The Visible World
Samuel van Hoogstraten’s
Art Theory and the
Legitimation of Painting in
the Dutch Golden Age

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THE VISIBLE WORLD
Ik derf vaststellen, dat een oprecht oeffenaer der Schilderkonst, die baer alleen om baer zelfs wil, en om baeren deugtsaemen aert navolgt, waerlijk t’onrecht zoude versmaet worden. Alle wijgeerigen zijn tot geen staeten of burgerbestieringen beroepen, en niettemin zijnze in ’t versmaeden der werelt-sche hoogheden by Plutarchus ... hoog genoeg gepreezen, schoonze aen de werelt geen grooter sieraet, noch aen baer zelven meerder gerustheit en vernoegen, als onze Schilders in ’t oeffenen dezer beval-lijke wijigeerte, hebben toegebracht.

Samuel van Hoogstraten,
Inleyding tot de Hooge Schoole der Schilderkonst

Jene trefflichen Niederländer, welche solche rein objektive Anschauung auf die unbedeutendsten Gegenstände richteten und ein dauerndes Denkmal ihrer Objektivität und Geistersrube im Stilleben hinstellten, welches der ästhetische Beschauer nicht ohne Rührung betrachtet, da es ihm den rubigen, stillen, willensfreien Gemüthzustand des Künstlers vergegenwärtigt, der nöthig war, um so unbedeutende Dinge so objektiv anzuschauen, so aufmerksam zu betrachten und diese Anschauung so besonnen zu wiederholen ... Im selben Geiste haben oft Landschaftsmaler ... höchst unbedeutende landschaftliche Gegenstände gemalt, und dadurch die selbe Wirkung noch erfreulicher hervorgebracht.

Arthur Schopenhauer,
Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung I

To Marieke
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‘Painting, sir, I have heard say, is a mystery’, says the pimp Pompey in Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure. Implicitly he elucidates this mystery with a reference to his whores, who use the deceit of painting to enhance their looks. I never sought such irony in Samuel van Hoogstraten. My interest in his treatise was sparked by a fundamental question, which I first encountered during my studies at a small art college in Amsterdam: ‘Why do artists depict the visible world?’ Van Hoogstraten’s book of painting seemed to reveal what he and his colleagues were about in their apparently unpretentious depictions of cloudy skies, interiors and the play of the light.

Soon I found that neither my question nor my expectations of Van Hoogstraten’s treatise accorded with the seventeenth-century situation. Fortunately I was supported in the reordering of my ideas by Eric Jan Sluijter, the supervisor of the dissertation at the University of Amsterdam which was the basis for this book. His expertise and the great confidence with which he guided the research saved me from many a false step. He also unfailingly shared my conviction that Van Hoogstraten has something particular to say about the extraordinary blossoming and the specific nature of Dutch art in the seventeenth century.

This book had existed as an idea, however, for rather longer: Ernst van de Wetering’s attachment to Van Hoogstraten as a rare conduit to the thoughts of important Dutch masters was a source of inspiration. I am also indebted in this regard to Maarten van Nierop, whose encouragement sustained me as I wrote. His ideas about traditions and structures in history provided a framework for my treatment of works of art and figures from the past.

The English translation was undertaken with great skill by Beverley Jackson and Lynne Richards, whose lives I often made difficult with my specific wishes – not least my insistence on retaining the word ‘legitimation’, even in the title. Their work was made possible by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research, which also funded my appointment and enabled me to proclaim the importance of Van Hoogstraten’s ideas from Amsterdam to Rome and from Tokyo to Rio de Janeiro.

To some extent I have been able to follow in the footsteps of Van Hoogstraten’s peripatetic career, and my gratitude goes to the Dutch University Institute for Art History in Florence, where Gert-Jan van der Sman and Bert Meijer made me welcome, and the Royal Netherlands Institute in Rome. I should also like to thank the people at the library of the Art History Institute of the University of Amsterdam, the Rijksmuseum, the Bibliotheca Hertziana, the Deutsches Kunsthistorisches Institut, the Warburg Library and the British Library.

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Last but by no means least, I want to thank my friends and family who joined me in staging Van Hoogstraten’s play Hof-krakkel in the KunstKerk in Amsterdam on May 7, 2005. Perhaps even more than the diligent study of his treatise on painting, this joyous performance brought the ‘mystery’ of Van Hoogstraten’s world closer.

I dedicate this book to Marieke, who advised and assisted me times beyond number and who was and is my Muse – in art and in everything else.
INTRODUCTION
Fig. 1 – Samuel van Hoogstraten, title page to *Inleyding tot de hooge schoole der schilderkonst*, Rotterdam 1678.
Introduction

‘Is there a Baroque theory of art?’ The art historian Jan Białostocki posed this famous question in an article in which he set out to define the specific characteristics of seventeenth-century ideas about painting, as distinct from the older tradition. He was responding to the prevailing view that only fifteenth- and sixteenth-century artists wrote about their profession in an interesting manner. His question is most relevant in relation to Dutch art: is there a theory of Northern Netherlandish painting in its so-called ‘Golden Age’? Godfried Hoogewerff, noting in 1939 that Dutch painters had not written a great deal, concluded: ‘We find ourselves in an Arctic expanse!’ There could scarcely be a greater contrast, in his view, than that between the high quality of painting in the seventeenth century and the paucity of contemporary writings on art. Hoogewerff’s study highlighted what he perceived as an intellectual contrast between Dutch writers and their counterparts in Italy, where dozens of painting treatises were published in this period. France, too, was the scene of lively debate. The view that authors from the Netherlands were in some sense the exception that confirms the rule is still propagated to this day. The rarity of Dutch texts and their limited dissemination gave rise to the view that those few Dutch authors who did venture into literature merely repeated the prevailing international views, displaying little insight into the specific aspects of their own country’s art. Hoogewerff’s negative verdict may go some way towards explaining the relative neglect of seventeenth-century art theory in present-day debates on the nature and significance of Netherlandish painting, which focus on its so-called ‘realism’. The new genres that were developed in the Netherlands, such as landscape and still-life painting, have been interpreted in different ways. Two rival camps have locked horns in this controversial field: the iconologists, who see a religious and moralistic symbolism below the surface of seemingly everyday objects, and those who maintain that Golden Age painting had a purely ‘descriptive’ function: the function of surveying or ‘mapping out’ the visible world. This is not just a dispute about academic approaches; at the heart of the disagreement is the question of whether or not Dutch painting is substantially different from other artistic traditions of the age. Was it simply a continuation of Mediaeval art in which visible things were presented as allusions to more general religious ideas, or can it be regarded as a kind of l’art pour l’art avant la lettre?

This book seeks to clarify the ideological background of seventeenth-century Dutch painting. It also explores a specific question in the context of the debate about the presumed ‘realism’ of this art: what are a painter’s underlying motives for depicting the visible world? In other words: the book explores the issue of how seventeenth-century texts describe and explain specific qualities of the art of the Netherlands using themes from the tradition of art theory. It attempts to chart the ways in which new artistic forms and genres were invested with theoretical legitimacy.
Fig. 2 – Egidius Sadeler after Hans von Aachen, Minerva Introduces Painting to the Liberal Arts, engraving. Rijksmuseum Amsterdam.
The best-known painting treatise in Dutch, Karel van Mander’s *Schilder-boeck (Book on Painting)*, published in 1604, largely reflects views on sixteenth-century art. It was followed, in the seventeenth century, by Philips Angel’s oration in praise of painting (1642) and Willem Goeree’s writings on painting and draughtsmanship dating from 1668-1682. In comparison to all these texts, Samuel van Hoogstraten’s *Inleyding tot de hooge schoole der schilderkonst; anders de zichtbaere werelt (Introduction to the Academy of Painting; or the Visible World, 1678)* is more ambitious in terms of both theoretical scope and volume (fig. 1). This treatise draws on a plethora of literary, philosophical and historical sources as well as other texts such as travel accounts and collections of quotations, and may thus be assumed to present a cross-section of general seventeenth-century views. In recent years, both adherents of the iconological approach and those favouring a more ‘modern’ interpretation of seventeenth-century art have quoted from this treatise to corroborate their own points of view. But neither group has taken the objectives of Van Hoogstraten’s text as a whole into account. The present study looks at the aims of the treatise and its position in the literary tradition, and from this point of departure explores a number of themes expounded in his treatise that are related to the theoretical status he accords to the depiction of the visible world.

Although readers will seek in vain for words like ‘justification’ or ‘legitimacy’ in early modern art literature, many treatises set out explicitly to assert the status of painting as one of the liberal arts, those activities that were seen as essential aspects of a humanist’s education, corresponding to the ideal of the ‘universal man’. Van Hoogstraten himself openly deplores the relative absence of this emancipatory project in the Netherlands, which he seeks to remedy. He states that he was inspired to write his book because ‘the Art of Painting has come to be seen, in most people’s eyes, as a common art or craft’. He names Leon Battista Alberti’s Italian treatise *Della pittura* of 1435 as the first text to bring together ancient views on painting in a systematic framework, thus laying the foundations of art theory as a genre. By emphasizing painting’s intellectual basis, these theories endowed it with fresh legitimacy as it gradually struggled free from the old constraints of guild regulations and church patronage. Exemplary to this project is Hans von Aachen’s image of a personification of painting who is introduced to the select group of the *artes liberales* by Minerva, the goddess of wisdom (fig. 2). In the seventeenth century, the issue of painting’s legitimacy was especially topical for genres such as landscape and still-life painting, which were not informed by traditional religious or literary iconography.

One of the main instruments that Van Hoogstraten used to place the art of painting of his contemporaries and fellow-countrymen on firm foundations was the authority of literary tradition. The present study will take this tradition and its international background as its point of departure and will include relevant theories of Van Hoogstraten’s contemporaries in the analysis, as well as drawing on older material, mainly from Southern Europe. In this respect, its vantage point differs from those of earlier works on Van Hoogstraten’s theory, which have largely glossed over these traditions. Similar research has been done primarily for the Italian literature of art. For the texts written in Dutch, while various individual theoretical concepts have been studied, little attention has been paid to the literary framework in which these concepts operated. Although Jan Emmens set out to provide a historical overview of Dutch-language art theory in his *Rembrandt en de regels van de kunst (Rembrandt and the Rules*
of Art, 1964), he was unable to find a place in it for Van Hoogstraten’s treatise. One of the basic assumptions of the present study is that the framework within which Van Hoogstraten’s theory must be placed is determined by a moral philosophy rooted in classical rhetoric, which endured in the seventeenth century in the courtiers’ ideal of the honnête homme. It was an ideal that combined didactic, aesthetic and ethical concepts.

The first chapter explores the limits and scope of a reconstruction of Van Hoogstraten’s philosophical views by determining his role in the European ‘republic of letters’. It sets out to analyse his use of the humanist arsenal afforded by his literary milieu and the way in which he sought to situate his treatise within the tradition of art theory. This refers not only to the Inleyding, but also to his other writings, in the fields of poetry and drama. The chapter addresses the encyclopaedic multiplicity of views provided by the treatise and the significance of rhetoric to views on art as part of a comprehensive theory of communication and action.

The second chapter focuses explicitly on the theoretical status of the depiction of the visible world. It explores Van Hoogstraten’s emphasis, as part of his effort to legitimize painting, on the concept of the ‘visible world’ – which is highlighted in the subtitle and illustrations of his treatise, and explains certain basic assumptions of his text. Van Hoogstraten’s ideas about this concept become clearer when they are placed within their philosophical and religious context as well as within the context of art theory. From the material thus compiled, preliminary conclusions are drawn concerning the debate on the so-called ‘realism’ of seventeenth-century painting.

In the third chapter, general questions relating to the representation of the visible world are narrowed down to problems surrounding the concept of imitation. Both the imitation of nature and the emulation of artistic examples are discussed, as well as the significance of productive rivalry. Van Hoogstraten’s views are linked to the didactic and ultimately ethical ideals that can be traced back to ancient rhetorical theory.

Chapter four elaborates on a specific aspect of the theory of imitation: the power to evoke emotions. The reality of emotion, in contrast to the fiction of art, is the painter’s most powerful tool in his effort to involve the viewer. Clearly, this is much more than a matter of applying illusionist devices. The passions are central to Van Hoogstraten’s views on the purpose and subject of painting. His assertions are embedded in a cosmology in which planetary influences, the four elements and the related humours play fundamental roles, and in which works of art are believed to effectuate ‘action at a distance’: the making and enjoyment of painting is deemed to have a strong physical component. The affective influence attributed to painting arises not merely from the choice of subject, but also from stylistic aspects, whereby colouring is of especial importance: this is the subject of chapter five. From Van Hoogstraten’s views regarding the persuasiveness of colouring follows an ambivalent appreciation of the ephemeral, superficial and seductive aspects of painting. This proves significant to a subject that has often raised questions for art historians analyzing the supposed ‘realism’ of seventeenth-century art: landscape painting. According to the ideas set out in the Inleyding, the superficial temptations of landscape may lead the viewer to focus on the deceptiveness of the visible world itself.

Chapter six, which illuminates the definition of painting as a ‘mirror of nature’, revolves around the fundamental duplicity of the artwork that ‘deceives the eye’. In this connection,
it explores in detail the status of visual perception in seventeenth-century art theory. The epistemological and religious attitudes that come to the fore prompt a final analysis of the relevance of contemporary philosophical trends to the theory set forth in the Inleyding. Venturing beyond the realm of art history proper, the chapter is followed by an ‘excursus’ concerning a philosophical controversy in Van Hoogstraten’s own circle, to explore from a different vantage point the issue of the intellectual authority vested in the concept of the ‘visible world’.

The conclusion returns to the historiographical debate on the presumed existence of an authentically Dutch theory of art and so-called ‘Dutch realism’, and reviews the divergent answers that have been given to this question. The debate may perhaps reflect certain contradictions within seventeenth-century culture, opposing vantage points that can also be identified in Van Hoogstraten’s theory of art: the ‘Book of Nature’ versus the ‘Holy Scriptures’, the visible versus the invisible world, and the paradox between appearance and reality that underlies painterly illusion. The Inleyding itself, combining as it does, for example, a belief in magic with an interest in the ‘new philosophy’ of the seventeenth century, bristles with inconsistencies. The discussion of Van Hoogstraten’s place in the wider ‘rhetorical culture’ of his humanist milieu will shed new light on these contradictions.

**Talking about art in the seventeenth century**

This book aims to reconstruct the terms and concepts that Van Hoogstraten and his readers used for discussions of painting. It also recognizes that isolated terms do not suffice to give a full account of seventeenth-century thinking about art; the study of the painter’s vocabulary is supplemented by an analysis of the rhetorical framework in which the different terms operate. A few words of explanation about the rhetorical nature of Van Hoogstraten’s theory are essential to introduce a methodological issue that will come up several times in this study.

As will become clearer, to develop his theory, Van Hoogstraten borrowed the rational framework, the terms and concepts of classical rhetoric. Although he may have been trained in rhetoric himself, he closely followed the work of Franciscus Junius, who reconstructed the views of classical authors in *De schilderkonst der oude* (*The Painting of the Ancients*, 1641) (fig. 3). In writing this most systematic of Dutch treatises on painting, Junius, in the knowledge that no ancient theory of art had survived, applied the ideas on oratory of Cicero and Quintilian to the visual arts, often simply by changing the word ‘orator’ to ‘painter’. Van Hoogstraten’s adaptation of these ideas produces a conception of painting that is predicated on the assumption that its primary aim, like that of rhetoric, is not simply to convey a visual (or verbal) message but to create an affective relationship between artist (speaker) and viewers (audience).

As far back as in ancient rhetorical theory, one means of speaking persuasively was the graphic evocation of a state of affairs, and several terms were developed for the stylistic virtues needed to achieve this. These terms – such as ‘imitation’, ‘affect’, ‘perspicuity’, ‘ornament’ and ‘energy’ – all recur in Van Hoogstraten’s treatise, in which they are linked to concrete painterly issues. Indeed, some of the metaphors used in rhetorical theory for evoking a narrative in a ‘lifelike’ manner seem to invite this application to painting, such as the orator’s need to embellish his speech with ‘colours of rhetoric’ and the ‘lights of an oration’. We shall see that Van...
Hoogstraten’s central views regarding the function of art as imitating nature in a lifelike way are greatly influenced by Junius’s ideas on rhetorical persuasion. Thus, it is not surprising that seventeenth-century art theory accords to painting the same functions as it does to oratory: that of persuading one’s public in order to change their ethical outlook and ultimately ‘move them to action’.

Once we have understood the significance to Van Hoogstraten’s ideas of the topos that ‘painting is just like oratory’, we will find that it illuminates numerous elements relating to the aims and structures developed in his treatise. His wish to link his ideas to classical rhetoric may be explained from a desire to position himself within the tradition of writing about painting as it had developed in Italy. Given its objective of demonstrating that painting, as one of the liberal arts, was a subject worth writing about, early modern art theory can be classified as a kind of ‘rhetoric of praise’ or epideictic rhetoric, as apposed to the forensic and political species of oratory. Epideictic rhetoric was used to prove a subject’s merit, and those who wrote about art
used it to invest their profession with intellectual legitimacy. In his treatise, which invokes the
authority of literary tradition to describe the art of his contemporaries, Van Hoogstraten states
explicitly that he seeks to elevate the intellectual status of painting. We shall explore and define
the ways in which epideictic rhetoric influenced the structure and nature of the *Inleyding*, and
the findings will serve as the point of departure for the subsequent analysis of the basic prin-
ciples and system of his theory.

