniers 2016).

From 2002, when Europe eliminated visas for Romanians, the structure of Romanian emigration changed. Migration with an aim to settlement gave way to a form of ‘migrant traffic’ that renewed itself with each generation. Italy and Spain became the priority destinations. According to the Italian Ministry of the Interior in 2007, when transitory measures were first put in place, two and half million Romanians were living in Italy. This Romanian exodus included Roma, on a much smaller scale, but made far more visible by the immigration policies of the host countries.

Conclusion

The aim of this chapter has been to show the diversity of Romania, and the Roma, as a structural characteristic of a Balkan country, determined by its historical roots at the crossroads between three Empires, and by its agrarian economic foundations. Three periods in the twentieth century have conditioned the situation we see today. The post-emancipation period, in particular the interwar period, shows how, under late seigniorial domination and with an overwhelming majority of the population being peasants, agrarian reforms were decisive in shaping the status of the Roma. The long struggle between the permanent peasant insurrection and those in power gave rise to the deportation of the Roma to Transnistria, facilitated by war and the Fascist period.

A second key period opened with the Communist takeover and the subsequent reshaping of society, characterised by the collectivisation of production units (state farms, etc.). It is important to recall that mobility and pluriactivity are shared features of all populations (Roma and non-Roma) in a Romanian economy dominated until recently by the agrarian sector. This social organisation
has allowed for inclusion in a collectivist labour market, as well as in a seigniorial or a capitalist one. The need for mobile work brigades allowed Roma communities to integrate into the labour market, while maintaining cohesive family networks and thus a distinct Romani identity. This is a powerful determinant of their present-day social status.

Finally, the transition of 1993 and its consequences for the rural system, allow us to understand why the new emancipation, based on the recognition of minorities, often had negative effects on society, but also how it has introduced new forms of mobility.

Since the end of the 1990s and the opening of the country to the West, the game has changed. International emigration is widespread across the whole of the Romanian population. Roma communities of rural origin, whether now living in villages or within the fabric of medium-sized cities, have also responded to the general pull of the West. The original contribution of a method combining the testimonials collected by the MigRom project and archival records, is to demonstrate that this is a new phenomenon, a new paradigm in respect to the historical patterns of what between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were the essentially regional and cross-border movements of the Romanian Roma.

Notes

* The research leading to the present publication results from MigRom, ‘The immigration of Romanian Roma to Western Europe: Causes, effects, and future engagement strategies’, a project funded by the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme under the call on ‘Dealing with diversity and cohesion: the case of the Roma in the European Union’ (GA319901).
1 Archives from: Direcția Județeană Dolj a Arhivelor Naționale, Domeniul Coroanei Segarcea 1915–1945.
2 Archives from: Direcția Județeană Dolj a Arhivelor Naționale, Domeniul Coroanei Sadova 1919–1946.
3 Interview with Petre Petcuț during the framework of the project, ‘The untold story. An oral history of the Roma People in Romania,’ in the community of Kelderari of Poiana Mare, Dolj judet, 2013.
4 Archives from: Ministerul de Interne. Diviziunea Administrativă (1859–1867) a Arhivelor Naționale, dos. 155, 1868, f. 55
5 M. I., Inspectoratul Județean Dîmbovița Securitate, Nr. 005296 din 18/01/1989.
6 Archives from: Consiliul Național pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securității (C.N.S.A.S), fond Documentar, 144:15, 1–11.

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Romania’s Roma: an overview

55


3 Romanian Roma at home
Mobility patterns, migration experiences, networks, and remittances*

Stefânia Toma, Cătălina Tesăr, and László Fosztó

Introduction
The number of Romanian citizens who migrated abroad during recent decades is somewhere between three and three and a half million, and there is a general consensus that Romania is one of the main source countries in Europe when it comes to migration and the mobility of its citizens. This large population movement has had considerable social and economic effects both in Romania and in the host countries. This chapter focuses on social changes at the grass-root level in home communities. We engage with the local social context that frames the mobility of Roma individuals and families in five localities situated in different regions of Romania using both quantitative and qualitative methods. The driving question of our research is: What are the effects of Roma migration on the home communities? Additionally, we aimed to understand the diversity of local conditions that shape different mobility patterns across our field sites, and the ways migration unfolds through time and according to destination countries. Above all, we analyse the socioeconomic processes triggered by the return of migrants and by remittances, including local relationships between different ethnic and social categories.

Our chapter contributes to a growing body of literature on the migration of Romanian citizens (see Anghel & Horváth 2009; Sandu 2010; Vlase 2012; Anghel 2013), engaging with classical research interests in migration literature, such as push/pull-factors, networks and transnationalism, and furthering it with insights into the effects of migration on home localities (cf. Anghel 2015).

In doing so, this chapter draws on recent approaches in migration studies, which focus on the way migrants maintain contacts with their home localities and family members, and on the consequences of their migration for their home society (see Faist, Fauser, & Kivisto 2011; Glick Schiller & Faist 2010) by articulating mobility across borders with broader social changes and development perspectives (Kearney 1986; Binford 2003; Portes 2010). Swinging back and forth between developmentalist optimism and pessimism (de Haas 2007, 2010; Gamlen 2014), these analyses often deal with the problematic aspects of the role of states in the context of global capitalism. Rather than foregrounding the role of states and supra-national institutions in transformations that local
communities undergo, we draw attention to the grass-root level, that is, changes driven from ‘below’. We thus follow in the footsteps of authors who maintain that financial and social remittances are among the indicators and vehicles of the development in home communities (see Levitt 1998; Levitt & Lamba-Nieves 2011).

Turning now to the migration of Roma individuals and families – which is the focus of this volume – there is a tendency in public discourse to single out Romanian Roma migration as allegedly having some peculiarities. We follow the idea that there is significant evidence for viewing the migration of Roma as part of the post-socialist east–west European migration (Benarrosh-Orsoni 2015: 24) and, more specifically, as part of the post-socialist transnational migration of Romanian citizens (Cingolani 2009; Benarrosh-Orsoni 2015). In contrast to the migration of other ethnic minorities from Romania, which was at least in the beginning shaped by ethnicity, the migration of Roma rarely began as an ethnic migration; rather, it began as a circular movement organised through family connections (Diminescu 2009: 47). Inspired by approaches which focus on the effects of the migration on local societal and economic development, this chapter examines the consequences of migration of Romanian Roma on local communities. In so doing, we endorse Hein de Haas’ (2011) position assessing migration as a heterogeneous process, and approaching migration theories as neither exclusive nor contradictory.

We address the migration of the Romanian Roma as part of the post-1990 massive movement of Romanian citizens (Sandu 2010). More specifically, we argue that individual and structural push/pull-factors of migration and immediate effects and consequences of migration on Roma families and households are impressively diverse, and are reflective more of the local and regional socio-economic contexts than of allegedly ethnic characteristics of particular households. Yet, seemingly in contradiction the conclusion to this chapter highlights several features that make the migration of Roma distinguishable from that of the non-Roma Romanian population. To exemplify, there is a process of status change of the groups involved in migration, as local perceptions of ‘the Roma’ are slowly changing and features of the established ethnic landscape are remodelled as a result of the improvement of Roma households.

Roma in Transylvania and southeast Romania: a description of local context

Romania is regionally diverse in terms of social history, socioeconomic development, and ethnic configuration. This diversity defines patterns of migration, in as much as it engenders a diversity of causes, temporalities, and effects of migration. In this section, we offer a glimpse of the socioeconomic context of the migratory flows. The data presented in this chapter were gathered between autumn of 2014 and spring of 2015, using mixed methods: quantitative surveys at the household level, semi-structured interviews, and ethnographic fieldwork. We selected five localities, in different regions, with diverse characteristics. We
balanced urban and rural settlements in our sample, three small towns and two villages. All these localities are characterised by the presence of a significant Roma population belonging to different groups, and by their increasing mobility. The selected localities are spread across the country (see Map 3.1). The three urban field sites, which number between 10,000 and 13,000 inhabitants, are: Gurai in Ialomița County (in southeast Romania), Baniod in Cluj County (in Transylvania), and Hideni in Bihor County (in western Romania). The two rural field sites are: Baratca in Brașov County in central Romania, and Bighal in Sălaj County in the northwest.

Gurai is typical of a failed communist project for an agro-industrial town. Small in size and lacking the amenities of urban life standards, it has a rural atmosphere given by the constructed landscape. Here, houses that are typical of Romanian rural areas outnumber the blocks of flats in the town centre. Formerly an important centre of production with several factories and collective farms which attracted workforce from across Romania, the town is characterised today by a declining economy and shrinking job opportunities, and has been vacated by the younger workforce. It is located in a relatively poor region, with the highest rate of unemployment in the country. In the aftermath of the process of privatisation and land restitution following the 1989 Revolution, the town’s population, both Roma and non-Roma, was hit by severe unemployment and resorted to deriving their livelihoods from (labour) migration. A visible effect of migration was the uneven improvement in the situation of the population, with an increasing number of villa type houses overshadowing modest adobe houses. The Roma population of Gurai is heterogeneous and its geographical distribution across the town is uneven. It comprises two Romani groups: the Ursari (bear leaders) who were traditionally comb makers, and the țigani vătrași (‘sedentary Gypsies’) who were traditionally musicians and silversmiths and who are culturally and linguistically rather similar to their Romanian neighbours. During the communist era, the Roma lived from a combination of contractual employment and specific economic activities, such as comb-making or the trade of silver objects. No ethnic conflicts have been reported, although ethnic territorial segregation was and at present continues to be a characteristic of the town.

Hideni is a small town in Bihor County in northwest Romania. It is ethnically mixed, with Hungarians making up the local majority. Its economic situation is heavily defined by the geographical proximity to the county administrative centre (Oradea) and the eastern border of Hungary, but even more so by the legacy of state socialism. The local population – including the Roma – used to rely on agriculture and the food processing industry and few nearby clothing and shoe factories. The regime change in 1989 did not bring a sudden and dramatic change for its Hungarian and Romanian inhabitants, while the significant Roma population became increasingly deprived. Today the bulk of the economy is still represented by agriculture and some remaining small and medium-sized companies of light industry. Only a few Roma persons are employed with contracts; the majority remain unemployed and they rely mainly on working as day-labourers for local farmers, but some of them also beg and collect scrap in the
Map 3.1 Field sites in Romania.

Source: map by László Fosztó, attribution © CARTO, © OpenStreetMap contributors.
Romanian Roma at home

nearby town. According to representatives of the local administration, the Roma make up approximately 27% of the local population. Most of them are Hungarian speaking, while about 10% of the Roma speak Romanian as their native tongue. Roma live in a segregated area on the outskirts of the town, but also in two smaller ethnically mixed areas.

The third town included in our research, Baniod, is located in one of the most developed counties of Romania (Cluj). The main European transit highway and a major railway line cross the town. The dismantling of collective farms and land restitution has directly influenced the everyday lives of the Roma. Previously, many of the Roma used to work as agricultural day-labourers and some of them were brick-makers or musicians. With the industrialisation of the socialist period, many Roma were employed by factories in the nearby industrial centres. Some men (typically Lingurari) were employed as wagon loaders by the National Railway. Most of the women engaged in menial jobs at the furniture factory or worked in the collective farms as day-labourers or collecting medicinal herbs. At present, the former farms are in ruins, the factories are closed. Many of the local Roma (mainly Kortorari and Lingurari) chose to leave the country and try to earn their livelihoods in Western Europe. Those who stayed rely on occasional or seasonal jobs. Although local ethnic relations seem at first glance peaceful, memories of the violent conflicts in the early 1990s are still vivid.

Ethnic tensions also exist in Baratca, a village near Braşov. During the last decade, there were several instances of violent confrontations between the Hungarian majority and local Romanian-speaking Roma population. The authorities’ solution was to maintain the peace through a visible presence of police forces not far from the growing and territorially segregated Roma community. Due to the proximity to Braşov, an important industrial centre, inhabitants of Baratca (including the Roma) were commuters during the socialist period. Some Roma used to work in the collective farms and as day-labourers on small plots owned by locals. After the regime change, most locals lost their jobs and a large part of the younger generation of ethnic Hungarians moved to Hungary. Those who stayed started small enterprises, moved to nearby towns, and a few continue to work the land. For the Roma, opportunities to find employment locally remain limited.

Social and economic processes followed a quite different path in Bighal (Sălaj County), the second village in our sample. It is situated in what was, during the socialist period, a traditionally agricultural region with weak industrialisation. While both the majority population (Hungarians and Romanians) and the Roma worked in factories, agriculture and related domains (stock farms, agricultural machine park) remained an important part of local economy. Most of the local Roma live in a segregated neighbourhood on the outskirts of the village. They are Romani speakers, but they are proficient in Hungarian and Romanian as well. They used to be servants working for the locals, and then they were hired by the collective farms, sometimes even travelling to other regions in Romania. During the 1990s and until recently, they worked as day-labourers on properties owned by local residents, which helped maintain peaceful relationships in the village. In the past few years, agriculture lost terrain to
small and medium-sized enterprises in various domains of light industry and tourism. Local opportunities for Roma, even for temporary work, have diminished.

This brief presentation of our field sites shows the context for the multiplicity of dimensions that shape the socioeconomic development, the diversity of ethnic composition, and the patterns of interethnic relations, as well as the background for Roma migration. Table 3.1 summarises our sample for the quantitative survey in relation to the official numbers of the National Census 2011.5

We surveyed basic demographic and economic indicators (composition of households, education level, self-declared ethnicity, age, religious affiliation, household income and spending, household utilities, housing conditions, etc.), previous experiences of migration and future intentions to go abroad, as well as the potential destination countries for future migration plans.

Patterns of migration of Romanian Roma

In this section, we focus on the comparative presentation of the local context for Roma mobility. Generally speaking, in all five field sites the living conditions of Roma families are well below the national average as measured by the National Statistical Institute. Three-quarters of the households are situated in segregated neighbourhoods.6 About half of the households live in one room, while the average number of household members is 3.95. The highest local average of persons per household is 5.16 in the Ialomiţa field site, which is almost twice as high as the national average.7 The unemployment rate is high in all of the settlements. Only 12.3% of the households said that they had received salary income from formal employment in the month prior to the survey. For the households that receive salaries, this is typically the most important income. In the absence of formal employment the most frequent source of income is day-labour in agriculture, construction, or some other form of menial work.

Welfare benefits are an important source of income. However, the Romanian welfare system offers tenuous stability and security. The main form of benefit is the MGI (Minimum Guaranteed Income, Venit Minim Garantat), which is a ‘means tested’ social benefit scheme, for which not all poor households qualify. Those who own property (land, car, livestock, or other assets), and/or receive other forms of income, which, divided by the number of family members, reach a specific threshold, are disqualified. MGI is mentioned as a form of income by 44% of the respondent households, and it is considered the most important source of income by more than one-third of the households.8 The monthly level of MGI is very low, not more than the equivalent of €100 per family of four members, and this is not enough to survive on.9 Other forms of social benefits, while accessed more frequently by these households, are nonetheless lower than MGI and they do not contribute significantly to the households’ total income (Table 3.2).

More than two-thirds of households rely on two or more forms of income, but even when combined, these hardly provide enough resources for a reasonable
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Locality</th>
<th>Total population (rounded figures)</th>
<th>% of Roma population (Census 2011)</th>
<th>MigRom Roma sample (households)</th>
<th>MigRom Roma sample persons</th>
<th>MigRom majority sample (households)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ialomița</td>
<td>Gurai</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>5.21</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>826</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cluj</td>
<td>Baniod</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bihor</td>
<td>Hideni</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>6.02</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>749</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brașov</td>
<td>Baratca</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>1,041</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sălaj</td>
<td>Bighal</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>6.69</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>672</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total households | 978     | 3,865 | 990 |
standard of living. As a result, families increasingly seek jobs abroad, thus becoming what the journalistic discourse calls, ‘subsistence migrants’. Yet not all families have the opportunity for migration, as it requires resources, and it also has a considerable social cost for family members living apart. We identified, nonetheless, 496 persons, representing 20.25% of the working age population in our sample, who travelled abroad to work after 2007. Three-quarters of them migrated between 2014 and 2015. This shows that 374 households (38.2% of the total sample) are exposed to recent migration experience of one or more members being abroad.

Our data show that a higher proportion of households receive money from abroad than from a salary at home (21.5% vs. 12.3%). They also show that a significantly greater proportion of households reported spending money received from abroad than participated directly in migration. While only 38.2% of households had members working abroad after 2007, 73.2% of households declared that they spent remittances during the past year (2014). The difference indicates economic links between different households along broader kinship networks. Remittances spent and invested at home show how mobility is an ongoing process and reveal the transnational character of social ties. Most of the households (about two-thirds) spend remittances on food, basic utilities, or paying their debts. Besides daily needs (food and clothing), they spend remittance money on improving their quality of life (new furniture, electrical goods) and on the enlargement and improvement of housing (repairing the roof, constructing a bathroom, and additional rooms). Still, there are very significant differences between the spending of remittances across the field sites (Table 3.3).

For the different groups of Roma, educational and cultural capital is an important asset for initiating and maintaining the migration process. In the survey, we asked about the native tongue of participants, other languages spoken, and the level of education. About half of our Roma sample declared Romani as their native tongue, while the remaining respondents declared Romanian or Hungarian as native languages. Romani native speakers form the

---

### Table 3.2 Type of incomes in households (N=978)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of income that a household had the previous month</th>
<th>Frequency of mention (%)</th>
<th>Most important income (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Child benefits</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day-labour</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MGI</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money received from abroad</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salary</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other social benefits</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sickness pension</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disability allowance</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own business</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment benefit</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Total Roma sample (%)</td>
<td>Field sites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household goods</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House utilities</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debts</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schooling of children</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health, medicine</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
majority in Bighal (94.6%) and Gurai (90.3%), while in Baniod the local Roma are divided between Romani (63.6%), Romanian (26%) and Hungarian (10%) native speakers. The majority of our sample in Hideni declared Hungarian (80%) as their native tongue, while the Roma community in Baratca is entirely Romanian speaking. Looking at the level of education, the highest is in Baniod; 22.49% of persons in the sample attained secondary level or higher, while only about 4% are without any formal education. The situation is the reverse in Baratca where only 4% attained secondary school or higher and in the Hideni sample the proportion of those with no formal education is exceptionally high (see details in Table 3.4).

The relationship between level of education and mobility is not simple or straightforward (migration is not directly influenced by education level in our sample), but it is a key component for the longer-term development of the local communities (Nyberg-Sorensen, van Hear, & Engberg-Pedersen 2002). In Bighal (Sălaj), a significantly higher proportion of households mentioned spending remittances on children’s education than in any of the other field sites, and this is reflected in the higher level of education in this locality. A similar tendency is observable in Baniod (Cluj). This process can be taken as an indication that in addition to satisfying basic needs, improving household furnishing and living conditions, remittances are also invested in education, that is, in developing the human capital of the migrant families.

During the period of data collection, almost all members of the surveyed households were at home; only 4% of household members were reported to be abroad. This is due to the fact that the temporary jobs that migrants regularly perform (such as working in construction or agriculture), are scarce in late autumn and early spring, and to the fact that migrants prefer to spend the winter holiday season with their families. The temporary jobs available usually involve hard conditions, and 70% of respondents who were working abroad at the time of our survey were men. Their destination countries are the UK, Spain, Hungary, France, and Italy (in order of preferences), but also several other countries mentioned by fewer respondents. Those who are receiving remittances do not necessarily plan to get involved actively in migration; only 22.9% of the total number of households plan to look for a job abroad. Migrant household members usually spend relatively short periods abroad, in most cases less than four months. We did not find significant associations between receiving and spending money from abroad and future plans to migrate.

From the early 2000s, thanks to Romania’s EU accession, the legal barriers for mobility were gradually removed until visa obligations for travelling to the EU were cancelled in 2002. The process culminated in 2007, when the country became a member of the European Union (EU). This was an important moment in the emergence and growth of Roma migration, as our rural field sites illustrate. Our survey shows that there was virtually no migration from Baratca (Brașov) and Bighal (Sălaj), and very little from Hideni (Bihor) during the earlier period, but after 2007 the migration increased dramatically in the two villages (up to 60% of households reported recent migration experiences). There was also an increase in the towns (see Table 3.5).
Table 3.4 Educational level and mother tongue ($N=3,631$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Persons, school-age or older (%)</th>
<th>Field sites</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gurai (%)</td>
<td>Baniod (%)</td>
<td>Hideni (%)</td>
<td>Baratca (%)</td>
<td>Bighal (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without formal education</td>
<td>12.26</td>
<td>7.14</td>
<td>4.28</td>
<td>39.97</td>
<td>13.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With primary education</td>
<td>62.88</td>
<td>72.02</td>
<td>73.05</td>
<td>49.59</td>
<td>78.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary education or higher</td>
<td>11.32</td>
<td>15.48</td>
<td>22.49</td>
<td>8.29</td>
<td>4.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School-age but not attending</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>5.36</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>3.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romani as mother tongue ($N=3,865$)</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>90.3</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.5 Migration experience and migration intentions in the different field sites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field sites</th>
<th>Gurai (%)</th>
<th>Baniod (%)</th>
<th>Hideni (%)</th>
<th>Baratca (%)</th>
<th>Bighal (%)</th>
<th>Total Roma sample (%)</th>
<th>Baratca and Bighal majority sample (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Work abroad before 2007</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work abroad after 2007</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intention to go abroad again</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Roma households in Baratca and Bighal are more mobile than those in the other three localities: 60% of households had one or more members working abroad after 2007 (compared with 28.8% of households in Gurai, and approximately 17% of households in Baniod and Hideni). Another significant difference between the localities concerns the year of the informants’ most recent travel abroad and length of stay. While in the localities from Brașov, Sălaj, and Bihor counties, more than three-quarters of migrants had a very recent migration experience (in 2014 and 2015); in the towns of Baniod and Gurai, this percentage is much lower.

Recent experiences have a significant impact on intentions for further migration, which remain particularly high in Bighal. Bighal stands out when compared with the other localities with regards to intentions to migrate in the future, as until recently, the Roma could rely on the local formal or informal jobs (day-labourers in agriculture, unskilled workers in construction, and light industry). However, during the past few years, job opportunities have decreased: the construction of a planned highway was stopped, businesses in the region reduced their activities, and household-based agriculture was abandoned. If we compare the patterns of migration experience and the Roma’s future intentions with our data collected from the majority population, a clear contrast emerges: local non-Roma started their migration earlier, about one-quarter of the households experienced migration abroad before 2007, and the proportion of migrants decreased after that. Today, only a small minority (4.7%) declared that they intend to go abroad again.

There is a connection between the socioeconomic arrangements of the locality of origin and the configuration of the migration networks, the starting date of mobility and its tempo and temporality, and the countries of destination. Migration started earlier in areas in which deindustrialisation and land restitution resulted in high unemployment (Gurai and Baniod) and later in areas in which employment opportunities in the informal sector continued to exist even after the fall of the communist regime (Bighal). In connection with this, the economic dispositions of the different Roma populations influenced the composition of migration networks: in localities where Roma’s livelihood was more or less independent of their immediate neighbouring majority populations, the networks were family based (Gurai, Baniod). By contrast, in localities where the economic activities of Roma relied on the local majority and interethnic social interaction was, as a result, greater, migration networks extended beyond family connections and bridged ethnic divides (Bighal). Through these networks, Roma gained the necessary information, resources and access to broader international networks in order to gain access to the employment market in destination countries.

We can distinguish two relatively clear patterns if we look at the number of destination countries (as shown in Table 3.6). The highest number of destination countries was mentioned in Bighal (11), followed by Baniod (9), and Baratca (8). The number of destinations from Hideni and Gurai are relatively lower (5 and 4, respectively). We can thus observe that newly emerged migration (in Bighal and among the Romungre from Baniod) correlates with a larger number
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Roma households (%)</th>
<th>Field sites</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gurai (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total countries</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.6 The frequency of mention of migration destination countries (N=978)
of destination countries reported, while in cases where migration started earlier (e.g. in Gurai), the number of destination countries is lower.

The differences in the number of destination countries in each locality are illustrative of the role of social networks (Boyd 1989, Fawcett 1989, Haug 2008). Among the Ursari in Gurai and the Kortorari in Baniod, migration is organised according to kin and family ties, which explains the relatively lower number of destination countries (in Gurai), and the frequent mentioning of Spain among the Roma in Baniod. On the other hand, in Bighal and among the Romungre in Baniod, reliance solely on family ties was not as characteristic as it was in the other localities. Roma have ties with members of the local majority, so these links have become channels of migration that facilitate information exchange on job opportunities, including recruitment for jobs abroad. We turn to this issue in the next section.

Interethnic relations and migration networks

On a summer day in 1990, a mob of about 100 locals gathered on the streets of the town that later became our field site in Cluj County. They started to systematically attack and beat up Roma, and houses where Roma lived on the outskirts of the town were set on fire the same year. Following these events some families from one of the local Roma groups (Kortorari) decided to migrate to northwestern European countries, as asylum seekers. International organisations documented the process and provided legal support, as they did when ethnic clashes triggered Roma migration elsewhere in Eastern Europe during that period (Matras 2000: 37). But this is an exceptional case as it allows us to clearly trace a starting point for the migration process; and, indeed, in all field sites, there was a moment in time when the practice of international migration emerged. Looking back, this period can be seen as the initial phase of a migration, which expanded to the extent we observed during our fieldwork. We were not able to interview persons from this pioneer group during our fieldwork in the community of origin, but the signs of Roma migration are clearly visible in the town: large two- or three-storey houses with shiny roofs. The locals call these houses ‘palaces’, and their owners spend most of their time abroad. Since their first departure, members of this group of Roma have managed to settle in a number of Western European countries, drawing on the support of their family and kin networks. We nonetheless surveyed other local Roma groups (Romungre and Romanianised Roma) who became involved in migration more recently. It is less characteristic that they follow family/kin networks. Instead, they use transethnic networks in order to find jobs abroad. Moreover, they are engaged in circular migration and stay for shorter periods of time working abroad, while their family and household members stay at home. Just like in Bighal and in Hideni, these persons chose to migrate after 2007, when local opportunities became even scarcer than before and the opening of EU borders and the migration experiences of the local majority made their mobility easier.

When a shoe factory close to Hideni closed in 2013, leaving almost 150 Roma without jobs, some were able to secure fairly regular alternative work as
day-labourers using the networks of local Hungarians. Some found work as agricultural workers on farms in southwestern Romania or in Hungary. Only a few tried their luck in more faraway countries such as Italy, Spain, Austria, or Germany. From this perspective, Hideni resembles Bighal: both localities have a rather long history of coexistence, one could even say interdependence, between Roma and the local majority, with the significant difference that in Bighal institutional and political efforts to improve the Roma’s situation have been much more effective in recent decades. In contrast, in Baratca this type of coexistence could not have developed for several reasons. Here, the Roma community is larger and their identity is more strongly Romanianised, while the ‘historical’ majority in Baratca is Hungarian and economic opportunities in the micro-region have not led to patron–client relations like those which exist in Bighal and Hideni.

In Baratca, the segregation of Roma stands out and ethnic tensions have been looming for a long period and even led to an outburst of violent conflicts. In 2007, more than 350 persons (Hungarian and Roma) were involved in a conflict on the village streets, after some Roma were caught stealing from local residents. Police forces were moved to the village for a week in order to maintain peace, and following the event, mixed groups (Hungarians, Romanians, and Roma) were set up to prevent further conflicts. Although the violence did not directly trigger the flight of Roma to Western countries (as was the case with Baniod), 2007 is the year mentioned by most of the local Roma as the year of their first travel abroad. Repeated violent events merely reinforced the tensions between the Roma and the majority Hungarians and Romanians, and resulted in the continuous presence of police forces in the locality, as well as regular unannounced visits to the houses of the Roma. However, as migration progressed, more and more local residents acquired Roma neighbours and despite general negative attitudes towards the Roma, many admit that Roma who work abroad and invest their earnings at home have helped improve the community and its environment. In Gurai, the tendency is similar.

