The aim of the current work is in the analysis of the phenomenon of foresight in the structure of problematic of creativity. For defining the nature of the prognostic abilities in the activity of a commander the analysis of Napoleon’s battles is presented. The analysis of Italian campaign 1796-1797. Battle of Rivoli 1797 and Battle of Ulm 1805 indicates the range of factors, which allowed Napoleon to win the battles. The victories in Italian campaign 1796-1797 can be easily explained by the professional talent of Napoleon. Napoleon had analyzed the situation thoroughly: from the bumps on the battle field to the information from the intelligence. “My genius was in that”, wrote Napoleon without uncharacteristic for him modesty, “with a glance I comprehended all the difficulties of the business, but at the same time the resources for overcoming those difficulties; my superiority on the others owns to that”[1]. Alongside with that, the whole analysis of the combat operations was stimulated by the demand of winning the battle in the situation of having the army with smaller strength.

The battle of 1797 is characterized by a thorough analysis basing on generalization of the applied strategies. That explains the reaction on the originality, novelty of the unexpected decisions, which is provided by different functional consideration of the natural conditions. Already in 1800 before the Battle of Marengo when the Austrian had a numeric superiority over Napoleon, he went through the Alps to go to the rear of their army. That combination allowed sudden attack of the Austrians as they were expecting the appearance of Napoleon’s forces from the obvious position of the French army.

This approach was demonstrated even more clearly in 1805 in the Battle of Ulm. Preparing to the Battle of Rivoli 1797 Napoleon understood how the events would develop and foresaw all the possible variants of actions. That was confirmed by an unexpected appearance of the division of Muratt through the lake. In this case such appearance brought closer the end and showed the strategic talent of Napoleon in the full glory. To enforce the division overland was not unusual but when preparing to the battle to notice quite a big lake on the map and “to involve” it into the battle, to realize how to use it in one’s favour – this was not an ordinary trick of a commander of the army. “It is not a genius who suddenly and secretly shows me, what should I do or say by the circumstances to seem unexpected for the others, but my reflection opens it to me. I work always, work during the dinner, when I am in the theatre; I wake up at night to work”, said Napoleon. The Murat’s appearance stated the final point in the battle. Such an appearance was so overwhelming, that Napoleon did not have to risk his soldiers. “In the famous Battle of Rivoli 14-15th of January 1797, the battle remained one of the glorious achievements of the military art, Bonaparte totally destroyed his enemy”[2].

Thus, this battle showed the noticeable shift of Napoleon to the heuristic level. The difference is that the ideas come not in the situation of searching for an answer to the circumstances arisen in the situation of a battle, but as the result of progress of cognition in the situation of quit reflection in the office. Not as a necessity, but as an involuntary process of constant thinking. “If it is seems that I am prepared to everything, that it is explained by the fact that before doing something, I have reflected for a long time; already before I have forecasted what could happen” [3]. But every such sole correct step of Napoleon could not be possible without the round-the-clock work not on the current issues only but on himself as well. And, finally, the Battle of Ulm 1805 or, rather its impossibility. Napoleon’s workaround has been discovered by the Austrians. In a fear that they could move from their positions, Napoleon sent a rumor that the Frenchmen were going home because of the rising. Such a cunning trick disoriented them and allowed Napoleon to surround them in a turning movement. 7th of October frenchmen closed the way of retreat to Vienna. Soon the Austrians pull back, but the Frenchmen already took the crossing of the river and that threatened the rear of the Army of the Danube.

10th of October the Austrians concentrated all his forces near Ulm. Answering this action Napoleon cut to the Austrian the way of retreat via Tyrol. The attempts of the Austrians to move out somewhere, for example, to Bohemia led to nothing. On the 13th of October, all Napoleon’s army was united from various sides near Ulm. The Commander-in-Chief wrote: “It is not about beating the enemy, it is necessary that the enemy do not escape from us. Call your generals and the commanders of divisions. Tell them I think that in the current situation it is important not to miss anything to make our success whole and absolute”[3]. The Austrians capitulated. Building up the structure corresponds to the theoretical comprehension of the problem and characterises reaching the creative level. The cited above letter was written by Bonaparte far from Ulm, from Munich. But what a glorious sureness in his rightness! He knew the final result so well that all the actions he had taken before allowed him to move out from the front: the victory would have come itself. “I won the battle by the marches only”[3]. Indeed, it was a completely new way. There were no sufficient battles.

The analysis of Napoleon’s activity shows that his mind has an identical structure with the mind of a prominent scientist and the phenomenon of the forecast grows not because of the professionalism and general knowledge, but corresponds to the character of the movement of a thought described by Hegel: from the analysis of a single unit via the special to the general. This can be seen in Napoleon’s reconsidering a new strategy and in fact draws to the building up a theory, providing the most precise forecast of the enemy’s behaviour.