One thing that will become clear is that this rhetoric is governed by a different mode
of reasoning than that of logic: in an epideictic treatise, one persuades by invoking authority
and by citing a large variety of arguments. The *Inleyding* abounds in repetitions of traditional
views; the mutual consistency of these views and their compatibility with contemporary studio
practice are subordinate to the author’s main goal, which is to cite ancient, preferably classi-
cal, authority. It is this goal that explains why Alberti names only painters from antiquity, and
why Van Hoogstraten also alludes to them more frequently than to contemporaries from the
Netherlands (indeed, preferring to leave living masters out of consideration altogether).

The structure that can be identified in the *Inleyding* is also related to Van Hoogstraten’s
wish to elevate the status of painting. At first sight, the treatise seems to confront the reader
with an abundance of different kinds of information and vantage points. This multiplicity
seems to derive from an ideal of encyclopaedic completeness; Jan Emmens described the *Inley-
ding* as a ‘not uncongenial amalgam’. But the early modern ideal of comprehensive knowl-
edge of the world does not suffice to explain Van Hoogstraten’s way of thinking: the epideictic
rhetoric of this treatise essentially possesses its own rational structure. The structure that can
be identified here is first and foremost that of rhetoric itself. Ever since antiquity, authors of
rhetorical treatises have applied an authoritative vocabulary of flexible terms to different areas
and ages of human endeavour. Rhetoric provided a discursive framework for these terms, a
framework within which certain terms relate, for instance, to the process of creating a speech
or a work of art, while others focus on the end result or on the public’s reaction, and still oth-
ers on the ‘actor’ himself. The overall objective of ancient rhetorical theory was general and
didactic, and this too affects the way in which Van Hoogstraten compiles his treatise and its
interpretation.

After outlining these general issues in the first chapter, this book will discuss a number
of terms used by Van Hoogstraten by explaining their place in the framework of epideictic
rhetoric. Thus, it will become clear that concepts like *imitatio* and *affectus* have connotations
relating to general ideas about civic virtues. Other terms that can be linked to matters beyond
mere questions of style are *gratia* and *perspicuitas*, for instance. The proposed selection of terms
is determined by the scope for linking rhetorical theory to elements of seventeenth-century
painting as discussed by Van Hoogstraten. This will reveal the shifts in meaning that took place
in time-honoured rhetorical terms in the course of the seventeenth century. In fact, Junius
himself was by no means a neutral philologist who sought to make material from antiquity
available to painters: he incorporated it into a systematic whole, in which his own preferences
and modifications are discernible. One example is his combination of the two Greek terms of
*energeia* and *enargeia* to coin the new term *energia*, from which it becomes clear that the ulti-
mate effect of the work of art on the viewer is the central subject of his theory – more so than
in antiquity. The fact that rhetorical terms can be adapted to different circumstances, which
gives them their enduring relevance, also enables their transformation; there is seldom a one-to-one correspondence between a term used by Quintilian and one of Van Hoogstraten’s, for instance, but the central paradigm of rhetorical persuasiveness remains the overall interpretive framework.

The study of topoi, as well as terminology, can greatly help to clarify the position of a text such as the *Inleyding* within the art-theoretical tradition. The selection of commonplaces and their arrangement to form lines of argument constituted a separate discipline – dialectics or ‘the art of reasoning’ – in the seventeenth century, the importance of which for discussions of art in that period has only recently been acknowledged. One would suppose that for the study of commonplaces an analysis of Van Hoogstraten’s borrowings from Van Mander’s *Schilder-boeck* would be essential, since this was the book he sought most explicitly to surpass.
Yet comparisons of the *Inleyding* with Van Mander’s text are less fruitful than one might expect. Van Hoogstraten’s borrowings appear to be primarily shifts of emphasis, and in many cases his use of commonplaces differs from Van Mander’s more in degree than in absolute terms. To clarify the significance of these borrowings, it is often more useful to look at what Van Hoogstraten leaves out than what he includes, since this reveals a difference in emphasis. One example is his opinion of Caravaggio: while he describes the latter’s art in terms derived largely from Van Mander, he arrives at a positive verdict that contrasts with his predecessor’s negative assessment. For the purposes of assessing the commonplaces reiterated in the *Inleyding* it turns out to be more useful to contrast a range of material derived from the Italian tradition with Van Hoogstraten’s phrases, rather than merely quoting Van Mander.

Besides the diachronic approach required for a study of the rhetorical foundations of art theory, Van Hoogstraten’s project of elevating painting’s intellectual status makes it useful to adopt a second vantage point with a synchronous approach. This vantage point takes account of the multiplicity of texts that he consulted while preparing the *Inleyding*. Van Hoogstraten quite casually invokes philosophical literature, in most cases without noting explicitly why a particular author is worthy of his interest. Giving the context of these borrowings may clarify what an earlier study of the *Inleyding* defined as ‘the book’s profoundly religious conception of the world and of art’.

We shall analyse Van Hoogstraten’s position vis-à-vis certain contemporary religious views in order to show that his theory, though based on the authority of antiquity, was not untouched by the intellectual and religious debates of his age. This will shed new light on the most significant addition that the *Inleyding* makes to the art-theoretical tradition: the concept of the visible world.

This study sets out to show that the *Inleyding* should not be interpreted as a self-contained treatise. Its internal contradictions are inherent to a specific literary genre, in which various traditions in the sphere of rhetoric, literature and philosophy possess equal authority. Rather than seeking explanations for possibly paradoxical or idiosyncratic elements in the text itself, this study adopts an approach geared towards this wide-ranging reconstruction.
Chapter I

SAMUEL VAN HOOGSTRATEN
IN THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS
Fig. 5 – Samuel van Hoogstraten, *Self-portrait*, 1644, panel, 59 x 74 cm.
Boymans-van Beuningen, Rotterdam.
Chapter I

Samuel van Hoogstraten in the Republic of Letters

‘The human intellect is governed by speech ... for that is the sole means by which we disclose to each other our thoughts, preferences and desires; and failure to maintain it would deprive us of self-knowledge, disrupt the community and loosen the ties within governments, and amount to disgraceful conduct.’

Samuel van Hoogstraten, Den eerlyken jongeling

A LEARNED ARTIST: VAN HOOGSTRATEN AS PAINTER AND POET

In 1924, Julius von Schlosser declared that Dutch painters took no interest in literature and that art theory left them cold. ‘The very country that developed an art which, while being wholly independent and self-contained, also revealed and paved the way for the work of the moderns, the Netherlands, most notably Holland, was vastly uncommunicative in its main utterances’. Van Hoogstraten did not succeed in bridging this gap, in Von Schlosser’s view: ‘The great didactic poem by the Rembrandt pupil Samuel van Hoogstraten of Dordrecht shows him to be a thorough classicist and rhetorician in the Romanic tradition ... Such exponents of official theory scarcely had anything new to tell us.’ He concluded that the Dutch masters ‘painted diligently in their studios; they did not talk, and any literary aspirations were alien to them.’

Von Schlosser considered his characterization of Van Hoogstraten (1627-1678) as a ‘rhetorician’ to somehow invalidate the latter’s theory of art. This theory, he maintained, reflects the official dogmas and is not relevant to the art of the Netherlands. The present study will confront the literary output of this learned painter-poet, playwright, courtier, traveller, and pupil of Rembrandt, with the works of art he describes and analyses. By seeking to define Van Hoogstraten’s position in the republic of letters, it will be argued that his rhetorical qualities in no way undermined his capacity to give proper theoretical legitimacy to his profession and that of his colleagues: the art of painting.

That Van Hoogstraten liked the image of himself as a man of letters from an early age is clear from a painting, dated 1644, in which he represented himself reading, and from a self-portrait he made showing himself well-supplied with books (figs. 5 and 6). In his painting treatise, the Inleyding, he observes that ‘the practice, or in any case reading, of Poetry’ is unquestionably essential for a painter. Van Hoogstraten owes his current fame primarily to his two-pronged career: he was both a successful painter and a writer of plays, poetry and art
theory. This range of interests was certainly not exceptional in the Netherlands. Van Hoogstraten’s great example may have been Karel van Mander, who belonged to the literary society Den Nederduytschen Helikon and who is referred to in the Inleyding as ‘our poet’. Many seventeenth-century painters, including Frans Hals and Adriaen Brouwer, belonged to Chambers of Rhetoric. Others, such as Hendrik Bloemaert, Pieter Codde and Heiman Dullaert, concerned themselves independently with poetry. Illustrious contemporaries from Italy may have served as their examples. The Inleyding quotes from Michelangelo’s famous sonnets; the painter Gian-paolo Lomazzo also published a collection of poems as well as his writings on art theory.

Art theory traditionally urges painters to put into practice the commonplace ut pictura poesis: a painting is just like a poem. When Van Hoogstraten maintains that painters can derive great benefit from ‘consorting with wise and sharp-witted men and reading edifying books’ he is repeating a conviction, first phrased in Italy by Leon Battista Alberti, that painters must go to rhetoricians for counsel. Similarly, Van Mander suggests that it is most advantageous for the artist to be ‘experienced in languages or learned in fine literature’. Van Hoogstraten’s successor Gerard de Lairesse, who published his Groot schilderboek (Great Book on Painting) in 1707, states that apprentice painters must know Latin and should read a great deal.

As far as Van Hoogstraten’s life and work are concerned, what makes him stand out among his contemporaries is the interplay between painting and literature, as reflected most notably in the Inleyding. This text was partly written with a view to enhancing his reputation as a painter while also serving to consolidate his social network, just like his other literary activi-
ties. The explicit aim of the *Inleyding* is more general: elevating the status of the art of painting itself. Many of the author’s views relating to this endeavour can be clarified from his position in the seventeenth-century ‘republic of letters’. The *Inleyding* develops an argument based on traditional commonplaces that the author has applied in a specific way. As will be argued in the next chapters, Van Hoogstraten’s approach to the representation of the visible world was a reworking of the literary and scholarly commonplaces for which his humanist milieu provided the framework.

The intellectual context of the *Inleyding* is wide-ranging, and a variety of themes will recur throughout the subsequent chapters. The painter-poet’s position in the republic of letters determines the conditions and scope for studying the ideological roots of his ideas and defines the various vantage points available to him in his project to raise painting’s status, to provide it with theoretical legitimacy.

**Rhétorical culture**

Several scholars have studied Van Hoogstraten’s life and the genesis of his *Inleyding*. These studies have focused on the *Inleyding* primarily as the expression of his ambitions as a social climber, and have discussed the treatise’s theoretical premises and its supposed internal coherence. The present book aims at a wider contextualization to situate the views expounded in the *Inleyding* within the cultural context best described as ‘international humanism’, focusing on two central subject areas: rhetoric and moral philosophy.

As Van Hoogstraten was writing his treatise, the intellectual movement that is generally labelled ‘Renaissance humanism’ was apparently on its last legs. Influential authors like Gerardus Johannes Vossius, who still aspired to universal scholarship, have been called ‘the last of the Renaissance monsters’. In many ways, Van Hoogstraten’s text is a late product of the humanist encyclopaedic project; with its jumble of borrowings from diverse literary sources, the treatise is not always easily accessible to modern readers. It cannot be properly appreciated without an understanding of the rhetorical ideal pursued by scholars such as Vossius and Junius. Rather than defining Van Hoogstraten’s theory of art in a particular literary or philosophical school, it can more appropriately be placed in the context of a ‘rhetorical culture’. In this connection it is important to emphasize that in the seventeenth century, rhetoric – in the Republic as elsewhere – was far more than a general theory of communication. Eloquence was regarded as a prerequisite for diverse occupations – not just for preachers and scholars, but also for merchants and people who pursued the arts. Rhetoric provided guidelines for human behaviour in general, and it was applicable in fields ranging from politics and ethics to painting.

**Van Hoogstraten’s literary education**

It is not known what school Van Hoogstraten attended before he went to Amsterdam to train with Rembrandt. The Latin School in Dordrecht is the most plausible option. His younger brother Frans was well-grounded in Latin and letters from an early age; he may have been taught by his uncle David de Coning of Rotterdam before his apprenticeship to a Dordrecht printer. In the seventeenth century it was quite common for only the younger children of
middle-class craftsmen to be offered a school education, while the eldest son pursued a lucrative craft. Still, it is certainly not impossible that Samuel attended the Latin school for some time, given that he later associated with Dordrecht literati with all the self-assurance of an intellectual equal. When he started writing novels, several of his contemporaries followed his example.

After Van Hoogstraten’s training in Rembrandt’s studio, Dordrecht’s local circle of poets supplied his most noteworthy literary ‘education’. Hans-Jörg Czech, who compiled an index of Van Hoogstraten’s borrowings from other authors, demonstrated the sheer number of sources that the painter-poet relied on in writing his Inleyding, and showed that he could read English and Italian. In his study of the classical sources for the treatise, Czech also concluded that Van Hoogstraten probably had the original Latin texts at his disposal or at least maintained contact with scholars who knew the original works. Latin texts are reproduced untranslated in two sections of the Inleyding. Van Hoogstraten also refers to works that did not exist in Dutch translation. It is probable that all who belonged to the intellectual circle around Van Hoogstraten and his brother had a fairly sound knowledge of Latin; this would have been in line with Goeree’s advice that painters derive great benefit from knowing a foreign language such as Latin, French or Italian. Van Hoogstraten himself writes that a knowledge of Latin in the first place, and French and English in the second place, was indispensable to a ‘gentleman’. Even so, the classical texts were widely available in translation in the Netherlands, and additional compilations of translated quotations were published in philological compendia such as Franciscus Junius’s Schilderkonst der oude and Petrus Lauremberg’s Acerra philologica, two texts that Van Hoogstraten cites among his sources. As will become clear, many of Van Hoogstraten’s statements are based on adaptations of concepts from ancient rhetorical theory or on commonplaces from the Italian tradition of art literature.

Van Hoogstraten’s later literary work reflects his affinity with two central elements of the curriculum at Latin school: rhetoric and drama. Among the texts studied most closely were the writings of Gerardus Vossius, who had been headmaster of the Latin school in Dordrecht (fig. 7). His Rhetorices contractae (1621) served as a textbook throughout the seventeenth century. Vossius also wrote a treatise on painting, entitled ‘De graphice’ (1650), for which he drew on Junius’s treatise on the art of antiquity – one of the most important books about painting available to artists in the Republic. Junius was Vossius’s brother-in-law, and also lived in Dordrecht for several years. The two luminaries of humanist scholarship surely served as intellectual role models to others. They corresponded about planned editions of Vitruvius’s famous books on architecture and of Philostratus’s writings about the visual arts, which in fact never materialized. Vossius’s example may have inspired Van Hoogstraten early in life to conceive the idea of writing a treatise on art; Alberti and Junius are among the authors referred to in this context in ‘De graphice’.

At Latin school, Van Hoogstraten would not only have read Vossius’s work, but also would have been acquainted with the ancient rhetorical theories of Cicero and Quintilian, which he uses in the Inleyding: he refers to Cicero’s most important writings on the subject, repeatedly quotes Quintilian’s Institutio oratoria, and also draws on the Orationes by the Greek rhetorician Dio Chrysostom. In addition, he mentions authors of modern theories of poetics such as Julius Caesar Scaliger, whose Poëtices libri septem was highly influential. The Inleyding
applies the theories governing the training of rhetoricians to that of painters. In the minds of some, it was only one short step from the didacticism of the Latin school to that of the painter’s studio; the Antwerp art theorist Cornelis de Bie, for instance, describes art theory, in his *Golden cabinet van de edel vry schilderconst* (*The Golden Cabinet of the Noble and Free Art of Painting*, 1661), as a ‘small Latin school’ for aspiring painters.

The teaching of Latin was based primarily on the principle of *imitatio*: pupils built up collections of commonplaces and subsequently devised variations. Quotations were arranged in accordance with the dialectics of the Dutch humanist Rudolf Agricola, with topoi grouped in structures reflecting particular lines of reasoning. The *Inleyding* probably has its roots in a collection of this kind on which Van Hoogstraten had been working since boyhood. This could be one explanation for the thematic diversity exhibited by his treatise.

Drama, with pupils performing plays themselves, also figured prominently at Latin school. Van Hoogstraten was clearly familiar with this practice, since he emulated it in his studio with his own pupils, an idea he may have derived from Rembrandt. Van Hoogstraten himself wrote two elaborate plays that may have been staged there: *De roomsche Paulina* (1660) and *Dieryk en Dorothé* (1666), which exhibit a distinct affinity to the theatre of his age. This affinity is also manifest in the *Inleyding*, which includes references to Vondel’s plays and theories about drama.