In Gurai, the Ursari are descendants of a semi-nomadic population that was forcibly settled in the territory of the present town in the aftermath of the deportations during the Second World War. They stand out through their so-called ‘traditional’ dress code, their maintenance of the Romani language and preservation of cultural practices. The Vătraşi show a longer local history of coexistence with the non-Roma population, taking great pride in their ability to adapt. They adopt practices found among their Romanian neighbours, and they pride themselves on their romanizare (‘becoming Romanians’, or Romanianisation). They enter into mixed marriages with Romanians, pursue higher levels of education than Ursari, and the younger generations (unlike their elders) neither understand nor speak the Romani language. Initially, the Ursari were clustered in a neighbourhood that was notoriously associated with begging, burglary, pilfering, and illicit trading, and during the communist era was hemmed in by a barrier that restricted their access to the town. The most successful Ursari migrants moved out of the neighbourhood, and built houses on the town’s main streets. By
contrast, the Vâraș, who have always lived in houses situated in ethnically mixed neighbourhoods or in flats in the blocks in the town centre, and invested the money earned through migration in social mobility (i.e. subsidising children’s education) rather than in territorial mobility. The mobility of Ursari has been organised through kinship networks both in regards to the organisation of the flow of people and of the economic activities carried out in destination countries. The first destinations of their migration in the early 1990s were Germany, where Ursari were registered as asylum seekers, and the UK, where at that time, access to the formal labour market was restricted by law. In the late 1990s, Ursari migrated to Italy, France, and Spain, and later returned to the UK. Given that the UK did not open its formal labour market to Romanian citizens until 2014, the Ursari in the UK were pursuing primarily informal economic activities such as scrap metal and plastic collection. Unlike the Ursari, the Vârași migration was organised along ethnically mixed networks and formed part of a general trend followed by Romanian citizens. It began as ‘illegal’ or ‘undocumented’ migration in countries such as Italy and Spain, before 2000. It was normalised after 2002 (when the circulation of Romanian citizens within the Schengen area became visa-free), and culminated in the legal integration into the job market in destination countries after 2007 (when Romania officially became an EU member state).

Probably much more than in the case of the Ursari who pursued a kinship-based migration, the changing of border regulations impacted upon the Vârași’s lived experience of relatedness. The consequence of irregular migration was the scattering of families, sometimes their dissolution, the weakening of family ties and the uneven enactment of parenthood and care: husbands who left their families behind had adulterous affairs abroad and ended up remarrying; married couples left their children in the care of grandparents. However, since the regularisation of migration after Romania’s EU accession and the advent of the free mobility of Romanian citizens in Europe, a tendency towards family reunification has emerged. In the aftermath of the 2007–2008 financial crises, more family members who had lost their employment abroad returned home to live on pensions or welfare provided by the destination countries. At present, younger generations seek jobs abroad. Besides the continuous renegotiation of family ties and feelings embedded in them, which accompany the process of migration among Vârași, a striking feature of their circulation across countries is people’s desire to climb the social mobility ladder in order to come closer to Romanians.

Attitudes are difficult to change, but there are signs that this process is also underway on the part of the local majorities. In some cases, we observed that returnees more readily ‘speak up for themselves’ when dealing with the authorities. These interactions typically concern requests for infrastructure improvement or for solutions to legal issues arising from the purchase of new household equipment or from improvements to their houses. The tone of these exchanges has become firmer, and the inquiries are more likely to render a positive reply.

Villagers in Baratca express their approval of the newly-built brick houses in the Roma settlement and admired the masonry skills that the Roma men acquired
on their trips abroad. These elements were perceived as signs of ‘civility’ from the perspective of local peasants. During the hot summer days in August 2015, we were carrying out fieldwork in the village, while the Hungarian television channels covered the migration crisis in minute details. A Hungarian woman in her sixties told us what she had learnt about the ‘refugee invasion’ at the borders of the EU and in the middle of Budapest at the Keleti Railway Station. She shared her fears of a future when her village will be ‘invaded by the barbarians’. ‘It is so much better to live side by side with our Gypsies!’ she concluded, ‘At least we have known them for a long time, and now that they’ve seen the Western world, they learned a lot and were able to reach our standards!’ Values of coexistence in the village gain importance when the public sphere is teeming with disturbing and fearful images about the refugees in Europe. When their migration trajectories bring them back home, the Roma’s qualities as ‘familiar strangers’ are perceived to be enhanced; they return ‘more civilised’ from an increasingly borderless world. Their return home is a sign of ‘normality’ and contributes to the image of the cosiness of village life.

The impact of migration

Irrespective of the differences in the forms of migration, there are commonalities in their impact. Migration resulted in the wellbeing of both migrants and non-movers, which is substantiated both in the welfare of families and the changes in the built landscape. The construction of houses as a form of status investment has been described among ethnic Romanians in different regions of Romania (Nagy 2009; Larionescu 2012). As with the majority, Roma invested in the construction of houses, and in their improvement. This can be symbolically read as the affirmation of success – whether inside or outside the community. Different forms of conspicuous consumption were observed in home communities in special ritual transfers within the kinship structure (Beluschi Fabeni 2013; Berta 2014; Tesăr 2016). Studies have noted practices of investing in goods at home in order to increase status in the eyes of the majority (Anghel 2015), in particular by building houses (Benarrosh-Orsoni 2015) or even ‘palaces’ (Tomlinson 2007; Gräf 2008). Moreover, what distinguishes Roma migrants from their neighbours in terms of impact is their increased capacity for self-management.

In Gurai, migration provided the means for creating a burgeoning local informal job market and for the development of informal economy activities (such as money lending and peddling) that supplement the shortage of regular employment. First, ongoing house construction relies on unskilled labourers who are hired on a daily basis among the pool of local residents. Although such temporary jobs do not provide safety for the future, they nonetheless help those holding them to make ends meet. Second, a new occupational niche has been created, namely housekeeping for the households of Roma migrants who reside abroad with their entire families. Those who look after the houses of migrants, and in some cases dwell in their outbuildings, are paid monthly through wire transfer. The monthly pay varies between €50 and €200, depending on the size
of the house, its location, and the economic standing of its owners. Third, opportunities have arisen for women to be hired as domestic workers, either on a daily basis or for a longer period of time. In some instances, permanent carers are hired for old people who have been left behind by their families who reside abroad. Generally, those hired for such informal jobs are both ethnic Romanians and Roma.

The experience of migration is, however, different for the two Roma groups in Gurai. The process of Ursari’s transnational migration, which began in the aftermath of the fall of the communist regime has led to their territorial desegregation and to changes in the ethnic Romanians’ perception of them. The Ursari, who travelled abroad in pursuit of economic gains, started as early as the 1990s to invest effort and money in moving out of their ill-famed neighbourhood. Some bought houses located on the side streets in the city centre, from their Romanian owners. Others leased house plots from the city hall, alongside the motorway that crosses the town. Those who bought houses from Romanians demolished them and built new houses, following the architectural style of the houses they saw abroad. The leased plots were occupied with villa type houses constructed with much attention to detail, colour, and finishes. The process of constructing houses in areas of the town that are strikingly visible, started in the wake of migration and continues to present. The visibility of Ursari’s new houses contrasts with the invisibility of the formal Ursari quarter, which is sprawled along several rough unpaved roads on the outskirts of the town. The building process is nourished by financial remittances sent from members of the households who reside abroad to those left behind, who supervise the construction work. In several ways, the Ursari remittance-financed building projects resemble the construction boom that sweeps the homelands of migrants across the world. Illustratively, as though Ursari’s bad reputation was linked to the place they inhabited, the families who own new houses have a good reputation among their Romanian neighbours. They are talked about as having become civilised and less dangerous, and as being resourceful. Their Romanian neighbours are in awe of the brands and designer clothes that their children wear when returning home from abroad for holidays, of the cars they drive, and of the extent of their spending.

An ethnic Romanian resident of Gurai once told us, half-jokingly, that one could grasp the impact of Roma migration simply by observing the movement of people around the pub in the town centre. More specifically, the Ursari who used to be banned from the premises under state socialism, could now afford to eat and drink inside, while poor Romanians peep in through the pub windows, which our interlocutor ironically called ‘the fence of hunger’. It would be simplistic to claim that positive representations of the Ursari have replaced their stereotypical negative representations, given that local Romanians are rather ambivalent in their attitudes. It is equally consistent with the former’s position to claim that those still residing in the Ursari quarter are perceived as uneducated, drunken, uncivilised, dirty, unhealthy, backward, and dangerous.

Similar processes took place in Baniod in Cluj County, where more and more Kortorari Roma families, through extended kinship networks, left the town and
chose to live in various countries of Western Europe, coming back home only for special events such as religious holidays or lifecycle celebrations of the extended family. In addition, they pay special visits to manage and supervise the construction of their new houses in central locations in the town. In most cases, professional builders from the local majority (Romanians and Hungarians) are entrusted with these constructions. Maintenance of the buildings is the task of older family members and relatives. Some of the wealthier families opened car-wash businesses or car repair workshops. The other local Roma communities developed different migratory trajectories; consequently the effects are divergent as well.

In the state socialist era, members of the Romungre community were employed in factories and industrial centres around the town or in collective farms. During the 1990s, the restructuring of industry and collective farms brought about massive unemployment among local residents, not just Roma, the alternative being to find employment in the private or informal sector. The closeness of the county’s administrative headquarters ensured job opportunities for some of them, but these mostly went to the majority group. Others managed to open micro-enterprises (with 1–10 employees) of the kind that mushroomed in this period, or found employment in one of these enterprises. Roma relied mostly on social benefits and jobs in the informal market. After 2007, however, when EU accession overlapped with the first signs of the economic crisis, the Romungre joined the majority’s migratory networks.

In contrast to the migratory patterns of the Roma from Gurai and to the other Roma community from Baniod, the Romungre migration is sequential in time, i.e. migrants spend on average of 2–3 months abroad working in construction sites or farms, or in other seasonal jobs. On their return, they take on temporary jobs for a few months, until the new season starts abroad or a new opportunity emerges. Besides their saved money, they return home with new or improved skills and professional expertise, which, even without formal training, can help guarantee a more permanent job, though only in the longer term. Yet, only 16.1% of the household sample from Baniod has migration experience, which indicates that living in a small town, outside a segregated area, can still offer opportunities to make a living locally.

Conversely, in Bighal, situated in a county with a high poverty rate, 60% of households had migrated abroad for shorter periods of time, but these migrations only began after 2007. This percentage can be considered high and shows the rapid pace in which migration reproduces itself in a smaller community. There was a short period after the regime change in 1990 when mostly Hungarians, though only a few families, chose to move to Hungary or to the USA. Local Roma worked as day-labourers on farms and agricultural lands belonging to local residents. More recently – parallel with the decrease of active age population in the locality – opportunities to work as day-labourers has become scarcer, and the incoming investments in the region (which for a while was categorised as disadvantaged, thus offering preferential tax regulations) offer fewer positions than needed. Further, the Roma often did not fulfil the formal requirements to be
hired for certain positions. While the Hungarian population in the village (and in the micro-region) was not involved in any kind of migration before, the Romanians from neighbouring and more remote Romanian villages started to engage in temporary migration to Italy and Spain. On their return, they invested in houses in Bighal (which is situated in the centre of the region, at the crossroads of national roads and not far from the still unfinished highway). This way, new social connections emerged among the local communities, with more and more Hungarian and Roma families finding their way to jobs abroad in the last few years. Bighal is outstanding in at least two respects compared with the other research sites. First, a series of different inclusion and community programmes (education, housing, health, environment) were more or less successfully implemented in the locality very early on. Second, there is a long history of collaboration between the Roma and the majority population, which in some cases turned into ritual kin relations (Hungarians are chosen as Godparents for the Roma children). This provided the necessary conditions for the migrating Roma to maximise the benefits of migration, simply due to the extended networks they rely on, both in the context of migration and in the home context. For example, remittances are spent not only on the improvement of house utilities, but also on the education of children, which is not characteristic for the other field sites.

The impact of the remittances is complex, ambiguous, and sometimes contradictory. In the village in Brașov county, there is a visible improvement of housing conditions due to remittances and also due to the labour performed by the returnees, who are eager to apply their newly learnt skills at home. On the other hand, in addition to the improvement of housing within the compact Roma neighbourhood, new investments appear in the form of small family businesses or village shops (magazin mixt). Shopping in these shops is more convenient for the inhabitants of the neighbourhood, so they rarely go to the small shops in the centre of the village, which are run by members of the majority population. This has resulted in financial decline of these shops, since the wealthier members of the majority population have already started to do their shopping in the nearby malls, where it is cheaper and the range of goods is wider.

The process of improving their houses and building new brick houses (instead of the traditional wooden-framed mud huts) and the presence of small shops acts as a compelling force on the local authorities and institutions to take firmer action to develop and improve the basic infrastructure in the neighbourhood. The localised development in the neighbourhood – though it might be too early to conclude, given that the migration process is still unfolding – contributes, at least for some, to the perpetuation of geographical and social segregation of the local Roma. On the other hand, those who can afford it try to buy houses on the main road of the village and move into more central locations in order to attain a higher status. As in the cases of Gurai and Baniod, this can be interpreted as bottom-up residential desegregation, while the appearance of shops within the segregated settlement points in the opposite direction – at least at this relatively early stage of migration.

Houses built using remittances are the most common material expression of success and improvement (Leinaweaver 2009; Moisa 2009; Mihăilescu 2011;
Lopez 2015) and stand as proxies for the absent migrants in the process of transnational relatedness (Dalakoglou 2010). Placed within the worldwide ‘remittance landscape’ (Lopez 2015), Central and Eastern European Roma migrants’ architectural projects articulate aspirations and desires of improving one’s life and wellbeing (Grill 2016), or of becoming complete moral persons (Benarrosh-Orsoni 2015) through integrating the materiality of the buildings into the process of marriage (Tesâr 2016). Yet, what is very particular about Roma’s use of remittances for building projects, when compared with the non-Roma migrants, is the struggle to build a house in the centre of one’s hometown, as the Ursari case illustrates, or at the centre of one’s village, as described in the above-mentioned ethnographies. Thus, in several locations of our research, Roma’s remittance landscape is the expression of the overlapping of one’s personal fulfilment with one’s participation/integration into the non-Roma social worlds. In other words, migration offers opportunities for the process of territorial and ethnic desegregation of Roma, which results in piecemeal changes to the perception of Roma by their host societies.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have presented data gathered from five Romanian settlements using mixed methods. The novelty of our approach is that it focused on the local contexts and offered a comparative view of the migration of Romanian Roma, while accounting for the effects of migration on home communities. The socio-economic indicators collected in our survey broadly map onto the findings of previous descriptions of the regional and local profiles of the localities. In addition, we have been able to produce a detailed analysis of the connections between the local contexts, different patterns of migration, and local social changes supported by qualitative analysis.

Conceptually, the migration of Roma from Romania cannot be captured with a single theoretical model. The diversity of the phenomenon defies simple explanatory patterns. While some features may be explained with the neo-classical economic analysis of relative deprivation (Duval & Wolff 2016), of growing precariousness, persistence of discrimination and history of local ethnic conflicts, in other cases the focus must be on the development and cultivation of transnational ties, and circular mobility, requiring a different model of analysis. Investments and increased consumption in home communities are also important features of the mobility patterns we observed. As a general approach we proposed to view the migration of Roma in the five localities as part of a migration cycle, which develops at a differentiated pace. In some of the localities, particular groups were pioneers of migration, even before the majority, and now many Roma coming from these groups are settled with their family networks abroad. It is, however, more typical that the migration of the local Roma emerged later (mainly after 2007), so in these cases we are dealing with a relatively new migration. As with to the migration cycle of the majority societies, this mobility is undergoing changes.
It would be misleading to focus on ethnicity *per se* as an explanatory variable for all our cases, since different networks within the Roma communities and patterns of mobility of the local majority population play more important roles than ethnic belonging. However, we should not underestimate the role of social and ethnic boundaries, since the development of networks is shaped by the existence of different local groups who participate in differentiated migration. Based on the analysis, we can distinguish between two directions of network formation that shape these mobility paths. On the one hand, we can see the development of close-knit family networks, which do not encompass the entire local ethnic group, being more focused on a particular kinship group. Some of the early migrants, typically from groups that are viewed as ‘traditionalists’ (e.g. *Ursari, Kortorari*) from Cluj and Ialomiţa, relied on and developed these kinds of networks. On the other hand, other migration networks are more encompassing. The emergence of the new migration cycle among the local Roma in the settlements that we studied can be seen as catching up with the existent broader mobility patterns present among the majority population through networks which bridge ethnic divides. Thus the migration networks that we observed are either broader or much narrower than the concept of ethnic networks would suggest.

The effect of financial and social remittances is shaped by these networks and group boundaries. We observed the process of status increase in all cases, and this is often accompanied by spontaneous residential desegregation. Moving away from compact communities does not mean giving up particularities. Economic improvement also created new jobs in the home communities, particularly within the spheres related to care (elderly care, taking care of empty houses, etc.) or services (car-wash business, car repair workshops, etc.). Another effect of increased status is the more conscious self-management of the returnees. This process is commented on approvingly by the local majority who perceive this effect of migration as a ‘civilising’ process among the local Roma. The concept of *being at home* in these ethnically mixed communities is slowly undergoing changes. In these places, Roma carve out increasingly visible and significant positions for themselves as a consequence of their mobility.

**Notes**

* The research leading to the present publication results from MigRom, ‘The immigration of Romanian Roma to Western Europe: Causes, effects, and future engagement strategies’, a project funded by the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme under the call on ‘Dealing with diversity and cohesion: the case of the Roma in the European Union’ (GA319901).

1 This chapter benefited from the feedback received from the editors of this volume and comments received from our colleagues at the Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities during a seminar in October 2016. We are also grateful to our research assistants and research participants in the five localities. All remaining shortcomings are the responsibility of the authors.

2 For details of the methodology, see http://migrom.humanities.manchester.ac.uk/report-policy-briefs/. During the fieldwork, local research assistants (most of them of
Roma origin) joined the research team, helping both with the data collection process and with the interpretation of the findings.

3 In assessing the regional and local development of the field sites, we followed the concept worked out by Sandu (2011) based on data from the National Censuses (2002, 2011). See also maps of the urban (Anton et al. 2014) and rural marginality (Teșliuc, Grigoraș & Stânculescu 2016).

4 Names of the five localities were altered in order to protect the identity of the research participants.

5 In Table 3.1 we provide rounded numbers of the total population to preserve the anonymity of the localities.

6 Our sample includes 288 non-Roma persons (183 Romanians and 105 Hungarians), who live in ethnically mixed households/families together with the Roma. In some cases, they were categorised by the local assistants as Roma, but they did not want to be considered as Roma. It is worth mentioning that the ethnically mixed families mostly live in ethnically mixed neighbourhoods, while 81.1% of the Roma live in compact Roma communities.


8 There is certainly a bias in responses to the survey questions; people tend to overemphasise the importance of the ‘official’ income at the expense of other sources for fear of losing the MGI.

9 The calculation method can be found at: http://asistentasociala.info/social/html.

10 In our sample, we could not include households with all members abroad for longer periods. We tried to gather information about them using different methods (qualitative interviews and ethnography) to complete the picture.

11 See Diminescu (2009).

12 National and international media reports made allegations of child trafficking and other crimes in relation to Gurai Roma. Local Romanians associate crime and other negative stereotypes with Ursari segregated neighbourhood and the people who still inhabit it, while representing positively those who moved out of the place.

References


4 Founder effects and transnational mutations

The familial structure of a Romani diaspora*

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Introduction

In this chapter, we present a case that illustrates the role of kinship networks in the recent migration of Romanian Roma groups to the West. Commonly, Roma family networks diverge in important ways from those found among majority European populations, including those in their home countries. Our case study involves a group of people who self-ascribe as Roma, the descendants of a Roma couple originating in a Transylvanian town. In recent decades, about 1,000 people from this family network have created Roma ethnic enclaves in dozens of localities in Western Europe and the United States. Their networks of kin relations have provided effective bottom-up sources of information, influence and support to this diaspora which constitutes one of the most marginalised and segregated communities in Europe.

The case study may have some relevance for migration studies, as Ballard (2008) notes, ‘analysts of migration have paid remarkably little attention to matters of kinship’, even if ‘the success with which migrants are continuing to sweep across ever more defended borders is to a large extent […] kinship-driven’ (Ballard 2008: 46). Often, extended kin and marriage networks have become chain-migration devices, ‘powerful engines of socioeconomic change’ that deserve closer examination than they have hitherto received (ibid.).

Particularly in Europe, the study of the role of kinship and families in migration seems to have been neglected. In an important review of the topic, Kofman (2004) stresses how ‘despite being the dominant mode of legal entry for the past two decades in European Union states, the study of family migration has been marginalised theoretically, methodologically, and empirically’ (Kofman 2004: 243). Commonly, ‘migrants cannot determine for themselves the persons who constitute their family’ (ibid.). State authorities define this typically as the ‘nuclear’ or ‘conjugal’ family. This narrow view of family ties corresponds to the predominance of employment-led migration both in policy and research agendas. ‘Family’ has usually been used to refer primarily to those people
'accompanying workers'. Hence, in policy terms, family-related migration is perceived as a secondary or derived type of migration.

Interestingly, in the decade following Kofman’s review, a number of family issues ‘moved to the centre of political debates on migration, integration and multiculturalism in Europe’ (Kraler 2011: 1). These debates took place within the frameworks of governments’ policies seeking to control the number of migrants, particularly those poorer or less skilled, many of whom came from countries with contrasting family and marriage systems. Therefore, many of these policies use immigration control to manage familial relationships (see Kofman 2004; Kofman, Kraler, Kohli, & Schmoll 2011; Grillo 2011). Processes of family or spousal reunification are particularly important in this respect (González-Ferrer 2011), and more generally, the interaction of ‘migrants and their descendants with legal systems and judicial processes in both receiving and sending countries around key life cycle events’ are also important (Ballard et al. 2009: 9).

Moreover, in many European neighbourhoods there is a widening conceptual, moral, and political gap concerning gender and marriage issues between members of the dominant majorities who see themselves as the ‘legitimate insiders’ (Ballard 2008) and many of the members of the migrant minorities who have settled there. An over-commitment to familial solidarity, perceived to exist among some migrant minorities, is often seen as constraining individuality and restricting personal and human rights. Some allegedly transgressive practices such as arranged or early marriages are becoming key elements of political contention (Grillo 2011). They are often presented in the most sensational forms such as lurid reports about ‘forced marriages’, ‘family clans trafficking in child brides’, and even the so-called ‘honour killings’. Over the past decade, Romanian Roma have figured prominently in the mass media as groups whose family practices are seen as objectionable.

In this same vein, European governments are being accused of inaction in what is seen as a tolerant attitude toward oppressive family regimes entailed by their support of a false multiculturalism (Wikan 2002; Hagelund 2008).

In Europe, this politicisation of family issues is framed by the concerns associated with the apparent erosion of family solidarity, the fall of fertility below replacement levels, and the ageing of populations, all of which are seen as serious threats to the sustainability of the present welfare states.

These clashes and conflicts bring research on migrant families into the spotlight. There is a growing body of literature that deals with various family strategies deployed in the course of migration. For instance, much attention has been paid to the gendered composition of migration and the generational changes that migration is generating in gender relationships (Kraler 2011). The growth of mixed marriages and the generation of mixed, dialogical sociality is receiving increasing attention (Rodríguez-García 2008; Bauer 2010). Important research is also being produced on transnational marriages and the processes involved in supporting families across borders (Kraler 2011), on the construction, mostly by women, of ‘global care chains’ that transcend several global regions (Hochschild
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2005; Yeates 2009), as well as on the transnational circulation of care in the moral economies of families bounded by complex patterns of reciprocity (Baldassar & Merla 2014).

However, most of these valuable research lines still seem bound by overly restrictive and static models of the ‘migrant family’ and its problems with integration (Kofman 2004, Kraler 2011). The concept of the ‘family’ itself is rarely questioned. This is surprising, since the ‘super-diversity’ (Vertovec 2007) that is present today in many European countries requires us to recognise the diversity of kinship and gender projects within which transnational ‘families’ are currently embedded.

Our case study therefore needs to be integrated within more complex models that show how the kinship-instituted ideologies and norms of migrant minorities not only ‘generate distinctive patterns of interpersonal behaviour’ but ‘also have a far-reaching impact on demographic developments, on innumerable aspects of their users’ everyday social, personal and strategic practices, and hence on the structure of the wider socio-political order’ (Ballard 2008: 48).

Particularly relevant to the analysis of this case is therefore the work of migration experts who entertain a view of kinship in a broader anthropological sense, as a mediator between personal, domestic, and institutionalised social networks (Boyd 1989; Dumon 1989; Ballard 1990, 2008, 2009).

The work of Boyd and her collaborators (Boyd 1989; Boyd & Nowak 2012) has been an inspiration with respect to the attention given to the permanence of strong ties that bind affinal and birth kin in ‘a complex web of social roles and interpersonal relationships’ (Boyd 1989: 639). Families in migration are seen as active agents who form networks of assistance, information, and moral obligation (Boyd 1989). Other important lines of work demonstrate how ‘members of families retain their sense of collectivity and kinship in spite of being spread across multiple nations’ (Baldassar, Wilding, & Baldock 2007: 13).

Ballard’s comparative approach to the kinship models of non-European minorities living today in Europe has been particularly helpful for situating our case within a wider cross-cultural perspective (Ballard 1990, 2008). Particularly inspirational was Ballard’s (1990) seminal research comparing the differential effects of marriage rules, gender norms, and funerary practices on the migration processes of two Punjabi groups that had moved to Britain, and the ‘varied and often sharply contrasting social trajectories’ of the two groups resulting in divergent patterns of economic and educational development (Ballard 1990: 220).

Also very helpful was his recent essay showing the ongoing clash between the kinship conventions and normative worlds of dominant European majorities and the non-European minorities who seem to have ‘invaded’ the territory of their former colonial masters (Ballard 2008). Our case study offers important contrasts to Ballard’s views, since the Roma considered in our study are both European and Christians, making them the targets of a distinct exclusionary history.

We also sympathise with the ways in which some demographers applied comparative analysis of kinship and gender systems to the study of differential fertility
patterns in several world societies. Mason (2001), for instance, studied the role of gender and family systems in fertility transition and traced the implications for future trends in fertility.

__Substantive and theoretical hypotheses in the case studied__

From this starting point, we have generated five main hypotheses that underlie our own analysis:

1. Romanian Roma ‘families’ living in Western Europe are generally part of wide and dense kinship networks that extend over several countries. Ties of filiation and marriage beyond members of actual households are crucial to systems of support and care across generations.
2. These kin networks are embedded in larger social fields of intermarrying groups. They can be described as ‘networks of networks’, or as a diffuse community that shares a common history, language, and territorial affiliation.
3. These wide kinship networks are generated by the persistent operation of culturally specific marriage and gender systems that produce distinct cycles of domestic development.
4. These marriage and gender systems contribute to reproductive regimes that have sustained high fertility for generations.
5. The intense transnational migration observed among these Roma groups is a path-dependent process, contingent on structural changes and favourable conditions. It was opened by the fall of the Communist regime and has matured through the long-term process of Romania’s integration into the EU.

In this chapter, we develop each of the elements listed. First, we present the group’s large network of descent, its origins in a shantytown, and its connection with a larger Roma community. We briefly describe how we studied this group and show the main historical phases of the migration of families from this network. Following this, we analyse the marriage system and the domestic organisation of the community, as well as the important demographic growth underpinning this diaspora. Finally, we summarise the most important lessons to be gained from an initial analysis of this case.¹

__The case study: the Jonesči diaspora__

Calaş (a pseudonym) is a Transylvanian town of about 10,000 inhabitants that lies on the northern side of the Apuseni Mountains. The national road to Hungary crosses the town. On the roadside, about two kilometres outside of Calaş, a slope ascends from the railway tracks towards the forested hills. On this slope, there is a rubbish dump and, beyond it, a shantytown made up of one-storey houses, many of which are abandoned and derelict. In December 1989,
over 400 Roma Korturari (divided into around 65 households) lived in this area in poverty, without running water or electricity. They referred to it as Po Plaj, ‘on the hill’. These people belonged to three major family groups that had been living there for decades. The largest of these groups was known as the Jonesči, or ‘sons of Ion’, the founder of the lineage. They occupied a cluster of 27 houses, mostly on the southern side of the hill.

Ion was born around 1890 and came to Calaş after the First World War. He married twice and had 14 children between 1907 and 1944. Most of his children and grandchildren were born in Calaş, though one of them claims that he was born in Russia. Most likely, he was born in Transnistria in 1942 when the Po Plaj Roma were deported there (see Chapter 2). After the war, the family returned to Calaş, and Ion died there in the late 1960s.

Literally speaking, the Jonesči are the descendants of Ion. It is a pyramidal population whose history began from one person (in fact a married couple), around a century ago, and developed in Calaş into a group of families formed mostly around male ties. This group shows a bilateral understanding of kinship and filiation with a strong patrilocal, patriarchal, and patrilineal bias (see also Scheffler 2001; Godelier 2004; Beluschi-Fabeni 2013a). Living and growing up together is a key element in the Jonesči sense of memory and belonging.

A few months after the death of Ceauşescu, many adults from Jonesči families started to move abroad, mainly to Germany. This was the first step in a process of displacement that would eventually encompass most of Ion’s descendants. Today, a quarter of a century later, the Jonesči constitute a kinship network of over 1,000 people living in over 30 localities in a dozen European and American countries. Some of their children were born in these places, attend local schools, speak the local languages, and are obtaining new nationalities. Through the intense use of communication technologies, they maintain daily interactions among relatives in a digitally linked diaspora.

The eponymous founder’s name represents a category of self-identification that at times exceeds kinship and has become a sort of ethnic label. We have found it used in independent reports from different countries to allude to one of the resident Roma groups.

Although most Jonesči have grown roots in foreign places where they have lived for years, most adults maintain a strong connection with Calaş as their homeland, and many dream of returning there, to the place where their dead are buried. As for many other migrants, building a house in their home country has been a key motive for saving money and is a sign of the fulfilment of the migratory project. The more prosperous families have built houses there, some of which are ostentatious, multi-storey and colourful ‘palaces’ that have transformed the town’s urban landscape. They have also generated considerable resentment among non-Roma neighbours. These blue-red Roma neighbourhoods are becoming a tourist attraction and may be one of the most visible legacies of post-communist Romanian migration, at least in terms of urban development.

On the other hand, most of the Jonesči houses in Po Plaj now lie in ruins. The Jonesči do not want to return there and instead they prefer to build new houses
in more central areas of town. Some of the houses that are in a better condition have since been inhabited by Roma people from rural communes around Calaș, whose living conditions were even worse than those at Po Plaj.

The Joneschi, like most Roma immigrants, have rarely been welcomed in Western European countries. Almost everywhere their arrival illustrates what Portes & Böröcz (1989) describe as the ‘handicapped context of reception’ characterised by low receptivity by the host society and a ‘dim view’ of the inflow of these migrants by both authorities and the majority populations. Employers often describe these immigrants negatively ‘either as unsuitable labor or as suitable only for menial jobs, a condition compounded by generalized prejudice among the native populations’ (Portes & Böröcz 1989: 618). However, contrary to these authors’ predictions, the migration patterns of the Joneschi within these negative environments have not been ‘surreptitious’ or ‘temporary’ (ibid.), and their settlement patterns have not always been precarious.

Nonetheless, as diaspora, the participation of the Joneschi in the formal labour market has been very limited. Few Joneschi adults have had full-time jobs. Their low level of education and qualifications have made it difficult for them to compete for skilled or semi-skilled jobs. In addition, they often feel discriminated against when their ‘Gypsy’ identity is discovered. Most families have survived by means of a variety of income-generating activities such as different forms of begging, recycling, scrap metal collection, seasonal farm work, petty trade, and small businesses such as small shops or car-wash outlets. Welfare benefits are resources that most households have used whenever possible. Although the desire for economic improvement and savings was a key motivation for displacement, Joneschi international migration cannot be characterised as labour-led migration.

In sum, we contemplate a form of radiating transnationalism from below (Smith & Guarnizo 1998), in which members of a localised descent group have moved to a dozen different countries, and maintain strong connections both among themselves and with those in their country of origin using advanced communication technologies. Through a process of ‘ethnic crystallization’ (Ballard 2008), these families have been able to recreate miniature Romani worlds almost everywhere they have moved to, from slums in the periphery of European cities to houses and flats in working-class quarters. Kin and family networks have been crucial to this transnational project, which, arguably, constitutes one of the most reproductively active migratory movements of any European population today.

Since 2007, Joneschi displacements have become more multidirectional and circular. They include temporary and long-term displacements across different countries, including Romania. Today, Joneschi families return to Calaș and other Romanian localities for holidays, weddings, and funerary rituals. Some benefit from pensions and public services from different host countries and will return there, for instance, for follow-up medical treatments scheduled by their family doctors.

This prolonged process of transnational migration involves a category of people who see themselves as a bounded collective with a clear origin in time,
space, and relatedness. In the process, the Jonesči have maintained some key cultural beliefs, values, rituals, norms, and even dietary habits in the most adverse circumstances. But they have also changed in many ways, and have contributed to changes in the social texture of their place of origin.

**The wider community: Amare Roma/the lume**

The Jonesči consider themselves part of a wider community of Roma families or kinship groups that live all over Transylvania and Banat. They refer to the group as Amare Roma, ‘our Roma’, considered to include those people whose judgement really counts and whose respect they strive for. In their daily speech this large community is also referred to as the lume (from Romanian lume, ‘world, people’) – the people, the meaningful social universe. The lume also represents a linguistic community that speaks a particular Romani dialect and is largely endogamous. In previous work (Beluschi-Fabeni 2013b) we described how Jonesči explained the historical ‘foundation’ of their community of lineages (in Romani, race) – the sets of descent constructs bound by marriage alliances. Their narrative tells how their ancestors used to travel in carts with tents as groups of Korturari Roma (from Romanian ‘corturari’, ‘nomads with tents’), led by notable and respected men (‘bulibașa’), who stopped travelling at some point in time and settled in the towns and cities where their descendants now live. Outside the context of this narration, the term Korturari, as well as ‘Čurari’ (‘sieve makers’, from Romanian ‘ciurar’) was more generally used by the Jonesči to refer to Roma communities who speak the same Romani dialect and share a common cultural background (see also Urech & van den Heuvel 2011). Interestingly, this term is rarely used by the younger generations and instead it has been replaced by the more general term Amare Roma or simply Roma to refer to a supposed community of equals.

This large and diffuse linguistic, territorial, and cultural community constitutes a social space formed by a series of nested networks of kin and kin of kin (cf. Glick Schiller, Basch, & Blanc-Szanton 1992; Piasere 2004). It is also a moral and legal community, as it sustains an efficient system of autonomous law-making and conflict resolution which at present operates transnationally. This judicial system is based on the kris or ‘Romani court’ and the acceptance of its decisions shows the strength of the community and the fear of being shunned by it (cf. Weyrauch 2001; Marushiakova & Popov 2007).

The international dispersion of the Amare Roma has been accompanied by the rapid development of new information and communication technologies. Today a key transnational communicative dimension underscores this community’s existence, wherein daily interactions help to diffuse particular pieces of information and amplify certain forms of remembering and forgetting. Such daily interactions facilitate certain institutional processes such as marriage agreements or kris negotiations, which are carried out online and thus long-distance (Itzigsohn & Saucedo 2002).

Long-term international migration has also meant increased differentiation within the Amare Roma society. Some families and local groups are doing better
economically because local circumstances have been more favourable, but also because some individuals and families have been more prudent, organised, or hard-working. In this process of social mobility, the relationships among some family groups have been re-evaluated. For instance, the Jonesci have become more appreciative of some of their old neighbours from Po Plaj who they had previously stigmatised as ‘hindžere’ (‘dog skinners’, from Romanian ‘hingher’) but who later became more successful in their endeavours abroad. Thus, many of them have become acceptable xanamikuri (co-fathers-in-law) and marriage partners for the Jonesci.

Methods and sources of data

Our data were collected through longitudinal ethnographic research among seven Roma family networks living in Spain (cf. Beluschi-Fabeni, Gamella, & Gómez Oehler 2015). Three of these networks were Korturari/Čurari people from the region of Calaș. One of them belonged to the Jonesci family. Long-term fieldwork in Granada, Malaga, Seville, Cordoba, and Madrid was complemented by short trips to the UK and Romania in order to obtain a multi-sited perspective on this network.

The sample category relied upon for this study, the Jonesci network, emerged as an emic category among the people we met in the field. The ‘Jonesci’ are a self-bounded group: membership is defined on the basis of belonging to consanguineous lines, although each member has a different perspective on the whole network. Those related through female lines also often have a strong affiliation to their fathers’ race.

We undertook the genealogical reconstruction of this network using a combination of historical demography and ethnographic methods applied in previous work among Romani populations (see also Martin & Gamella 2005; Gamella, Carrasco-Muñoz, & Garrido 2014). A great-grandson of Ion contributed as a research assistant and co-author. With his assistance, we accessed many other Jonesci directly or via mobile phones and digital social networks. We also had key informants from other branches of the lineage over and across different periods and countries (see also Beluschi-Fabeni 2013a; Beluschi-Fabeni et al. 2015).

Where possible, we consulted archival data. However, we relied mainly on the information provided by the subjects themselves – that is, their knowledge of their relatives – and we triangulated the information obtained. We also used information from other sources such as birth and death dates from Calaș cemetery tombstones. Today, our database includes about 1,200 individuals. Over 640 are direct descendants of Ion and his second wife. All personal information has been anonymised and codified.

The main phases of the Jonesci diaspora

The Jonesci diaspora appears today as a mature migration process, an impressive testimony to the resourcefulness and resilience of a people with apparently very
little human or financial capital. However, it has been a dynamic historical process. Its direction, composition, and persistence has been conditioned by structural shifts and connected political and economic changes in both sending and receiving countries (Boyd 1989). For that reason, the main periods of Jonesči migrations roughly correspond to those of other Romanian citizens who migrated to EU countries after 1989 (Horváth & Anghel 2009; Anghel 2013).

However, the migratory strategies developed by the Jonesči often diverged from those of their non-Roma compatriots in two key aspects. First, there was an important difference in the role of labour demands as a key impetus for staying in the new place of residence, although Roma groups were heterogeneous in this respect.

Additionally, Roma were probably pioneers in some of the migration processes undertaken by Romanians more generally. Often, they had greater freedom of movement due to their experiences of enduring difficult living conditions and ‘unregistered’ existences. They were often less discouraged by state regulations and remained undocumented for long periods.

**First phase: asylum seekers in Germany (1990–1993)**

The first large Jonesči migrations targeted primarily Germany. They were part of a ‘strong wave of Romanian citizens’ that used the demand for political asylum as a resource (Anghel 2013: 5). In this phase, the pathfinders among Korturari Roma seem to have been urban residents in places such as Timişoara and Hunedoara. Some Jonesči, in turn, facilitated the migration of some of their neighbours in Calaș, who often paid them for their assistance to travel to Germany.

By mid-1991 most of the young Jonesči adults had moved to Germany. Couples from Po Plaj travelled with some of their children, leaving the others in Calaș in the care of their grandparents. They received subsidised housing, food coupons, and some cash, while their asylum applications were being decided. During that time, family members had access to public health care, and their children were able to attend public schools.

For instance, Rupa, a grandchild of Ion the Founder, born in 1961, spent more than two years in Cologne with Myndra, his wife, and their two older sons, who were 13 and 11 years old at the time. Their three younger daughters remained in Romania with their paternal grandparents. Rupa and Myndra were granted a house and benefits while their asylum case was being decided. Rupa obtained work in a fruit-processing factory. Their children attended public school (irregularly) and begged in the streets. Rupa and Myndra were able to save some 30,000 German Marks, which they took back to Calaș. Two new sons were born during these years in Germany.

Access to quality public services was very important for the Jonesči. For instance, Martza, the wife of one of the grandsons of Ion, had her eighth child in Cologne in 1992, when she was 32. She had to undergo a caesarean section. Her husband was seriously ill at the time and she did not want any more pregnancies.
She therefore requested and received a tubal ligation from a ‘German doctor who spoke Romanian’ as part of her surgical procedure.

Germany’s policies towards asylum seekers became increasingly restricted and selective. There were many signs of a rise in negative attitudes among the German public in response to the growing presence of foreign immigrants. In 1991 and 1992, racist attacks against foreigners, often targeting Romanian Roma, shocked the country. In September 1992, Germany signed a bilateral repatriation agreement with Romania, wherein Romania agreed to take back 100,000 Romanian citizens. Germany would cover the transport costs. Furthermore, Romania was included in the list of safe countries and further asylum applications were denied. The open-door policy for those escaping the Iron Curtain had ended (Matras 2000).

By the end of 1992, most Jonesči families living in Germany were repatriated or went back to Calaș voluntarily. A combination of social benefits, formal and informal jobs, and begging, together with favourable exchange rates allowed many Jonesči to take their savings to Calaș. They were able to live on those savings for some time. A few improved their houses or bought land in town. While their stay in Germany rarely lasted more than a couple of years, it was nevertheless very important for their future plans and expectations. Most of the adults have positive memories of that period, particularly when compared with that which they were to endure later on.


During these years, the economic situation in Romania deteriorated dramatically. The massive restructuring of the Romanian economy generated a rise in unemployment, inflation, and poverty that led to the emergence of an entire class of potential migrants. Anghel (2013: 7) emphasises how the definitive destruction of job opportunities provided ‘a sense of this dramatic change’. From a total of 9.5 million jobs in 1990, only 4.5 million remained active in 1999, and 4.1 million in 2010.

In this period, the Jonesči developed new migratory strategies, mostly of a dynamic, exploratory, and unsettled type. From 1994 to 1997 they travelled to Italy, France, and the Netherlands and later to the UK, Ireland, Spain, and Portugal. Interestingly, by 1995, Argentina (alongside Brazil and Uruguay) became a destination for a handful of Jonesči families who stayed there until 2001. Travelling to Argentina was an exception motivated by the special treatment offered to migrants from Central and Eastern Europe in this country.³

Their status as irregular migrants and the presence of heightened border controls in most European countries affected their displacements. Their access to the formal job market and the housing sector was limited. They travelled mostly in family groups and established themselves in camps, slums, or abandoned buildings, lacking the most basic facilities and comforts. Sometimes these living conditions were not so different from those that they had endured in Po Plaj. Conversely, they were slowly gaining experience and adapting to different
countries and a variety of languages, legislations, and perceptions of them as Romanian ‘Gypsies’.

Families often followed the traces of relatives or co-ethnics who had arrived earlier. Sometimes the youngest children were left in Calaș in their grandparents’ care. Often the grandparents also moved in order to help out in the new places of residence. They tried to exploit gaps in the systems of control and find favourable contexts for their adaptive practices. For instance, Roma migrants adapted to the local traditions of slum formation in each country. In Spain, some Roma families built chabolas (‘shacks’) in some of the country’s largest shantytowns (poblados chabolistas), which at the time were occupied mostly by Spanish Gitanos. In France and Italy, bidonvilles or campi also entered a ‘Romanian’ phase. The UK, in contrast, had few slum camps, which underscores the important policy differences concerning substandard housing and the building of shacks in adjacent European countries.

Third phase: residents all over Europe (1997–2002)

Romania’s economic situation further deteriorated in the aftermath of the restructuring plan of 1997 (Calcagno, Hefner, & Dan 2006). At that point, the migration of Romanians to Italy and Spain began to increase. By then, most Jonesči were living in various EU countries. They tried to balance the risks of displacement against their ability to develop new social ties with potential partners, clients, and local authorities.

While some Jonesči travelled to Italy and remained there, during this phase, Ireland, the UK, and Spain were their main destination points. There was a period of economic expansion in these countries. From 1996 to 2007, Spain was seen as a land of opportunity, coinciding with the economic boom of the period and the rising supply of informal and low-skilled jobs, mostly in intensive labour sectors such as the construction industry, tourism, and agriculture. Although few Jonesči obtained stable jobs, they nonetheless benefited from the general rise in salaries and living conditions.

In Spain, after a short stay in Madrid in 1996, a few Jonesči families travelled south to Granada, Malaga, Seville, and some surrounding towns. By 1997 there were four Jonesči families living in rented houses and flats in Granada. In the following years, more than 40 families moved to this city. Some occupied empty buildings as squatters, being joined there by brothers, cousins, in-laws, and their families (see Piemontese & Beluschi-Fabeni 2014). Following a similar migration trajectory, other groups of Korturari settled in Malaga, Seville, Jaen, and Murcia. In Spain, they often replicated the tendency to create ‘colonies’ of related patri-groups in a wide region, as their ancestors had in Transylvania and the Banat. Many of these families later moved to Ireland, the UK and, less frequently, Germany.

Cooperation among related households reduced the costs of raising children and recreated sustaining and supportive social and cultural spaces. Concerted action was also important in negotiations with public authorities, as in the case
of illegally occupied buildings or the protection of families from abusive groups that often preyed on irregular migrants (Anghel 2013).

Fourth phase: slow and partial access to citizenship (2002–present)

As part of the accession agreement between the EU and Romania in 2002, Romanian citizens were made exempt from visa requirements when travelling to the EU. In the following years, Romanian migration to EU countries intensified, particularly to Italy and Spain. As a result, the number of Romanian residents registered in Spain rose from about 30,000 in 2001 to about 865,000 in 2010, almost multiplying their numbers by 30. Romanians became the largest group of foreign residents. Only Italy had a larger number of Romanian residents (968,576 in 2010). The Joneschi favoured Spain over Italy. They generally arrived with a three-month tourist visa, and then overstayed when it expired.

In 2007, Romania became a member of the EU. The Joneschi migration patterns became more circular and multidirectional as travels to and from Romania increased. Veresco (born 1977) remembered: ‘When Romania entered the EU, our lives were changed. We did not have to worry about the police anymore, that they would discover us and expel us’.

The number of Joneschi people in Granada reached its zenith between 2004 and 2008. From 2009, Spain became less attractive as a migratory destination for people of this lineage; instead, many moved to the UK, Ireland, and Germany. However, this does not apply to all Korturari groups. Since 2001, members of two other family networks originating in rural communes near Calaș moved to and settled in Granada. They are related to the Joneschi through various marriage ties. Two of these couples were instrumental in the first exploratory trips. In the coming years, a large part of these two kin networks moved to Granada. Thus, by the end of 2015, we found 69 households from these two communes living in this city. They had developed different occupational, residential, and migratory strategies to those of the Joneschi. For instance, they rarely travelled to other foreign countries, and a significant number of these families return every summer to Romania to work in the fields and in the forests.

By early 2016, only 13 Joneschi households consisting of about 90 people remained in Granada. Two of these families left for Ireland in the following months, and others were considering moving. Their motives for these international displacements were not simply economic. For instance, 56-year-old Gica and his three adult sons moved to the UK because they had cases pending in the Spanish courts for petty thefts, unpaid fines, and driving without insurance. Kostika, 24, married, with a child, was unemployed and barely surviving on the money earned from parking cars. In 2016, he was offered a job in Ireland by his father-in-law (and first cousin), who was doing well in the car-wash business. Rosa, Kostika’s wife was very happy to move back to her parents and to the country where she had grown up.
At the time of writing, anti-Gypsy sentiments have risen all over Europe. In most Western countries, the Romanian Roma have come to epitomise the undesirable migrants from Eastern EU countries that have little or nothing to offer the host societies. The Jonesči are well aware of the turbulent social and economic climate that is threatening the EU and they are worried. Some of them are developing surprising strategies including a kind of ‘rush’ to beg in the USA, while others are investing more in houses back in Calaş. In sum, the position of the Jonesči diaspora is far from conclusive and should continue to be documented.

Three generations nourishing the diaspora

The main agents nourishing the Jonesči diaspora roughly belong to three cohorts that were born in Calaş in the last century. First, there are those who are currently grandparents, born mostly in the 1950s and early 1960s. They were the pioneers in the first two phases of migration. Second, there is the generation of the parents, mostly born in the 1970s, who are currently in their forties. They are most experienced with and active in economic endeavours and social negotiations. Third, there are the parents’ younger siblings and older children, born in the 1980s and early 1990s. They have spent most of their childhood and teenage years abroad. They are young parents raising children. They are also the cohort that is most actively involved in digital communication and social media with their relatives and co-ethnics.

Regular school enrolment was very difficult for this last cohort. They rarely attended schools, whether in Romania or the destination countries, and are less literate than their parents. These children are part of what Rumbaut (1976, 2004) has called ‘the 1.5 generation’ of international migrants. They are now parents who can barely help their own children with the schoolwork they bring home from the British, Irish, or Spanish schools that they attend.

For example, Fardi, born in 1987, moved to Germany with his parents at the age of four, then lived for a couple of years back in Calaş before moving to France. After that, he moved to Spain where his family stayed for ten years. He is almost completely illiterate. Angela, who was ten when she first arrived to Spain, is another example. She lived with her parents in vans and shacks in the Spanish Levant until their luck improved, when her father discovered a profitable way to help Romanians obtain legal Spanish work permits and other documents. After that, they moved to a nice house with the rest of the family. Yet, she never returned to school, and when she married at 18 she too was barely able to read or write.

The institutional basis of kinship networks

Among other (non-Roma) Romanians, networks of kin and friendship have also facilitated migration (see also Şerban & Voicu 2010; Anghel 2013). However, as stated previously, family and kin networks among Roma Korturari tend to be larger and more complex. They include hundreds and even thousands of people linked by ties of birth and marriage. These intricate Roma kin networks derive
from culturally distinct reproductive strategies. At the core of these reproductive strategies are marriage systems and domestic dynamics that include gendered rights and obligations for each family role. These strategies, in turn, must be understood in interaction with processes of historical exclusion, persecution, and discrimination. Such strategies can be viewed in terms of ‘weapons of the poor’ or collective forms of resistance (Scott 1985) and cultural reaffirmation (Kóczé 2009). Arguably, in their reproductive strategies, Roma groups have been able to exercise a minimum of autonomy compared with their limited options in the reproductive, residential, or political domains.

A contrastive marriage system

Marriage is a key institution in the reproductive systems of most Romani groups. Roma families are close-knit as a result of their marriage strategies. Among the Korturari, marriage tends to be universal, early, pronatalist, endogamous, and frequently consanguineous. Permanent matches are usually sanctioned as valid common law unions by the community, even when they are not legalised by state law or adequately registered in official documents. The institutional elements of Korturari marriage are interconnected and they are crucial for domestic dynamics and reproductive outcomes.

Marriage is one of their main purposes of life. The production of ‘marriageable bodies’ (Tesár 2012) and marriageable persons is the primary goal of the nurturing process. It is difficult to find a Jõesći adult who has remained celibate. Every person is expected to enter into a heterosexual, permanent, and reproductive relationship with a gendered division of tasks and responsibilities. To remain single is not an acceptable life project in this transnational network.

On the other hand, the Jonesči marry at an early age by Western European standards, generally in their mid-teens. While women are considered marriageable soon after puberty, men are more variable in this respect, although both must ideally be from the same generation. In our study of networks of Roma living in Southern Spain, we established the age of 65 Korturari married women and the average age for the first recorded maternity was 18.2 years of age. The estimated age for first unions was 16.8 years on average, within an age range of 12–23. All women were married by 24 years of age. Early marriage is the fulcrum of a very competitive Roma marriage system and, when it involves minors, it is a source of conflict with the majority populations and state authorities.

In most Roma groups, the primary goal of a young marriage is bearing children. Newlyweds are encouraged and even pressured not to delay the birth of their first child. This event socially confirms the union, the maleness, and femininity of the partners (see Tesár 2012), their adult status, and the bond between the two families.

Marriages are ideally arranged by both pater familias acting as the head of their families. Both fathers become xanamikuri, or ‘co-fathers in-law’. Young people, however, do have ways of expressing their preferences and exercising
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their agency. They may even truncate the plans of their parents by eloping or taking a bride away (našajmo) (see also Beluschi-Fabeni 2013c). Increasingly, the entire process involves varied negotiations between parents and youngsters. However, the father of the bride is still regarded as the owner of her marriage rights, and as the offended party in cases of elopements or mismatches.

Marriages usually involve important transactions known among the Korturari as garancja or wedding costs (mostly paid by the father of the groom), and are publicly celebrated and sanctioned by lavish weddings. Today, they motivate long-term savings and are a source of conspicuous consumption.

Korturari marriages are largely endogamous within the linguistic-cultural and territorial community of those defined as Amare Roma; the lume is a marriage community. This community is constructed through discourses of shared identity and on the basis of a common history of cooperation and conflict, and it represents a moral and legal reference. The community is seen as including those people whose opinion, sanction, and respect really count. Marrying Gadže (non-Roma) is considered disgraceful and is avoided. Marriages with other Roma and with other ‘țigani’ (non-Roma Romanian ‘Gypsies’) happen, but they are considered shameful and tend to be avoided.

As mentioned above, the Korturari marriage community is increasingly segmented by differences of prestige, wealth, and prominence. Some families prefer not to mix with families that are seen as unworthy, problematic, or inadequate, even if they are accepted as members of the Korturari community. The criteria for these homogamous tendencies are variable and are being reshaped by transnational displacement and settlement. For instance, the two groups originating from the rural communes near Calaș and currently living in Granada are rejected by the Jonesči, who tend to perceive them as poor and unsophisticated, in contrast to their own perceived greater prestige, access to wealth, and cosmopolitanism. They view them as unworthy in-laws, despite maintaining relationships of cordiality and even solidarity with them abroad. Interestingly, such hierarchies and distinctions are emphasised more intensely back in Romania, where the most prestigious Jonesči families seek to maintain social distance from their co-ethnics in Spain. As many Jonesči have been beggars for years it can be difficult for outsiders to understand the reasons behind the distinction they so clearly attach to themselves.

In this community, consanguineous marriages are accepted and even preferred. In our ongoing genealogical reconstitution of the Jonesči network, we gathered data on 294 unions from 1938 to 2015 that include people from four generations. Of these unions, 76 (26%) were found to be consanguineous. The most common type of relationship occurred between first cousins (10% of all marriages), followed by second cousins (7%), and cousins-once-removed (6.8%).

Consanguineous marriages reduce the uncertainties of unions between unknown individuals and families. They may also strengthen family ties, facilitate marriage arrangements, and reduce the costs of marriage transactions and wedding feasts. Moreover, they tend to reinforce the common identity of the group including its social and genetic homogeneity (Bittles 2012). They multiply...
the ties among kin, as brothers and cousins become *xanamikuri*, cousins become brothers-in-law, aunts become mothers-in-law, etc. In sum, consanguineous marriages help generate very dense kin networks with intersecting and ‘multiplex’ ties. They may also limit bridging ties to other networks.

On the other hand, *Korturari* marriages today involve transnational experiences. Partners often live in different countries and their union implies international communication and displacement. Digital technologies play a growing role in the processes of knowledge, negotiation, and agreement. Messages, pictures, and proposals are exchanged. Youngsters’ technological abilities often represent a new tool that may complement or undermine the agency of parents attempting to drive marriage choices. Consider that at present the young Jonešči born in the early 1990s have around 90 first cousins and 350 second cousins of both sexes on average. These relatives figure among the most active nodes in each other’s personal communication networks.

**Domestic dynamics and transnational household networks**

Young newlyweds normally move in with the family of the husband. Thus, for the *Korturari* marriage rarely means the foundation of a new household but, rather, the extension of an existing one. During the first years of their marriage, young couples tend to be dependent on the husband’s parents. In their development cycle, most Roma homes therefore become extended domestic units, with several reproductive couples and their children sharing a common household.

The institution of the *bori*, the incoming daughter-in-law, is nowadays a key cultural element of the *Korturari* marriage and household formation system. It has developed new meanings in the recent diaspora. In the space of a single day, most brides find themselves living in an unknown domestic environment, surrounded by strangers and depending on the goodwill of people who may consider them subordinate, dependent, and even subservient. Patrivirilocal patterns contribute to the inequalities affecting women, as marriage often entails – for women, though not for men – leaving the parental home. Marriage is therefore expected to result in a more important change in the life of the wife than in that of the husband. Following patrivirilocal norms, a pattern emerges in the Roma domestic domain: sisters move away, whereas brothers tend to cluster together and cooperation among them is reinforced.

This household formation system is maintained in the new destination countries. Roma *Korturari* couples tend to travel together, often with some or all of their children. Even difficult migratory conditions are unlikely to prevent them from having children, and the efforts associated with raising children may be mitigated by the support of extended local networks of relatives (Bereczkei 1998). If the entire family moves together, it is unlikely that the reproductive project will be interrupted.

In general, the mobility of women for the purpose of marriage represents an ignored but ‘significant proportion of migration in low-income countries, particularly in rural areas’ (Rosenzweig & Stark 1989). Presently, the movement of
young Roma women when they marry is compounded by the international dispersion of families. For instance, Myndra and Rupa, who migrated to Germany in 1991, as we reported, had four sons and three daughters. The four brothers live in the same neighbourhood in Spain. The three sisters, however, have moved with their husbands to a different city in Spain, and to Ireland and the UK.