Dordrecht’s Latin school was seen as the ideal preparation for the university of Leiden. Throughout his life, Van Hoogstraten kept in contact with a number of contemporaries from Dordrecht, nearly all of whom went to Leiden. They included the literary celebrities Adriaan and Karel van Nispen, Johan van Someren and Lambert van den Bos. We also see
that someone like Samuel’s nephew David van Hoogstraten (1658-1724), a son of his brother Frans, studied medicine and philology there before accepting a position at Dordrecht’s college, the ‘Athenaeum illustre’. Later, he became deputy headmaster at the Latin school in Amsterdam. David van Hoogstraten’s activities may be seen as the culmination of an intellectual development initiated by the generation of his father and uncle. While his grandfather Dirk, as a painter and goldsmith, had been a craftsman, David became a respected citizen of the ‘republic of letters’, publishing in poetics and rhetoric.38

Unlike his peers who went off to university, Van Hoogstraten left Dordrecht for Amsterdam to train with Rembrandt.39 Rembrandt’s early work had certainly not gone unnoticed by his intellectual contemporaries. Several art lovers took an interest in him, as recorded in Jan Orlers’s 1641 eulogy on the city of Leiden; of particular importance were scholars well-read in the humanist literature of art such as Theodorus Schrevelius, headmaster of Leiden’s Latin school, and Constantijn Huygens, poet, statesman and secretary to Frederik Hendrik, who described his visit to Rembrandt’s studio in his autobiography. Schrevelius may have discussed Rembrandt’s work with the antiquarian Arnoldus Buchelius, who was acquainted with Van Mander’s Schilder-boeck. The painter’s admirers also included the philologist Petrus Scriverius, who contributed a eulogy to Van Mander’s treatise and owned two paintings by Rembrandt.40

Rembrandt’s teacher, Pieter Lastman, was one of the most erudite painters of his day, and when in Leiden, Rembrandt had already sought to present himself as an ambitious painter with intellectual aspirations.41 He had not only attended Latin school, but he had also enrolled at the university. He may even have made a self-portrait posing as a student.42 Van Hoogstraten may well have become acquainted with the application of rhetorical concepts to painting, and to the role of literature in the painter’s choice of subject, in Rembrandt’s studio.43 In Amsterdam he also became familiar with the novel, then a fashionable new genre, which he subsequently introduced to his peers in Dordrecht.44

It was evidently a desire to emulate the scholarly atmosphere of Rembrandt’s studio that prompted Van Hoogstraten to join the Develstein circle – a group of poets in which Jacob Cats had played a prominent role – when he returned to Dordrecht in 1646. There he completed his first literary work.45 Members of this group would furnish the Inleyding with liminary poems, and Van Hoogstraten in turn wrote a variety of occasional poems for them.46 Lambert van den Bos, a prolific poet who also wrote about Rembrandt, observed that Dordrecht’s literary circle had ‘a kind of Republic among them’, by which he meant a miniature republic of letters in which information was exchanged and people commented on each other’s writings.47 Groups like this were the Netherlands’ answer to Italy’s literary academies, which provided an institutional context in which painters could develop their knowledge of literature and publish theoretical treatises.48

The Develstein group was decidedly progressive. It included a substantial number of women; the prominent member Margaretha van Godewijk was compared by her contemporaries to the ‘learned maid’ Anna Maria van Schuurman and praised for her painting.49 Van Hoogstraten produced an engraving after one of her self-portraits for a book on the city of Dordrecht (fig. 8). In the caption, the artist commends Van Godewijk’s knowledge of languages and her proficiency in art and learning. The group also became acquainted with modern and controversial philosophy: one important figure, who became a good friend of Van Hoog-
straten’s, was the philosopher and theologian Willem van Blijenberg, chiefly known for his correspondence with Spinoza.\(^{10}\)

Philosophical discussions loomed large in another literary group that Van Hoogstraten joined ten years later. Formed in 1656, it met at the publishing-house of his brother Frans in Rotterdam. Frans’s son, David, describes in detail how his father and uncle welcomed Rembrandt’s pupil Heiman Dullaert to the circle.\(^{11}\) This group was chiefly concerned with the philosophical issues that had moved to the forefront of intellectual discourse in the Republic from the middle of the century onwards. For Samuel, it provided access to international intellectual debates.\(^ {12}\) Frans’s catalogue provides an impression of the literature that this group discussed: most of it had an international philosophical and theological orientation, which suggests that Frans included other kinds of literature only for commercial reasons.\(^ {13}\) The painters Joost van Geel and Willem Paets also belonged to this group; in terms of intellectual standing, however, Joachim Oudaen was the key figure. Secretary to the scholar Scriverius, Oudaen had developed into something of a connoisseur of the visual arts, a theologian and a historian. His writings included poems to accompany the paintings of Rembrandt’s teacher Pieter Lastman, a commentary on the poetics of Andries Pels, and a critique of Spinoza.\(^ {14}\) Van Hoogstraten maintained an extensive correspondence with Oudaen; among other things, he wrote to him about the *Inleyding*. For this treatise he drew on a variety of philosophical texts, and it is fair to assume that Van Hoogstraten had absorbed more than a superficial knowledge of the prevailing philosophical climate.

With its plethora of references to literary sources, ancient rhetorical theory and modern philosophy, the *Inleyding* makes it clear that the genesis of Van Hoogstraten’s theory of art

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\(^{10}\) The name of the philosopher, Willem van Blijenberg, is sometimes spelled as Willem van Bl evenberg. The name is often referred to as Willem van Blijenberg.

\(^{11}\) Frans’s son, David, wrote a detailed account of how Rembrandt’s pupil Heiman Dullaert was welcomed into the group.

\(^{12}\) The group was chiefly concerned with philosophical issues that had moved to the forefront of intellectual discourse in the Republic from the middle of the century onwards. For Samuel, it provided access to international intellectual debates.

\(^{13}\) Frans’s catalogue provides an impression of the literature that this group discussed: most of it had an international philosophical and theological orientation, which suggests that Frans included other kinds of literature only for commercial reasons.

\(^{14}\) Oudaen’s writings included poems to accompany the paintings of Rembrandt’s teacher Pieter Lastman, a commentary on the poetics of Andries Pels, and a critique of Spinoza.
certainly derived from a lifelong interest in scholarship. In this context, it should be borne in mind that literacy skills were well-developed in the Republic, even among painters and other craftsmen. Most attended elementary school, some went on to Latin school and a few even studied briefly at university, although a painter such as Dirk Barendsz, whom Van Mander describes as ‘versed in Letters, a Latinist, and a Man of Learning’ and who corresponded with the art theorist Domenicus Lampsonius in Latin, was an exception. In painting, there was a certain – admittedly small – overlap between the categories of craftsmen and erudite art lovers. Prolific authors such as Junius and Goeree, the lawyer Jan de Bisschop and the Leiden professor Paulus Merula concerned themselves on an amateur basis with drawing, and in some cases also with painting. The ideal of the ‘learned artist’ was proclaimed, of course, in art theory. That pictura and poesis could also be combined in practice is clear from the careers of painters who ventured into literature, and by some who switched from one profession to the other: the famous poet Gerbrant Bredero started life as a painter, as did Heiman Dullaert and the church minister Dirk Rafaelsz Camphuysen. A few noteworthy women straddled the worlds of craftsmen-painters and erudite humanists – one was Margareta van Godewijk, celebrated for her twin gifts for art and letters.

Travels and international contacts
Many of Dordrecht’s prominent literary scholars undertook educational journeys to Rome. Among them were Johan van Beverwijck and Cornelis Pompe van Meerdervoort, two patricians to whom Van Hoogstraten dedicated the Inleyding. The painter made a portrait drawing of Matthijs van de Merwede, a member of the Develstein group, notorious for the erotic poetry that he wrote in Rome (fig. 9). Shortly after completing his education, Van Hoogstraten too set off on a European trip, and Italy was one of the countries he visited. In his case, however, it would not be entirely accurate to speak of a grand tour. While travellers from the upper classes sought primarily to attain practical wisdom or prudentia, Van Hoogstraten was most concern to make a living by securing commissions. Just as when he later went to London, the painter focused primarily on destinations known for the opportunities they provided for Dutch painters: Rome and the Habsburg court in Vienna. On his return, however, Van Hoogstraten did use his travels to claim a social and cultural status equal to that of patricians’ sons who had visited Italy. He even became dean of the ‘Gentlemen of St Peter’s’, a Dordrecht society for those who had visited Rome. His social standing appears to have been based partly on this journey: eulogies celebrating his literary work often referred to his supposed international fame and experience. As Goeree observed in his Inleyding tot de practijck der algemeene schilderkonst (Introduction to the Universal Art of Painting, 1670), the work of masters who had travelled abroad achieved popularity almost automatically.

The ideal of a courtier-painter who was widely educated in rhetoric and literature had been formulated at the Habsburg court in the sixteenth century. Vienna’s courtly culture was not as ceremonial and hierarchical as that of Versailles, but the assumptions of a God-given social order and the accompanying rhetorical codes of conduct were just as ingrained. While staying at this court, Van Hoogstraten, who was rewarded with a medal by the Emperor Ferdinand III for one of his still-life paintings, may have become aware of the rhetorical background
underlying the codes of conduct of courtiers, an understanding that would later prompt him to write an adaptation of a French courtiers’ manual. With veneration he wrote in 1651 about the arrival in Vienna of the painter and art theorist Joachim von Sandrart; perhaps Von Sandrart’s efforts to produce a major treatise on art theory (the *Teutsche Academie*, published in 1675-1679) came to his attention when he later embarked on his own *Inleyding*. In his turn, Von Sandrart was aware of Van Hoogstraten’s reputation in Vienna, and refers to him in his treatise as a pupil of Rembrandt and a skilled painter.\(^6\)

The fierce competition in Rome, where painters from all over Europe congregated, probably made it impossible for Van Hoogstraten to earn a living from his work there.\(^6\) In fact, the main benefit arising from his stay was the opportunity it furnished to study Italian and classical art. Van Hoogstraten’s Italian experiences in this respect, however, are hard to reconstruct; he probably visited Naples, Florence, Siena and Venice. In the *Inleyding* he frequently refers to Italian masters and describes his visits to collections and towns. But the account of his travels stops at Vienna, and according to the text it was completed there in July 1651.\(^6\) Van Hoogstraten’s route can be reconstructed from an ode in a travel account by his friend Van den Bos, the *Wegwijzer door Italien* (*Guide to Italy*, 1657). Van den Bos’s book is not based on his own experience; he compiled it from ‘the best writers and observations’. The ‘observations’ were probably Van Hoogstraten’s; the pages dealing with Rome, in particular, and to a lesser extent those on Venice and Florence, reflect an affinity with the experiences of an interested eyewitness.\(^6\) Where the *Inleyding* is concerned, Van Hoogstraten’s knowledge of the Italian tradition is most evident from his effort to trace certain assertions back to Italian masters.
whose status had come to equal that of the painters from antiquity, in particular Titian and Michelangelo, who figure prominently in the *Inleyding*. It is hard to determine to what extent the painter absorbed the prevailing climate of art theory while in Italy; as we shall see in chapter II (pages 97-101), he most probably took note of the debates that arose around the Roman Accademia di San Luca, but he was also familiar with the ideas of others.

During his travels, Van Hoogstraten tried to make contact not only with painters, but also with art lovers with scholarly interests. In Rome he lodged with Otto Marseus van Schrieck, a painter and a collector of biological curiosities whose name is linked to the ideas of the Florentine scientific society Accademia del Cimento. In Germany he visited the painter-publisher Matthäus Merian, of the famous family of cartographers of that name. A third example is Gabriel Bucelinus, a historian, genealogist and architectural designer, and a key figure in the European republic of letters, whom Van Hoogstraten met in Regensburg. This Benedictine abbot was in contact with Von Sandrart and with Italian masters such as Guido Reni and Giulio Benso. Around 1664 he composed a list of painters, just as Jan de Bisschop and others did in the Netherlands. This list consists primarily of the names of Italian masters, but also includes Van Hoogstraten and his master, Rembrandt. On a later trip to London, in 1662-1667, Van Hoogstraten would again try to become acquainted with the latest scientific developments, when he visited the recently founded Royal Society. This was one of the first independent institutes of scientific research that, based on the ideas of experimental learning propagated by Francis Bacon, actively promoted the ‘new philosophy’.

**A courtiers’ handbook, novels and drama**

While P.S. Schull, writing in 1833, could assert that Van Hoogstraten’s literary qualities greatly surpassed his talent as a painter, present-day literary history generally passes over his writings in silence. In any event, Van Hoogstraten was a productive writer, who even exerted a certain influence on his contemporaries. In 1657 he published his greatly abridged and free translation of Nicolas Faret’s courtiers’ manual, *L’Honneste homme ou l’art de plaire à la cour* (1630), to which he gave the title *Den eerlyken jongeling, of de edele kunst, van zich by groote en kleyne te doen eeren en beminnen* (*The Honest Youth, or the Noble Art of Making Oneself Loved and Honoured by Those Great and Small*). On the title page, Van Hoogstraten presents himself as the author; we shall likewise refer to him as such. The genesis of the *Eerlyken jongeling* is in some respects comparable to that of the *Inleyding*. The work may be regarded as a preliminary foray into the theoretical project to which Van Hoogstraten would continue to apply himself throughout his life. The book was published by Abraham Andriesz, the printer to whom Frans van Hoogstraten — who would later publish the *Inleyding* — was apprenticed in Dordrecht, and it was dedicated, like the *Inleyding*, to burgomaster Van Blijenburg. In the *Eerlyken jongeling*, Van Hoogstraten takes the opportunity to expound his views on the benefits of painting to ‘gentlemen’. This was his first attempt to write about the art of painting in the context of rhetorical codes of conduct and the ethos of *bonnêteté*, and we shall return to it repeatedly in our analysis of the *Inleyding*.

After Van Hoogstraten’s first novel, entitled *Schoone Roselijn* (Beautiful Roselijn, 1650), four similar works were published in rapid succession in Dordrecht (figs. 10 and 10a, b, c). Dordrecht’s like-minded literati set about mastering the ‘arcadian’ genre, taking internation-
Fig. 10 – Samuel van Hoogstraten, title page to *Schoone Roelijn*, Dordrecht 1650.

Fig. 10a

Fig. 10b

Fig. 10c – Figs. 10a, b, c, Samuel van Hoogstraten, engravings from *Schoone Roelijn*, Dordrecht 1650.
ally renowned authors like Philip Sidney and Jacopo Sannazaro as their examples. Schoone Roselijn and a second novel, entitled De gestrafte ontschaking of zeeghafte herstelling van den jongen Haegaenveld (The Punished Abduction; or, the Victorious Reparation of the Youth Haegaenveld, 1669), illustrate Van Hoogstraten's self-assurance as a literary author; he also emphasizes, however, that he earns his living by painting – something that he is apparently by no means ashamed of.

He writes that his pen sometimes falls short in describing a scene that he would rather have painted, and uses his painter's occupation to excuse any imperfections in his work: ‘If even the great Poet who polished his hymns all day long was not flawless, how then should I, who, having served another goddess [Pictura] all day long, cannot turn to Roselijn until bedtime, be free from error?’ He also expresses the hope that his painting might yield enough income to leave more time for his literary pursuits. In the middle of Haegaenveld he notes: ‘I begin to doubt whether all this writing is to any purpose, since I am bound to a different Muse, who rewards her servants better than Poetry’. At the end of the book, by contrast, he promises that if his ‘goddess Pictura’ will allow – that is, if he earns enough by painting and has some free time left – he will soon have ‘even stranger and more unheard-of things to relate’.

Here Van Hoogstraten unhesitatingly equates poetry with painting, in referring to two equivalent Muses: efforts spent on one could equally well have been devoted to the other. Apparently, the medium itself does not present any barrier in this regard; the most fundamental difference between the two art forms is that you can earn a living by painting and not by writing poetry. Van Hoogstraten’s explicit wish to vie with Virgil and Ovid by writing in Dutch can therefore be compared to his ambitions as a painter. He opens Haegaenveld in a classical way by invoking the Muses, his ‘proud heroines of Song, whose exertions embrace the vernacular [i.e. they inspire in Dutch as well as in Latin]’. He similarly invokes one of the Muses at the beginning of each separate chapter of the Inleyding, and the treatise thus becomes a plea for the art of painting to be invested with the same social and intellectual status as that due to the writing of poetry.

Van Hoogstraten’s Roomsche Paulina, ofte Bedrooge Kuisheyt (Roman Paulina; or, Chastity Deceived) is structured as a classical tragedy, in five acts (separated by choruses), dealing with an action that takes place in approximately a day and a night. Dieryk en Dorothé, on the other hand, is a long-winded account of the siege of Dordrecht in the year 1084; contemporaries compared it to the works of none other than Pieter Cornelisz Hooft, the Republic’s main historiographer. Van Hoogstraten bends the historical facts to suit his dramatic purpose, shortening the siege and liberation of the city to a twenty-four hour period. The plays reflect an affinity with the doctrine classique emanating from France, which was institutionalized from 1669 onwards in the Amsterdam art society Nil Volentibus Arduum (known popularly as Nil). It should be said that Nil’s views appear to have passed Van Hoogstraten by, since its doctrine of art left no traces on the Inleyding (it is unclear whether the painter shared the criticism of Nil’s activities expressed by Oudaen, for instance); this in contrast to Gerard de Lairesse’s painting treatise, published in 1707, which was greatly influenced by the society’s views.

It is hard to overstate the importance of the theatre to Van Hoogstraten’s art theory. It is quite possible that he concerned himself with the stage, as he urged others to do in the Inleyding, in order to develop his skills as a painter. As we shall examine in more detail in chapter...
Fig. 11 – Samuel van Hoogstraten, title page to *De gestrafte ontschaking*, Amsterdam 1669.