The pattern of post-marital patrivirilocal residence is one of the reasons why consanguineous relatives are preferred. These unions may mitigate the hardships of a woman’s displacement as she moves with ‘blood’ relatives she may have known since infancy. Patrilocal arrangements also contribute to the preference of sons over daughters, and may influence reproductive decisions. A couple with only daughters will most likely keep trying to have children, even if they already surpassed their preferred number of children.

Although brothers try to remain close, fracture lines tend to appear between their families when they include adult sons and grandchildren. The family network often becomes segmented across collateral lines. Commonly, there are more tensions and conflicts in large households when several brothers, their wives, and their children live together. We have witnessed how some brothers paid most of the expenses, while others just enjoyed free-rides. This eventually leads to conflict and generates fault lines that may cause the family to split and even to move to other countries.

Eventually, a new couple will have their own house and another son will bring his wife to his parent’s home. Ideally, when all children are married, the youngest brother will stay with his elderly parents, take care of them, and inherit their house when they die. This is the normative expected development for the Korturari home. Thus, Roma ‘law’ may not coincide in several important aspects with the inheritance laws of the state.

**Demographic processes: high fertility and demographic growth**

This particular kind of diaspora was predicated on a notable reproductive success resulting from an important population growth. Universal, adolescent, and pronatalist marriages have contributed to the maintenance of a high fertility regime among the Korturari Roma. These processes have occurred within a specific form of demographic transition that was launched, in all likelihood, decades ago by a decline of infant and child mortality. There is evidence of this process happening all over Eastern Europe, at least since the 1950s and 1960s (Ladányi & Szelényi 2006; Potančoková, Vaňo Pilinská, & Jurčová 2008). When infant and child mortality rates declined, high fertility patterns generated considerable demographic growth, which is still continuing.

The high fertility of Roma women is evident in the demographic structure of local groups. Almost all homes include babies and small children. In our study of seven Roma networks in Southern Spain, which included 81 households and 518 people, 46% of the population were children under 15 years of age.
Among the Jonesči, population growth in the past decades has been considerable. The 11 children of Ion by his second marriage had a total of 69 grandchildren, and in our genealogical and family reconstitution of this network so far we located 255 great-grandchildren and 291 great-great-grandchildren. Many of them were born in the UK, Spain, Ireland, Germany, France, and so forth. Thus, in the five generations following Ion, we found over 640 direct descendants and over 1,100 members of the Jonesči network, including spouses and close in-laws. Born between 1913 and 2016, they illustrate the decisive demographic expansion underlying the Romanian Roma transnational migrations.

Nevertheless, many of the elder women born in the late 1950s and thereafter tried to ‘stop’ having children in their thirties, earlier than their mothers and grandmothers. Moreover, many of the women born in the 1980s and the 1990s are spacing the births of their second and subsequent children through the use of contraceptives provided by the family planning services of Romania and their new countries of residence. This sort of ‘fertility transition’ seems to have started with the fall of Ceauşescu and the displacements to the West. The Ceauşescu regime ‘enforced one of the most repressive pronatalist policies known to the world’, including a strict anti-abortion law originally passed in 1966 (Kligman 1998: 2). Nevertheless, the fertility rates of the younger Roma women (3–4 children per woman) are still several times higher than those of Romanian women in general (1.52 children per woman by 2014).  

**Conclusion**

The story of the Jonesči during the last quarter of a century can be described within a narrative of continuity, permanence, and relative success. Once ‘dispensable’ people both physically and metaphorically, now their houses dominate the skyline of a town that they were historically barred from. They have broken a form of secular territorial exclusion. Change and adaptation are an integral part of these narratives. First of all, there has been a transformation in the quality of relationships within the Jonesči lineage itself. Their members have gone from living and conducting their daily interactions in a small camp, to living in dozens of European regions and communicating daily by means of smartphones and Facebook.

The dispersion has also implied a growth in numbers and in diversity. Every new generation is larger than the previous one and also more heterogeneous and cosmopolitan. The hundreds of great-grandchildren of Ion, growing up in different countries, are developing varied expectations and a variety of shared identities. The construction of identity among the Jonesči draws, at present, on relatedness and ethnicity but also on new forms of national and linguistic identification (Glick Schiller et al. 1992).

The meaning of ‘home’ and place is also changing for the new generations, particularly those born and raised abroad. Their parents’ houses in Calaş may
mean less to them than their homes in Dublin, Seville, or London. Links with the home locality are thus dynamic.

Moreover, the Jonesči diaspora exemplifies the power of kinship networks in the present transnational migration of Roma groups to the West. These networks of strong, multiplex ties are larger, denser, and more complex than those found among most other European groups. They are constituted by marriage and gender systems that generate specific domestic arrangements and development cycles. These interconnected institutions have operated in an expansive conjuncture generated by an autochthonous Roma demographic transition.

In migration studies, there is a need to understand the integrated systems of kin, marriage, and gender in relation to reproductive regimes and the social organisation of reproduction. Differential fertility and population growth is currently a highly politicised issue across Europe. Eastern European countries in particular are suffering from a sustained demographic downturn that is perceived as ‘massive depopulation’ (Horváth & Kiss 2015). Populist and nationalist discourses often use Roma fertility as a point of contention in the ‘national catastrophe’ of population decline. Some go so far as to talk about ‘Gypsyisation’ as a dreadful distortion of the nation, the ‘shrinkage of its core ethnicity’ (Kotzeva & Dimitrova 2014: 767).

The Jonesči diaspora also exemplifies the contingent character of migration (Boyd 1989). The fall of Ceaușescu; the generosity of German political asylum policies during the Cold War period; the process of incorporation of Romania into the EU, and the economic boom in some Western European countries coincided with a unique period of population growth. The availability of cheap means of communication and transport developed in recent decades were instrumental to the generation of this particular form of collective displacement.

Cooperation and assistance from relatives have been decisive in sustaining this unique form of transnational migration. The Jonesči have shown a surprising capacity for adapting and thriving, fulfilling their own goals, and maintaining and recreating their own institutions and community bonds. People with little to offer in terms of educational or technical expertise have developed a surprising migratory potential.

Crucial to this collective resilience is a particular form of social capital deriving from moral obligations among kin and family. This takes the form of tangible resources and also reliable expectations, including enforceable trust (Portes & Landolt 2000). These resources are often pooled in local domestic networks, thereby allowing their members to bypass limitations and exclusions in relation to income, skills, access to jobs, and rejection by dominant majorities (see Matras 2000). This is especially important considering that these Roma migrations are not properly labour-led migrations. Few of the migrant adults obtained jobs in the new localities of residence. They mostly relied on a variety of occupations providing variable incomes.

However, there are also undesired consequences of the social capital based almost exclusively on strong bonds with a low capacity to ‘bridge’ with other social fields. First, most Roma lack the ties associated with jobs and work
The strong ties of race, familje, and lume confer benefits and resources on their members but often at the expense of their individual incorporation in a larger public order. Moreover, the ‘same mechanisms approachable by individuals as social capital can lead to a set of negative outcomes for others’ (Portes & Landolt 2000: 531). This includes, among others, the restrictions of individual freedoms, the imposition of downward levelling norms, the exclusion of outsiders, and faulty decision-making derived from the non-critical trust of co-ethnics and their sources of information (Portes & Landolt 2000; Portes 2014).

Many of the disadvantages of Roma social capital are gendered; Roma women are the ones most severely affected. It is, disproportionately, through the hard work and difficult lives of wives, daughters, and sisters that Roma families survive and overcome their most difficult obstacles. These often multi-burdened women (Oprea 2004) see their chances for educational and professional attainment, and even for personal realisation, seriously curtailed by their family obligations. Roma women are often at the crossroads of multiple processes of discrimination and exclusion, including those derived from the conflict of roles between affinally-related women of different generations in the Roma home itself. In turn, if the mother’s education is an important determinant in the educational success of her children, then the marginal status of future Roma generations is more difficult to overcome. The strong ties bonding the Jonesči to each other and offering them warmth, protection, and meaning, may also limit their individual growth and choices. They will have to solve these contradictions in the future. In any case, the foothold gained by the Jonesči and other Roma groups in different European countries has opened a new period in Romani history. These peaceful diasporas are helping Roma to become full citizens and break processes of secular exclusion and segregation. Contrary to negative views of an intractable people, there are many signs of hope in the new generations of Jonesči growing up in so many European regions and countries.

Notes
* The research leading to the present publication results from MigRom, ‘The immigration of Romanian Roma to Western Europe: Causes, effects, and future engagement strategies’, a project funded by the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme under the call on ‘Dealing with diversity and cohesion: the case of the Roma in the European Union’ (GA319901).
1 In further publications, we will compare the kinship, gender, and marriage institutions of the Korturari Roma studied here with those of other Roma groups that have been studied ethnographically. This comparative endeavour is beyond the scope of this chapter.
2 By mid-2016, we found Jonesči-related families in Dublin, Cork, Portalington, and Athlone in Ireland; in London, Manchester, Luton, Rotherham, and Birmingham in the UK; in Paris and Marseille in France; in Rome and Milan in Italy; in Granada, Seville, Murcia, and Tarragone in Spain; in Essen, Köln, and Dusseldorf in Germany; in Brussels, Belgium; in Amsterdam, the Netherlands; in Faro in Portugal; in Toronto in Canada; and in Calaş, Turda, Hunedoara, Oradea, and other places in Romania. There was a flood of migrations to the USA, with families living in Miami, New York, Chicago, and Houston.
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Founder effects and transnational mutations


5 Romanian Roma migration to Italy
Improving the capacity to aspire*

Stefania Pontrandolfo

Introduction: social inequality and transnational migrations

Social inequality, that is to say, an increase in the difference between incomes and life chances within different areas and segments of the population, is continuing to grow in Europe as a direct consequence of so-called globalising economies and policies (e.g. ILO 2008, 2016). Several scholars have recommended reflecting critically on what Faist (2014) calls ‘the transnational social question’ in Europe, because social inequalities emerge in the contemporary framework of increased flows of people, capital, objects, ideas, and practices across national borders (Appadurai 1996), influenced by neo-liberal politics. In this context, circular rural–urban and transnational movements, from poorer to wealthier areas, within and between national borders in Europe, are some of the most relevant responses to problems of local vulnerability (Kaneff & Pine 2011). In other words, transnational migration can be defined as the agency of large portions of European populations in vulnerable situations who try to improve their living conditions through a particular coping strategy: transnational mobility. Many scholars are therefore advocating for research and studies on how migrations are modifying the social order in Europe and particularly on the role that transnationalism practices can play in these changes (e.g. Favell & Recchi 2011; Kaneff & Pine 2011; Glick Schiller & Salazar 2013).

One of the main routes of present-day migrations in Europe is from the post-socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe to western countries. The transition towards more liberal economic regimes in former socialist countries has led to deep recession that, in turn, has forced thousands of people to see transnational migration as a means to improve their living conditions (e.g. Morokvasic-Muller 1999; Okólski 2004). Migrations from Romania are therefore also to be included in the framework of coping strategies aimed at dealing with the difficulties of economic transition after the fall of Ceauşescu’s communist regime (e.g. Potot 2010).

Romanian migration patterns from 1989 to date, have undergone various changes (e.g. Diminescu 2003; Sandu 2006; Horváth 2007; Horváth & Anghel 2009) but what has not changed since the first stages of these migrations is the main reason behind them: the economic recession that engulfed the country after
the fall of the communist regime. An estimated 2–2.5 million people (10% of the Romanian population) were abroad in 2011 (Alexandru 2012). According to ISTAT figures for 2016, about one million of these migrants headed for Italy and at least 20,000 of them were Roma originating from different regions of Romania (Pontrandolfo et al. 2014; Agoni 2016).

Studies on post-communist Roma migration from Eastern to Western Europe initially focused on an attempt to define the phenomenon from a quantitative point of view, and on the description of migrations in structural terms: push/pull-factors, emigration policies of the country of origin, and immigration policies of the receiving countries, migratory models (e.g. Matras 2000; Reyniers 2003; Sobotka 2003). However, more recently, researchers have begun to describe particular forms of agency in migration on the part of Roma (Vlase & Voicu 2014). Researchers have also underlined significant elements (spatial, social, and cultural) that affect Roma mobility paths in various ways: the importance of being organised into social, parental, or religious networks (Pantea 2012; Dion 2014; Vlase & Voicu 2014); the importance of social organisation within the group and therefore of particular family relations and kinship configurations (Beluschi Fabeni 2013; Vlase & Voicu 2014; Benarrosh-Orsoni 2015a, 2015b); the importance of constructing cultural identities (Tesăr 2015, 2016); or of particular work ethics (Grill 2012, 2016).

This chapter aims at contributing to this line of research by referring, in general, to sociocultural anthropology’s interest in cultural change in migration (e.g. Brettel 2015) and, in particular, on ‘cultural mobilities’ in transnational migration (e.g. Salazar 2010; Glick Schiller & Salazar 2013). More specifically, this chapter refers to the theoretical reflections of Appadurai (2013) on the ‘future as a cultural fact’, and investigate a particular aspect of transnational cultural mobility, that is, the impact of migrations on the ‘capacity to aspire’: the capacity to imagine changes in one’s own living conditions and to act in order to make these changes happen.

In the first part of the chapter, I will briefly summarise some significant aspects of the theoretical reflections on the capacity to aspire, as proposed by Appadurai (2013). Then I will show how Roma migrants’ capacity to aspire can be both limited and encouraged by the different local policies within the Italian context, and finally how the Roma themselves strive to improve their own capacity to aspire through migration.

The chapter is based on data collected during fieldwork with two Roma family networks originating in Oltenia (southwest Romania), who migrated to Milan (North Italy) and Bari (South Italy), and with whom a significant part of the MigRom research by the Italian study team was conducted, between April 2013 and December 2015.

The first part of the fieldwork produced a series of semi-structured interviews, in the Romani language, conducted by researchers Marianna Agoni and Suzana Jovanović. They were conducted in Milan and the Milanese hinterland with a network of Roma families originating from villages and small towns in the district of Olt, Romania. Some of these families live in extremely precarious
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conditions in tents and makeshift huts in informal settlements that are constantly dismantled and rebuilt, in the northwestern suburbs of Milan. Others, after a lengthy experience of similar housing conditions, are currently living in rented houses or accommodation provided by private social associations in Milan. It is shown below how the different housing conditions, and especially the politics of continual evictions, considerably affect the migratory courses of these people.

The second part of the fieldwork produced several semi-structured interviews, in the Romani language, conducted by Dainef Tomescu and myself, as well as an ethnographic study carried out in Bari with a network of Roma families from the city of Craiova (district of Dolj). These families live in the only authorised ‘nomad camp’ in Bari and have therefore been living in reasonably stable conditions for over ten years, a fact that deeply affects their future prospects.

They are, therefore, two different family networks who define themselves as Roma but whose identity refers mainly to the density of parental, friend and neighbour relations that existed in their places of origin in Romania and which they have maintained or recreated in their respective migration zones in Italy. Two family networks that, while coming from different places in Oltenia, share a similar historical and geo-political background as well as similar initial migratory experiences (e.g. migratory motivations and strategies based on family and village networks). However, their migratory routes in the Italian context have turned out differently, mainly due to different local immigration policies, as discussed below.

While the individuals concerned in this chapter will remain anonymous, references will often be made to the places, dates, and contexts of extracts from ethnographic interviews and conversations. However, some expressions repeatedly used by many interlocutors during various ethnographic conversations and/or interviews have also been used. These are authentic leitmotifs that were repeated so often that I have only inserted them in quotation marks, so as not to burden the text with too many references.

The capacity to aspire

Appadurai (2013) argues that critical reflection is needed in order to identify ‘possibility policies’ that would generate improvements, or at least support attempts at improvement, in the lives of those subject to vulnerable conditions.

Appadurai’s line of thought begins with the observation that there has been an exponential increase in the number of people living in poverty and a worsening of their oppressive conditions in the contemporary age. Despite this, the poor often embrace the dominant standards of the societies in which they live, which could explain why, in many cases, they submit to the conditions in which they find themselves without voicing their discontent. Normally, impoverished people respond to systems of ideas that justify and legitimise existing social orders (those which, in Gramscian terms, could be defined as ‘hegemonic ideologies’) in one of two ways. One option, which Hirschman (1970) calls ‘exit’ strategies, is to display ironic and distancing attitudes, which allow the poor to maintain
their dignity and identity but leaves them in structurally vulnerable conditions. Alternatively, the poor display what Hirschman (1970) terms ‘loyalty’ strategies, various forms and levels of compliance to ideas and practices that actually contribute to reproducing their marginalisation. What Hirschman (1970) refers to as ‘voice’ strategies, counter-hegemonic ideas, practices, and forms of protest that effectively and substantially change existing social orders are, according to Appadurai (2013) and others (e.g. Narayan, Chambers, Shah, & Petesch 2001; Narayan, Patel, Schafft, Rademaker, & Koch-Schulte 2001) rarely employed. Poverty is therefore not only definable as reduced access to material resources and services, but also as a symbolic adhesion to hegemonic ideologies that legitimise and contribute to creating social inequalities.

Based on this premise, Appadurai defines the capacity to aspire as the cultural capacity to imagine improvements in one’s own living conditions, while simultaneously giving voice to that imagination by publically and collectively protesting in an attempt to change the status quo. ‘Possibility policies’ should therefore prioritise strengthening the combination of impoverished people’s power of imagination, along with their power to protest in an attempt to change oppressive situations.

Furthermore, Appadurai considers the capacity to aspire as a ‘capability’ in the sense proposed by Sen (e.g. 1992, 2000). According to Sen, capabilities represent the substantive freedom to achieve various lifestyles, and poverty can be defined as a lack or reduction of capabilities and freedom of choice. Following Sen’s line of thought, Appadurai defines poverty as the exclusion from access to material goods and services, as well as a reduction in the social practice of imagining the world and the future. Since the capacity to aspire is not equally distributed in our current stratified and unequal world, its reduction for certain social groups can constitute an integral part of their conditions of poverty, just as its improvement can constitute a factor in their emancipation.

The extension or reduction of less privileged people’s capacity to aspire depends on the constraints and limits that, in different contexts, are imposed on the recognition of the right to aspire. Referring explicitly to the debate on recognition and redistribution policies (e.g. Taylor 1992; Kymlicka 1995; Fraser & Honneth 2003), Appadurai underlines that in many cases poor, marginal and subordinate groups are either not recognised as legitimate interlocutors in political negotiation, or are treated in ways that do not essentially change the redistribution of resources. Therefore, conditions of inequality either remain the same or worsen. Consequently, ‘possibility policies’ that can be adopted are, first and foremost, those that actually attempt to modify the terms of recognition themselves. Only in conditions that give the poor more space to imagine can a greater capacity to aspire be experimented and developed. The latter is, in fact, a navigational capacity, that ‘thrives and survives on practice, repetition, exploration, conjecture, and refutation’ (Appadurai 2013: 189). Thus, those who are privileged in any given society are those who have had, and continue to have, the chance to explore the future more frequently and repeatedly over time, as compared with those with fewer privileges. On the one hand, the latter have fewer
opportunities to practice this capacity, while on the other, they have a much more fragile aspirational horizon.

Appadurai indeed argues that persons or social groups that have developed a greater capacity to aspire are more able to produce metaphors and narratives which connect access to goods and services to wider social scenes and to wider norms and beliefs. Consequently, they are more able to make themselves heard and politically negotiate changes in the social order. This depends on the fact that the capacity to aspire is a cultural capacity. Just as imagined changes for one’s future derive from the cultural norms of the society in which a person has been socialised and encultured, the ‘voices’ that may be able to become heard or recognised are those expressed in ways that are culturally shared by all those belonging to that society. In order for the poor to exercise their ‘voice’, they need to experiment with and exercise, on the one hand, their capacity to imagine changes on the basis of what is culturally desirable for them and, on the other, their capacity to protest and ask for those changes in ways that those in power can recognise. In order for voice to take effect,

it must engage social, political and economic issues in terms of ideologies, doctrines and norms that are widely shared and credible, even by the rich and powerful. Furthermore, voice must be expressed in terms of actions and performances that have local cultural force.

(Appadurai 2013: 186)

Strengthening the capacity to aspire and the faculty of ‘voice’ therefore implies that the poor must learn and be able to use ‘levers of metaphor, rhetoric, organization and public performance that will work best in their cultural world’ (Appadurai 2013: 187) in order to debate, contest and oppose visions of future collective social life.

From our research with Oltenian Roma families, it emerged that they are incessantly trying, through transnational migration, to increase their capacity to aspire as well as to improve their economic and social conditions. However, depending on the terms of recognition imposed by local Italian policies, areas of possibilities of variable dimensions are created, giving them greater or lesser room to practice, and therefore expand, this capacity.

Local policies in Milan and Bari

In this section, we see how local Italian policies can affect the migrant Roma’s capacity to aspire by either restricting or extending the terms of their recognition.

It is first necessary to stress that local policies constitute the main arena for Italian multiculturalism politics (Grillo & Pratt 2002). In fact, in Italy, the only form of politics of recognition, which foresees the acknowledgement and institutionalised recognition of cultural differences, was introduced on a national level through Law 482/1999 on the protection of 12 autochthonous linguistic minorities, from which Roma and Sinti minorities with Italian citizenship were excluded.
Considering the lack of national politics of recognition targeting migrants and Roma, the local dimension of Italian policy-making was, and still is, of decisive importance in shaping the ways in which institutions treat Italian Roma and Sinti minorities or Roma migrants from the Balkans or Eastern Europe. On a local level, over the last 30 years, so-called ‘soft recognition’ policies have been activated. These policies can take into account the relevance of cultural difference in access to social services and resources, even without explicit acknowledgement or strong institutionalisation of group differences (Caponio 2010). Indeed, in Italy some differentialist, as well as essentialist, soft recognition policies have been widely applied based on specific visions of Roma and Sinti ‘culture’ and specific visions of how their ‘integration’ into Italian society could be. These recognition policies did not, however, alter the redistribution conditions or make it any easier for Roma and Sinti to access resources. In fact, they often worsened the situation, as in the case of ‘nomad camps’ policies (Pontrandolfo 2014).

The following analysis of the Milan and Bari cases will concretely show how local policies can impose terms of recognition that either help or hinder Roma migrants’ capacity to aspire.

**Milan**

Milan is a large metropolis in Lombardy, a region in northern Italy, with a Roma presence of 0.3% of a total population of 1,350,387. The Roma and Sinti groups, of both Italian and foreign citizenship, are highly complex and diverse (70% of Roma and Sinti minorities in Milan are Romanian Roma, constituting about 0.2% of the entire Milanese population). The complexity of the Milan case relates to the historical background of Eastern European Roma migrations to Italy dating back to the 1970s.

Policies targeting Roma and Sinti that have been planned and implemented over the last 20 years by Milan Council have always been based on a homogenising vision of extremely diverse sociocultural realities. In fact, these policies have always focused, without differentiation, on all groups that define themselves as Roma, Sinti, or Caminanti within the urban territory, regardless of their legal status. They may be Italian, foreign, or stateless and they may have been living in the city for decades, even centuries, only recent arrivals or just passing through. They may be living in equipped camps or in tents and huts on unauthorised sites. The families could have totally different social, economic, and juridical situations, as well as different migratory experiences and highly diverse expectations and projects for their future. Although the particular administrative categorisations used to define them have changed over the years (initially ‘Gypsies’ or ‘Nomads’, but now ‘Roma, Sinti and Caminanti’), the homogenising approach, which tends to place all these people into a separate group from other citizens and/or migrants, has not.

For example, on the basis of the 1989 Lombardy regional law regarding *Action for the protection of peoples belonging to traditionally nomadic and semi-nomadic ethnic groups* and the 1998 *Regulation regarding Gypsy minority*
settlements within the territory of the Municipality of Milan, these populations were mainly categorised as ‘Gypsies’ and ‘Nomads’ and the most commonly adopted ‘housing’ policy, especially for Roma groups from the Balkan States, involved placing them in authorised ‘nomad camps’. Between 2007 and 2008, partly due to difficulties in managing a large number of informal settlements within the city, the administrators established provisions like the Pact for a Safe Milan and the so-called Nomad Emergency. Such provisions showed growing concern for safety and encouraged repressive actions to drive away the migrants and evacuate informal settlements that, at the time, mainly housed Romanian Roma migrants. Some of these actions, particularly forced evictions, are still carried out today, even though the aforementioned legislative provisions were declared illegitimate in 2013 (Sentence no. 9687 of the Supreme Court of Appeal).

Faced with substantial problems linked to the harsh living conditions of some populations that had migrated to the urban territory (predominantly Romanian Roma), the Milanese authorities responded by either activating emergency reception provisions or evicting migrants and driving them away, and seldom resorted to ordinary welfare instruments, like social housing, to solve the problems. With particular regard to Romanian Roma migrants, and with the exception of one authorised camp (closed definitively in 2011), for years local authorities did not provide any further equipped areas for families arriving from Romania. Therefore, as they were constantly driven out of informal settlements, the Romanian Roma’s only alternatives were mother-child communities for women and minors and dormitories for men (alternatives that, since they necessarily separated family members, were rarely accepted).

In 2012, the introduction of Guidelines for Municipal Administration intervention on the topic of Roma, Sinti and Caminanti populations in Milan and for the agreement with the Milan Prefect’s Office offered a three-fold suggestion on how to go beyond the ‘camp policy’: first, by relocating the families into social housing; second, by acting against all new informal settlements through systematic and repeated evictions, and third, by setting up temporary reception centres for those ‘with no fixed abode’. Although the legal provisions in this case did consider broader and more politically correct categorisations, and did try to activate reception as well as expulsion policies, the problems remained. The maximum capacity of reception centres established between 2012 and 2013 was, and remains, far smaller than necessary, and social housing provision is equally lacking. Therefore, hundreds of people still face housing problems and have been forced to undergo repeated evictions and relocations over many years. Just to give an idea of what the eviction policy in Milan implies, below are some figures issued by Milan Council’s Security and Social Integration, Local Police, Civil Protection and Voluntary Association Office on evictions and expulsions. Starting in 2013, up until September 2015, 1,284 people (approx. 1.3 evictions a day) were expelled; 518 from unauthorised areas and buildings and 766 from camper vans and caravans. In addition, there were so-called ‘micro-expulsions’, often managed by police forces with no municipal authority involvement or
participation. This means that in some cases, and in contrast to regulations on expulsions, the Council was not informed and no notification was given in the press (NAGA 2015).

A further characteristic of these policies, promoted in equal measure by centre-right and centre-left administrations in Milan, was the creation over the years of alliances between third sector organisations and the Council. These alliances have allowed some of these organisations to play an important role in camp management, solution programming and political actions concerning Roma in general, although Roma were only marginally involved in the decision-making processes. In fact, one could almost say that the third sector took on a substitutive role in relation to administrators and, when Roma live in unauthorised camps or in temporary reception centres, relationships with institutions are almost entirely mediated by volunteers or social workers. This means that, rather than directly communicating with the Roma, politicians often rely on reports from local association representatives. What impact, then, do these policies have on the lives of the migrant Roma from villages and towns in the district of Olt to whom we spoke during our research in Milan?

Some of these families live in tents and huts in informal settlements on the northwestern outskirts of Milan, while others live in temporary reception centres set up by Milan Council. Others still, often with the help of third sector association mediators, have managed to rent an apartment.

Almost all the Roma families from Olt living in informal settlements practice a temporary and circular type of migration featuring frequent round trips between Milan and their villages of origin in Romania. This circular pattern is strongly conditioned by the local policies, which make it almost impossible to have a permanent arrangement. Living in an informal settlement indeed means living in extremely precarious conditions, constantly waiting for the next eviction, no matter how much the Roma try to make these places more homely. This is why, in the majority of cases, families leave their children in Romania when they migrate. It is usually the adult members of extended families that alternate stays in Milan and Romania so that there is always someone in Romania to take care of the children, house, and land. For example, married men may depart leaving their wives and children in the village, or young married couples may set off leaving their children in the care of paternal grandparents. On their return to Romania, it will be the grandparents’ turn to head for Italy in order to make sure that the extended family has constant support from whichever members are abroad. The harshness of life in a makeshift camp is accepted only as a temporary strategy to economically sustain the family. In fact, these families usually spend 3–7 months in Italy, interrupted by 2–3 stays in Romania, usually at Christmas, Easter, and in late summer. The decision to leave Milan is often due to the frequency of evictions, especially when people lose all their belongings and the law enforcement authorities continue by hunting them down around the city, preventing them from finding a new arrangement. All these people have lost count of the number of evictions they have experienced over the last 20 years. Despite this, they continue to come to Italy. They consider their migration
to Italy as a temporary but necessary phase of their existence that will end, sooner or later, with their definitive return to Romania. In reality, despite their desires to fulfil their plan to return, migration often remains fundamental for sustaining the family’s daily life, both of those members living in Milan and those still in Romania. In this way, a definitive return to Romania is continually postponed to a more or less distant future and the migrants continue to spend a good part of the year in Italy.