Fig. 11a

Fig. 11b

Fig. 11c – Figs. 11a, b, c, Samuel van Hoogstraten, engravings from *De gestrafte ontschaking*, Amsterdam 1669.
IV, the metaphor *ut pictura poesis* is based largely on the supposed performative nature of both literature and painting (see below, pages 182-197). A play, like an oration, does not come into its own until performed or recited; in the seventeenth-century painting too was treated as a performative art. The visual arts were frequently assessed for their theatrical qualities, aimed at arousing emotions. In some cases, paintings were even kept concealed behind curtains, which would be drawn when the owner wanted to exhibit them.87

In *Schoone Roselijn* too, Van Hoogstraten asserts that having been trained as a painter, he is already well-versed in manipulating the public’s affective response. The same assertion about the painter’s proficiency in representing emotions recurs in a number of poems written in praise of the *Roomsche Paulina*.88 Here Van Hoogstraten does not shrink from comparing himself with Erasmus, who practised depicting human emotions in diverse ways from an early age, ‘in consequence of which he attained a near-supreme measure of eloquence, being able to describe in lively manner all properties of mind and passions, as well as flaws and the remedies whereby these may be improved’.89

**‘Visible’ and ‘Invisible’ Worlds**

In 1678, which would be the year of his death, Van Hoogstraten published his ‘Introduction to the Academy of Painting’ at his brother Frans’s printing-house, furnished with a large number of introductory poems by literati among his circle of friends. The subtitle of the treatise, *Anders de zichtbaere werelt* (Or the Visible World) refers both to the subject of the book, that is, the entire ‘visible world’ that can be depicted by the painter, and the comprehensive scope of the book itself, which deals with all aspects of visible reality. The subtitle also distinguishes the treatise from an unpublished second volume, entitled *De onzichtbare werelt* (The Invisible World). Arnold Houbraken, one of Van Hoogstraten’s pupils, writes in his biography of his mentor that he has a manuscript of this second volume lying on his table, which he plans to publish after completing his own painters’ biographies.90 This never happened, however, and the manuscript was lost. The *Inleyding* refers several times to the second volume, which apparently adopts a more philosophical approach: ‘we shall save our more profound discussion of the invisible to our *Invisible World*’.91

The division into ‘visible’ and ‘invisible’ worlds is rooted in a theological or philosophical tradition that distinguished between *mundus sensibilis* and *mundus intelligibilis*. It is not improbable that the lost volume was a philosophical treatise; alternatively, it may have been a series of artists’ biographies.92 In adding painters’ lives to his work, the author would have been emulating Van Mander’s *Schilder-boeck*, which combines a didactic poem with the lives of painters, and also includes sections with iconographical notes; the first volume of Von Sandrart’s *Teutsche Academie* likewise pairs a theoretical section to biographies. However, Van Hoogstraten states that he does not wish to imitate Van Mander in publishing painters’ lives, leaving this task to someone else ‘who has more time’.93 That the painter did indeed write a philosophical book is suggested by one passage in the *Inleyding* relating that ‘the Philosophers’ distinguish three parts of the soul: the author states that he will save the discussion of this distinction for his *Invisible World*.94 The addition of a philosophical treatise to a theoretical exposition on the art of painting has a precedent in a two-volume treatise on drawing by Federico
Zuccari (1607): one volume being a practical guide to drawing and the other a discussion of the subject’s philosophical foundations.95

Can we make an informed guess as to the contents of the Invisible World? We shall discuss two hypotheses, the first being that it was a treatise on moral philosophy, and the second that it dealt with themes from the ‘new philosophy’ that were topical in the years preceding the publication of the Inleyding. The possibility that the ‘invisible’ subjects discussed in this volume were moral lessons, and that it was primarily a treatise in ethics, is suggested by a reference in the Inleyding that ‘the benefits to be gained from the constant endeavour to generally do good will be addressed in the final chapter of this book, and elsewhere at greater length’ (italics mine).96 If ‘elsewhere’ is a reference to the Invisible World, this text would be a continuation of the ideas on moral philosophy that crop up at certain points in the Inleyding. This might indeed have been a treatise with guidelines for a virtuous life. It would have elaborated again on some of the themes that Van Hoogstraten discussed in the Eerlyken jongeling, such as dealing with the human passions or the doctrine of the vanity of all earthly things – themes that were popular in the latter half of the seventeenth century.97

A treatise on moral philosophy

It has been suggested that Van Hoogstraten based the second volume of his publication, in rivalry with Van Mander, on the latter’s work of moral philosophy, Kerck der deucht (The Church of Virtue, 1600); in this case, the Invisible World would likewise relate to a dreamlike tour of moralistic dangers on the artist’s path to virtue.98 In the seventeenth century, ethics was dominated largely by Neostoicism, one of the most authoritative of the intellectual schools in the Republic that reinterpreted ideas from antiquity. To illustrate the spread of Stoic ideas in the Republic, it may suffice here to point out that Justus Lipsius’s De constantia, the central text of Neostoicism in the Netherlands, was translated and published as late as 1674 by Van Hoogstraten’s brother Frans.99 The circle of educated men who assembled in his publishing-house discussed the work of Dutch Stoics such as Dirck Volckertsz Coornhert, Hendrik Laurensz Spiegel and Pieter Cornelisz Hooft.100 Stoic ethical views also played a role in theories of art, as was acknowledged in Hessel Miedema’s comments on Van Mander’s didactic poem which, referring to Coornhert’s work, primarily preaches moderation and modesty.101 Most of the Inleyding’s philosophical borrowings are accompanied by references to the ancient Stoics, in particular to the works of Plutarch and Seneca. This ideology was by no means reserved to the earliest stage of the seventeenth century; Arnold Houbraken too, in his painters’ lives published in the period 1718-1721, expresses a world view coloured by Stoicism.102

One of the central views of this philosophy is that the rules of meaningful human behaviour are embedded in nature. The study of the natural world and that of ethics, Stoicism maintains, are closely related. That is why painting was expected to fulfil an ethical function, for instance by depicting scenes from everyday life, and why even the painting of landscapes could be seen as a meaningful activity.103 In discussing these views, it should be borne in mind that in the early modern period, ‘philosophy’ always had a practical component, in contrast to modern academic philosophy that increasingly developed into an autonomous intellectual discipline. In Van Hoogstraten’s age, philosophy was seen primarily as a set of guidelines to help
one preserve constancy in times of political unrest; moreover, it provided a justification for this position by basing itself on a literary tradition. Marsilio Ficino, for instance – to whose *De vita libri tres* (1489) Van Hoogstraten expressly refers to legitimize the structure of his treatise – was an outspoken supporter of ‘practical philosophy’; he called himself a ‘doctor of souls’, a doctor who alleviated spiritual rather than physical pains, and provided practical guidelines for life. The rhetorical aspects of philosophy in the early modern period should also be assessed in this context. Abstract wisdom without rhetoric was seen as worthless; the point was not merely to propagate virtue, but to behave virtuously and thus to set a good example to others. Van Hoogstraten observes in his *Eerlyken jongeling*, for instance, that ‘it is indeed a sad misfortune to live a virtuous life according to one’s own views and yet to be considered lacking in virtue by all around one’, and he believes that a true philosopher would assert ‘that he did not even desire wisdom if he would have to retain it in the recesses of his mind, without propagating it’.

In the seventeenth century, philosophy was deemed just as much for the untutored as for those with an academic education. As will be observed in the next chapter, this ‘practical reason’, a code of conduct based on inner constancy and an attitude of equanimity to the things of this world, may ultimately include a comparison between painting and philosophy.

**A discussion of the ‘new philosophy’**

In assessing the content of the *Invisible World*, it should be noted that Van Hoogstraten’s interest was not confined to literature and painting alone; he also sought to link his ideas to the empirical science of his day and the ‘new philosophy’ as pursued at the Royal Society. At the time when he was completing his *Visible World* and *Invisible World*, the Republic was in the throes of philosophical debates. Although the universities officially disapproved of Cartesianism, it had become a recurring factor in seventeenth-century thought, especially *outside* academic circles. Van Hoogstraten befriended several thinkers, like Oudaen and Van Blijenberg, who could help to involve him in the international philosophical debate; it is clear that he was more interested than his brother in the scientific side of the ‘new philosophy’ and that he did not focus exclusively on the pietistic texts which Frans translated.

A few comments are needed on the different terms to be used in the present discussion of Van Hoogstraten’s understanding of philosophy – terms that will be applied here not only to specific concepts but also to different philosophical vantage points, such as ‘Stoicism’, ‘Neoplatonism’ and ‘Aristotelianism’. For the early modern period, it is not always possible to distinguish rigidly between the lines of argument that are denoted by these terms. The Neo-stoic world view, for instance, contains many features of Neoplatonism, and in the seventeenth century, modern Cartesian views were frequently combined with elements of Aristotelianism: a case in point is the work of the British philosopher Kenelm Digby, whom Van Hoogstraten quotes in the *Inleyding*. It would certainly be a misconception to assume that Van Hoogstraten distinguishes clearly between different philosophical views in his treatise, which combines many, frequently logically contradictory, points of view. So terms such as ‘Stoicism’ and ‘Aristotelianism’ will be used in this discussion not so much to refer to separate schools of thought as in relation to the work of specific authors: Stoicism (or Neostoicism) refers here primarily to the ethics of Seneca and Plutarch as reintroduced in the seventeenth century by
Lipsius, and Aristotelianism to the ideas on perception laid down in Aristotle’s *De anima*. We shall be using the term ‘Platonism’ (and ‘Neoplatonism’) mainly in relation to the denunciation in Plato’s *Republic* of an art focusing purely on outward forms, and the converse – that an art capable of penetrating to what lies behind these outward forms would be of value. Where possible, the relevant texts will be indicated whenever these terms are used.

**ELEVATING THE STATUS OF PAINTING**

Art historians who have discussed Van Hoogstraten in the past have presented the *Inleyding* as an idiosyncratic offshoot of his social aspirations: as a use of literature largely to boost his reputation. This interpretation fails to take into account the fact that the painter-poet shows himself to be perfectly aware that his work stands in a particular literary tradition. He puts himself forward as Van Mander’s successor – and his surpassor. Van Hoogstraten was indeed seen as such in his Dordrecht literary milieu, and as late as the 1730s he was included in a list of illustrious authors including Van Mander, Junius and De Lairesse, as well as the Frenchmen André Félibien, Charles Aufonse du Fresnoy and Roger de Piles.

In the preliminary text to his book, entitled ‘To the Reader’, the author justifies his project by stating that the tradition of art theory has been neglected; that ‘no-one has recently seen fit to describe the entire Art of Painting with all that pertains to it.’ The deplorable result of this lack of art theory, it seems, is:

> ‘that the Art of Painting has come to be seen, in most people’s eyes, as a common art or craft: and in consequence, thousands have strayed into art, or been led to it, without ever considering the difficulties involved, indeed, neither more nor less than if they had taken up the cobbler’s trade: entirely oblivious to the fact that this art encompasses the entire Visible World; and that there is scarcely a single art or science of which it is fitting for a Painter to remain ignorant (italics SvH).’

From the stated aim of investing painting with a status among the liberal arts, it is clear that we are dealing here with an epideictic text, a text ‘in praise of the art of painting’. This choice of words regarding painting’s putative loss of status is similar to certain observations found in handbooks of rhetoric. Quintilian writes, in his *De causis corruptae eloquentiae*, that rhetoric has declined because it is taught as a craft, and not as an art with an ethical objective. This is why didactic manuals are essential. Insight into the epideictic and didactic objectives pursued in rhetoric are crucial to a proper appreciation of the *Inleyding*.

To attain his didactic goal, Van Hoogstraten offers his readers ‘an Introduction’ in the form of nine chapters, ‘as if we were to take pupils by the hand and lead them around our Academy, which we have divided into nine rooms of learning, and indicate to them ... which parts of painting (deelen der konst) they should be practising at each stage.’ In the first chapter, he states that he has been inspired in part by the academy founded by King Louis XIV in Rome. This had developed, in 1666, into the Académie Royale de Peinture et de Sculpture in Paris. The *Inleyding* may be viewed as the programme for an academy of art that was never built. Van Hoogstraten’s interest in this institute is apparent from the fact that in 1671 he joined
the Hague painters’ confraternity Pictura, which would become the Northern Netherlands’ first academy of art in 1682, when it started organizing classes in drawing from live models.\textsuperscript{112} Van Hoogstraten compares the programme of his own written \textit{hooge schoole} or ‘academy’ to Le Brun’s academy, where students ‘do not simply practise painting, but work according to a certain order, under supervision’; we shall see that, in Van Hoogstraten’s book, this ‘order’ is determined in large measure by the didactic framework of rhetorical theory.\textsuperscript{113}

The \textit{Inleyding} sets out to elevate painting above the crafts, to instruct the pupil, and to supply criteria on the basis of which painters and art lovers can judge paintings. Professional artists (\textit{meesters in de kunst}) will benefit from reading the book, since it will make it easy for them to examine their own work in the light of certain rules (\textit{zoo zullen sy haer eygene werken ... tegen onze regels kunnen toetsen}). Each chapter focuses on one of these criteria or ‘virtues’ of art. Van Hoogstraten maintains:

‘Thus, our Introduction will greatly help all lovers of Painting, even those entirely without experience in this regard, not to be deceived when buying a work of art, since they will appreciate works according to the virtues they see in them.’\textsuperscript{114}

Apparently, the \textit{Inleyding} is intended not only for skilled painters and their pupils, but also for art lovers too, whom Van Hoogstraten includes in his address on the title page: he commends his book to ‘all those who pursue this noble, free and high Art, or seek diligently to learn it, or otherwise bear some love for it’. These art lovers will have included dilettante draughtsmen as well as patrons and other clients.\textsuperscript{115} Studying the \textit{Inleyding} will not automatically equip them to judge a painting, though, Van Hoogstraten warns; this requires the help of an experienced painter.\textsuperscript{116} He considers authors ‘who did not wield the brush themselves’ as not being entitled to write about art.\textsuperscript{117} In this regard, Van Hoogstraten is as strict as Lomazzo, for example,\textsuperscript{118} – unlike some theorists who lump painters and art lovers together, such as Junius and the Italian art theorist Rafaello Borghini, who regard art lovers as ‘artists’ on the grounds that they have developed their powers of imagination.\textsuperscript{119} Van Hoogstraten’s manifest emphasis on the painter’s practical experience and on the concrete application of theory is prominent throughout his book.

The encyclopaedic nature of texts such as the \textit{Inleyding} presents fewer problems of interpretation if these texts are construed as attempts to create a rhetorical context for judging paintings. The \textit{Inleyding} sets out to provide a standard for ways of speaking about painting in studios and in collections. When the text’s rhetorical objective is taken into consideration, there is no need to distinguish between two possible readerships – artists reading about painting practice on the one hand, and erudite art lovers whose interest lies in the various moral and intellectual implications on the other – or two different levels of interpretation.\textsuperscript{120} Rather, one may speak of a kind of mutual interaction. Painters needed the educated interest of art lovers, just as much as the latter needed a theory that was informed by the practice of painting, to arrive at a ‘meaningful discourse’ that legitimized both activities. The intended readerships of art theory were just as varied as the authors’ backgrounds. Humanists writing about art like Alberti, Junius and the Neapolitan Pomponius Gauricus were prominent scholars with wide-ranging interests, who pursued painting or sculpture not to earn a living but as part of
their encyclopaedic studies. Others, such as Lodovico Dolce and Benedetto Varchi, probably had no practical experience of art, and wrote art theory as a popular literary genre and as one of the pursuits expected of a courtier. Goeree, Van Hoogstraten and De Lairese all make a point of addressing ‘art lovers’ – both on their title pages and repeatedly in their texts. There is little point in drawing a strict distinction between different intended readerships; a more helpful suggestion is the ‘symbiosis’ between artists and art lovers posited by Ernst van de Wetering. This symbiosis came into being in the studio, the setting for the civil conversazione pittorica (to use a term coined by Ricardo de Mambro Santos). The studio thus functioned as a showroom for visitors from different social classes, a practice to which Van Hoogstraten refers on the title-page of his sixth chapter, in which a number of well-to-do burghers stand looking over the painter’s shoulder (fig. 12). An indication that art theory was indeed used as a requisite for conversation is that several painting treatises are cast in the form of dialogues, for instance between a painter and an art lover. Art theory supplied all the necessary material for ‘civil conversation’ – that is, discussion governed by humanist principles: a vocabulary, a set of commonplaces, and a structure determined by the theory of rhetoric and dialectics that could link these concepts and commonplaces.

That the Inleyding at length succeeded in acquiring a place in the literary tradition is clear from the fact that later Dutch theorists all knew of Van Hoogstraten’s ideas. Rather than enquiring into whether his work was read by painters and whether his theories were ‘put into practice’, it is evidently more useful to approach his treatise from the opposite direction: as a reflection of discussions that took place in painters’ studios in the seventeenth century. Van Hoogstraten describes such discussions in Rembrandt’s studio as largely determined by rhetorical commonplaces. He may have been alluding to this state of affairs in the picture on the frontispiece of his second chapter, dedicated to the Muse of rhetoric, which shows two young men, possibly aspiring painters. While discussing the work of art at their knees, one of them is holding a reference book (fig. 13). Erudite art lovers could contribute to this discourse by
drawing on commonplaces and concepts that enjoyed international currency at the time, such as those recorded in Vossius’s ‘De graphice’. The written tradition is probably only a fragmentary reflection of what was discussed on a larger scale in the numerous studios and collections in the Netherlands.\(^{126}\) Given that the \textit{Inleyding} is an epideictic amalgam, based on a collection of quotations, it is practically impossible to separate observations originating in the studio from those reflecting tradition. Even so, the treatise has often proved a valuable resource in studies aimed at gathering historical facts. The research on discussions in Rembrandt’s studio, for which the \textit{Inleyding} is the central source text, is the most productive example.\(^{127}\)

\textit{The Inleyding in the tradition of art theory}

Van Hoogstraten emphasizes that his text is designed to fill a gap that has arisen in the art-theoretical tradition; he asserts that ‘no-one’ has recently written on the art of painting. What is the place of the \textit{Inleyding} among traditional descriptions of the art of painting ‘with all that
pertains to it'? Van Hoogstraten's attempt to construe the intellectual importance of painting is based largely on the authority of literary tradition. It is essential to define his relationship to older sources more precisely; this will allow us, in the following chapters, to draw on material from the international tradition with which the author is likely to have been familiar.

In the introduction to his first chapter, Van Hoogstraten urges the importance of art theory. He begins by enumerating 'some of those who have written on the art of Painting'. After a number of authors from antiquity whose work has not survived, he dwells on the Italian tradition. He mentions the ‘three books on Painting, in Latin’ written by Alberti, and Leonardo da Vinci, who wrote ‘boldly and wisely’ on painting, in his view, although only a few ‘remnants’ of his texts have appeared in print. When Van Hoogstraten comes to Vasari’s Vite (the first editions of which date from 1550 and 1568), he notes that the biographer used the ‘notes’ made by other Italian artists (such as Lorenzo Ghiberti, Ridolfo Ghirlandaio and Raphael).128

Van Hoogstraten may have become acquainted with some of these texts outside Italy. Alberti’s De pictura was reprinted in Amsterdam in 1649 in a joint edition together with Vitruvius’s books on architecture and Gauricus’s De statua (1504); Gauricus’s work probably had a larger readership in the North than in Italy.129 In 1651 an Italian edition of Alberti’s work on painting and sculpture and a selection of Leonardo da Vinci’s notes were both published in Paris.

Of the Dutch art theorists, Van Hoogstraten mentions Van Mander, who ‘aside from his Painters’ lives’ had also written a verse treatise on art: the didactic poem ‘Grondt der edel-vry schilder-const’ (‘Foundations of the Noble and Free Art of Painting’) in his Schilder-boeck; a few unnamed writers ‘who did not wield the brush’; and Franciscus Junius, whom he praises for his ‘great diligence’ (fig. 2).130 In citing Van Mander and Junius, Van Hoogstraten is referring to the most important texts in the Dutch tradition of art literature. The body of texts about painting produced in the Netherlands has scarcely been studied as a whole. Contrary to the damning pronouncement of Von Schlosser that opened the present chapter, seventeenth-century texts about Dutch painting are both numerous and rich in content. Besides texts that can be labelled ‘art theory’ proper, a variety of eulogies on painting were produced, such as the playwright Jan Vos’s well-known Zeege der schilderkonst (The Triumph of Painting, 1654), while the church minister Camphuysen wrote a censorious poem: Geestichdom der schilderkonst (The Spectres of the Art of Painting, 1638).131 The storehouse of poems inspired by paintings, captions to images and ‘explanations’ of prints has scarcely yet been opened up for art historical research.132

If the theoretical texts written in both Latin and Dutch from the Northern and Southern Netherlands are gathered together, they form a sizeable body of texts.133 Those that will be cited most liberally in the present study, besides the works of Van Mander and Junius, are Philips Angel’s Lof der schilderkonst (In Praise of Painting, 1642), Cornelis de Bie’s Het gulden cabinet (The Golden Cabinet, 1661) and De Lairesse’s Groot schilderboek (Great Book on Painting, 1707). Huygens’s unpublished autobiography (written in the period 1629-1631), which discusses painters and his own training as a draughtsman, is also relevant.134 The Dutch tradition is remarkably heterogeneous, as Paul Taylor recently commented.135 The debate conducted in France and Italy concerning the theoretical poles of drawing and colour (disegno versus
colorito) and their ideological connotations, is not so prominent in the Dutch tradition. Certain consequences of this debate are discernible, however, in explicit attitudes to the ‘fine painters’ (fijnschilders), the adepts of Gerard Dou (in relation to whom Philips Angel was ‘for’ and Van Hoogstraten ‘against’) and to Rembrandt (in relation to whom Van Hoogstraten was ‘for’ and De Lairese fiercely ‘against’), controversies to which we shall return in due course.\textsuperscript{136} The ‘War of the Poets’ (Poëtenoorlog), a debate about the relative merits of Ancients and Moderns in literature that arose at the beginning of the eighteenth century, and in which David van Hoogstraten played a key role, is without a parallel in the theory of the visual arts.

How should the \textit{Inleyding} be situated within this Dutch tradition? First of all, it should be noted that the encyclopaedic nature of this treatise is based on a desire to emulate the erudition of Junius’s book on the artists of classical antiquity. The \textit{Schilderkonst der oude}, Junius’s own translation (1641) of his work \textit{De pictura veterum} (1637), is Van Hoogstraten’s primary source. It is a fairly free translation from the Latin original, greatly abridged but furnished with several new additions adapted to the Dutch context; the author comments that he has seized the opportunity of the translation process to effectuate certain substantive changes.\textsuperscript{137} Junius probably had some experience as an amateur draughtsman. It may have been his book that inspired the Earl of Arundel, for whom Junius had written the first version of \textit{De pictura veterum}, to have his children tutored in the art of drawing.\textsuperscript{138} Vossius’s ‘De graphice’ is primarily based on the philological work of Junius, but it is also related to modern painting, with discussions of Dürer and a number of Italian painters.

Of all Dutch writings on painting, Van Mander’s ‘Grondt’, the first theoretical treatise to be published in this language, was unquestionably the best known internationally.\textsuperscript{139} Van Hoogstraten criticizes Van Mander’s work, however, because its purpose is more inspirational than didactic.\textsuperscript{140} The \textit{Inleyding} shows him to be a faithful reader of Van Mander, so it is not immediately clear how he intends to surpass him in didactic terms. Van Hoogstraten is probably referring to a systematic classification according to principles derived from rhetoric, which Junius provided and which the \textit{Inleyding} modifies in its own individual way, as will become clearer below.

Van Hoogstraten’s comments on the tradition of art theory relied heavily on paraphrases of Junius and Van Mander. He also used the works on painting and drawing by Goeree – who is probably the butt of his remark about theorists who did not wield the brush.\textsuperscript{141} For the chapter on proportion, Van Hoogstraten drew on passages from Dürer’s treatment of anatomy. The ideas of various Italian and other foreign authors may have reached him through these sources. Van Mander translated passages from Vasari, and he used a German translation of Alberti; he was probably also familiar with a manuscript by Leonardo.\textsuperscript{142} More in general, Van Mander was acquainted with Italian views of art: he studied under Pieter Vlerick – who had been apprenticed to Tintoretto from 1555 to 1560 and lived in Italy from 1573 to 1577. It is difficult to assess Junius’s familiarity with the international tradition of art theory; he approaches painting on the basis of a rhetorical classification much like that which had been customary in Italy since Alberti. Given his philological bias and the fact that he refers exclusively to authors from antiquity, it is clear he was certainly acquainted with the content of several Italian treatises.\textsuperscript{143}
Knowledge passed on by word of mouth

Van Hoogstraten probably acquired much of his knowledge of art-theoretical tradition from oral rather than written sources. We may assume that information was constantly being passed on in painters’ studios: the popularity of certain standard anecdotes that recur in diverse texts, sometimes in a slightly altered form, adapted to the lives of different painters, is indicative of a lively exchange of ideas. Views originating from Italy loomed large in the discussions in his circle – Rembrandt’s teachers, Lastman and Jacob van Swanenburgh, as well as Van Hoogstraten’s father, Dirk, who was also a painter, had all visited Italy.

Humanism involved so many international ties that some modern scholars have referred to a ‘humanist Internationale’, sustained in the seventeenth century partly by large correspondence networks connecting scholars throughout Europe. Karl Borinski, for instance, showed that writings on poetics published in various Western European countries can only be properly appreciated when studied as parts of this larger whole. Other, more recent researchers have based their work on this principle. Similarly, the tradition of ‘art theory’ – an umbrella term justified by the substantive and formal similarities between the different texts on painting – was international in nature: painters visited studios in diverse European countries, ensuring a constant transfer of ideas. In this context, the relationship between poetics and art theory must not be seen as one-way traffic; while Alberti’s comprehensive, systematic theory of painting had been completed as early as 1435, the first systematic poetics did not emerge until the end of the fifteenth century. In the Netherlands, texts on poetics remained scarce; indeed, there was more theorizing about art than about poetry.

One particular meeting place where international views on art theory may have been passed on orally or in writing was Rembrandt’s studio, which attracted erudite art lovers and where Van Hoogstraten was trained together with the German pupil Jurriaen Ovens and Bernard Keil of Denmark. What is more, Van Hoogstraten belonged to Bucelinus’s network, which, as we have already noted, included painters from the Italian and German states. A pivotal networker was Von Sandrart, who befriended famous Italian artists like Domenichino, Guercino, Poussin, Testa and Da Cortona, as well as several members of the Dutch painters’ community in Rome. He later left Rome for Amsterdam, where he was living at the same time that Van Hoogstraten was working in Rembrandt’s studio.

Texts of art theory written in Latin could easily acquire the status of authoritative works in the European respublica litteraria. Most, however, were written in one of the vernaculars. The most important of the above-mentioned texts, Alberti’s De pictura and Junius’s De pictura veterum, were published in Latin as well as in the vernacular. Alberti’s treatise was in many respects a seminal text: the first handbook on one of the arts to be written in the vernacular, it showed the relevance of rhetorical concepts to painting.

It is not easy to define the precise relationship between Dutch and Italian art theory. To art historians like Von Schlosser and Emmens, the influence of ideas from Southern Europe was self-evident. In practice, this influence is difficult to pinpoint. Dutch authors seldom quote texts from the Italian tradition verbatim. Van Mander’s painters’ lives are the main exception – these contain numerous borrowings from Vasari’s work. Although Lampsonius writes of learning Italian especially so as to be able to read Vasari’s Vite before embarking on his own project of Dutch painters’ biographies, and De Bisschop too read Vasari in Italian, for the
rest we can find few explicit borrowings. Where the biographical literature is concerned, Giovanni Baglione’s *Vite* (1642) and Carlo Ridolfi’s *Maraviglie dell’arte* (1648) were known in the Netherlands, but the extent of their influence is unclear. The only texts produced in Italy from which Van Hoogstraten quotes literally are Vincenzo Cartari’s *Imagini degli dei degli antichi* (1556), which he reproduces in Italian, and the poetry of Michelangelo, which he may have translated himself. Curiously perhaps, Lomazzo’s major *Trattato della pittura* (1584), which was translated into English soon after publication, is mentioned only a few times in the entire body of Dutch texts. The *Trattato* was one of the most comprehensive and practically oriented treatises on painting in the Italian tradition. It is one of the texts with which Van Hoogstraten is most likely to have become acquainted on his European travels. Lomazzo’s views were well suited to adaptation to Dutch authors, because he had a greater understanding of Netherlandish art than other Italian theorists and thought highly of it. His general observations on landscape and genre painting and his detailed treatment of stylistic matters such as light and reflection also make his text particularly applicable to Dutch art.

From the mid-seventeenth century onwards, France was the main conduit through which international views of art reached the Dutch Republic. Goeree noted in 1697 that France had taken over Italy’s role as a desirable destination for painters; Van Hoogstraten maintains in the *Inleyding* that, as a result of effective patronage, ‘Italy seems to have moved to France’. In the case of French authors, too, their contemporary influence is hard to ascertain. The first French texts, by De Piles and Du Fresnoy, were not translated into Dutch until 1722; Félibien is mentioned by a few Dutch authors in the early eighteenth century.

In spite of the paucity of direct allusions, it is certainly justifiable to study the northern and southern traditions as a related body of theory. Authors such as Zuccari and De Piles visited the Netherlands. Van Mander, Von Sandrart and Van Hoogstraten probably conceived the idea of writing lengthy treatises on art theory while travelling in Italy. The Dutch painters were known for their international orientation and the fact that ‘almost all’ of them visited Italy, to return, ‘experienced and skilled’, to their country, wrote Lodovico Guicciardini as early as 1567. ‘The present study will frequently invoke Southern European – especially Italian – art theory, including texts such as Francisco de Holanda’s *Diálogos em Roma* (1548), Benedetto Varchi’s *Della maggioranza e nobiltà dell’arti* (1549), Gabriele Paleotti’s *Discorso le immagini sacre e profane* (1582) and Marco Boschini’s *La carta del navegar pitoresco* (1660). Literal borrowings are rare, but this study will take as a basic premise that there was a widely shared conception of art throughout Northern and Southern Europe. It is tempting to see internationally oriented figures such as Van Hoogstraten as ‘idea brokers’ who disseminated views about art. The role played by the Danish painter Bernhard Keil, for instance, who studied in Rembrandt’s studio at the same time as Van Hoogstraten, invites speculation. Van Hoogstraten may have visited him in Rome; Filippo Baldinucci subsequently derived his information about Rembrandt in his *Notizie de’ professori del disegno* (1681-1728) from Keil.

‘THE WHOLE OF PAINTING AND ALL THAT PERTAINS TO IT’

At the beginning of his book, Van Hoogstraten stresses the importance of his chapter division. While noting that the material itself is largely familiar to painters and is based mainly
on existing commonplaces, he maintains that his division into nine chapters, nine ‘parts of painting’, will be of great benefit to the training of painters: ‘For although [other masters] may understand art as a whole through their experiments, they may not have wished to divide it into parts, such that they can proficiently pass on their knowledge to another.’ Van Hoogstraten’s specific preferences emerge more clearly from the place he accords in his book to certain time-honoured principles. His treatise is structured around elements from diverse intellectual traditions: the rhetorical division of a speech into parts (the partes orationis), the cosmology based on the planetary spheres, and the different qualities ascribed to the nine Muses in mythographical literature. Each chapter is dedicated to one of the Muses, who are described as ‘goddesses’ accompanying the aspiring painter on his life’s path.

In dedicating each chapter to a Muse, Van Hoogstraten bases himself explicitly on the iconography codified in Vincenzo Cartari’s Imagini degli dei and Cesare Ripa’s Iconologia (published in Dutch in 1644), two handbooks on symbolism and allegory often used by seventeenth-century painters. This makes him the first art theorist to use the division into Muses and their qualities to structure his views: Sebastiano Resta’s treatise, which also uses the Muses to distinguish the various parts of painting, did not appear until 1707. The verse captions to the chapter frontispieces show that Van Hoogstraten also links his Muses to the five known planets, the moon (associated on account of its alleged mutability to the chapter on composition) and the sun (linked to the chapter on chiaroscuro). The eighth chapter is associated with the harmony of the spheres, and the final chapter with the fixed stars.

Van Hoogstraten rejects Cartari’s order, instead applying a hierarchical order of his own that reflects his didactic aims. This classification is an adaptation of his two main sources. In broad outline, his first seven chapters correspond to the subjects of the fourteen chapters of Van Mander’s didactic poem. The subjects dealt with in the last two chapters derive to a large extent from Junius.

The first chapter of the Inleyding (dedicated to the Muse Euterpe) sets forth the aim and foundations of the art of painting and the artist’s profession (fig. 14). Here, the art of drawing is presented as essential to human perception and imitation in general. Then follow three chapters on the painter’s choice of subject: chapter 2 on proportion – that is, Man; chapter 3 on the passions and historical scenes – that is, Man interacting with his kind; and chapter 4 on Man’s entire natural and architectural surroundings. This structure serves to emphasize the all-inclusive scope of painting, which embraces - as Van Hoogstraten asserts in his words ‘To the reader’ – ‘the entire visible world’.