Another influential factor that affects the lives and future projects of these people, is their integration into particular and highly unstable niches of the Italian economy, which do not guarantee a regular and sufficient income to pay private market rents. These families support themselves almost exclusively by practicing *mangimós* (begging). Other undeclared and occasional work is carried out alongside *mangimós*: jobs in construction, gardening, cleaning, or agricultural seasonal work in other Italian regions or towns. Waste recovery activities involving a variety of different goods (food, clothes, shoes, appliances, furniture, and various other items) are practised on a large scale.

The highly restrictive limits that local policies impose on these families’ agency in the migratory context can also be seen clearly in comparison with the situation of those families that live in more stable conditions. Living in social housing or rented apartments and, with varying degrees of stability, being integrated into the employment market, with their children with them and enrolled in schools, changes the way in which these families see their migration and plans for the future. According to the interviews, as time passes by, trips back to Romania become less frequent, relations with their home country tend to fade and the definitive return is postponed to a distant future. Some even declare that they no longer want to go back and have even thought about selling their home there. Of course, they may still suffer from homesickness and have daily links with Romania, but their own lives, and above all, those of their children, are increasingly considered to be in Italy.

Lastly, local Milanese policies, especially forced evictions, not only produce considerable limits in terms of space, time, and opportunities for those living in informal settlements, but they also impact on their capacity to aspire. Imagining the future seems to bend under the weight of the desire and need to guarantee daily sustenance and maintenance. Protesting, for example, in an attempt to postpone or receive forewarning of an eviction, or to extend residency in a temporary reception centre, appears to be limited to negotiating with third sector agencies rather than direct confrontation with officials. Nevertheless, in the case of several families in Milan, a difference in the possibility to extend one’s own capacity to aspire can be found between those living for years in informal settlements and those who manage to find a variable degree of stability in the Italian employment market (even if only in the informal economy) and move to rented accommodation. Those who experience more stable living conditions also have an improved capacity to aspire. For example, their migration becomes more permanent with fewer trips to the home country, projections are made for a life in Italy rather than in Romania, and investments are made into their children’s education.
Bari

Bari is an average-sized city in the region of Apulia (southern Italy) with a Roma presence of about 0.1% in a total population of 325,183. There have been several Romanian Roma communities in Bari since the end of the 1990s. Previously, in the early 1990s, only a few Roma families from Bosnia were camped in an area on the city outskirts, while the arrival of meagre groups of Roma families from Bulgaria is relatively recent. It can therefore be said that, in the last 20 years or so, the local authorities have had to deal with the presence of Roma groups, each very different from one another, but mainly originating from Romania. Relations between the various communities and the local authorities are all different and experiences have been variable, but the first dealings between the Bari Council and Roma occurred when the numbers within the city territory were considerably less significant than today (about 30 people in 1999 and around 80 in 2007). This change in numbers probably helped to activate direct negotiations between those Roma families and the Council, something which, at the time of our research, seemed much more difficult to achieve. From 2007, new communities began to make their way to the Bari area, some from the same parts of Romania (from South West Oltenia, especially the districts of Dolj, Olt, and Mehedinți); others from different areas (from North East Moldova, particularly the district of Suceava). While the Council opened its first authorised Roma camp in 2007 to host the pioneer migration families, further informal settlements, both large and small, sprang up around the city area, some more permanent than others; some more visible than others.

The Bari Council centre-left administration have performed a variety of public interventions aimed at the social inclusion of the families who currently live in the only Council-authorised Roma camp. However, these administrations have appeared indifferent to, or have merely ‘tolerated’ those who arrived after the pioneer families; ‘tolerant’ often being the term used by Bari administrators and officials (see Rizzin forthcoming). This means that, contrary to what happens every day in Milan, the administrative tool of eviction has only been adopted in Bari in exceptional cases over the last 20 years. Thus, even if many of the families that arrived in Bari about 15 years ago still live in informal settlements or in the authorised camp, they do so without the constant nightmare of being regularly evicted, something that greatly contributes to the relatively positive activation of projected futures for migrant families.

Another important feature of the Bari case is that, over time, a strong alliance between the third sector and the pioneer migrant families within the urban territory has been created to negotiate with the Council. By the end of 1990s, these families and their representatives had established a strong political alliance with mostly Catholic-oriented civil and third sector organisations. This alliance led to the onset of negotiations with local authority representatives that, a few years later, resulted in the establishment of what is still the only ‘authorised Roma camp’ in the city today. Since the onset of negotiations with local institutions, these families have faced categorisations that defined them as ‘Roma’ or, by way
Romanian Roma migration to Italy

of synonym, ‘Nomads’, and not as ‘migrants’ or ‘asylum seekers’, as well as a social and political situation where access to social housing was very difficult. The Roma had immediately tried to oppose the visions that non-Roma had of them by underlining how their migration was essentially for economic and political reasons (requests for asylum, which were mostly rejected by the Italian State at the beginning of the millennium, were submitted on the basis of discrimination suffered in Romania). In other words, contrary to the ‘culturalist’ dimension into which they were relegated, these Roma always attempted to reframe the public debate about them within broader social, economic, historic, and political issues. In this context, these families’ request, in their lengthy negotiation with local institutions, for a piece of land on which to settle permanently without the constant risk of eviction, was a considerable act of political pragmatism that has achieved results, despite the ambiguities that this decision certainly brought about. By asking to be accommodated in a camp, the Roma risked recreating a ghetto. However, because of the chronic lack of social housing in Italy, the creation of a nomad camp was the most easily achievable option. Furthermore, the Roma felt they would cope better with life in a camp than with their families being dispersed across the town.

One of the most interesting results of this negotiation is the success in persuading the authorities in Bari to make use of the public discourse of ‘multiculturalism’ instead of the security-obsessed rhetoric so widely used in other Italian contexts. Another interesting result was the chance that some representatives from this family network had to intensify their political participation through training courses and their professional activity as cultural mediators. The recognition of these people as legitimate political interlocutors at the onset of negotiations by the Bari centre-left administration therefore led to their training and political involvement. What impact, then, did these policies have on the lives of migrant Roma from Craiova who live in Bari Council’s authorised camp?

These pioneer migrant families have had the chance to take advantage of the area conceded by the City Council and autonomously organise their lives within it. This stability has led to an increase in the life opportunities of these people, primarily by giving them a greater chance of finding work, including a combination of various practices such as mangimós; undeclared and occasional jobs mostly in construction and demolition companies; undeclared agricultural seasonal work; occasional jobs as housekeepers or carers; waste recovery activities involving food, clothes, shoes, appliances, furniture, recyclable materials, and various objects for resale in second-hand markets authorised by the Bari Council; recovery of iron. Another positive aspect is the creation of a Roma cooperative, operating in the cleaning and clearance sector for small removals, goods transportation, gardening, and material recovery. This cooperative has proved to be one of the most advanced actions in the inclusion initiative in Bari.

Despite all the limitations that a settlement of self-built huts can have, housing stability for about ten years in the same place has also allowed extended families to be reunited. The Bari camp hosts a network of related families who, over the years, have gradually joined the families who first set out to migrate to
Bari. The reunion of families who had neighboured each other, living in the same Craiova neighbourhood (in the so-called țigania) has recreated an authentic community in Bari, where a spatial and sociocultural closeness, similar to that of Romania, can be found in the camp. Another element to be highlighted, and an effect of the stable living conditions of these families is that, over time, children have joined their families. While in the initial phases of their stay in Italy, these families left their smaller children (or the eldest, depending on the circumstance) in Romania with other members of the family (as many migrants in Milan who live in informal settlements still do), once they were allowed to stay in the authorised camp in Bari they were joined by all the family members. Moreover, as of that moment, many children have been born in Bari, only going back to Romania once a year for their summer holidays, and they are growing up immersed in an Italian sociocultural environment through which they also acquire different expectations to those of their parents. In fact, what seems to be happening in Bari is that those in their thirties and forties still maintain a strong link with Romania and regularly express the desire to return to their homeland sooner or later. On the other hand, those in their twenties, who have lived the greater part of their lives in Italy and are well aware of the structural and long-lasting socioeconomic problems in Romania, are more inclined towards emigrating to other European or American countries rather than aiming to return to their country of origin. They see these countries as offering more opportunities to fulfil their ambitions and improve their lives. While those in their thirties and forties speak of Italy as a place to live a ‘nice life’ compared with the standards of poverty they had experienced in Romania, the younger generations compare their current living conditions in Italy to their relatives or countrymen who emigrated to other countries and had better luck. This is why many young people are leaving to seek opportunities in other European countries or in the USA, while their parents stay on at the camp.

To conclude, the chance of having stable living conditions has had a truly positive effect on the future plans of Roma migrants both in Milan and Bari. While a large number of migrants living in constantly evacuated unauthorised settlements in Milan only see their migration as temporary and aimed at achieving particular short and medium-term objectives in Romania, those migrants living in private social apartments in Milan and in the authorised camp in Bari have had the chance to experiment with practices of fundamental citizenship (including some forms of political participation) as well as greater housing stability and these people can also afford to make plans for the long-term future, which are not necessarily linked to their country of origin.

The following section of this chapter shows how, for these Roma, experimenting with different ways of imagining their future combines with attempts at voicing their discontent, thus extending their capacity to aspire.

**Motivations for migration and aspirations for the future**

In the narratives of the Roma we met, motivations for migration and aspirations for the future partially overlap and are embedded in and conditioned by concrete
fields of action. Their motivations for migration, the hopes they had at the time of their first and subsequent departures from Romania, were conditioned by the social, cultural, political, and economic context of their area of origin. Their aspirations for the future were equally conditioned by the social, cultural, political, and economic context of the country of destination. Motivations for migration were in most cases similar, due to the migrants’ shared historical, geopolitical, and economic background in Oltenia. On the other hand, aspirations for the future could be very different due to the local institutional treatment received in the migration context. As we have seen above, those who succeeded in gaining greater housing and working stability in Italy tend to engage in various ways of imagining the future. As shown below, in these cases, narratives about the reasons behind individual and collective success or failure in migration also tend to take on a more explicitly political tone, particularly in terms of recognition. Through these types of narratives, the Roma improve their capacity to aspire because they are not only trying to voice their dissatisfaction but are also indicating the political responsibilities that determine their condition. That is, they are trying to become legitimate political interlocutors within a political framework that usually does not recognise them as such.

Economic reasons was the recurrent motivation for migration. People left, and continue to leave Romania due to a chronic lack of employment and limited access to resources, brought about by the persistent economic crisis of a post-socialist society as it moves towards a free-market economy. On this topic, some expressions became a recurring leitmotif during ethnographic interviews and conversations: ‘you can starve in Romania, there is nothing, there is nothing you can do’; ‘we don’t have a house in Romania, we don’t have a job, we have nothing’. This language of lack and deprivation describes the living conditions in the country of origin, while, on the other hand, the following phrases were also often repeated: ‘you don’t starve in Italy, you can find food on the street’, and above all, ‘you can do something with your life in Italy’; ‘Italy has saved us, it has given us prospects that we didn’t have before’. Unsurprisingly, these comparisons between Italy and Romania also involve rational calculations of economic convenience (a constant comparison between salaries in Romania and Italy, frequent comparison between earnings by mangimós in Italy and the earnings from informal activities in Romania).

Securing a house and a job mostly motivates these people’s migration. Some leave Romania to earn enough to buy some land on which to build their house; others to earn enough to pay property transfer charges; others to build a new house or to modernise or change an old clay house; and some to build a second house for their children. These situations are all very different, and often, all these objectives follow one another and overlap during individual and family life paths, in an incessant effort to improve one’s own conditions. The need to find work, or another source of regular income, makes it hard for individuals to maintain the standard of living that migration leads them to aspire to. The Italian economic context, which incorporates migrants in the less qualified segments of the jobs market and often without proper contracts, strongly limits work opportunities.
Furthermore, the Italian cultural context, which features considerable anti-Gypsyism, often pushes those that find a job (no matter how informal, stable, or well-paid) to conceal their Roma identity from the employers. We heard from many people of how they revealed their Roma identity only after having solidly gained the employers’ trust through continued employment relations.

In several cases, migrants aim at accessing health care, since the Romanian system is deemed insufficient, inefficient, and corrupt, and the Italian law provides everybody with at least emergency health treatment. In other cases, people migrate in order to continue their studies, or for more concrete reasons, such as getting a driving licence and buying a car. In many cases, the reasons are closely linked to family needs: undesired marriages to be avoided or marriages to be arranged and the acquisition of the required amount for a bride-wealth.

Nevertheless, besides urgent economic considerations, there were also motivations linked to a desire for social equality that cannot be interpreted purely in terms of income. Through the recurring expression of the desire ‘to be like the others’, these Oltenian Roma underline that their migration is an attempt to escape the systematic exclusion from citizenship rights in both their social dimensions (rights to a house and job, access to social services) and their political dimensions (participation and recognition of cultural diversity), in their own country and in the country of destination. Especially with this kind of narrative, we see the emergence of differentiations based on the capacity to aspire: those who have been able to exercise their capacity to aspire on various occasions in Italy manage to give more voice to their discontent and try to renegotiate the terms of their recognition.

Those Roma who live in highly precarious, unauthorised settlements or in temporary reception centres in Milan and survive essentially through mangimós, articulate their aspirations as a list of concrete and tangible desires and interpret their individual paths with fatalism as the result of a mixture between individual ability, luck, and God’s will. Instead, those Roma that have had more stable working and housing experiences (salaried but informal jobs; insertion in a social cooperative; permanent settlement in the authorised camp in Bari, or in private social apartments in Milan) have more complex aspirations and interpretations of individual and collective success stories, which take on a decidedly political tone.

**Interview 1:** S. and her husband come from a small town in the district of Olt. Before migrating to Italy, both of them had always worked in Romania. During the Ceauşescu era, they had jobs in farming cooperatives. Then, after the regime fell, they mainly worked in recovering iron and subsistence farming. However, for about ten years, together with their children and grandchildren, they have been practising circular migration, alternating stays between their home country and Milan, where they all live in informal settlements and survive on mangimós. After many evictions from unauthorised settlements, S. was living in a Milan Council temporary reception centre, where she missed some of her children and grandchildren who, although in Milan, had not been accepted into the centre and were therefore living away from the rest of the family.
S: Everybody is leaving, but it all depends on luck, everyone has their own luck. I have done what I could. May God keep my family, my children, my grandchildren. For this I thank God, I don’t need anything else, only good health for my family…. I am poor but I am committed to maintaining them, to giving them something to eat. I’m not committed to building big houses, there is no greater wealth in the world than food and good health … I also dream of earning a bit of money, … to live, to get all the documents for the house…. And then to go back and earn a little more money … but the rich man is always lucky, the poor man isn’t … the poor man isn’t lucky, … the poor man is totally poor, for example, just like me. The rich man attracts money and wealth, the poor man lives in his poverty.

(Milan, 17 December 2013)

S.’s words show a rather fatalistic approach to her social situation. In her experience, there is no space for any political protest that could go beyond negotiating for all her family to be reunited in the reception centre.

Interview 2: M. and his wife arrived in Milan from a small town in the district of Olt, where they survived by combining various day-to-day jobs. They lived in a small house ‘made of clay’ that belonged to M.’s parents, and in which 12 people were living before migration. They have been practising circular migration between Italy and Romania for ten years, adapting to the living conditions in unauthorised settlements. After many evictions, this family was offered accommodation in a Milan Council temporary reception centre for 200 days between 2013 and 2014 but then they found themselves back on the street again.

M: In Romania … I worked as a day-labourer, … I earned money for food but it wasn’t enough, then … we said: ‘Let’s go too so that we can sort ourselves out’…. And yet here it’s even worse … they send us away, worse than dogs, … if they see a dog, they give it something to eat and find it a place to sleep … and me? … the people from the Council told us that they would send the children to school … they would find us a job, like all the other people, they would give us a house to live better … but … they haven’t done anything…. We did live better for 200 days … we were fine … but a person’s life doesn’t last 200 days … 200 days are not long enough to sort oneself out and live better … we thought we would also have lived better, but nothing has changed, nothing, nothing! We left the rubbish heap and we returned to the rubbish heap!

(Milan, 26 June 2014)

M.’s words express a desire to be like the others, that is, to have a job, a house, his children with him, yet, at the same time, he seems aware of the impossibility of making these dreams come true, due to there being no recognition of his humanity. M. complains about the dehumanisation processes that are carried out
daily against Roma. This is a kind of protest against discriminating forms of recognition.

Interview 3: L. and her husband had been in Italy for about ten years. They too lived in informal settlements that were subject to evictions over many years and in a temporary reception centre for a short period. But in 2012, they managed to move into a private social apartment that they shared with an uncle’s extended family. She and her husband had managed to work on and off for several years for Italian families and companies, hiding their own Roma identity.

L: I would like … there to be work [in Romania] so that I could feed our children! … I would like our government to do for us what the Italian government does for Italians … to be given a job! Because, when there is work, we work! We don’t shrink from it! Just as we work here in Italy, we would also work at home!

(Milan, 1 May 2014)

With these words, L. expresses a clear awareness of the political and economic dimensions that affect her life and that of her loved ones.

Interview 4: D. and his wife arrived in Italy from Craiova in 1999 and were the pioneers of migration to Bari. During the Ceaușescu era, they had always worked with their families in farming cooperatives and in a hand-made brick factory, combining these jobs with other informal activities such as selling clothes at markets. Their arrival in Bari coincided with a period of negotiating with the local authorities which eventually placed D. in the role of political representative for his community, which was fundamentally made up of a network of D.’s and his wife’s siblings’ families. This involvement led to the creation of Bari Council’s only authorised camp where the community currently lives. These achievements (e.g. the creation of an authorised camp in Bari; the setting up of a social cooperative; various assignments as cultural mediator), as well as the failures and periods of stalemate (e.g. persistent inadequacy of the camp facilities and self-built huts; the cooperative’s economic crisis), are the main themes in his narratives, which tell us of quite stable political relations with the city’s administrators and officials.

D: My hope, my big wish, is that our children, our grandchildren, can live in better conditions, because we are living in a democracy now too, so therefore we can have a say. We have people in the government. We too have learned how to read and write. I think it would be extremely normal and … natural for us to change our life, the opportunities for our children…. In Romania we have a problem, … we don’t have many people in the government, … [we are waiting] for us to have someone in the Parliament and in the Government too and even in Brussels, who can represent us, who can present our requests, our ideas, our pain, our suffering…. Because there are a lot of Roma who deal with these things and who … can speak in countries where there are poor people. They can go
and speak with the mayors and with the Gadže to solve the problems of these poor Roma.

(Bari, 29 November 2013)

In this case, the appeal for forms of Roma political participation that could modify the terms of their recognition, mainly through the Roma’s own appropriation of democratic instruments, is absolutely clear.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have sought to connect Appadurai’s theoretical approach to the capacity to aspire, with the particular ethnographic case of Romanian Roma migrants encountered during the MigRom research. A strong contrast emerges in this analysis between these families’ dynamism (trying to improve their social condition as well as their capacity to aspire through migration) and the institutional inertia of many local Italian policies, which continue to fluctuate between indifference and repression and which continue to frame Roma through stereotypical images as problematic and marginal people, with no subjectivity, capacity, or agency. The causes of this inertia can indeed be found in the diffused, pervasive, and violent anti-Gypsyism that characterises the contemporary Italian context (e.g. Piasere 2012; Meneghini & Fattori 2016). I argue that, in order to re-model social assets and the political terms of Roma recognition, recognising the anti-Gypsyism in Italian local policies on the one hand, and the collective effort of Roma on the other would be a priority exercise in democracy.

Local policies towards Roma and Sinti are, in fact, inspired by anti-Gypsyist visions that are common in Italian public opinion. However, as we have seen in the Milan and Bari cases, within these policies some more than others have had the effect of reducing the Roma’s capacity to aspire, as well as reducing their capabilities in general. That is, they reduce their possibilities to contribute to their own wellbeing, and that of society. To conclude, these research results underline once again the importance of promoting policies that encourage recognising Roma as political subjects with whom to hold direct dialogues.

Notes

* The research leading to the present publication results from MigRom, ‘The immigration of Romanian Roma to Western Europe: Causes, effects, and future engagement strategies’, a project funded by the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme under the call on ‘Dealing with diversity and cohesion: the case of the Roma in the European Union’ (GA319901).

1 See http://dati.istat.it/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=DCIS_POPSTRRES1#.

2 Contemporary sociocultural anthropology defines imagination as a form of agency that all human beings use at a symbolic level. Through it, individuals engage in forms of reproduction, resistance or cultural change by striving daily to symbolically interpret and model the world.

For further details on the presence of Romanian Roma in Italy on a regional and provincial level, see Pontrandolfo et al. (2014) and Agoni (2016).

For a more detailed account of local policies regarding Roma and Sinti adopted in Milan over the last 20 years or so, see Pontrandolfo et al. (2015) and Agoni (forthcoming). The section in this chapter on the Lombardy capital’s policies refers to data collected in the accurate research work carried out by Marianna Agoni as part of the MigRom project.

Regional Law no. 77 of 22nd December 1989. Regional action for the protection of peoples belonging to traditionally nomadic and semi-nomadic ethnic groups. See www.sucardrom.eu/regionale.html#lombardia.


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Regional Law no. 77 of 22nd December 1989. Regional action for the protection of peoples belonging to traditionally nomadic and semi-nomadic ethnic groups. See www.sucardrom.eu/regionale.html#lombardia.


Declaration of a state of emergency in relation to nomadic community settlements in the regional territories of Campania, Lazio and Lombardy, see www.governo.it/Governo/Provvedimenti/testo_int.aspx?d=39105.

Council deliberation no. 2445 of 23rd November 2012. Approval of the guidelines for municipal administration intervention on the topic of Roma, Sinti and Caminanti populations in Milan and for the agreement with the Milan Prefect’s Office, see www.comune.milano.it/alcopretorio/ConsultazioneDelibere/showdoc.aspx?procid=44493.


Non-Roma generally translate the Romani word mangimós with ‘begging’. However, according to a number of Roma, mangimós refers to a set of activities that also includes various forms of exchange. A widespread form of mangimós that these families practice in Milan is, for example, begging at supermarket entrances, but they also receive donations from charitable organisations in the form of food, clothes, school equipment, and so on.


For a detailed history of relations between the various Roma communities and Bari public administration, see Pontrandolfo et al. 2015 and Pontrandolfo (forthcoming).

For a detailed history of relations between the various Roma communities and Bari public administration, see Pontrandolfo et al. 2015 and Pontrandolfo (forthcoming).

References


Introduction

In August 2010, just as the French President Sarkozy launched a national campaign for the forced repatriation of Romanian Roma (Sallé 2011), the European Roma Rights Center, a Budapest-based NGO, asked me to accompany Costel, a Romanian monitor, on his visit to the shantytowns in the northern Paris suburbs. Together, we rushed through a harrowing tour of sites to collect documents and narratives in support of the complaint the ERRC was lodging with the European Commission. At the end of this all-day marathon, we ended up at the Samaritain shantytown in La Courneuve where, upon seeing our defeated expressions, Mihai, the headman, received us with a warm welcome. We sat down under an improvised gazebo, appreciatively sipping coffee and fizzy drinks, and chatted about this and that with the residents, everyone taking care to avoid the subject of the ongoing evictions.

Such was my first impression of the Samaritain, a lull in a storm of political violence. In the five years that followed, my impression did not waver, and I regularly returned with a certain pleasure to the Samaritain, first in the course of my doctoral work in public law and my job at the European Roma Rights Center, and then, from 2013, as a post-doctoral researcher in anthropology with the MigRom project. It was not until the summer of 2015, when the Samaritain was about to be razed, that I realised the exceptional nature of the welcome I had received, the rare stability of this shantytown, both because of its six years of existence and because of the little society that lived there. It was a highly civilised place, whose peaceful, friendly character had struck me on my first visit. The enduring welcome provided optimal conditions for an extended ethnographic field study of the site’s inhabitants.

The originality and the strength of the MigRom project lies in the decision to recruit Romani research assistants. In 2013, we hired Florin Nita and Petre Petcuţ. Together we carried out some 60 biographical interviews in the Romani language in three different shantytowns. In the Samaritain, we recorded and transcribed 15 interviews, which provided us with precise, comparable details on the interviewees’ social and migratory paths. This semi-directive method was nevertheless limited by the formality required in its implementation. The act of
making an appointment, of taking notes or turning on a recorder made our informants feel they needed to watch what they said. The limitation of questionnaire-based studies, often pointed out in the literature (Burawoy 2003), makes them, for Judith Okely (2008: 56) ‘inappropriate for Gypsies as a non-literate group, used to deviating from outsiders’ interrogations. Question asking was associated with interfering officials such as the police, health inspectors and local councillors’.

We would temper this criticism: the questionnaires were very useful for gathering factual information (e.g. date of arrival in France; parents’ occupation, etc.). They provided a solid foundation that could be enriched by floating observation (Pétonnet 2002) made possible by a deeper anthropological relation with various people on the site, and in particular Mihai, the headman.

This particular relationship was based on the participation of my colleague, Florin, a 30-something Rom. Although he was a long-time resident of Paris shantytowns, Florin had no relationship with the inhabitants of the Samaritain before I introduced him. Our informal discussions with Mihai rapidly turned into three-way conversations in Romani between Mihai, Florin, and myself. More accurately, Florin and Mihai talked about anything and everything, and I would sometimes try to break in for an explanation of a point or a word I did not understand. Mihai and Florin had much in common: they were both Romanian Roma who had experienced migration to France and shantytown life. Nevertheless, they would never have known each other and related as equals without the research programme. Mihai was an elder, while Florin was still regarded by his peers as a young man. Florin was a Rom, but he was employed by a French institution whose goals remained hazy for Mihai. And above all, they did not come from the same region: Florin was from Dobrugia, while Mihai, like the other residents of the shantytown, was from northwest Romania. The relationship between Mihai and Florin was, so to speak, halfway between a relationship between Roma and the classic relationship between anthropologist and informant. Our discussions often involved what Barth (1969) described as a play on the definition of ethnic borders. The common regional Romanian stereotypes separating the more ‘civilised’, more ‘central-European’ Transylvania from the old, more ‘Eastern’, more ‘Balkan’ kingdoms (Botea 2012) were brought into play by Florin and Mihai to distinguish themselves:

Mihai (one day when he was angry): You see, in the south you are always boasting but you aren’t serious; us, we’re like the Germans, we hold back.

Florin: You, you’re more Hungarian, not true Romanians, and true Roma are Romanian ...

This distinction makes use of knowledge about Romania but is encompassed in a *jeu romanes* (Williams 1988: 381), playing on distancing but also convergence. For instance, in the course of their conversation, Mihai and Florin found a vague family tie between Mihai’s son-in-law and Florin; they discussed the meaning of a word or punctuated their conversation with, ‘you’re a Rom, you understand
that too’. Both also wanted to get closer while pushing me away by reassigning me to my role as an outside observer. More broadly than in our particular relationships, this interplay between linguistic and social distancing and convergence guided many of the relationships observed in the Samaritain. The importance of the *jeu romanes* underscores the importance of the multi-ethnic (or rather multi-Rom) composition of this shantytown. Usually, studies of Romani migrants in France show that the French shantytown is the imperfect continuation of a village community in Romania (Olivera 2011). The Samaritain was an exception. The families came from different villages scattered around the historical regions of Crişana and Banat. From the standpoint of identity, most of the families considered themselves to belong to different sub-ethnic groups – *race* – such as Calderari, Lingurari, Ciurari, or Romungri. Affirming their belonging to different *race* was a way for these particular different ‘Roma to represent themselves among the other Roma even as they assert themselves as a closed entity among these perpetually ill-defined groups known as the ‘Roma’ (Olivera 2007: 117). In addition to the Roma, the shantytown included a few families of ethnic Romanians and Hungarians who ‘shared with the Roma the fact that they were seen as Gypsies’, as Gabor, an ethnic Hungarian living there explained to me.