Chapter 5 deals with painterly composition, while chapters 6 and 7 relate to the painting’s execution: colouring, brushwork, and chiaroscuro (figs. 15 and 16). The eighth chapter discusses the concept of ‘grace’ (fig. 17). This quality, which refers to the pleasing and lifelike effect of painting in general, is a cohesive principle linking all the parts of painting dealt with in the previous chapters (we shall study it in more detail on pages 159-160). The caption to the frontispiece of this chapter invokes Calliope, as ‘foremost among the Muses’, who controls ‘the art that makes a complete master’. In the margin, Van Hoogstraten quotes Cartari, who describes this Muse as perfettione di Scientia, ‘a discipline’s finishing touch’, rather than associating her with a specific property. This chapter closes with a treatise on ‘good behaviour’: ‘How an Artist Should Conduct Himself in the Face of Fortune’s Blows.’ Finally, chapter 9 describes the
benefits that a painter can expect to derive from his work, whereby Van Hoogstraten articulates an ethical objective. He presents the art of painting as a contemplative activity; if it arises from ‘the love of art’, it gives the painter peace of mind.\textsuperscript{166}

Van Hoogstraten’s chapter division has two functions. On the one hand it charts the chronology of the painter’s education: the aspiring painter is expected to pass through the various stages of his training ‘as if climbing steps’. On the other hand, each chapter contains one of the ‘parts of painting’ that the art lover too must be able to distinguish as critical categories.\textsuperscript{167} Thus, the author counsels art lovers who want to buy a painting to take account of each ‘part of painting’.\textsuperscript{168}

In this division, Van Hoogstraten’s adaptation of the structures of his predecessors is rather free, and can be traced back to several notions developed in ancient rhetoric. Alberti followed Quintilian’s three-part division into Rudiments, Art and Artist. The \textit{Inleyding} too can be fitted into this scheme: chapter 1 supplies the basic principles, chapters 2 to 8 deal with art itself, and chapter 9 deals with the artist’s morals.
According to the rhetoricians, the process that leads to a speech may subsequently be divided into different elements. Traditional art theory frequently distinguishes between three or five ‘parts of painting’ (*partes pingendi*), echoing the parts of an oration (*partes orationis*) according to the theory of rhetoric. The most authoritative theory regarding this division, from Cicero’s *De inventione*, is repeated as follows in Vossius’s *Beghinselen der redenrijk-konst* (Elementary Rhetoric, 1648): ‘There are four tasks for the orator: discovery of the arguments, arrangement, embellishment, and enunciation of the arguments. And it follows that the art of rhetoric possesses an equal number of parts: invention, disposition, elocution and delivery.’ The point of this kind of classification is not so much to analyse the different elements of a speech as to analyse the process of its preparation. It is applied to the visual arts in the same sense. In his treatise on painting, Vossius again names four elements: *inventio, dispositio, color* and *motus* (whereby *motus* relates to animation through the passions). On the basis of this scheme, Junius distinguishes five parts of painting: invention, proportion, colour, passions and composition, besides which he discusses the cohesive concept of grace and adds a section on the role of the viewer.
In applying the division into partes to his chapters about painting, Van Hoogstraten does not follow either Vossius or Junius precisely. This demonstrates the flexible nature of rhetorical rules, and the fact that they may be applied with a certain latitude to a field such as painting. Van Hoogstraten does not treat rhetoric as a fixed framework, but as an aid in writing and thinking about his multi-faceted subject. (The nine chapters of the Inleyding may be associated with the following rhetorical keywords: 1. introductio and imitatio; 2. inventio: proportio and memoria; 3. inventio: historia, affectus/motus, the genera dicendi; 4. inventio: parerga and decorum; 5. ordo/dispositio; 6. elocutio: colores; 7. elocutio: lumina orationis; 8. gratia; and 9. artifex.172)

**The order of nature**

When we analyse Van Hoogstraten’s chapter division as a key to the didactic ideals in his treatise, it is relevant, first of all, to note that two different aims are distinguished in traditional art theory. Lomazzo defines these aims clearly in his Trattato della pittura, quoting from Aristotle’s
Physics: the first focuses on ordine della dottrina, the order prescribed by the rules of argumentation, and the second on ordine della natura, the order of nature itself. Lomazzo himself explicitly chooses a ‘doctrinal’ structure. This means that he starts by providing abstract definitions before discussing the details of painting. The ordine della natura, by contrast, is not based on this kind of strict argument that moves from ‘abstract to concrete’, but on the human capacity for learning. It starts with the incomplete and ends with the complete, which thus reflects the supposed chronology of the human learning process, from the newborn’s first sensory impressions via the development of memory in childhood, to the faculty of rational judgement. This ‘order of nature’ runs parallel to the chronology according to which the various aspects of art were supposedly discovered in the past: first contours, then light and shade, and finally colour.\[173\]

In the Dutch tradition, Lomazzo’s term trattato (traktaat in Dutch) is not included on title pages – the emphasis is apparently on the didactic nature of art literature, rather than on its doctrinal qualities. Van Mander’s ‘Grondt’ (or ‘Rudiments’) is manifestly an elementary
textbook or primer; this is confirmed by the fact that when the Frisian painter Wybrand de Geest wrote a prose adaptation of the ‘Grondt’ in 1702, he called it *Leermeester der schilderkunst* (*Instructor in the Art of Painting*). The titles of Van Hoogstraten’s *Inleyding* and Goeree’s so-called ‘introductions’ to drawing and painting identify the texts unequivocally as primers. It is striking that more general treatises on human conduct bear similar titles: Van Hoogstraten refers, for instance, to Hugo Grotius’s popular *Inleydinge tot de Hollandsche rechtsgeleerdhbyt* (*Introduction to Dutch Law*, 1631), and Frans van Hoogstraten translated a text by Vives as *Inleyding tot de ware wysheid* (*Introduction to True Wisdom*, 1670).

This anchoring of art theory in didactic views originating largely with Quintilian influenced several aspects of the *Inleyding* – its many repetitions, for instance, the purpose of which is purely didactic. Van Hoogstraten’s description of the development of painting (‘On the Beginning, Rise and Fall of Painting’) links up directly to the *ordine della natura*, starting with Pliny’s anecdote of the invention of drawing by shepherds tracing the shadows of their flock on the ground. The traditional view in this regard is that the natural order of Creation is also based primarily on lines and shapes, to which colour is a secondary, less elementary addition. The view that the ‘rules of art’ reflect the ‘rules of nature’ is a commonplace in art theory, corresponding to the doctrine that following nature is the ultimate guiding principle – both in art and in ethics. Ghiberti, for instance, states that in the most fundamental precepts of art theory, he has ‘always sought to find out how nature operates and how he could base himself on it’. Goeree too states that the rules of the arts derive from the rules of nature, and Van Hoogstraten himself concludes: ‘art is immersed in nature; if you take it from there, you will avoid many errors in your work.’

An order that is supposedly ‘derived from nature’ also determines the chapter divisions of the *Inleyding*. The first chapter, on aspects of training relating to *imitatio*, discusses drawing as a general and fundamental skill: the attentive observation of the visible world, ‘so as to imitate things precisely as they are’. Just as Quintilian says that a child must start by copying individual letters, Van Hoogstraten counsels aspiring painters to start with separate elements of the face: eyes, noses, mouths. At the next stage, according to Quintilian, the child must learn to combine letters into words, and words into sentences, eventually doing exercises in composition. Van Hoogstraten describes how the pupil practises composition by copying the work of others until he can trust his own inventions.

After studying the interaction of figures in scenes of history, the ideal painter of the *Inleyding* moves on to the landscape as staffage, extending his choice of subject to ‘everything under the sun’. Colour and light, treated in two separate chapters, are among the finesse of execution (or rhetorical *elocutio*); finally, an entire chapter is devoted to the concept of grace, as a gift that cannot be learned (the ‘finishing touch’ that is also deemed necessary in rhetoric). The treatise’s final chapter contains a discussion of the painter’s task in society, placing the virtues of painting in the context of a code of moral behaviour, in the same manner as Quintilian’s discussion of the orator.

*The order of doctrine*

In the *Inleyding*, although the ‘order of nature’ is the primary structural principle, Lomazzo’s
ordine della dottrina, the order prescribed by the rules of argument, is discernible as well. For the ‘parts of painting’ are not only placed in a didactic order, but serve alongside one another as critical categories for the appraisal of painters and their work. In this Van Hoogstraten again follows Quintilian, who was the first to ascribe certain qualities to specific painters. Using the example of artists, rhetorical theory explains that in oratory, too, speakers may excel in specific areas. Quintilian praises the ancient painter Parrhasios for his circumscriptio, for example; he also mentions Zeuxis’s rendering of light and shade, and links Apelles’s name with grace. Similarly, Van Hoogstraten illustrates his ‘parts of painting’ with diverse names of artists, not only from antiquity but from his own time as well, frequently using rhetorical categories: in one passage, for instance, he writes that while Rubens focuses on rich compositions (dispositio) and Anthony van Dyck on elegance (gratia), Rembrandt concentrates on the passions (passiones) of the soul, and Hendrik Goltzius’s skill lies in ‘imitating faithfully the hand of certain great Masters’ (imitatio). Such links between specific artists and particular artistic qualities are furnished with astrological explanations by Lomazzo, and appear in their most systematic form in De Piles’s Traité du peintre parfait (1699). De Piles actually awards marks to different artists for the qualities in which they excel. The theory of distinct qualities can be used to explain the existence of different schools of painting; as Giovanni Battista Agucchi writes in his Trattato della pittura (1607): ‘art was not born from one artist but from many, and only with the passage of time’.

Van Hoogstraten distinguishes not only the ‘Sikyonian, Ionian and Attic’ styles from antiquity, but also the modern centres of art in Rome, Florence, Venice, Germany, and the Low Countries.

Van Hoogstraten’s combination of didacticism and art criticism reflects the rhetorical principle that children learn best from simple facts combined with practical demonstrations. Clearly, theory alone does not suffice to teach the liberal arts: practical experience is essential. The Inleyding reiterates this view several times: art lovers cannot learn to appraise art judiciously just by reading; they must themselves pass through the successive stages of the learning process.

‘Three times three beacons’

The Inleyding is cast in the form of a course of instruction in which aspiring painters develop their intellectual faculties one step at a time. Their goal is ultimately construed as a moral objective. The chapter divisions thus provide indications that enable one to interpret the text as a whole.

The frontispiece, the first illustration in the Inleyding, shows the aspiring painter, clad in armour and sporting Hermes’ winged helmet and sandals, being assisted by the Muses as he takes his first steps on the steep path of learning that leads upwards behind him (fig. 18). In Cartari’s manual the Muses are linked to all the human qualities that are required for one to develop into a homo universalis. Van Hoogstraten’s iconography is similar to that developed by Giovanmria Butteri, who depicted a middle-aged Michelangelo surrounded by the Muses and crowned with laurels by Apollo (fig. 19).

The Inleyding refers in this context to Ficino’s De vita libri tres, borrowing its view on ‘three times three beacons’ that one who wishes to study the liberal arts must follow. These
are three celestial bodies, namely Mercury, the Sun, and Venus; three mental qualities, namely strength of will, understanding and memory; and three other ‘beacons’ for the purpose of support: good parents, a capable teacher and an experienced physician. Ficino’s book contains countless guidelines for a balanced life, and may have inspired Van Hoogstraten to present his *Inleyding* too in the form of a path of life in which attaining tranquillity of mind plays an important role. In any case, Van Hoogstraten’s chapter divisions largely reflect Ficino’s structure, being based on three specific planets, three mental qualities, and three ‘supporters’. Instead of Ficino’s ‘beacons’ he posits ‘nine mistresses, who are of old placed over all the planets, the heavenly stars, and their motions’. (To be precise, Euterpe, who is governed by Mercury, is followed by Polymnia, who is associated with memory, and then by Clio, ‘for support’; then follows the trio Erato, who is linked to Venus, Thalia, linked to the power of understanding, and Terpsichore. The last three are Melpomene, linked to the sun, and Urania, who governs the will, supported by Calliope.)

The chapter division shows that the painter’s curriculum, as prescribed in the *Inleyding*, is intended to have universal meaning. Like Ficino’s *studiosus*, the young painter depicted in the frontispiece apparently achieves his goal by following a staged ‘introduction’ to virtue, through a field governed by the entire range of human qualities (the Muses) and cosmological correspondences (determined by the planetary spheres). In Ficino, this goal is the equanimity of a life spent studying the liberal arts; in the *Inleyding* it is achieving a successful career as a painter – which implicitly includes living a life of a high moral standard.

The ideals of the aspiring painter are thus ultimately comparable to those of the *bonnête homme* as described by Van Hoogstraten in his *Eerlyken jongeling*. Romein de Hooge’s title print
for Lambert van den Bos’s Volmaekten hovelinck (The Perfect Courtier, 1675) depicts a young man surrounded by figures representing the different challenges he may encounter on his path to virtue, similar to the figure on the Inleyding’s frontispiece (fig. 20). In the title print to Den eerlyken jongeling, the youth is already being crowned with laurel wreaths, rather prematurely, by Mars and Venus (fig. 21). The topos of the youth being led towards the temple of virtue in successive stages recurs in the traditional representation of the artist’s tasks. Thus, Federico Zuccari depicted ‘the path to virtue’ in a fresco in his house in Rome. Lomazzo represents this in a drawing as a flight of steps being ascended by putti who personify the painter’s rewards, similar to the steps leading to artistic virtue depicted on Van Hoogstraten’s frontispiece (figs. 22 and 23).197

The learning process of the ‘vir proficiens’

The comparison of the art of painting to an arduous ‘course of instruction’ prompts Joachim Oudaen, in his liminary poem to the Inleyding, to describe painting metaphorically as a labyrinth in which the rules presented by Van Hoogstraten serve as Ariadne’s thread, to help one find the ‘right way ... amid the confusion of so many winding paths’. Similarly, the reader’s ‘journey’ is compared to the legendary peregrinations of Amadis de Gaulle and those of Aeneas through the underworld.198 Van Hoogstraten sketches a similar ‘career’ in his Eerlyken jongeling. In the dedication ‘To the lovers of virtue’ he describes the honest youth as a ‘stroller’ exposed to the ‘changes of fickle Fortune’. The ‘rules’ set forth in the treatise serve as guidelines ‘like Theseus’s ball of thread, [so as] to find one’s way successfully in the labyrinth of this world’.199
The allegory of the path of life is a theme from Stoic philosophy, which holds, in the words of Quintilian, that ‘Art is a skill used to achieve something by following a path, that is, a method’. Seneca distinguishes in this context the ideal of the wise man, *vir sapiens*, from the reality of the man who is progressing along the path to wisdom, *vir proficiens*. To his mind, no one will acquire wisdom during this life; but the path to wisdom is a goal in itself. As the Stoics maintain, on this path to happiness one will learn to control one’s passions through the application of ‘right reason’ or *recta ratio*.

As is suggested by the metaphor of the path of life, the ideal of the *vir proficiens* is relevant to the *Eerlyken jongeling* as well as to the aspiring painter, who has chosen the path to virtue but needs to be constantly steered in the right direction. Van Hoogstraten writes that his treatise on painting teaches ‘the road one should go down, in order to reach the end of one’s life’s work, where so many have stumbled halfway or gone astray’. In line with Stoic views, the chief guideline on this path is to ‘follow nature’: Van Mander, who compares the art of painting to a labyrinth in his ‘Grondt’, states that nature itself provides the ball of thread (*t clouwen der Natueren*) to lead one through. Junius also sees the ‘setled short way’ to success as identical to ‘following nature’: indeed, those wanting to achieve something in art ‘should strongly be possessed with this opinion, that there is a certain good way, in which Nature must do many things of her owne accord without any teaching’.
Van Hoogstraten concludes his book, which is broadly framed as an allegory of life, with several observations about death, the vanity of worldly fame in particular, and the hope of a better life hereafter. The ‘temple of virtue’ depicted in the frontispiece will not be attained in the sublunary sphere, the ‘visible world’. What matters is to lead a virtuous life on one’s way to the unattainable and invisible goal. This train of thought is supported by traditional allegory linking the Muses to the ‘ascent’ of the path of life, with Mount Helicon as the destination, as is expressed, for example, in Hendrik Laurensz Spiegel’s *Hertspiegel (Mirror of the Heart*, 1614) a treatise on ethics based on Neostoic principles that shows the ‘steps to salvation’; it may well have served as one of Van Hoogstraten’s sources of inspiration.

The large number of moral admonitions to aspiring painters in Van Mander’s ‘Grondt’ led Hessel Miedema to conclude that the text as a whole can be interpreted on various ‘levels’ by various groups of readers, such as apprentices, accomplished painters, and humanists. One of these levels, to Miedema’s opinion, is an interpretation in terms of ethics. ‘Art’ (*Konst*) in Van Mander, he suggested, essentially means ‘the art of living the good life’. Thus, when Van Mander states that painters must ‘pay attention to the passions’, Miedema believed that this means that they must not only become skilled in depicting emotions, but must also control their own emotions. The *Inleyding* too contains a wealth of moral admonitions and guide-
lines for good behaviour, which suggests that one of the objectives of these texts is to offer a manual for ‘civil behaviour’ among painters and art lovers.\textsuperscript{207} Especially in the verse sections of Van Hoogstraten’s text, he incorporates moralistic admonitions for young painters, warning the ‘travel-loving youth’ against excesses, for instance. He discusses the moral importance of moderation most explicitly in the chapter on pictorial composition:\textsuperscript{208} in ‘How an Artist Should Conduct Himself in the Face of Fortune’s Blows’, he provides a code of conduct for painters in their dealings with fellow artists and art lovers, and advises them not to condemn the views of the ignorant, for instance, or to praise their own work too highly.\textsuperscript{209} In the ninth chapter, which concludes the trajectory followed by the aspiring painter, the author also emphasizes that painting is itself a virtuous activity: the most important reward that awaits the painter is the satisfaction of his conscience arising from a disinterested ‘love of art’.\textsuperscript{210}

\textbf{Fig. 22} – Federico Zuccari, \textit{The Artist on his Path to Virtue}, 1590-1600, Casa Zuccari, ceiling of the entrance hall, Rome.
Moral admonitions are by no means rare in early modern art theory. As early as 1390, Cennino Cennini’s painting handbook advised young artists to avoid the temptations of the senses, ‘as if they were studying theology or philosophy’. The painter’s profession was believed by its very nature – as we shall have frequent occasion to note below – to expose pupils to all kinds of sensory seductions, such as those of deceptive colouring, physical beauty, and sensual naturalism. It is evidently the task of a text such as the Inleyding to take the pupil ‘by the hand’ and to help him to reach his virtuous final goal unscathed.