For the members of this mixed temporary-housing community, the Samaritain shantytown was an enclosed, shared space where they could deepen their relationships for six years. The shantytown space inhabited by Romanian and Bulgarian Roma has been a recurrent configuration in France for the last 20 years. The Roma call it a ‘Platz’, adopting a term from the first wave of migration, in 1990, in the German Federal Republic. Historically, the German term designated a social space, a city or town square, and by extension, the surrounding neighbourhood. In 1930s Paris, for Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe, the term designated the predominantly Ashkenazi quarter of the Marais district in Paris (Green 1985). Like the Jewish ‘pletzl’, the Romani Platz is seen and experienced as a world in itself (Williams 1994). Nestled within the city, and despite opposition from the government authorities, it provides migrants newly arrived to Paris with socially cohesive housing (Green 1985). Based on the co-habitation practices there, we might argue that the Platz worked as a limited territory in which the social, economic, and religious networks of the Romanian Roma families living there have overlapped and merged. In the Samaritain Platz, at the centre of these ties stood the figure of Mihai, who managed to retain his position at the head of the shantytown. How was the original governance of this site created, and, especially, maintained? Mihai’s personal path was not that of a traditional Romani headman, ‘bulibaşă’ or ‘baro rom’ (Piasere 2005) or ‘shato’ (Lee 1997), as described in the literature, whose power is based on his family’s prestige and strength. Rather, it was that of an outsider from a discredited family that had managed to take advantage of the disruptions occasioned by history and migration. We could draw a parallel here with another go-between: the ‘development broker’ described by Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan, who is also ‘a marginalized dominated actor in the local political arena. He exercises his brokerage in the service of an internal ascension strategy’ (Olivier de Sardan 1995: 530). Mihai
Life and death of a French shantytown

Mihai’s governance at the local level, rooted in contemporary France, presented a symmetrical challenge to city government, which thus appeared to be deprived of its principal functions, leaving it with only the power to destroy. In point of fact, however, above and beyond this dichotomy, the boundary between the headman’s power and the French political system was highly porous and could be breached via numerous intermediaries. But just how are these ways of practicing power related? Unlike non-Western societies, where informal power is a key issue in political and economic anthropology (see for example in post-colonial Africa: Geschiere & Roitman 1997), in Europe, this kind of local, informal, and porous power has received little attention. The fieldwork on the Samaritain promised to be an interesting case study in political anthropology, by which to conduct a broader investigation of local governance, rather than simply a study of Romani shantytowns.

Act one: opening the Platz

Mihai arrived in France in 2002 with his wife, Livia, and their three children. He is a powerful, stocky man with a closely trimmed moustache, and is always well dressed. Since his arrival he has gone from one shantytown to the next, driven by forced demolitions and reinstallations, caught up in the constant turnover of the shantytowns which have been targeted for the last 25 years by a systematic eviction policy (Cousin & Legros 2015). Having been evicted once again in 2009, Mihai decided to found his own Platz. Instead of buying a shack from a shantytown owner and setting up house as he had done on previous occasions, he convinced a few families to rally around him and to establish their own settlement. He was 35 at the time, old enough to be trusted. He had a few contacts among the local associations and numerous Romani friends whom he had met in the Platz where he had lived. In an industrial zone beside the train tracks in La Courneuve, they spotted a vacant lot. There they built a Pentecostal church and a few shacks; the rest of the lot became settled following encounters, evictions, and migrations. In 2010, the 3,000 square metres of vacant land were occupied by some 200 persons. They were mainly working-class Romanian Roma, between 20 and 50 years old, couples with children. This was the case of Danutz, a distant cousin of Mihai, who had been living in the Platz with his wife and their two children since 2014. His ‘parents had worked in the cooperative’, and he explained himself in this way:

You know, I came to this Platz because I’m really familiar with this place, you can take the RER [Paris urban train] and in two minutes you’re in Paris or Villepinte. Since I sometimes work at the exhibition complex [in Villepinte], it’s easy. Before I was in Sarcelles, but it’s far from everything.

Residence in the town of La Courneuve provides the inhabitants of the Platz with a base from which to access the centre of Paris, the town in its broad sense,
its public transportation network, its financial and social resources. The location of the Platz in an uninhabited space in an industrial zone in La Courneuve, alongside the tracks, ensures relative invisibility while offering the advantage of being less than five minutes’ walk from the tramway that serves the northern suburb and ten minutes from the train line that, in a few minutes, takes them to the centre of Paris. The possibilities of easy connections with other Roma in the Paris region, with ironmongers, with begging sites, with French acquaintances or other migrants they have encountered are all resources provided by the city. This is the exact opposite of the isolation of the Romanian village. The inhabitants of the Platz can therefore be considered part of a network – the Platz, which is part a bigger network – the city. This is the efficient network of networks (Hannerz & Joseph 1983) that forms the fabric of urban life.

For Danutz, there was nothing definitive about his installation in La Courneuve. When we interviewed him in 2014, he explained that he had come to France for three months, taking advantage of a vacant shack, before trying his luck on a construction site in Italy. A year later, we came across him again, moving back into the shantytown when a cousin returned to Romania. A more systematic analysis of the presence of the inhabitants shows this to be a common situation. Between September 2013 and August 2015, we saw numerous departures, but four-fifths of the persons present at that time had already been there in 2011 and/or in 2013. The Platz served as a home base for numerous people who lived intermittently in France. With the ebb and flow of an intense circulation – returns to Romania, migrations to other towns or countries – a shack could be lent or sold, but that did not keep people from coming back. Because of the demand for informal housing, the opportunities afforded by the shantytown needed to be made available to a maximum number of families, and an effort was made to reduce vacancies. A dozen families, often present from the start, formed the heart of this network and provided a stable foundation. At the centre was Mihai’s family whose precise role was to ensure the shantytown’s social continuity, as he explained:

I must stay here, always, the others, they go to Italy, to England, they go back to Romania, but, what do you want, I’ve got to stay here with my family to take care of everything.

Taking care of everything means first of all enabling the shantytown to exist and organising its space. Mihai gave everyone a space to build their shack and thus, little by little, drew a street a few meters wide running down the centre of the settlement. As head of the Platz, Mihai provided a general layout, but the inhabitants built their own shacks the way they saw fit with whatever materials were to hand.

Quick to build and very efficient, such shacks can be put up in a single day and for very little cost. Ownership of the living space by the inhabitants requires taking care with the interior. As Certeau, Giard, and Mayol (1994: 22) noted:

The act of arranging one’s home parallels that of arranging the pathways in the neighbourhood urban space, and these two acts found, to the same
Life and death of a French shantytown

The dwelling was the family’s private space, the front door was locked when they were away, visitors knocked before entering. Nevertheless, it was permeable to noise from outside: people could talk through the walls or could hear a couple fighting. The daily life of the Platz resembled that of the French shantytowns in the 1960s (Pétonnet 2002). Each dwelling had a front stoop, often protected by an awning, with a table and chairs; this space was both private and public. It was a space of sociability, where one sat in front of the door, invited friends for coffee, chatted with passers-by.

After a few years of living side-by-side, many residents who did not know each other before meeting in the shantytown, had moved from having formal neighbourly gatherings, to closer relationships. Calin, a resident interviewed in 2014, explained that:

Here you don’t see Roma people being impolite, here when I get up I go to greet my neighbours, and all the Roma, when they see each other say ‘te oves baxtalo, mo Phral’ [‘Hello brother’], things have got better.

Living together provided a feeling of physical but also of symbolic security and bolstered a sense of belonging to the Romani community. This collective feeling meant that children were allowed to roam and play freely, for the Platz was a

Figure 6.1 Front stoop of a Samaritain shack. © Yann Merlin 2013.
highly sociable, enclosed space, watched over by the adults. Adolescents coming into adulthood attempted to cultivate both their childhood Platz friends (marriage, business, etc.) and their extant race ties in their family. Here, we touch on the adaptability and dynamism of the Romani worlds. The families transmitted their social-relations capital to new domestic units, which quickly became autonomous. With each generation, the transmission of relational capital integrated both the family relations mobilised before migration, and those developed in France. As migrants, the Roma connected with each other through mutual acquaintances and the daily experience of a shantytown more than through their race connections. With time, the double Romanian and French geographical anchoring of migrants (Benarrosh-Orsoni 2015) became a double identity anchoring in the Samaritain: one was ‘Čurar’ or ‘Lingurar’ in Romania and ‘from the Samaritain’ in France.

**Kerel Lové: iron, construction sites, and markets**

Because of its overall composition – houses and collective space – the shantytown ensures its residents an initial integration in the French economic world. It is its financial viability that guarantees each shantytown’s continuation and that of the shantytown as a model. The Platz provides the tie between the informal economy and the formal market. This connecting can be observed at two levels: scrap metal collection and access to the building-trade labour market and its services.

The Samaritain Platz was an economic unit based on the recovery of scrap metal. The primary activity of identification and collection was carried out by a fleet of people who had either carts attached to bicycles or small trucks (under 3.5 tons). The scrap metal was first recovered in the street, from rubbish cans, or from public dumpsters. Those who were best equipped (with trucks) were in contact with building contractors who gave or sold them the scrap metal from demolition sites. The scrap metal collected was brought back to the Platz, where it was dismantled, the copper wire stripped off, motor windings removed and the aluminium put on one side. Loaded onto trucks, these materials were resold to major companies in the sector.

The Platz was also a gateway to the building trades or occasional work on exhibitions or fairs. From 2014 and with the end of the transitional measures, several residents who had been engaged in undeclared work setting up exhibition stalls found themselves obliged to negotiate a regularisation of their status. These regularised workers were team leaders and recruiters, and they reproduced the work brigade model (see Chapter 2). They recruited undeclared day-labourers from the Platz, the teams being as big as ten or so, and a fleet of small trucks. The Platz acted as a cheap labour pool, with family and social ties guaranteeing both the workers’ reliability, and that they would not report these practices to authorities such as the labour inspectorate or the labour tribunal.

The Platz is primarily a market in the first sense, a place of exchange and in particular of economic exchange. At the Samaritain, a few tables in front of the
church served as stalls: there were shopping bags with shampoo, chocolates, cakes, which Gadže (non-Roma) delivered from Romania about once a week; the Roma in the Platz sold food in the same place when the opportunity arose (food-aid packages, products past their sell-by date). While not prohibitive, the prices were not rock-bottom, but ‘it means we don’t have to go as far as LIDL’. Two Roma from the ‘Voltaire’ Platz went from shack to shack selling skirts and T-shirts with ‘I Love Paris’ embroidered in sequins. From time to time, various Romanian ‘specialties’ such as cabbage, sausage, and cakes, arrived with the return of someone from Romania. The market was not really specialised, but depended on the opportunities of each participant. The market was free, the head of the Platz did not control it, no more than he controlled the other economic activities in the Platz. Nevertheless, a small share of this circulation came back to him through his monopoly on the sale of soft drinks and crisps. As well as providing a little additional income, this monopoly provided him with business relations with the residents. For instance, when talking with the head in his shack, I often observed the deferential attitude of the young people who came to buy a can of fizzy drink for €1. He also saw this relation as a form of new-found prestige, as he explained: ‘you see, when I was 15, I was a bad guy, but now in the Platz people talk politely to me, I have become a respectable man’.

The Kaštalo’s new-found prestige

Nothing in Mihai’s social origins predisposed him to head a Platz. When the communists came to power in 1948, Florian, Mihai’s grandfather, produced and sold wooden utensils and tools in a village in the plain near the town of Oradea. He was a Rudar and did not speak Romani. In the 1960s, his older son moved 45 kilometers away from there, to the village of Balnaca in the foothills of the Apuseni Mountains, where he married and went to work in the Bratca-Borod mines. He was soon joined by his younger brother Viorel and his brother’s wife Lucica, a ‘tchachi romni’ (‘true Romani woman’) from the județ (‘county’) of Salaj. In response to the 1948 Moscow International Conference, Romania switched its agricultural economic policy to mining and the machine-tool industry. In line with national policy, between 1950 and 1962, companies in the Aleșd conglomerate stepped up industrialisation of the so-called mining zone of Borod-Șuncuiuș-Dobrești-Vadu Crișului, in the Județ of Bihor and opened new silicate mines in the Bratca-Borod sector to supply the cement industry. The conglomerate combined mines and small industrial transformation units with a network of small towns and villages. In the rural-industry model, villagers both worked in the mines and engaged in agricultural activity to top-up their income (Roger 2002). Viorel, Mihai’s father, for instance, not only worked in the mine but also caught fish and sold the catch in the nearby villages.

Labour requirements in the mines encouraged the local Roma, from different race and geographical origins, to settle in the village of Balnaca. There they found themselves thrown together in a figania, or ‘Gypsy quarter’, located in a little valley subject to flooding and separated from the rest of the village by the
railroad tracks. The diverse origins of the Balnaca Roma led to an extremely complex and continuing personal redefinition, a *jeu romanes*. Today the ethnic identities declared in the village are still nearly as numerous as the inhabitants: Čurari, Patrinari, Kovači, Romungri, Rudari, Lingurari, German Roma. Mihai was born in 1971, in Balnaca and spent his childhood in this ‘multi-Rom’ village community. His sister repeatedly referred to herself as a ‘Kaštali’, before switching to the term ‘Lingurar’, ‘because Kaštalo is what other people say to make fun of us’. The adjective ‘kaštalo’ is in principle felt to be highly derogatory by the local Roma, because they form:

> an antithetical category: Barbarians threatening Romani Civilization … unlike the Gaže, they were called to live as Romanes but did not do so: bibaxtale manuše (‘accursed men’), without respect (patjiv) and without shame (laža), dirty (melale) and wicked (žungale), they are a corrupt humanity.

(Olivera 2007: 525)

This assertion ought to be relativised. Mihai did not seem ashamed to call himself a ‘Kaštalo’ and used the term in speaking of his family and his origins. He was comfortable with the deprived social position implied by the term from both an ethnic standpoint – ‘my father did not speak Romanes well, I learned it on the streets with the other children, in the Gypsy community’ – and a social standpoint – ‘the village was poor and we were the poorest in the village’. In 1985, the family moved from Balnaca to a village some 15 kilometres west of Oradea:

> After my father quit work because of black lung, we were starving to death with the Gypsies, so my parents settled with the Gadže in Gerhis because the slaughterhouses for the whole town of Oradea were there and we could get the leavings for free.

Mihai married a Čurari woman from the village, against her father’s wishes. His marriage gave him a position in the Roma community of Balnaca but also enabled him to reinforce the previous marriage ties between the Čurar and his Kaštale cousins in Balnaca. The 1989 revolution and the post-communist transition period brought with them the closure, one after the other, of the valley’s mines. In these hard times, the Balnaca community eked out a living collecting scrap iron from the old abandoned factories of the conglomerate and gathering mushrooms in the nearby mountains. In Oradea, Mihai also fell victim to the disastrous transition period. From 1986, he, like his brothers and sisters, had worked in the State factory at Sanandrei where they fattened pigs for slaughter. In the 1990s, an Italian tannery took over part of the factory’s installations and employees, among them Mihai, before going bankrupt in 1997. At that point Mihai joined the collaterals of his Balnaca family and took up scrap collecting and mushroom gathering. At the end of the 1990s, Mihai found himself heavily in debt and in 2001 he fell seriously ill ‘in the last stage before death’.
Although he believed he was lost, he was nevertheless to be reborn. Invited by a friend to attend a Pentecostal church service, he heard a voice urging him to change his ways if he wanted to be healed. He made a promise to God, the miracle happened, the sickness vanished, and he converted to the Pentecostal faith. His conversion story follows the patterns described by Fosztó (2009): personal crisis (in this case a serious illness), promise, and then a supernatural event providing evidence of God’s power, and conversion to Pentecostalism. Mihai’s story also corresponds to another pattern identified by Fosztó: the direct connection between the macro-economic variations during the transition to the market economy and a personal experience of crisis. ‘Ritually revitalised’ by his conversion, in 2002 Mihai was able to take advantage of the waiving of the visa requirement in the Schengen Area to move to the West and start his new life.

He set out for France, partly by chance, because a smuggler from Arad proposed this destination. He was dropped off in front of the Platz of the headman Costica, on the Rue des Fillettes in the Paris suburb of Saint-Denis. He spent 13 years within a radius of a few kilometres from there. Moving from one shantytown to the next, he became a part of the Romanian Roma community, made his living from scrap collecting, and eventually brought his family to France. In 2005, he moved to the Platz on the Quai Saint-Ouen. This extended shantytown encompasses several Platz run by many headmen. It was there that Mihai established ties with numerous Romani Pentecostals like himself, but also with activists in a number of associations. He built a powerful network of relations, which he activated when he decided to open his own Platz. Following the evacuation of Saint-Ouen in 2008, Mihai followed Costica, who opened a Platz in Argenteuil. Its evacuation a few months later and the political battle he waged alongside activists from the Association pour l’Accueil des Voyageurs (Welcome Association for Travellers) convinced him it was time to establish his own Platz, with himself as headman.

The golden tongue of the Platz headman

When I asked the residents of the Samaritain Platz what a Platz headman does, one of them responded ‘he’s a bit like your city police’; a form of territorial power that is emerging in France today because of the need to manage daily life in the community. This is not the modern reinvention of traditional chieftainships that is described in Africa (Perrot & Fauvelle-Aymar 2003). The Roma of the Samaritain Platz had no Romani counter-institutions: neither traditional headmen (the bulibaṣa) nor the well-known arbitral justice system (the kris, see Marushiakova & Popov 2007). In addition, when the anthropologist naively insisted on knowing the names of the Romani counter-institutions, he was referred to the police, the courts, and the Gadže mayor. The Platz headman exercised a suspended form of power that stopped at the shantytown gates.

Mihai had neither the family prestige nor the monopoly of domination to exercise this power. According to the residents, it was legitimate for Mihai to be the headman because he was the one who ‘opened’ the Platz: he found the site,
avoided immediate eviction, he was a pioneer. But that was not enough, ‘the plot doesn’t belong to him’ and ‘he mustn’t overstep the mark’, a man said when Mihai got angry over cars parking in front of the rubbish cans. Whether he was approved of or criticised, it was his ready tongue that was stressed by our informants: ‘He is intelligent, he talks nicely with everyone, including French people’. What mattered was the power of an intelligent man’s speech, as he liked to say of himself.

Mihai traded in ‘building plots’. He chose new occupants according to moral rather than financial criteria, the ideal choice being ‘Pentecostal brothers’, or at least quiet people who did not drink or gamble, and especially those who did not cause scandal. This choice was particularly appreciated by the other residents, who even made it a prerequisite: ‘This was a quiet Platz. We wouldn’t have let Mihai let in just anybody, we lived here with our families’, a former resident explained to me after the evacuation. In fact it was to protect the Platz against scandal that he evicted his own collaterals: ‘My sister’s husband drank, he was violent, he screamed and shouted at night, I asked them to leave’. At least that was how he told it to a group of men on the day after the departure, before stressing the fate of his poor sister, thereby showing he was sacrificing his own family to the group’s interests.

Keeping the public peace was thus the primary function of the headman; he also made sure the Platz was kept clean. This was a major issue: for the first two years, the local authorities did not remove rubbish, and so it piled up in several places, sometimes to a height of several metres. Appealing to Médecins du Monde, Mihai eventually managed to obtain a dozen dumpsters, which were emptied twice a week. This service was barely sufficient since scrap and rags produced a lot of waste. It was therefore necessary to force everyone to keep the alleys in front of their shack clean and to ban emptying dirty water in public spaces. Toilets were also an important issue. Fixed over a hole dug in the rubbish heap, they filled quickly and no one wanted to do the humiliating job of cleaning up, filling the holes, and digging new ones. It took the full force of Mihai’s authority, who threatened, paid out and sometimes personally helped with the operation in order to get anywhere. Security was another issue: two threats were identified: fire and malicious intrusions. Fires are common in shantytowns owing to the presence of inflammable materials and the use of candles and wood-burning stoves. The presence of gas bottles and the density of the dwellings make these fires rapid and deadly. Between 2013 and 2015 alone, nine people (among them six children) died in Platz fires, one of them, in Bobigny in February of 2014, was a little girl whom Mihai knew. As a precaution, several fire extinguishers were distributed around the Platz, and Mihai organised a nightly round. The watchman was also responsible for enforcing the curfew, after which all candles and other flames were forbidden. The same watchman looked out for marauding ‘Roma from Bucharest and Moroccans’. He was assisted by the presence of two large dogs that guarded the entrance to the Platz. These risks of intrusions, whether imagined or real, tell us a lot about the hierarchy of fears and frictions at the Samaritain.
The list of Mihai’s attributes adds up to the classic French legal definition of a mayor’s administrative policing powers: to ensure security, peace and public health (Hauriou 1993). This hijacking of mayoral attributes raises questions about the rivalry and the subsidiary relation between the mayor and Mihai. Mihai’s only regular contact was with the deputy mayor responsible for living conditions, who would come calling (usually accompanied by city police officer) with recriminations (neighbours complaining about noise, about the way cars were parked, sanitation workers about providing rubbish bins). On these occasions, Mihai would step outside the shantytown, and the discussion was conducted in front of the gates and not, as was customary in other cases, inside. With the exception of obtaining dumpsters, Mihai never took the initiative of going to the mayor on behalf of the group to request collective access to a service such as water, school enrolment, or registration on the list of local residents (administrative domiciliation).

Among the associations, the Samaritain always had the reputation of being easier to work with than other shantytowns. This reputation was the fruit of the special relationship Mihai had built up with Médecins du Monde, the Association de Scolarisation des Enfants (Association for School Enrolment of Children), the European Roma Rights Center, and the Voix des Rroms (the Voice of the Roma). In the first place, unlike other headmen, he assumed his place and positioned himself as the negotiator of collective relations with the associations. This made association representatives feel relatively safe and spared them the need to negotiate their presence with him. Furthermore, negotiations turned out to be fairly simple, for Mihai had retained from the experiences of Saint-Ouen and Argenteuil the idea that associations add to the quality of the Platz (and therefore to his own power) by bringing in medical services, helping with school enrolment, and with legal aid. Once they had checked in with Mihai, these associations’ employees and volunteers were free to come and go, visit families, and plan their work. Nevertheless, Mihai remained the headman and decision-maker refusing, for example, Medecins du Monde permission to park their TB-screening truck on the spot reserved for unloading scrap. The boundaries of this monopoly on collective interests were constantly subject to renegotiation. For instance, Mihai was unsure of how he should act when an association activist recruited workers for a brigade for the grape harvest in the South without asking him: was this a denial of his monopoly or a simple commercial transaction that was none of his business? In the end he reluctantly let the deal go ahead.

Relations with the press were also complicated. While it is hard to report on many shantytowns, since 2010 the number of stories in the news had grown, and the Roma took a dim view of journalists who ‘show the rubbish and say that we are thieves’. However, Mihai would admit journalists, students, photographers, and artists. As much as the presence of associations was appreciated by residents, that of journalists was on the whole rejected, and Mihai’s open-door policy was harshly criticised by the household heads. Mihai was repeatedly obliged to explain his choices and to argue for their validity, afterwards, at meetings of the householders. He discussed practical matters with them: parking,
rubbish cans, nightly rounds of the Platz, but also the engagement of a lawyer when it came to evictions, or allowing the presence of medical teams from Médecins du Monde, or a journalist. The aim of these meetings was to gain approval for his decisions and to respect the Romani egalitarian ideology (Stewart 1991). As we emphasised earlier, in the Samaritain Platz, the Roma did not recognise a Romani headmanship and preferred to turn to the Gadže institutions. Mihai had power because these institutions did not exercise their functions inside the shantytown; but his legitimacy was fragile, and he was constantly obliged to give the household heads the impression that his decisions were taken collectively in discussions with them.

In return for the function of regulation that he assumed, he enjoyed a monopoly on the economic exploitation of the Platz. In addition to the monopoly on the building lots, Mihai demanded a contribution from each household. Attribution of a lot was a one-time fee. Owing to the stability of the inhabitants and the finite size of the site, in a second phase, a contribution of €1 per night per shack was asked for. This was used, among other things, to pay the two men who did the nightly rounds and the person who cleaned the toilets – tasks that turned out to be doled out to family members. This contribution was the source of numerous complaints that indirectly called into question the custodianship of the Platz headman: the toilets were badly cleaned, there was no need to pay the watchmen, and he took too big a commission from the common pot. Nevertheless, this system managed to survive for six years. Mihai’s power model was thus based on a contribution in exchange for services. The model was original with respect

Figure 6.2 Mihai meeting the household heads. © Yann Merlin 2013.
to other observed models of exploitation (Cousin 2015), for it reinforced the interest of the shantytown’s continued existence, whereas the prefecture’s policy of systematic eviction reinforced the power and interests of Platz headmen who made their living exclusively from their monopoly on the formation of new shantytowns.

The topography of the shantytown underscored the centrality of power. Mihai lived in a big four-room shack in a little square in front of the church. This central location enabled him to observe all comings and goings. Around him lived his close friends, members of his family, who were also Pentecostals. Narrow streets of small one-room shacks radiated out from the square. The poorest families were relegated to the periphery of the shantytown, where the rubbish and collective toilets were. The heterogeneous composition of the site’s residents, which we underscored in the first part of this chapter, is important: Mihai had to manage conflicts between families and groups of different origins; at the same time this heterogeneity enhanced his power as a broker, for it was an indispensable part of his network of acquaintance.

Mihai explained that being a headman is not a comfortable position and that he remained at La Courneuve because of the Samaritain church, which is the ‘only thing that matters’. He was closely involved in the religious life of the Platz. Having built a church, he became its custodian, which meant he could perform certain everyday rituals, but had to invite outside pastors to conduct the weekly services and celebrate certain sacraments. In accordance with the social determinism of Pentecostalism (Garcia-Ruiz 2006), his economic exploitation of the shantytown did not call into question his Pentecostal ethics but on the contrary bolstered his stature. The Samaritain church anchored Mihai in the midst of the Romanian Pentecostal pastors of the Paris region. On their recommendation, he was recognised as a presbyter, in 2012, by a Texas Pentecostal church at a convention in Romania: ‘I am the priest chosen by God. I can baptise people, give blessings, heal, I can recommend them to God, celebrate the Lord’s Supper’. He held two services a week: on Sunday afternoon and on Thursday evening. Everyone in the Platz came. The church was the only collective facility and the only activity which included Orthodox Christians and Pentecostals alike. The church fostered a set social hierarchy, in accordance with the Pentecostal ideology. For Mihai, the only valid baptism was that given to adults, which transforms Man’s very essence (Garcia-Ruiz 2006) and makes Orthodox Christians inferior in essence.

In this way, Mihai seemed to use his double function as pastor and headman of the Platz to organise his community. In church, he would remind people of the moral precepts necessary to live together, but could not exclude those who did not respect them, for in Pentecostalism the priest is, in principle, not an intercessor. The Bible alone contains God’s Word, and the pastor’s function is to organise the community’s life and to explain the Bible. The mystical function is filled by the prophets, who ‘like Samuel have dreams inspired by the Holy Spirit’, on whom people commonly call for advice on their life or their future (Benarrosh-Orsoni 2015: 157). Whereas in the Romanian Roma’s version of
Pentecostalism, these prophets are generally women, in the Samaritain church, this role was played by Yogi, a 17-year-old boy who spoke six languages and sang at church in a still-childlike voice. Initially, Mihai was proud to have a prophet, who boosted the status of his church. Many women consulted the prophet for various reasons, and his power would gradually grow, making him the spokesman for the women and the poor families at the rear of the Platz. One day, while we were discussing the legal future of the Platz with Mihai and a few other men, Yogi arrived, surrounded by a dozen old women, and demanded to know what was going to become of the site in the coming months. Mihai answered politely, although with some irritation, that eviction was not imminent. Little by little relations between Mihai and Yogi became strained, but he nevertheless remained the official soloist and still prophesised. Indeed, he had a place in the balance of power in the Platz; he was the spokesman for the old women and the marginalised, he was a ‘trickster’, in Balandier’s (1980) sense of the term. His youth and his ambiguous sexuality made him a grotesque counter-power that buttressed what in this case became Mihai’s institutional power. For instance, he attended the deliberative meetings normally reserved for mature men uninvited. When he left, the men would agree that ‘he’s a woman, we can’t trust him’, but they still let him have his say. Nevertheless, it was on this ‘trickster’ that the community and the outside actors ultimately depended on in their battle to save the Platz.

A fight to the death with the mayor

The site on which the Platz stood was owned by the municipality. For a long time, the mayor of La Courneuve tolerated the Samaritain (contrary to other shantytowns in the city). But in March 2013, after it had been there for four years, the mayor began legal proceedings to obtain permission to evict the site’s residents. To explain this reversal, the town advanced the deterioration of relations over management of waste and more generally, the conditions of coexistence, together with pressure from the prefect who, it was claimed, demanded that the mayor should begin eviction procedures in exchange for his support on other issues. Much later, another much more compelling reason surfaced: an IT company had plans to build a huge data centre on the site, and the eviction of residents from the Platz was a prerequisite for this installation. The data centre needed to store hundreds of thousands of litres of fuel for back-up generators. A fire nearby could cause a major industrial catastrophe.

After deploying a bailiff and then the health services, the mayor took the residents of the Platz to court. Mihai turned to the associations for help. He needed to hire a lawyer, and to maintain relations between the lawyer and the Platz in order to provide various documents. After a summer and an autumn of uncertainty, and no fewer than three different and contradictory decisions, the risk of eviction was held off for another year. During this initial phase of the court battle, Mihai proved to be relatively at ease, discussing legal strategy directly with the association activists. This was his business, and he remained deliberately vague with the other residents about the risks of eviction. As he explained:
‘When the eviction comes, everyone does whatever they feel like, rubbish bins, thefts, fights’. In other words, he was trying to maintain his position within the system of ordinary governance for as long as possible.

In this initial phase of the procedure, Mihai altered the modalities of the legal struggle. At first he appeared alone at the hearings. But then in December 2013 came the prospect of a crucial hearing. Tensions rose in the Platz, and some of the residents accused Mihai of hiding an imminent eviction. To show that he was doing everything he could, he invited all the residents to attend the hearing. It was in the courtroom that suddenly the exceptional character of the collective dimension of a struggle for the life of a shantytown became clear. When 150 Roma from the Samaritain Platz turned up at the courthouse for the hearing, the proper functioning of admittance to the courtroom suddenly ground to a halt. The guards called the police, and a dozen agents arrived and cordoned off the entrance. The Roma protested that they had been summoned, and produced documents to prove it. The judge then intervened and, confirming the collective summons, admitted them, but, he added, without the children (and therefore without the women). After this first climax, the crisis died down. In early January 2014, the court annulled part of the procedure, thus making eviction impossible. Trust was re-established and Mihai resumed his governance.

The year 2014 was an election year for city officials: the mayor of La Courneuve, Gille Poux, was running for a further mandate. He was the successor to the city’s communist government, in power since 1959. In the autumn of 2013, the ‘Leonarda affair’ broke, in which government ministers clashed over the deportation of a Romani high-school girl to Kosovo (Gilbert 2015). The mayor of La Courneuve attempted to profit from this media window by addressing an open letter to the President of the Republic (Poux 2013), calling for greater national solidarity, but also (and above all), for a crack-down on the Roma in La Courneuve:

For several years, populations of what are commonly called Roma have been illegally occupying sites in our city, on which they install makeshift shacks. Fleeing their home countries, all of which are European, where they are the victims of unacceptable segregation, these populations live here in human and sanitary conditions that are quite simply unworthy of our century. All of the NGOs and associations working on the site agree that the situation is urgent!

Clearly the presence of veritable shantytowns in the midst of our neighbourhoods creates unbearable strains on the neighbours and weakens the capacity to live together, to which the inhabitants of La Courneuve are so attached, and leads to a strong sentiment of exasperation coupled with a sense of insecurity.

And he concluded:

The only solution offered today, and that which we are implementing is to take action to systematically evacuate the camps, whoever the owners, and
to await the decision and the cooperation of the police, in the awareness that these groups of persons will merely be pushed a few kilometres along to a neighbouring town and that they will be back in a few months.

That settled it – the city had a problem, which was ‘commonly called Roma’ and it had no other solution than to adopt a policy of systematic eviction. The text was posted on bulletin boards around the town. Scapegoating the Roma a few months before the April 2014 municipal elections gave the mayor a decisive advantage over his potential socialist rival. After a few months of hesitation, the Socialists, the Communists, and the Independents formed a coalition in February 2014, thus paving the way for the re-election of Gilles Poux in the first round of voting. His re-election barely masked the political disaffection from which he was suffering: he was elected with 3,361 votes, representing 23.41% of those registered and 8.58% of the town’s inhabitants. His power was therefore actually based on a tiny majority and he was trapped in a coalition in which his cumbersome socialist allies were present in equal numbers. He therefore continued his anti-Roma policy in the hope of garnering consensus around the theme of security and maintaining what he regarded as his Maghrebian clientele, which he believed to be fiercely anti-Roma.

The second act of the eviction was triggered by the rejection of the Samaritain residents’ appeal in October 2014. The associations working in the Platz took the strategic decision to boost their media visibility and to build local alliances, if possible within the majority and at least with local associations. A name was chosen for the shantytown, which would be ‘the Samaritain’, named after its church. Public interventions increased: a classical music concert, tea at the ‘citizenship house’, a guided tour of the shantytown for the city’s inhabitants, the presence of associations and Roma at the neighbourhood dinner were organised and town councillors from the majority party were contacted. Initially, in November 2014, the majority seemed divided, and positive signals went out. The deputy mayor for security and the heads of city services were fiercely opposed to any discussion, while, on the other hand, a few majority councillors (associations and tourism) urged more openness. The mayor was elusive, initially blaming the prefecture for the eviction initiative. During these two months, at the instigation of Médecins du Monde and the Fondation Abbé Pierre, a plan for social intervention in the shantytown was put together. It proposed to maintain the Platz for three years, the time needed to re-house its inhabitants.

Nevertheless, in December, the mayor took back control. He asked the prefecture for police assistance and excluded the councillors more favourable to the shantytown from his entourage. The plan proposed by Médecins du Monde and the Fondation Abbé Pierre was rejected. The head of social services took charge of severing the ties between the Samaritain and the town’s associations. Mihai wanted to create an association with a few household heads to defend the community’s interests. Since he did not have a legal address, he asked the association headquarters to let him use theirs. In France, the domiciliation of both persons and organisations is a political and juridical tool wielded by municipalities
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to ‘politically’ authorise or deny a person or an undesired group access to territory. After initially being accepted, the request was rejected in mid-December following the intervention of the head of the social services, who also reproached his services for allowing the residents of the Samaritain to sell crêpes at an association stand at the municipal skating rink, adding that ‘when it comes to Roms, everything must go through his office’. This retaking of control was meant to prevent the Roma from emerging as a community with any kind of political weight, at any cost. This necessity met the needs of the moment, namely, avoiding responsibility for the evacuation of the Samaritain. However, it was also a matter of structure: the emergence of a new and large community with voting rights (as European citizens) would endanger the fragile community arrangements within the municipal majority.

The non-recognition was reciprocal. During the initial contact phase, Mihai refused to go to city hall, explaining that, ‘to play the political game means lying and [I don’t] have the right to lie because [I am] Pentecostal’. What Mihai was refusing to do was to take himself to the seat of power. He left this role to his supporters and to a few people from the Platz, who went to testify about their situation. Yogi was put forward by the moral activists and represented the residents when a public appearance was necessary, such as the Mayor’s New Year wishes. That suited Mihai, who kept control of what mattered: on the one hand, the legal follow-up (a new procedure began in January 2015) and, on the other hand, relations with the religious authorities – diocesan priests and the pastor of the neighbouring black Evangelical church.

At the end of June, as the eviction that the court had postponed in February was drawing near, the associations decided out of desperation to alert the media, to ‘make the mayor pay for the eviction’. In mid-July a press conference was called in the shantytown, the militant media networks were mobilised, and many journalists were present. These mediatisation tactics emphasised ‘the voice of the residents’, more than the associations’ discourse. Yogi was showcased, and an online petition was ‘launched’ in his name. He told his story, his hope of winning the TV show ‘The Voice’ rather than finding himself in the street. The character appealed to the public and, over the summer, the petition relayed by the media obtained some 40,000 signatures.

All through summer, activists from neighbouring organisations, political personalities and, above all, numerous journalists visited the Samaritain; no fewer than 55 articles were written between the 1st and the 31st of August. Mihai remained more and more in the background. The increasing pressure from the media and the arrival of new support were destabilising forces that he channelled by putting forward Yogi, who received visitors and gave interviews. His function as spokesman was a continuation of his earlier function in the community. One morning in August, the La Courneuve police commissioner arrived to assess the situation. Yogi offered to give him a guided tour of the shantytown. He talked about his gift of second sight, introduced him to his mother, and congratulated him on his haircut. The commissioner, spellbound, explained that he was sorry but nothing more could be expected from the mobilisation; the shantytown would be subject to eviction.
Final act: wreaking havoc

The file was no longer in the hands of the mayor; it had been sent to the Government some time before. The media turned the eviction into a national issue. The housing ministry favoured a moratorium on the eviction in order to begin a discussion with the NGOs; the interior ministry maintained its tough stance. Dealing with the Roma at the State level had been a permanent feature of French politics since July 2010. The Prime Minister sided with the Interior Minister and ordered immediate destruction of the Platz on the 27th of August. This decision, taken at the highest Government level, was to be effective immediately but did not take into account the situation on the ground. The prefect of the region ordered an assessment of the social situation, which was carried out over two days. A UN delegate was coming to spend a few days on the site, though the police did not alert the residents. The Ombudsman (Toubon 2015) expressed his opinion, writing that he was ‘surprised by the improvised character of the conditions in which the evacuation seems to have been carried out’. It is important to stress the unbelievable, though ritualised, violence of this act: people were dragged from their homes by several companies of riot police, a bulldozer immediately razed the shantytown in front of their eyes, reducing the testimony of several years of existence to rubble. That morning, Mihai had only one thing to say before leaving for Romania: ‘they threw us out, worse than dogs’.

The bulldozer flattened everything: shacks, memories, and social hierarchies. Mihai’s power had been tied to his material governance of the shantytown, and disappeared with it. Having a thorough understanding of the limits of his role, he left. He refused to continue the struggle, to become a political representative for the Roma. At first, his refusal was deeply disappointing. He had seemed to be the only person capable of shoring up the little society of the Samaritain while waiting for better days.

I did not want to see the Samaritain disappear, quite simply because I had been happy there. It seemed to me that my role as anthropologist was also to hope that this society would be preserved. But I was wrong about the utopian function of the social sciences. The disappearance of the Samaritain Platz gave rise to other living spaces, other projects, and the most important friendships continued. The inhabitants dealt with their loss far quicker than the visiting anthropologist!

Conclusion

Mihai managed to keep his place as headman of the Samaritain Platz for six years. This longevity is remarkable. Although he was from a Kaštalo family that was looked down upon by the Roma, he established his position through a power grab made possible by the social reorganisation stemming from migration. He was then able to maintain his position because he did not restrict his domination to economic exploitation of the Platz, but also held the political power of negotiation and regulation. The primacy of the regulatory function of his power was a
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new element. This form of political representation, in a segregated Romani quarter, deserves a systematic anthropological study of its own. The literature on the Roma’s local political capacities usually singles out two types of political representation:

1 A representation rooted in the primacy of identity, in which a spokesman builds his political legitimacy on the community’s affirmation of a cause (McGarry 2010; Rövid 2011). These studies do not resolve the ambiguity surrounding the real capacity of local communities to create a system of true internal representation. They describe the ‘Roma’s cause’ at national and international levels, but are not studied at the level of segregated Roma neighbourhoods.

2 A distributive power, in which a local broker controls the flow of social and economic resources between inside and outside a segregated community. This model was identified in Rome’s ‘campi nomadi’ by Daniele (2011) and then by Maestri and Vitale (2017). In this case, the broker is both ‘officially and unofficially’ delegated by agents of external order (town, State, tertiary sector) to help maintain order within the community. This power neutralizes the political subjectivisation of the neighbourhood’s inhabitants.

These two models do not see the field of power from the standpoint of relations between Gadže and Roma. They do not conceive (either politically or anthropologically) the existence of a political autonomy for the Roma, for whom relations with the external order are not necessarily seen as being a priority.

The case study we chose to present here shows another form of political order, founded on the need to manage a territory. This form of power appears in the context of a re-reading of the political anthropology developed for Africa by Evans-Pritchard and, in particular, by Balandier, applied to the urban margins in Europe. For Balandier, power must be seen as ‘a necessity, with reference to the internal order it maintains’ (Balandier 1978: 46). This necessity became obvious to the inhabitants of the Samaritain Platz through the crucial need to live together, to settle everyday material questions, to manage to construct the stability necessary to the survival of the family unit. In the Samaritain, it was the day-to-day management that founded the legitimacy of Mihai’s power. To quote Balandier, in his struggle against the world’s entropy, Mihai represented ‘order and permanence’ (ibid.: 46), but also the principle of the ‘ambiguity of power’ (ibid.: 47). He stood at the heart of the sacred status of power (ibid.: 46).

The other contribution made by our study is of a heuristic nature. A Platz, a shanty town or a segregated quarter, can be defined as a territory in Balandier’s sense; in other words as a space with an internal order that offers its occupants a certain degree of stability and which is governed by a political power (Balandier 1978). For several years, the relative safety of the territory allowed the shantytown residents to live out their economic, and in particular social relations in the context of a compact Romani community. Of course, because it was inherently bound up with the existence of the shantytown, this community was only a temporary
fixture. To ensure its permanence and control, Mihai had to deal with other equally territorialised agents, whose authority encompassed the shantytown (mayor, prefect). Navigating between these different levels of authority required a thorough command of the city’s topography (where the vacant spaces not administered by the city were) and an extensive knowledge of the timeframes of French institutions (how much time would pass before eviction). Here we find what Balandier defines as the second criterion for defining the political character of a power: control of relations with external political organisations (ibid.: 46). Indeed, using Balandier’s criteria, we identified a form of Romani power that was political, thus making for a more subtle anthropology of the Roma, which usually stresses the non-political character of the power exercised in Romani communities (Williams 1985; Piasere 1994).

The Roma’s political power seems so close to the observers’ political and institutional habitus that it tends to go unnoticed. Mihai had to ensure the safety, tranquillity, and sanitation sought by the inhabitants of the Platz. In this sense, Mihai exercised an administrative police power (Hauriou 1993), like any French or Romanian mayor. This analogy stems from the fact that both Mihai and the mayor of La Courneuve shared a culture forged by the history of municipal power on the Continent.

It is precisely because they were alike that Mihai’s authority came into competition with that of the mayor of La Courneuve. If the Platz was initially recognised to some extent by associations and certain State institutions, its illegality ultimately prevailed over every other consideration in the discourse of French public authorities. This political construction of the Platz as an illicit space by definition (and therefore without order) denies any possibility of internal regulation or representation, and therefore of recognising the Platz headman. It denies the possibility of a presence negotiated between public authorities and Roma or their representative, and inexorably leads to the destruction of the Platz and of the territorial and juridical moorings of its inhabitants.

Notes

* The research leading to the present publication results from MigRom, ‘The immigration of Romanian Roma to Western Europe: Causes, effects, and future engagement strategies’, a project funded by the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme under the call on ‘Dealing with diversity and cohesion: the case of the Roma in the European Union’ (GA319901).
3 This showcasing of a 17-year-old boy (even if he was consenting) in a major mobilisation raises several ethical questions, but it is nonetheless the continuation of an emic function.

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7 Community identity and mobilisation

Roma migrant experiences in Manchester*

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Introduction

Romani political mobilisation is now an established part of the civil society landscape across Europe. It has given rise to various forms of political participation, with Romani NGOs taking up consultative roles in a number of countries, as well as in inter-governmental organisations. Models of direct political representation of Roma through a kind of quota system exist at the level of local government in Hungary and in the national elections in Romania, and a number of parliamentarians of Romani background have held direct mandates in national legislatures and in the European Parliament (cf. Klímová 2002; Fosztó 2003; McGarry 2010; Róvid 2011; Matras 2013).

Romani political activism has been labelled variously as ‘Romani nationalism’ (Hancock 1991; Kapralski 1997); ‘Romani movement’ (Matras 1998; Puxon 2000; Fosztó 2003; Vermeersch 2006; Rostas 2009; Trehan & Kóczé 2009); ‘Romani representation’ (Klímová 2002; Klímová-Alexander 2010; McGarry 2010); ‘Romani/Gypsy politics’ (Acton 1974; Sigona & Trehan 2009; van Baar 2013; Bunescu 2014); and more poetically as ‘Romani voice’ (Klímová-Alexander 2005); and ‘Gypsy struggle’ (Acton 2000). There is general agreement among analysts that Romani political mobilisation resembles a nation-building process in its effort to forge a collective sense of identity by cultivating cultural symbolism such as historical memory and seeking to secure declarations of recognition from public institutions (cf. Marushiakova & Popov 2005; Kapralski 2014; van Baar 2015). The relationship between mobilisation and constituency is often unclear, however (cf. Matras 2013). Romani NGOs usually receive their funding from sources that are external to Romani communities, such as European institutions and other multilateral organisations, national or local government agencies, or private charitable foundations (of which the most influential in the Romani sector has been George Soros’s Open Society Foundations). The objective of Romani mobilisation efforts is often to reshape non-Roma’s image of Roma, in particular in public institutions. Some authors have even suggested that the Romani nation-building project is itself a product of the attention given to Roma in European political institutions (cf. Vermeersch 2006; Ram 2014; McGarry 2014; Surdu & Kovats 2015; van Baar...
It has been argued that these institutions use the promotion of culture and ethnicity as a tool to address issues of deprivation and exclusion, thereby ‘ethnicising’ such issues.

In this chapter, we discuss a case of Romani mobilisation that is distinct in several key aspects from the political activism that has received attention so far in the research literature: It is local and centred around a group of individuals who are part of the young generation in a tight-knit community of migrants from the same town in Romania. Their mobilisation activities are a reaction to an emerging public discourse about their community, which they seek to contain rather than to enhance, and which they explicitly attempt to ‘de-ethnicise’. They are backed not by government agencies, political organisations, or charitable foundations, but by an academic research project, which provides them with logistical and argumentative support. Their public engagement is anchored within their existing community structures and does not seek to forge a new interest community or to indulge in ethnic symbolism.

We address the question of whether this kind of experience bears more resemblance to social protest movements than to ethnic-national movements. We also ask what conclusions can be drawn from the partnership that enabled it about the way higher education institutions are redefining their agenda and taking on a role as brokers of community relations, and how the experience offers an opportunity for a critical reflection on so-called ‘identity politics’ and the balance between targeted interventions that purport to support Roma, and the inclusion of Roma in mainstream policy measures.

**Theorising Romani mobilisation**

**Romani nationalism**

Early international Romani mobilisation has been portrayed as a kind of national awakening, with much attention given by those involved in the process to the intricate details of allocation of offices and the content of statutes and resolutions of associations (cf. Hancock 1991; Puxon 2000). By contrast, Nirenberg (2009) offers a critical insider view of contemporary initiatives. He laments the general lack of accountability to any Romani constituency, the permanent competition among Romani organisations for attention and sponsorship of international policy bodies, the tendency to allocate meaningless honorary titles, and for key members to regard the main benefit of the organisation in the credentials that it awards to them rather than the work that it carries out. In a comprehensive study of the historical interactions of a Romani political initiative – the International Romani Union – with a key policy body – the United Nations – Klímová-Alexander (2005) describes how attempts by a small transnational circle of activists to introduce a new public discourse on Roma resonated surprisingly well with many of the addressees in UN agencies, but how such efforts were generally disorganised and by and large failed to make use of available opportunities.
Some anthropologists have expressed the view that Romani political mobilisation amounts essentially to attempts by individuals to animate people of Romani background into organising themselves as a national movement, a concept that, they argue, is alien to the Romani community itself (cf. Cohn 1993; Okely 1997; Gay y Blasco 2001, 2002). The few in-depth analyses to date of Romani activists’ motivations give a more differentiated picture, however. O’Keeffe (2013) describes how in the early Soviet Union a circle of individuals from Romani families of travelling performers tried to redefine their own position in the new state, which had curtailed their former livelihood. They cultivated the notion that Roma needed special support to adapt to Socialist values, aiming to obtain positions as facilitators of that effort on the state’s behalf. This resulted in the state embracing the concept of a Romani nationality and lending its support to the creation of ethnic-national institutions such as Romani schools and literacy, and Romani industrial and agricultural collectives, which amounted in effect to the most far-reaching (albeit short-lived) state recognition of Romani ethnicity. Bunescu (2014), in a study of local Romani representation practices in Romania, argues that Romani political mobilisation is characterised by a hybridity that enables Roma to separate private practices from their public performance as a collective. In this respect, collective political identity is neither completely ‘indigenous’ nor is it entirely ‘constructed’, but is permeable and context-sensitive while co-existing with a separate, more guarded and private level of identity representation. This echoes some of Lemon’s (2000) observations on the performance of identity among Russian Romani artists and activists.

The so-called Europeanisation of Roma

A current research trend draws heavily on the work of Vermeersch (2006), who views Romani political mobilisation as the impetus for the construction of the ethnic category of ‘Roma’ in the first place. Authors such as McGarry (2014), Surdu and Kovats (2015), and van Baar (2015), have referred to this process as the ‘Europeanisation’ of Romani identity. They suggest that unlike other minorities, Roma-related policy is framed primarily at the European level and that it is European involvement that creates an incentive and an opportunity for Romani activists to cultivate and operate within the ethnic category of ‘Roma’.

There is no denying that there are contexts in which, as McGarry (2014: 769) implies, Roma ethnicity is being performed by Roma because that is what European policy is expecting of them. Perhaps the best example is the joint Council of Europe and Open Society Foundations initiative, launched in 2015, to set up a ‘European Roma Institute’. At the time of writing, those known to be involved in the process are individuals who collectively identify as being of Romani background. The initiative’s launch phase in the spring of 2016 focused on holocaust commemoration, a theme identified by authors such as Kapralski (1997, 2014), Marushiakova and Popov (2010), and van Baar (2015), as a key foundation of Romani political mobilisation. This suggests that the initiative’s founders seem
to regard Romani heritage as an intellectual project, to which at least some of them, it would appear, have committed as a professional career choice.

The protagonists of the mobilisation efforts in our study entertain hardly any awareness at all of the international Romani movement or of the Roma-related discourse among European political institutions. To them, the term Roma stands for various communities that they recognise as sharing language and other cultural practices; it is a category that is taken for granted rather than replicated from external (institutional or public) discourse. At the same time, their mobilisation efforts target individuals who share migration and family history, and are usually kin-related. To the extent that connections are forged with Roma of other backgrounds, they are indeed prompted and enabled through the mobilisation effort itself and serve to enhance it. Nonetheless, the idea that their identity as Roma is a product of political mobilisation opportunities or of the public political discourse around them is unlikely to resonate with them, nor would they subscribe to the idea that by entering the public discourse they are in any way reshaping or redefining their own notions of who they are.

**Romani mobilisation as a social protest movement**

Acton (1974) describes how mobilisation among Gypsies and Travellers in Britain in the 1960s was triggered by economic changes that curtail traditional patterns of work and travel and lead to a change in the relationship between Gypsies and the majority society, and to conflict. Lobbying for caravan sites and access to education and networking, led to the emergence of a political movement. In his assessment of that movement, Acton remains distant towards concepts of culture and ethnicity. Writing about the particular setting of British Gypsies and Travellers, for whom, until that time, an itinerant economy was a defining feature of their distinct culture, Acton regards accommodation of Gypsy economic particularities as the key to a successful policy.

A different kind of conflict is described by Matras (1998) in connection with the political mobilisation of Roma in Germany. That movement emerged in the late 1970s around the demand to reinstate the rights of those who had been stripped of their German citizenship by the Nazi regime, and to award them recognition as victims, and compensation. A second protest movement emerged in the late 1980s, calling for an end to the forced repatriation of Romani asylum seekers from Eastern Europe. Both movements resorted to public protest marches, often using holocaust commemoration sites as protest spaces to flag the continuity of exclusion and persecution, as well as to more drastic measures such as hunger strikes and occupation of public buildings and motorways, and a symbolic ‘begging march for human rights’, which provoked attention by question-ing traditional images of ‘Gypsy begging’.

While the ideological core and mobilisation tactics of the second, pro-migrant movement drew closely on the first, a political split emerged in the late 1980s. The network of organisations around the Central Council of German Sinti and Roma had succeeded in establishing itself as the officially recognised representation
of the indigenous Romani minority, but refused to support Roma who were foreign nationals. By contrast, organisations operating around the Rom & Cinti Union based in Hamburg extended their remit to the transnational community of Roma. The first movement was by and large successful in claiming recognition of victimhood and reparations. The second had limited success, at local and regional level, negotiating special arrangements to grant settlement rights to groups of migrants whose applications for asylum had initially been rejected. It also played a key role in putting migration and the social exclusion of Roma in Eastern Europe on the agenda of Western governments and European institutions such as the Council of Europe.

The tactics of mobilisation described by Acton (1974) and by Matras (1998) were essentially confrontational, resorting to public protest and exposure of what was presented as the inconsistencies of state institutions. Both cases can be framed as Social Movements, as defined by della Porta and Diani (1999): They show an overt expression of conflict where problems are identified as potential objects of collective action, and they turn values, interests, and ideas into action; they also offer an opportunity to examine how social and political contexts determine the Social Movement’s chances of success. In the following sections, we ask whether the mobilisation of Romanian Roma in Manchester can also be framed as a (micro-level) Social Movement rather than the kind of ‘ethnic awakening’ or ‘ethnic identity construction’ discussed in various contemporary studies of Romani mobilisation.

The emergence of local narratives on Roma

Defining Roma as a community

Roma from Poland and the Czech Republic began to settle in Manchester in the mid-1990s. From 2001, Roma from Slovakia, Lithuania, Romania, and Hungary followed. These remained distinct communities and the only known links among them were forged in the context of evangelical initiatives, led by British Romani Gypsy missionary groups who made an effort to reach out to Eastern European Romani migrants.

A further group of Romanian Roma settled in Manchester after Romania joined the EU in 2007. They were related to the first ‘pathfinder’ families who settled in the city in 2001. Many had previously lived in Italy, France, or Spain. There, they endured an unstable residence situation due to limited access to housing and suffered repeated evictions from makeshift settlements. As a result, they had irregular access to key services such as health and education.

The initial terms of Romania’s EU accession did not allow Romanian migrants to seek contractual or paid employment in the UK until 2014. Romanian Roma migrants in Manchester therefore engaged mainly in scrap-metal collection and cleaning, or worked as vendors of a local charity newspaper. This constituted self-employment and entitled them to claim state housing and child benefits to supplement their income. Access to cheap housing owned primarily
by landlords of South Asian background in one of Manchester’s deprived areas
enabled access to health care and eventually also to education.

Amounting, in 2007–2009, to perhaps around 300 individuals or around
40–50 nuclear families, this community of Romanian Roma originated in the
towns of Țăndărei and Fetești in southeastern Romania and belonged to the
group that calls itself Kangljari (‘comb-makers’, in Romanian Pieptănari),
though some also adopted Ursari as a parallel group label. From 2009 onwards,
they were joined by additional families belonging to the group calling itself Lin-
gurari, originating in Mărășești in central Romania. The Lingurari, who are not
Romani speakers, had contacts with the Romani-speaking Kangljari families
back in Romania and followed them to Manchester. Other Romanian Roma in
Manchester included families of Kalderari, Ćurari and Ardžintari from various
parts of the country, some of whom were attracted to Manchester because of the
establishment of a Romanian Roma Pentecostal Church, run by a Kangljari
family.

In 2009, Manchester’s Eastern European Romani population was thus a fabric
of family networks from different countries, with few if any ties among them. Even
the population of Romanian Roma was layered, with various networks of
contacts – some casual, some historical, some religious, and others kinship-based.

The presence of Roma as a ‘crisis’

The arrival, within a short period of time, of large families with many school-
aged children, who settled in the city’s Gorton area in close proximity to one
another, prompted local schools to notice a rise in the number of children from
Romania during 2008, though only some were aware that these new arrivals
were Roma. The sudden change created unease among some residents, who
complained to local councillors about the Roma’s frequent use of public space in
local parks and pavements, and made allegations of overcrowded housing,
dumping of waste in street alleys, truancy, so-called anti-social behaviour (dis-
turbances and loud gatherings), and even crime. These accusations were con-
veyed in the form of a petition, submitted on behalf of residents to the City
Council, in the spring of 2009 by a local councillor affiliated with the minority
opposition party. In response, Manchester City Council set up a ‘Gorton South
Roma Strategy Group’. Chaired by the City Council’s Deputy Chief Executive,
it included high-level representatives of key services including Street Manage-
ment, Regeneration, Health, Social Services, Revenue and Benefits, Education,
and the Police. The group met regularly over a period of almost two years. Its
remit was to share information about Roma, to seek ways to actively engage
with them, and to reduce tensions in the neighbourhood.