Hans-Jörg Czech concluded that in Van Hoogstraten’s treatise, his curriculum of art (curriculum doctrinae) blends indistinguishably with a curriculum for life (curriculum vitae). Even if we do not follow Miedema’s assumption that art treatises can be read on distinct ‘levels’ addressing different kinds of readers, it is clear that different objectives, including a philosophical one, merge within this one work. Philosophy as a specialized discipline, as already noted, is a modern invention. In early modern art theory one cannot speak of separate categories for practical guidelines on the one hand, and more general artistic and ideological views on the other. In the Inleyding, these elements are construed as intimately connected. Let it suffice here to note that both artistic and more general, ethical connotations are discernible in some of Van Hoogstraten’s observations on art theory. The following two chapters will show, for instance, that ‘following nature’ can be an ethical and philosophical principle as well as an artistic one. In his theory, Van Hoogstraten discusses how one should ‘virtuously’ imitate nature’s properties (de eygenschappen der simpele natuer zeedichlijk navolgen). He refers to the practice of virtuous morals as providing the ‘true repose for the Painter’s mind’, and admonishes the painter to seek moral satisfaction in his work. Exemplary to this equation of painting with the art of living a good life is his comparison of the apprentice painter’s relationship with his master, to Alexander the Great’s relationship with Aristotle: in Van Hoogstraten’s view, this philosopher taught his pupil ‘to live righteously by God’s grace’.

The visible world as a microcosm

The Inleyding displays similarities to treatises written in northern Italy in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries that are distinctly encyclopaedic. In Lomazzo’s Idea del tempio della pittura (1590) and Trattato della pittura, painting is taken as the point of departure for a complete explanation of the world. Zuccari’s Idea de’pittori, scultori et architetti (1607) likewise testifies to the desire to extrapolate from art to philosophy and to propagate a vision of the world in a single treatise, taking draughtsmanship as a metaphor for understanding the world in general. This desire for encyclopaedic and philosophical comprehensiveness also plays a role in the Inleyding, which aspires to describe an art, ‘with all that pertains to it’, that has as its subject ‘the entire Visible World’. Although he does not mention Lomazzo or Zucari, Van Hoogstraten resembles these authors in ascribing universal qualities to painting and in comparing it to ‘universal knowledge’, such that ‘there is scarcely a single art or science of which it is fitting for a Painter to remain ignorant’.

The structure of the Inleyding reflects this claim to universality – indeed, the treatise’s very subtitle, ‘Or the Visible World’ alludes to it. ‘World’ is a word that features frequently in treatises on cosmology, such as De mundo, attributed to Aristotle. Comenius’s didactic work,
Fig. 23 – Attributed to Gian Paolo Lomazzo, Allegory of the Artist’s Career, Albertina, Vienna.
which was aimed at acquiring universal knowledge (he himself referred to ‘pansophy’), was translated into German as Die sichtbare Welt (The Visible World, 1658). A similar title can be found in art theory: Francesco Scaneli’s Il microcosmo della pittura (1657). Lomazzo too, in his Idea del tempio della pittura, calls his virtual ‘temple of painting’ a microcosm. In the Inleyding, the cosmological presumptions are emphasized by the author’s decision to link the nine ‘parts of painting’ to planets and celestial spheres, akin to the classification in Lomazzo’s Idea, which assigns seven stylistic virtues to the different planets. By adhering to chapter divisions parallel to the division of reality into celestial spheres, Van Hoogstraten emphasizes his claim to cosmological all-inclusiveness. He may have been familiar with an image in a work by Athanasius Kircher from 1650, linking the Muses to the celestial spheres; in any case, his classification is based on the same principle (fig. 24). The harmony of the spheres in chapter 8 of the Inleyding thus becomes the principle linking the different elements of the visible world that have been discussed in the first seven chapters. The final chapter, which is devoted to the ‘fixed stars’, the basis of heavenly harmony, provides a moral commentary on the whole. The Inleyding too, as a ‘visible world’, has itself all the characteristics of a self-contained microcosm – a microcosm, however, that is confined to the visible aspects of reality, the naturalia and artificialia that belong to the domain of painting.

The cosmological scope of the Inleyding is intended to lend a certain universality to Van Hoogstraten’s assertions. It also emphasizes the comprehensive range of painting as an art capable of representing the entire visible world, and the moral function of the painter’s education, as a metaphor for a path of life in harmony with the ‘laws of nature’.

‘Ad fontes’

The encyclopaedic nature of the Inleyding may also be clarified by an observation made by the famous humanist Hugo Grotius concerning Junius’s philological research for the Schilderkonst der oude: he compares the book to a mosaic, composed of many different-coloured tesserae, the total effect of which is to produce a lifelike image. Grotius’s commonplace illustrates the tension between variety and lucidity, and shows that each of the many quotations collected with care over a long period of time acquired its own unique place in the whole. The fairly indiscriminate choice of quotations, which are included primarily because of their venerable age, means that it is only in the framework of the composition of the Inleyding that a new ‘mosaic image’, a new view of painting, comes into being. To assess how ‘original’ this new view is, one should realize that the humanist creed ad fontes, ‘to the sources’, is one of the most fundamental ideas underlying the genre of art theory. Invoking Greek and Roman antiquity as the most important argument from authority plays a key role in Van Hoogstraten’s text; as he observes, ‘nothing in this past century is entirely new’. This view should not be construed as a preference for the art of the past: on the contrary, Van Hoogstraten believes that the art produced by his contemporaries and fellow-countrymen has brought the art of the Greeks back to life: it has arrived ‘in a new Greece’. In his discussions of antiquity, he follows the practice among humanists of using classical literature as a means of interpreting and legitimizing modern activities, with the underlying assumption that these two ages are connected by an unbroken line. Characteristically, when Van Hoogstraten describes various objects from
the ‘visible world’, he refers at length to objects such as pieces of armour used in antiquity.

In *Schoone Roselijn*, Van Hoogstraten depicts an attitude to antiquity similar to the approach propagated in the *Inleyding*. He invokes the ‘proud Muse! who transposes Holland to ancient Rome ... at once gird your loins, and let Bato’s people [i.e. the Batavians, the alleged ancestors of the Dutch] hear poems in their own Language ... and raise monuments in honour of our Nation’.223 The desire to equal the greatness of antiquity in their own times is common among the Republic’s citizens; David van Hoogstraten ends his treatise on rhetoric with the comment that ‘Dutch ingenuity ... need not yield pride of place ... to the Greek, Latin, Italian, or French’.224 His uncle displays concern, in the *Inleyding*, to have specific ‘artistic terms’ (*Konstwoorden*) translated into the Dutch of the Northern provinces, a concern shared by other art theorists.225 For example, he coins neologisms like his Dutch terms *vinding* for invention and *doening* for action (as opposed to *lijding* or passion). He even notes that he has himself translated Van Mander’s ‘Flemish verses’ into ‘our Dutch language’.226 Goeree too explains that his work is prompted by the concern that ‘nothing has been written about painting in our mother tongue’, andarticulates in this context the rhetorical requirement for brevity, stating that ‘Instructions for Youths would be of far greater benefit if they were written in a common language, succinctly and clearly, and without rhetorical flourishes’.227

In the *Eerlyken jongeling*, Van Hoogstraten describes his relationship to older authors and his working method – which may also be deemed applicable to the *Inleyding*. ‘I have blend- ed my views with those of old and new writers, and combined them with my own experience at Court, and were I to give each one his due, I must confess that my own view is so intermingled with theirs that I could neither disentangle nor unweave it.’ He claims to attach no value to the reader’s opinion of his own additions and would rather admit that ‘the good things to be found in this piece were stolen, the mediocre ones poorly copied from good originals, and the flawed things that fill most of the pages come from my own head.”228 The encyclopaedic way in which the *Inleyding* blends views from antiquity and the recent past into a new whole makes it pointless to describe Van Hoogstraten as someone who inclined to any specific school of philosophy, such as (Neo)Platonism, Aristotelism or rationalism. In developing his theory, he read authors ranging from Agrippa von Nettesheim, Paracelsus and Ficino, all of whom adhered to an analogical world view in which ‘everything relates to everything’ within a hierarchical order, to authors espousing empiricist ideas and the ‘new philosophy’ such as Francis Bacon and Descartes. As will become clear, the art theory of the *Inleyding* contains references to both the mediaeval and the mechanistic world view. It is therefore more helpful to approach the text from the vantage point of rhetoric, and to see its various positions as cumulative arguments in an epideictic argument, rather than trying to fit Van Hoogstraten’s theory into any specific school of thought.

The rationality that characterises seventeenth-century treatises on painting is related to dialectics: the early modern discipline of finding arguments and arranging them into a line of reasoning. Van Hoogstraten calls this by the contemporary term of *redenkonst* (‘the art of reasoning’, very different from *rederijkkonst*, the art of rhetoric).229 Dialectics, as developed by Rudolf Agricola in his *De inventione dialectica* (1479), was a relatively new branch of learning, intended to teach how a problem can be seen from different points of view and how these different viewpoints may be combined within one argument.230

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The idiosyncrasies of the Inleyding fit within a more general context of a ‘rhetorical culture’, to use a term coined by Nicholas Wickenden in his assessment of Vossius’s work. This rhetorical culture included the fundamental belief ‘that all learning did ... form a systematic whole, all parts of which were harmoniously related to all other parts.’ In this encyclopaedic ideal, he argues, a ‘coherence theory of truth’ prevails, in which the greatest authority is attributed to an accumulation of as many learned views as possible. The emphasis on the practical application of this learning followed from the desire to place all forms of knowledge in the service of leading a ‘good life’: ‘[The orators’] bent was always towards the practical; indeed, probably their deepest concern was with ethics’.231

Some of the arguments invoked by Van Hoogstraten, drawn essentially from rhetorical tradition, are central to this study. His place in this ‘rhetorical culture’ will become clearer if we keep an eye on commonplaces and the ways in which they are applied and arranged in the Inleyding.

A hybrid genre

Van Hoogstraten’s treatise belongs to a genre of writing about art that by no means arose as an isolated phenomenon or as a rare combination of studio practice with theory derived artificially from humanist tradition. The genre draws its material in large measure from the same sources as the tradition of poetics, which flowered in a similar way from the fifteenth century onwards. The same sources also underlie related texts such as handbooks of rhetoric, courtiers’ manuals that codified good behaviour, and related texts with more general ethical guidelines. First and foremost, Dutch art theory can be studied as an offshoot of the older international tradition, and the present study will therefore frequently refer to older art theory, most notably to authors from Southern Europe. However, a different type of analysis can be arrived at by drawing on related texts that do not belong exclusively to poesis in the seventeenth-century sense – epic, lyric, drama – but that describe specific social, scientific or philosophical subjects: the present study will therefore draw on texts as diverse as Robert Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy (1621), Jan de Brune the Younger’s Wetsteen der vernuften (Whetstone of the Mind, 1644), Balthasar Gracián’s Arte de prudencia (The Art of Worldly Wisdom, 1647) and Spinoza’s Ethics (1677).

Before closing this chapter on Van Hoogstraten’s position in the republic of letters, we need to address the subject of early modern rhetoric. It is possible to define ‘rhetorical culture’ in relation to early modern art theory in various ways. Van Hoogstraten’s treatise, too, testifies to the fundamental role played by rhetorical concepts and structures in speaking and thinking about art. As will be argued below, the ‘rules of art’ laid down in his treatise are rhetorical in nature, and are part of a larger whole that borrows its didactic scope and structure from the theory of rhetoric.

PAINTING AND RHETORIC: RULES OF ART AND RULES OF CONDUCT

One of the central themes in studies of Dutch art literature has been ‘the rules of art’. Jan Emmens’s 1964 survey stated that a ‘classicist’ doctrine came to dominate writings about art ever more strongly from the latter half of the seventeenth century onwards. Rather than merely
focusing on the mathematical rules of perspective and proportion, this theory was predicated, according to Emmens, on an ideological preference for teachable doctrine rather than innate genius, and for an ideal of beauty based on that of antiquity. In relation to the ‘rules of art’, Van Hoogstraten adopts an ambivalent position. His assumption that these rules exist is as old as art theory itself; what he means by ‘rules’, however, is far less clear. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, following the rules of art is frequently equated with adherence to recta ratio, the ‘codes’ for human behaviour that are supposedly found in nature itself. Lomazzo holds, for instance, that the status of painting within the liberal arts is based precisely on the fact that it draws its rules from nature. Similarly illuminating is a quotation from Dürer invoked by Van Hoogstraten to show that the mathematical rules he gives for anatomical proportions do not possess universal validity. To Dürer’s mind, physical beauty is so diverse and ‘concealed within nature’ such that it can surprise our powers of judgement: ‘one may sometimes consider two people most beautiful and lovely, while the two have nothing in common’. One initial observation that should be made in this context is that in the Inleyding, the ‘rules of art’ are didactic rules. Its didactic ‘order of nature’ does not provide a fixed system of rules, but a collection of flexible concepts relating to the way in which human skills are developed, concepts that refer to the processes that underlie a work of art and an artist’s development, rather than to a canon of painterly forms and themes.
For a proper evaluation of Van Hoogstraten’s ‘rules of art’, the present study will take into account the nature and intended readership of texts such as the Inleyding, in which didactic precepts for the aspiring painter occur alongside precepts for proper behaviour and morals. The rules for the ‘good life’ are inherently different from the rigid rules of a doctrine classique. After all, codes of conduct serve as guidelines for adapting to particular situations and to different audiences. They are pre-eminently rhetorical rules.

Rhetoric in the seventeenth century

The relationship between rules of art and rules of conduct in the early modern period needs some explanation. Rhetoric, as a theory of eloquence, has the objective of convincing an audience. Its prime aim is not to transfer intellectual knowledge (although that may be part of it) but to create an affective relationship between speaker and audience. To quote one scholar: since in antiquity all important social, political and legal matters were resolved in an organized public arena, ‘everything under the sun belonged to the orator’s field of competence, and eloquence was a matter of life and death’. Ancient rhetorical theory developed from a collection of practical precepts for persuasive speech into a general theory of civilized communication. Humanist learning promoted the reprinting of rhetorical manuals from antiquity in large editions and the publication of countless new ones, so that anyone referring to rhetorical theory could be quite sure that his references would be understood. This meant that in the early modern period, basing a theoretical text (in fact almost any kind of text) on rhetorical foundations was more of an enabling condition than something providing ‘added value’.

The seventeenth century witnessed an upsurge in literature on the rules of rhetoric, some of which dealt with courtly codes of conduct, prompted by the organisation of society at the Habsburg and French courts. The same applied to the Dutch Republic where, even in the absence of a large court, considerable social mobility was possible and rhetoric was an indispensable aspect of almost all aspects of public life. Van Hoogstraten, himself an able social climber, demonstrated that he was well aware of this state of affairs when he translated courtly ideals for a society of burghers in his Eerlyken jongeling. This book, which refers metaphorically to ‘the great Court of this world’, belongs to the genre of courtiers’ manuals of which Baldassare Castiglione’s archetypal text was translated into Dutch in 1662 by Van Hoogstraten’s close friend Van den Bos. The illustrations accompanying a later edition of this work by Romein de Hooghe depict fashionably dressed burghers of the Dutch Republic (fig. 25). Above all, this courtly literature seeks to inculcate ‘political prudence’ or prudentia, a flexibility in social situations corresponding to the Neostoic doctrine of constancy in complex political conditions. In pursuing this aim, it repeats many of the exhortations from rhetorical theory; the guidelines in Cicero’s De oratore are not only for public speaking but apply more generally to appropriate conduct (he holds that the ideal orator is not only vir dicendi peritus, ‘skilled in speaking’, but also a vir agendi peritus, skilled in acting according to his words). That speech is assumed to imply appropriate action is expressed by Van Mander’s explanation of emblematic representations of ‘the tongue’: ‘A tongue held upright with one hand signifies eloquence: because eloquence is an act, and the hand is capable of performing that act, and is also proof of power’ (fig. 26).
In the context of the pursuit of prudence, *Den eerlyken jongeling* emphasizes the existence of a regulated code of conduct: “To stand one’s ground amid so many pernicious hazards, which may arise not only at Court but also in the business of common burghers, one must not emulate bad examples but reconcile oneself to a *fixed rule*” (italics mine).242 Nowhere does Van Hoogstraten define the nature of this ‘fixed rule’ explicitly: in practice, it consists of the various exhortations that he provides in his book, in chapters dealing with issues such as: ‘How to Moderate One’s Passions’ and ‘How to Forge Friendships’, as well as ‘Which Historians Make the Most Instructive Reading’, and ‘On Poetry and Painting and the Knowledge of Countries and Languages’.