Minutes of the group’s meetings illustrate how its deliberations at times
reflected preconceptions about Romani culture: the perception that Roma are
work-shy and keen to escape the reach of authorities, that they engage in crime,
truancy, and anti-social behaviour, and that they are negligent in respect of their
own wellbeing and that of their children, in particular girls (see MigRom 2015:
Community identity and mobilisation

Specific allegations of organised crime and tax avoidance were refuted, however, following action carried out by police and tax authorities that targeted Roma specifically. In response, the Roma Strategy Group flagged the need to confront negative perceptions of Roma by local residents. It also initiated a number of activities to actively involve Roma in neighbourhood events and in local youth centres, and to overcome obstacles in access to schools (including some schools’ reluctance to admit Romani pupils). In August 2009, the City Council commissioned the Romani Project at the University of Manchester to carry out a survey among Romanian Roma in the Gorton South district and to propose an engagement strategy. The report arising from the survey (Matras, Fabeni, Leggio, & Vránová 2009) was based on interviews in the Romani language, with Romani residents, during which they were explicitly invited to use the researchers as a conduit to present their views to the City Council. This was the only attempt to give the Romani residents, albeit indirectly, a voice in the consultation process.

Overall, Manchester City Council’s approach to the arrival of Romanian Roma had every element of ‘crisis management’, closely mirroring typical policy reactions to Romani migration (cf. Matras 2000, 2013; van Baar 2011). The setting up of a high-level strategy group dedicated to a particular ethnic community was unprecedented in the history of Manchester, a city that generally prides itself on its multicultural diversity. In the aftermath, two distinct policy strands emerged. By 2013, the Roma Strategy had been discontinued and the City Council’s official position was that Roma should fall within mainstream protocols of equal access to public services. At the same time, a group of people comprising staff of a local charity, the Black Health Agency for Equality (BHA), and staff from the International New Arrivals team within the City Council’s Education Department, launched a series of interventions that targeted young people within the community of Romanian Roma (cf. Matras, Leggio, & Steel 2015).

Ethnicisation and marginality management

The partnership had already started in 2010 and involved a team of around 5–6 City Council officers, some of them employed part-time by BHA (see Matras et al. 2015). Its first intervention targeted Pine Hill secondary school, which at the time enrolled around 60 Romani pupils. Mimicking the report by the University’s Romani Project, the team engaged these pupils in a consultation process and published an information brochure about their experiences. The publication testifies to the team’s initial enthusiasm and a commitment to inclusion, and conveys an overall positive image of the Roma. It reports that young Roma had experienced ‘prejudice, racism and conflict in Manchester’. It acknowledges that Roma parents value formal education and observes: ‘Most young people are excited, proud and motivated by school’. It calls to ensure that Roma pupils are listened to and able to contribute.

As the team began to receive dedicated funding for its Roma-related work, it also started to develop a narrative of Romani culture. In a toolkit developed in
2011 to instruct schools about Roma culture, BHA claimed that Romani children receive a name that is ‘whispered by the mother, which remains secret and is used to confuse supernatural spirits’, that Roma values are ‘related to a higher spiritual power (Rromanipen, Rromipa or Rromanija)’ – lending a mystical interpretation to what is simply an everyday Romani term for ‘being Roma’ or ‘Romani-ness’ – and that these values ‘are known as Karma in India and it is here where the Romani spirituality reflects the Indian origin of the Romani people most’ (see Matras et al. 2015; MigRom 2015: 34).

In 2012, the team received a grant from the EU’s Lifelong Learning Programme to extend its intervention to a number of local primary schools. Subsequent reports depict the Roma as a group with particular needs that required external support. They speak of ‘Roma learning styles’ and claim that Roma possess ‘the ability to negotiate the world without need for reading and writing’, and that Roma children may therefore ‘be better at memorising than other children’. They advise teachers that ‘Roma rarely sit still for a long time’, that ‘most Roma are highly skilled at talking and listening at the same time’, and that ‘teachers need to be aware that if a Romani child is not talking, it is likely they are not listening!’

The team thus created a narrative, communicated on behalf of the City Council’s education services, which implied that Roma require a separate educational approach within the city’s schools, one that caters to what was portrayed as their own cultural particularities and inherent abilities (and inabilities). They drafted a special ‘Admissions and Induction Protocol for Roma Children’, which proposed that schools should record, among other information, Roma pupils’ readiness for learning, whether the Roma pupil wears their uniform regularly, and whether the pupil ‘smiles and greets adults in school’; ‘has the strength of fine motor control’; ‘knows that words convey meaning’; and is able to ‘sit appropriately for lesson duration’.

As the EU grant was coming to an end, the team sought opportunities to prolong its funded interventions on Roma. Already in early 2012, BHA had approached Manchester City Council and warned that a reduction in its funding would have a negative impact, claiming, without substantiation, that ‘there is a higher prevalence of Hepatitis A and B among Romani [sic] and also a higher prevalence of tuberculosis and asthma’ (see MigRom 2015: 37). In January, 2013 BHA successfully applied for a grant from Manchester City Council’s Equalities Funding Programme. In its application, it claimed that Roma girls were disengaging from education due to early marriage and teenage pregnancy. It promised to use the grant to ‘develop protocols … which will identify and track hard to reach girls’ and to allow authorities to ‘share information regarding “at risk” young people in relation to criminal activity, school drop-out’, and it proposed to set up a dedicated ‘Romani Wellbeing Strategic Group’ (see MigRom 2015: 38).

In November 2013, the BHA reported on its project to the City Council’s Communities Scrutiny Committee. It stated that the rate of teenage pregnancies among the Roma was ‘disproportionate’ and that this was ‘influenced by cultural expectations’. The same information was replicated again in the City Council’s
annual flagship publication, the ‘State of the City Report: Communities of Interest’, from May 2014. In its interim written report to the City Council, from June 2014, the BHA claimed: ‘Early marriage is a rite of passage that [sic] individuals from within the Roma community are required to partake’. It concluded by stating: ‘Roma in the UK and on continental Europe have developed a deep-rooted mistrust of outsiders, limiting forms of interaction and engagement with social care providers’. It recommended that the BHA’s remit and funding for the intervention should be extended in order to draw on the expertise and ‘trusting relationships’ that the BHA team had established in its own work with the Roma.

At a meeting of the City Council’s Young People and Children’s Scrutiny Committee in June 2014, the Team Leader for International New Arrivals, working in partnership with the BHA project, reported that ‘there was an issue, particularly with Roma girls disappearing after Year 9’ and that ‘it was difficult to track them down’. The topic ‘safeguarding and attendance of Roma children’ was consequently put on the committee’s work programme in September 2014 and the Executive Member overseeing Children’s Services was asked to report on the issue (see MigRom 2015: 38).

During the same period, the BHA was contracted by Pine Hill school to support a so-called English as an Additional Language Pathway, which in effect was a segregation mechanism for Roma pupils. It engaged two members of the Roma community as ‘mentors’ and introduced a special ‘Roma Referral Form’, which teachers were asked to fill in to flag up problems with Roma pupils. In a memo to school staff in the spring of 2014, the joint team of BHA and the City Council’s International New Arrivals were quoted as saying that ‘[Roma] male and female students are not used to being together’, and that therefore, ‘Roma students can be very promiscuous and are very accepting of inappropriate sexualised behaviour from male students’; that female Roma pupils left school at the age of 13 to ‘get married back in Romania’; that they were caught ‘begging in Manchester City Centre’; and that weddings of female Roma ‘from the age of 11’ took place at a local park (see Matras et al. 2015; MigRom 2015: 54).

The narrative put forward by the BHA, with City Council funding and with the support of the City Council’s education department, thus claimed that Roma culture posed a threat to the most vulnerable members of its own community, i.e. young girls; that the community was not accessible to others, and that the BHA therefore required an exclusive franchise to intervene; and that it was the city’s responsibility to mandate such an intervention or risk failing in its statutory duty of care and protection. This narrative was adopted by City Council committees and by at least one school with a significant number of Roma pupils.

**Transformations in Roma participation**

**New practices as engagement capital**

van Baar (2013) describes how in the wake of emerging opportunities for funded interventions, Roma NGOs shift their role from advocacy to service provision,
and how they then engage in trying to replicate social science methods in order to
certify their expertise. The Manchester experience provides an example of a
process that heads, arguably, in almost the opposite direction. Drawing on its aca-
demic expertise, a university project helps set up a Roma engagement scheme
that provides a service to the local community which eventually, confronted with
an emerging public debate on Roma, gives rise to an advocacy initiative.

The original project plan for the MigRom consortium foresaw the allocation
of a budget to Manchester City Council to engage outreach workers from among
the members of the local community of Romanian Roma migrants. However, in
late 2012, the City Council had to respond to the government’s austerity meas-
ures by cutting a large number of jobs. Politically, it did not wish to be seen to
be creating positions specifically for Roma while other positions were being dis-
continued. Consequently, the University of Manchester, the lead partner in
MigRom, agreed to employ the outreach workers, in close collaboration with the
City Council. This fitted well with the University of Manchester’s newly
launched Social Responsibility agenda, through which it committed to actively
engage with local communities.

In the absence of a scripted outreach strategy, the University project’s team
decided to introduce weekly ‘drop-in’ consultation sessions for Roma that would
be run by the Roma outreach workers. The sessions gradually developed into a
new type of intervention. Led by Roma, they were strictly responsive to the
needs of clients and explicitly non-intrusive, and were therefore preferred to the
established format in which non-Roma case-workers would visit homes and
carry out surveys that were often perceived as invasive. The drop-in session fol-
lowed University research ethics protocols on data protection. By contrast to the
BHA’s declared policy of ‘data sharing’ (see above), it did not record or share
clients’ personal data, yet general statistics enabled the team to issue periodical
assessments of needs and trends, such as access to employment.\(^5\)

The scheme adopted an explicit policy of ‘self-reliance’, with the outreach
workers encouraging clients to acquire skills to interact directly with local
service providers. It took the view that in the longer term, the community should
release itself from its dependency on targeted advice and support services. In the
short term, the public message was that Roma were able to provide advice and
support to their own community, and that external interventions should give pri-
ority to the building of capacity within the community itself.

The MigRom project’s weekly Roma-led drop-in sessions soon became a
fixture in the local Romanian Roma community. Operating from a local com-
munity centre in the Longsight district in South Manchester, it soon attracted
Romanian Roma migrants from across the Greater Manchester area. Though not
excluded in any way, Roma of other backgrounds did not make use of the
service, an indication of how ‘community’ centres in this case primarily around
shared background and migration history as well as religious and kinship net-
works. The service and its delivery thus became the initial engagement capital of
a small group of emerging Roma spokespersons – those employed by the Uni-
versity of Manchester as outreach workers and a number of their associates who
took on roles as youth workers and classroom support staff. It allowed them to build their reputation within the community and their relations with surrounding actors such as the City Council and the service providers with whom they interacted regularly on their clients’ behalf.

**Scholarship and agency**

The MigRom project’s title: ‘The immigration of Romanian Roma to Western Europe: Causes, effects, and future engagement strategies’, explicitly contains a commitment to public engagement with research. It uses the need for change to justify the need for knowledge, and declares its intention to use knowledge to support change. As described in the introduction to this volume, Roma participation was built into the project design. In Manchester, that participation included the outreach work programme, which came under the management of the University of Manchester due to the circumstances explained above.

The research project also assumed an agency role in another way. The City Council regarded the absence of overt leadership as an obstacle to engaging with the Roma community. In 2009, it had asked the Romani Project to recommend ways to set up a direct dialogue with the Roma community. To that end, the MigRom agenda built into its work plan the establishment of a ‘Consultation Forum’. The project description submitted to the European Commission said: ‘The [project’s] outreach workers will support Council officials in setting up and running a regular consultation forum within the local Roma community which will act as a clearing house for issues with local services, authorities and non-Roma residents’. That objective had also been included into Manchester City Council’s own report from 2013 on its Roma Strategy.⁶

The project’s ambition to contribute directly to the creation of lasting structures was linked to the pilot research carried out in 2009 (Matras et al. 2009). That report identified the history, causes, and aspirations of Roma migration from Romania and thereby established a narrative for policy which argued that Roma arrived to seek in principle the same goals as other population groups, and so they can and should fall under the same protocols of needs assessment and access to service as other populations. By 2013, this narrative was adopted in the City Council’s Roma Strategy report, which put ‘mainstreaming’ at the top of its engagement agenda with Roma. A direct link was thus established between inclusion, mainstreaming, and the setting of sustainable structures to enable direct dialogue between the local authority and the Romani community.

In this context, the University project saw itself as a broker of relationships between the community and the local authority, and as the source of evidence-based analysis on which an engagement strategy was to be based. Unlike other approaches to scholarship and agency, such as those discussed by Cox (2015) as Participatory Action Research, the project did not have an ambition to produce knowledge specifically in order to empower a social movement. Instead, it had sought to use the academic space to engage others in a dialogue that would be informed by evidence-based research.
To that end, the project’s academic staff engaged in discussions with the project’s Romani outreach workers and a small group of young members of the Romanian Roma community. Initial conversations took place in October 2013, some six months after the project was launched, and led to a first public event, held at the University in November 2013, where young Roma were invited to present their views on Romani culture, alongside two guests from abroad, both prominent international figures in Romani education and culture. Later that month, the same people were invited to contribute to a news report on national television that featured the MigRom project’s work. In their statements, the Roma emphasised that they had no conflict with others, that they felt accepted and integrated, and that being listened to was the key to integration. Another public event followed in February 2014, also held at the University, where members of the local Roma community shared a platform with a senior politician and representatives of the city’s voluntary and education sectors. Through these events the University established a space in which ‘ordinary’ members of the Roma community – young individuals who had no formal role – had an opportunity to present their views and to try to influence the public narrative on their community.

In the aftermath of these events, the project invited young Roma to launch an informal ‘Roma Leadership Group’. The group formed around the individuals who participated in the discussions with the project, and who then invited further members to join. Through this forum, the project’s academic staff gave the Roma direct access to the local political discourse about them, introducing to them some of the documents produced by BHA and the City Council’s International New Arrivals team and relevant minutes of Manchester City Council committee meetings. The Roma had not been aware of these documents, and they objected to the way in which their culture and community had been depicted in them. In discussions with the project staff, it was decided that they should approach local Councillors and ask for their views about Roma in general, and confront them with the City Council documents. Councillors were happy to meet with the Roma, and some even marked these meetings with photos posted on social media. But they were unable to address the Roma’s objections to the narratives and referred them instead to the City Council’s officers.

The group then decided to take public action to try to counteract negative images. Embracing an idea put to them by the MigRom staff, they launched a series of public ‘litter-picking’ events in November 2014, in which young Roma called on their neighbours of various backgrounds in a multi-ethnic neighbourhood to join them on a Saturday morning to clean the streets. The symbolism was intended to confront the prejudice articulated by residents, local media, and some local politicians that Roma were to blame for irregular dumping of waste. It also aimed at raising awareness of Roma and offering Roma an opportunity to show that they are willing and able to play a key role in improving community relations. The activity received logistic support from local community organisations and schools, who contributed equipment. The University project helped the group produce leaflets for the event, with instructions, accompanied by images,
on waste disposal in several community languages including Romani (the leaflet was later adopted by the City Council for wider distribution). Local elected Councillors joined the activity, which, following an official University of Manchester press release, received coverage in the local press under the heading: ‘Roma youngsters clean up streets in attempt to sweep away prejudice’. Members of the group were cited in the article as saying: ‘We want to show that Roma are not different from other people’.

The group had by then established a reputation for community engagement; it had shown a commitment to challenge prejudice; it had opened a dialogue with local politicians to whom it made direct representations; and it demonstrated its ability to give wide dissemination to its activities and point of view. It had in effect established the capital needed to mobilise opinions in support of change. Through its public and media statements it had also established an incipient political vision, one that emphasised the similarities between Roma and other populations rather than the differences, and one that called for acceptance of Roma as mainstream citizens rather than as victims of discrimination or as carriers of a unique or ‘exotic’ culture.

Conflict, collective action, and political responses

Capitalising on this momentum, the Roma Leadership Group continued its meetings with local politicians and insisted on receiving answers to their objections to the narratives on Romani culture contained in publications produced or sponsored by the City Council. In response, a meeting was scheduled to take place at the Town Hall on the 1st of December 2014, at which the Roma would be able to face both elected politicians and officers from the relevant departments. The Roma were asked to send their questions in advance. They submitted a catalogue of questions, asking for clarification as to which City Council committees had been asked to discuss the Roma community; what their sources of information were; what the City Council’s priorities in regard to Roma were; and how Roma could have input into the process. They also asked specifically why the City Council chose to address the issue of ‘safeguarding and early marriage’ particularly in connection to Roma, and listed a series of statements from City Council documents on these issues, which they considered to be inaccurate depictions of the Roma community.

However, when they arrived at the meeting, the City Council officials refused to address the questions. Instead, the group was offered the opportunity to have input into future reports. This gave rise to considerable frustration among the group’s members. Assisted by the MigRom project team, the group published an account of the meeting online, and sent it to members of the City Council. They emphasised their wish to be consulted on matters related to their community, and announced their intention to set up their own community group. They said specifically in their statement: ‘These questions are important to our community and us because talking of Roma culture as dangerous for Roma girls is creating a bad image among our neighbourhood’. In this way, the group explicitly portrayed
City Council action as potentially harmful to the Roma’s own goal, already expressed through various public outlets, to be considered as equals. The group had now used its public image capital and the links that it had established with individuals in the City Council to stage a direct, albeit politely formulated confrontation with City Council policy, and had presented as an explicit objective, the wish to contain dissemination of information about their community in order to ensure equal opportunities. By making public a record of the proceedings, they mobilised the potential of public opinion in support of their cause.

In the following months, the group branded itself publicly as, ‘Roma Voices of Manchester’. With support from the University project, it set up a social media presence, began a process of drafting statutes in preparation of formal registration as a Community Interest Company (an officially registered charitable organisation), hired venues for public events, and used the University’s media relations apparatus to publicise them. In June 2015, Manchester City Council released a report in which it recognised Roma Voices of Manchester as a channel for direct dialogue with the Roma community. It distanced itself from the content of some of its own past reports and declared that it would not draw on ‘unsubstantiated information’ in the future. The report was presented to the City Council’s Communities Scrutiny Committee in late June 2015, in the presence of some two dozen members of the Romanian Roma community who attended the public gallery. The establishment of Roma Voices of Manchester was celebrated in the same month through two public events with the participation of local Councillors and representatives of the local authority’s executive department and it received press coverage and considerable attention from the local network of ethnic minority community groups.

The Roma’s collective action centred around changing the perception of their community by their immediate neighbours, local officials, and media. It publicly challenged the image that Roma were responsible for littering. In closed conversations with officials, it challenged the image of Romani culture as promoting early marriage and disengagement from education. It was not accompanied by any attempt to inform the public or the officials about Romani culture or history, or to formulate an alternative narrative of Romani identity. Instead, it set out to challenge the framing of issues as ‘Roma problems’, thereby challenging the ‘ethnicisation’ of issues as the pillar of a targeted Roma policy.

The conflict within

As part of the MigRom project’s effort to support the launch of a local Roma community group, it hired the services of Cherub – a Romani university graduate of southeastern European origin. Cherub had spent some of his formative years working with pro-Roma advocacy groups funded by European institutions and the Open Society Foundations in central Europe, and he continued to maintain close links with some of them. Cherub was line-managed directly by the University project and tasked with operating Roma Voices of Manchester’s social media, and supporting networking with local ethnic minority NGOs. He was
contracted to carry out this role for a number of months, and had relocated to Manchester specifically for that purpose. The rationale behind his engagement was to try to create a bridge between the local community of Roma, and the sector of international Romani activists.

However, Cherub’s relationship with the group of local activists was problematic from the start. He seemed reluctant to engage with individual members of the local community or to become involved in the advice and support work. The local group, in turn, was tolerant but not enthusiastic about his proposals to engage in activities to commemorate the holocaust or to introduce ethnic iconography such as the Romani flag or nationalist-sounding slogans into the group’s public events. Cherub also seemed uninterested in the conflict around the BHA’s narrative on ‘early marriage’ and ‘school disengagement’, which had prompted the group to take public action in the first place. Instead, in his discussion contributions and presentations, he often adopted elements of that very narrative, insisting that one of the group’s aims should be to encourage Romani parents to value education and to curb what he referred to as ‘child marriage’. In his interactions with the project’s academic staff, he often distanced himself from his local Romani peers and referred to their values, and to the dress codes of female Roma among them, as ‘primitive’, while on the other hand writing e-mails to local Police authorities with whom the Roma Voices group had been trying to establish cordial relationships, accusing them of ‘police brutality’ against Roma.

Ahead of the group’s formal registration as a Community Interest Company (see above), Cherub insisted that only ‘educated people’ should assume a function on its Board of Directors. Cherub had won over the support of three local Roma, migrants of different backgrounds, who were university students, and attempted to steer the incipient Roma Voices of Manchester initiative in a new direction, explicitly disowning the community engagement work such as the drop-in consultation sessions and public campaigning that had served the group of Romanian Roma as their starting capital. When tensions emerged, he changed the passwords for the group’s social media and e-mail account and blocked access to them for other group members. As the attempts to bridge the differences failed to yield results, he took his resentment publicly, circulating a letter via the group’s own social media and on international electronic discussion lists of Romani activists in early November 2015. Signing the letter as ‘Trustee Members, Roma Voices of Manchester Community Group’, he described how he unilaterally changed the password as ‘an act of rebellion against MigRom Project’s excessive control and manipulation’, turning his expressed anger toward his own employer, while claiming to be speaking on behalf of the Roma group, which that same employer had hired him to support. The channelling of resentment against an academic institution appeared to echo debates during the same time around the planned establishment of the European Roma Institute: various statements portrayed the planned initiative as a rebellion against academia, which was depicted as ‘a stronghold of colonial, exotic, and paternalist approaches to Roma issues’, claiming that the planned institute would provide ‘intellectual emancipation’ to Roma.11
The group of Romanian Roma reacted to Cherub’s public intervention by posting on social media polite, yet critical responses: ‘the Roma community does not want [Cherub to] represent them or help them anymore’; ‘We wish all the best … I can tell that you not represent us’. Cherub’s attempt to re-constitute the group as a team of ‘educated Roma’ under his leadership failed, and after several weeks of negotiations, the original members of the Roma Leadership Group restored access to their social media platforms and elected a group of Directors for their community group, which they had now registered as a Community Interest Company. In a statement released on their social media and delivered to local stakeholders, they disowned Cherub and expressed regret about the confusing messages sent by him supposedly on their behalf. City Council officials followed the events with interest, anticipating a possible split within the group but emphasising that they were committed to working with those who best represented the local community.

This episode illustrates an interesting clash between two mobilisation narratives. The first, centred around the group of young Romanian Roma, regards as its main capital its connection with a local network of families and its commitment to providing a weekly service to its clients. It centres its public engagement around promoting an image of Roma as equal participants. To that end, it openly challenges established negative images of Roma, though it does so, not by accusing others of harbouring prejudice, but instead by presenting the Roma as a group that actively reaches out to its neighbours. This is expressed in all its public events, which are actively inclusive and where the only particular symbolism of Romani culture is food and music, which are there to be shared and distributed. This approach engages in confrontation with local government only when it believes that a public narrative about Roma culture risks drawing unwanted negative attention to Roma and thereby jeopardising the effort to participate as equals. It accepts the offer for support and advice from an established academic institution as long as that support is seen to be beneficial to its own aims and values.

The second, short-lived initiative centred around Cherub, banks on the personal capital of individuals in the hope that it will help those individuals gain respect and recognition as Roma spokespersons. The aspiration to gain recognition as representing Roma is promoted as an end in itself, disconnected from the needs of a specific local community and anchored instead in the wider and more abstract narrative about global discrimination and human rights. This is nicely illustrated by the choice of arguments in Cherub’s open letter from November 2015, where he writes:

Consultation with our group’s members about our Romani community group and people is essential to us not only because we are an independent community group, but also because our group and community members are of a Romani minority ethnic background. Human rights law recommends to parties to consult with ethnic minorities about any matter and decision concerning their wellbeing, social, political and economic development as a group of people.
Cherub’s emphasis is thus not on similarities and partnerships between Roma and neighbours, but on entitlements. This is well in line with prioritising commemoration of the holocaust and the depiction of Roma as victims. Cherub’s confrontational action did not target the content of public depictions of Roma that were potentially discriminatory, but instead the involvement of a partner organisation, which he accused of ‘control’. His depiction of that action as a ‘rebellion’ appeared to take its inspiration from the image of post-colonial ethnic-national liberation movements.

**Conclusion: between social movement and identity politics**

In the terms introduced by della Porta and Diani (1999) to characterise social movements, the group of young Romanian Roma in Manchester had identified the manner of portrayal of their culture in City Council documents, in particular references to alleged ‘safeguarding’ needs and ‘early marriage’, as problematic and harmful to their image and so to their prospects of blending into the fabric of the local diverse community. The lack of response to their initial requests for clarification created a conflict potential which triggered collective action in the form of direct representations, made public, to a group of City Council officials. The values and ideas that they formulated revolved around nothing else but emphasising the commonalities between Roma and their non-Roma neighbours, and demanding explicitly to end the preoccupation with allegedly distinct characteristics of Romani culture. These ideas were put into collective action in the form of public statements and events, and direct approaches to local officials, and ultimately by setting up a formal framework (a community interest company) and demanding to be consulted on the drafting of policy that relates to their community. The chances of success of their mobilisation effort hinged on the City Council’s sensitivity toward public scrutiny, not least by the University’s research project, but equally on the City Council’s policy to support community groups in taking the initiative to respond to the needs of their own communities and acquire what the local authority narrative regards as ‘resilience’ capital that releases population groups from their dependency on local government, and arguably local government from the responsibility of providing long-term dedicated support.

Pontrandolfo (2014) discusses the clash between a tendency to abandon overt features of a distinct ethnicity and a preference toward invisibility on the part of a Romani community in Melfi, Italy, and trends to embrace particular images (such as nomadism), in order to partake in the politics of ‘ethno-cultural recognition’. The experience of Roma Voices shows precisely how the group’s action involved public representations geared toward removing ethnic-cultural images from the discussion, thus in effect aiming towards re-privatisation of the discourse on Romani identity (cf. Cools, Oosterlynck, Leggio, & Matras forthcoming). The main objective of the group of local Roma might therefore be described as attaining a status quo by which the discussion of cultural practices belonged strictly to the private sphere, while the aim of the public debate was to ensure
that Roma had all options open to them to participate in opportunities offered by the public sphere.

Our case study thus offers a new experience in the context of traditional dilemmas of ‘identity politics’. Gamson (2014) addresses the general problem of the contradiction between mobilisation as a form of ‘resistance’ aimed at deconstructing boundaries, and the forging of a ‘collective identity’ that is both a prerequisite and a by-product of that very mobilisation. With reference specifically to Roma, both Vermeersch (2006: 229) and Marushiakova and Popov (2015) have pointed to the contradictory aspects of the policy of Roma inclusion which, by singling out Roma creates and fosters a form of exclusion. In the case discussed here, we witness an argumentative focus on inclusion and mainstream participation rather than on cultural and historical uniqueness. We see a symbolic gesture of reaching out to neighbours rather than seeking to establish mechanisms of self-protection, and a willingness to embrace external partnerships and benefit from the resources that they offer rather than regard them as objects of resistance and rebellion. Not least, the protagonists seek an opportunity to draw on a firm sense of community that is anchored in family ties and shared migration history, rather than in an abstract sense of ethnicity or nationalism. All this, we propose, offers a fresh approach to negotiating the various dilemmas of identity politics and ethnic mobilisation.

Notes

* The research leading to the present publication results from MigRom, ‘The immigration of Romanian Roma to Western Europe: Causes, effects, and future engagement strategies’, a project funded by the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme under the call on ‘Dealing with diversity and cohesion: the case of the Roma in the European Union’ (GA319901).
1 Name altered by the authors.
5 For example, see http://migrom.humanities.manchester.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/MigRom-Briefing-June-2015.pdf.
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