Elsewhere Van Hoogstraten discusses the need to be able to adapt one’s own conduct to one’s public, and to ‘accede to the passions and opinions of one whose love we desire’.243 Apparently, there is no single rule for swaying the public: ‘One’s speech will change in multiple ways according to the person concerned, even though the speaker must always remain himself’.244
He refers to this ‘flexibility’ (buygsaemheyt), the capacity ‘to adopt many different personae’ as one of the primary rules of good behaviour.245 These personae should be capable of persuading different audiences; after all, ‘those with cheerful temperaments will want to hear a different mode of speech from those who are melancholic or earnest’.246

What is important is that at various points in the Inleyding, the code for flexible behaviour serves as a metaphor for the ideal method for a painter. This transposition from the domain of the court to that of the studio is reflected in the author’s love of social metaphors and similes based on a military hierarchy (as Celeste Brusati explored, he calls good painters ‘commanders’ and lesser ones ‘soldiers’, and he compares painterly composition to the movement of troops on a battlefield).247 For example, the concept of decorum, which in rhetorical theory means judging the right style of speech for different social situations, is used by Van Hoogstraten in a far broader sense, and relates to practical matters such as the artist’s adjustment of painted vegetation to the surrounding landscape.248 He is not the only author to make these connections; a striking parallel between the painter’s conduct and rhetorical decorum occurs in De Lairesse’s theory, which exhorts painters to conduct a civil conversation attuned to the sitter’s character when painting a portrait.249 Van Hoogstraten even measures the success of the painter’s ability to ‘deceive the eye’ by the social rank of the one deceived; when he himself had managed to deceive the emperor, he had attained the acme of artistic skill. But the most important social element which plays a cohesive role in Van Hoogstraten’s treatise is the elusive concept of grace. This concept, which relates to a wide field of associations ranging from theology to dancing, is accorded a central role in courtiers’ manuals, in which it refers to the ‘pleasing behaviour’ necessary to successful social intercourse as well as to convincing oratory. In art theory, it refers to the painting’s ‘pleasing’ appearance, without which it cannot persuade its viewers. As an essential element of political as well as artistic behaviour, grace is accorded a central role in the fourth chapter of the Eerlyken jongeling and the eighth chapter of the Inleyding. Grace is deemed a finishing touch, and as such it is pre-eminently beyond the remit of a doctrinal system of rules. Van Hoogstraten describes it as ‘a natural favour that should perforce be of assistance in all exercises. This is a factor of such sublimity that no teaching or rules of art can achieve it’.250

How may Van Hoogstraten’s ‘rules of art’ be compared to the rhetorical rules in his Eerlyken jongeling? For the Italian tradition, the relationship between rhetoric and art theory has been the object of frequent study; little has been done in this area for the Dutch tradition, however. There are many dimensions to the application of rhetoric to art theory. First of all, rhetorical principles largely determine the terms, concepts and structures used in art theory. Second, the Inleyding forges a link between painting and rhetoric. As the next chapters will explore, the treatise follows traditional art theory in adapting the orator’s tasks (officia oratoris: the elements of the process of making a speech) to painting, as well as the virtues of speech (virtutes dicendi: perspicuity, ornament and decorum). The same holds true for Van Hoogstraten’s ‘degrees of art’ (the genera pingendi), with their corresponding three functions: to teach, to delight and to move (prodessse, delectare, movere). Furthermore, the treatise contains individual concepts such as imitation, judgement, brevity and ‘energy’ (imitatio, iudicium, brevitas and energia) which play a role in rhetorical theory and are used in a specific sense in art theory too.

In the early modern period, rhetoric was one of the few ways of discussing the artes in a
meaningful way. It was not just a general theory of communication; it also possessed political, ethical and artistic components. In courtiers’ manuals, it is the ethical component that makes itself felt most strongly, but this component also provides added value to art-theoretical views, especially where a painting’s power to emotionally ‘move’ the spectator is involved, as will be shown in detail in chapter IV. As Aristotle notes in the second book of his *Rhetoric*, which relates to mass psychology, oratory has a vital function; it is capable of effecting an enduring change of character in the public, and consequently to ‘move it to (political) action’.

**The ‘Inleyding’ as an epideictic text**

Dutch art theorists exhort painters to master rhetoric in order to sing the praises of their trade. Philips Angel’s eulogy on painting, for instance, holds that painters should apply themselves to ‘the sweet-tongued eloquence of Apelles, which was so sweet that Alexander took great delight in it, frequently coming to visit, to converse with him.’ Van Hoogstraten echoes this sentiment when he advises painters to consort with courtiers and men of letters: ‘since a painter must associate frequently with the great and worldly-wise, it is apt for him to acquire a fluency of speech drenched in knowledge’. He notes that art ‘is loved in all the courts of the world, and sovereigns and princes who wish to speak eloquently about it will frequently be obliged to hear our words.’ Thus in writing the *Inleyding*, he calls on the Muse of rhetoric to assist him.

Three kinds of rhetoric were distinguished in ancient treatises on the subject: deliberative, used in politics; judicial, used in law; and epideictic, used chiefly for ceremonial occasions. Vossius’s *Beghinselen der redenrijk-konst* refers to these three kinds, describing an epideictic oration as that in which one ‘praises or slanders’, for which the arguments of *laudatio* or *vituperatio* may be used. He refers to ‘eloquence’ itself and to ‘agriculture’ as exemplary subjects for a eulogy. The rhetorical theory of the Roman authors whom Van Hoogstraten repeatedly quotes is heavily biased towards epideictic speech: it is here that the orator can go to town and show off his qualities. The *Inleyding*, along with Angel’s treatise explicitly entitled *Lof der schilderkonst* (*In Praise of Painting*) and, in fact, most texts on art theory belong to the epideictic
genre; epideictic arguments underlie many of the incongruities in Van Hoogstraten’s text, in which he flaunts as much learning as possible. The text is an eloquent ‘performance’ in which different types of prose, poetry and visual material collaborate to ‘sing the praises of painting’. The flexibility of rhetorical rules provides writings like this with a different structure than that of a strictly logical line of reasoning. This may be clarified by looking at the adaptability of Van Hoogstraten’s rules of art.

Regarding the ‘rules’ supplied by his Muses, Van Hoogstraten observes that the rhetorical description of any particular liberal art benefits more from amplification, or stylistic flourishes, than from doctrinal rules.256 As Ernst Gombrich pointed out in his 1966 study ‘The Renaissance Concept of Artistic Progress and its Consequences’, early modern views on the status of the artes were based on the belief that the liberal arts were not governed by a rigid system of rules.257 While crafts were supposedly founded on immutable rules handed down in the workshop, an art developed in the course of history, its ‘rules’ constantly changing in response to each new situation; the pursuit of the liberal arts thus called for a broad education. This view is reflected in seventeenth-century painting treatises. Junius, for instance, emphasizes that the rules of art are subordinate to the insight conferred by artistic imitatio: ‘The instruction to be gained from rules is long and arduous, while the instruction to be gained from examples is short and powerful’.258 Van Hoogstraten and Junius both maintain that for a liberal art, talent is of fundamental importance; it is the good soil that determines the way in which the ‘seed’ of the rules of art will develop.259 In this context, Goeree also repeats the Stoic comparison with the ‘seed of art’.260 In the Eerlyken jongeling, the author holds that ‘rules’ are merely precepts based on subjective judgement and long experience; ‘the arts ... cultivate a seed of wisdom, such that when one has experienced a wealth of examples, when a particular case arises the rule becomes apparent, and the mind becomes able to judge a matter well’.261 Education, in consequence, cannot be confined to the provision of rules, but must be adapted to each pupil’s personality.262

Rhetorical rules evidently belong to the realm of ‘practical reason’: only by being applied in everyday life do they prove their worth. In the Eerlyken jongeling, Van Hoogstraten states: ‘Instruction serves only to guide, and does not in itself achieve anything.’263 In the Inleyding he writes, in a similar vein, that it is only through studio application that the rules of art prove their validity. He posits that ‘no one will derive complete understanding from these writings unless he labours to learn this Art until the sweat stands on his brow’.264 Here, Van Hoogstraten shows himself to be aware of the danger that rhetoric poses to painting: after all, ‘it is more proper for Painting to show than to speak’; art consists of ‘doing well, not speaking well’.265 Painters must beware lest they become mere ‘masters of the mouth’, and resemble the orator who wanted to impersonate a general in the presence of Hannibal himself: Van Hoogstraten compares this ridiculous figure to writers of art theory who are not skilled in the practice of art.266 The disparagement of a surfeit of empty rhetoric – which actually undermines the persuasiveness of a speech – is, indeed, a popular theme in rhetoric itself.267 In the Eerlyken jongeling, Van Hoogstraten simply warns against too much hot air and calls speech ‘a precious treasure ... the motions of which are so delicate that they cannot be practised without distinct danger’.268 He also distinguishes clearly between speaking about art, and the activity of painting itself: ‘poets may become masters by thinking, painters by doing. We shall teach someone how
to speak beautifully about art, with the aid of the nine Muses, but we shall not make a painter with this teaching, unless he sets to work diligently with his hands.\textsuperscript{269}

The need to combine theory and practice is expressed in Van Hoogstraten’s views on the importance of the elusive quality of the ‘eye and judgement’ that the rhetoricians call \textit{iu-dicium}.\textsuperscript{270} He posits that while the rules of art may enable someone to speak about art, he will find himself corrected by someone who is ‘untutored’ but who has ‘compasses in his eye’.\textsuperscript{271} Elsewhere he speaks of a ‘painterly eye, more skilful in representing with images than with words’.\textsuperscript{272} The painter may develop this visual judgement, based on practical experience, even by studying minor details of the visible world: ‘For almost any part of nature is capable of fuelling this attentiveness, and honing one’s sharpness of eye.’\textsuperscript{273} He states that physical beauty is a matter of subjective judgement as well, and that ‘the true benefit’ of anatomical knowledge is not felt until it is held up to ‘living nature’.\textsuperscript{274} In considering this theoretical preference for practice over theory, or action over speech, the famous pronouncement attributed to Annibale Caracci may be borne in mind – that painters, unlike orators, ‘must talk with their hands’.\textsuperscript{275}

These observations about the importance of the practical application of theory suggest that there is no point in searching for a single, unequivocal basic principle in an epideictic text. Hessel Miedema concluded that Van Mander’s various views and pronouncements on painting are not informed by any single theoretical preference, but that they are best summarized by the comment ‘All is good that has a pleasing appearance’ (\textit{t is al goed, wat wel staet}).\textsuperscript{276} Van Mander’s treatise gives the appropriate commonplaces for informed discussions of painting, rather than providing a fixed system of rules.\textsuperscript{277} This observation also holds true for the \textit{Inleyding} – the author, for instance, having defined three subdivisions or species of painting, adds that these categories should be treated fairly loosely.\textsuperscript{278} All this does not mean that it is impossible or unnecessary to assume that Van Hoogstraten’s art theory is internally cohesive and follows a specific line of reasoning, merely that the line he follows is rhetorically rather than logically consistent – a reasoning in which argument from tradition, from recognizability that fosters persuasiveness, is the decisive factor.

This fundamental flexibility should be kept in mind when using rhetoric as a key to the interpretation of Dutch texts of art theory. The problems involved in the transfer of concepts from rhetoric and poetics to art theory and the visual arts have frequently been noted.\textsuperscript{279} Rhetorical terms, unlike philosophical ones, are not based on logical coherence, but can be adapted to changing circumstances. Instead of a canon of doctrinal rules, rhetoric provides a versatile vocabulary that can be used in speech, action, and aesthetic judgement. This flexibility makes it easier to understand how rhetorical concepts have endured in different periods and in different political and social contexts, and the multiplicity of skills and subjects with which rhetorical theory was associated in the early modern period. One consequence is that we shall seldom find a one-to-one relationship between a term used by, say, Quintilian and a similar term in Van Hoogstraten’s text. For a contextualization of Van Hoogstraten’s vocabulary, however, it is nonetheless very useful to incorporate the ancient rhetoricians into the analysis. What makes the study of rhetorical terms interesting is not so much their specific meaning in antiquity (as their transmission seldom follows a direct line), but their transformation when applied to new situations.
The epideictic nature of the *Inleyding* means that aspects that may strike the modern reader as completely unconnected are combined in Van Hoogstraten’s theory; for instance, in his discussion of the passions, he links an exhortation to be filled with poetic frenzy, deriving from tradition, to a practical suggestion to use a mirror and study one’s own facial features. A little research reveals that this concrete piece of advice is also sanctioned by rhetorical tradition; in the *Eerlyken jongeling* it is ascribed to Demosthenes.\(^{280}\)

**Painting and eloquence**

Van Hoogstraten uses the comparison between painting and rhetoric as an argument to bolster his point that painting is one of the liberal arts, ‘since although it is said to be dumb, it nonetheless speaks plentifully, in a Hieroglyphic manner.’\(^{281}\) At other times too, he compares the powers of painting with those of eloquence and refers approvingly to the actor Rossius, who claimed to Cicero that hand gestures were more eloquent than words.\(^{282}\) In this context, it should be noted that the formula *ut pictura poesis* has an important rhetorical foundation. Poetry belongs to the liberal arts only in its capacity as part of rhetoric, and is thus allotted the same fundamental function of persuading the audience.\(^{283}\) In effect, Paleotti singles out precisely this rhetorical function as the correspondence between poetry and painting.\(^{284}\)

The wish to raise painting’s intellectual status thus explains why many commonplaces from art theory stem from rhetorical theory. Van Hoogstraten clarifies his views on painterly composition (*ordinantie*), for instance, by invoking the subdivisions of rhetoric.\(^{285}\) His German colleague Von Sandrart compares painting and rhetoric on the basis of their three functions: to instruct, to delight and to move;\(^{286}\) indeed, in the frontispiece to his *Cabinet*, De Bie depicts Pictura next to Poesis, who is identified in the caption as ‘rhetoric with her sweet-rhyming poetry’ (fig. 27).\(^{287}\) In Italy, Lodovico Dolce remarks in his colloquy *L’Aretino* (1557) that rhetoric and painting went hand in hand in antiquity, and that Demosthenes himself was a creditable painter.\(^{288}\) Junius’s book likewise places painting and rhetoric on an equal footing, applying the theory of rhetoric to painting almost unchanged, frequently by replacing the word ‘orator’ with the word ‘painter’.

These comparisons of rhetoric to painting were self-evident to seventeenth-century readers since they had been made by the ancient orators themselves. Quintilian, for example, writes that visual aids can greatly enhance the persuasiveness of an argument, citing Phryne, who, by exposing her nakedness, surpassed the rhetoric of Hyperides. But he is scornful of orators who actually incorporate painted images into their arguments: by doing so, they show themselves incapable of producing a similarly graphic effect in their speech.\(^{289}\) Rhetoric and painting have indeed known simultaneous periods of flowering and decline, says Junius: ‘these Arts do love one another wonderfull well: ... It is a wonderfull thing, that picture hath ever flourished when eloquence did beare a great sway; ... but eloquence falling, picture also could not stand any longer.’\(^{290}\) That painting and rhetoric developed in equal step, coinciding in their times of flowering and decline, is another commonplace (*dum viguit eloquentia, viguit pictura*). From this vantage point, both painting and rhetoric are liberal arts with an inherently flexible tradition that endures in an essentially uninterrupted line from antiquity until the seventeenth century; the classical painters and orators, even though they are known only by reputation, are...
regarded as real objects of emulation. Vossius explicitly compares art theory to rhetorical theory, deriving his classification of the ‘parts of painting’ directly from rhetoric.

In the art-theoretical tradition, comparisons between rhetoric and painting are frequently justified by stating that they are both based on the same foundations. Speech and painting, as representational activities, are predicated on the ability to form ‘mental images’ of reality. The decisive factor, therefore, rather than the modern belief that all thought is related to language, is precisely the belief that all thought is essentially visual in nature, as asserted most notably by Aristotle in *De anima*: ‘The soul never thinks without images’. Vossius defines the common origin of visual and verbal ‘speech’ as *graphein*, which he says meant ‘to draw’ as well as ‘to write’ in ancient Greek. Many authors emphasize the intellectual origin of both skills. Van Mander, for instance, compares drawing to literacy: both are universally applied to record and communicate mental images; Paleotti discusses the respective ages of the arts of painting and speech, observing: ‘just as words, like messengers, convey our concepts to others, the art of painting conveys the things we mean to the mind’s eye of others’, which compari-

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Fig. 27 – Title page to Cornelis de Bie, *Het gulden cabinet van de edel vry schilderconst*, Antwerp 1661.
son he uses to explain the Latin term *graphice*.

These remarks suggest that the comparison drawn in the early modern period between rhetoric and painting should be construed literally rather than figuratively. There was certainly no ontological separation between two domains of language and image in this period; in many cases, word and image were seen as supplementary and mutually enhancing elements, a view that explains the popularity of emblem books, for instance, and of Comenius's *Sichtbare Welt*, which propagates a didactic method based on images. The use of personifications to represent virtues was not seen as a shift to a different sphere, but precisely as a consolidation within a single cohesive domain. This explains that Van Hoogstraten’s comparisons between *pictura* and *poesis* are more than metaphorical; they fulfill a structural function in his theory of art. For instance, he compares knowledge of different colours to a knowledge of the alphabet, and compares painting to pictographic scripts such as (or so he believes) Egyptian hieroglyphics and Chinese script.

The view that painting, like hieroglyphics – which were generally regarded in the seventeenth century as a collection of emblematic symbols – ‘speaks’, illustrates that language was not construed as a function of context. Words, like images, were seen primarily as symbols, each with its own meaning (or, in the case of homonyms, with different fixed meanings), and the two media can reinforce each other in a straightforward way. Von Sandrart says: ‘Thus painting holds forth, and verses can play / orators, poets, word-colours convey’. The close relationship posited between word and image is addressed in Camphuysen’s rhetorical *vituperatio*, which calls painting a ‘dumb lie’ and states: ‘The image is an orator, (alas!) one all too inarticulate’. The vehemence with which Camphuysen assails the dictum *ut pictura rhetorica* demonstrates its great popularity in Dutch seventeenth-century culture.

The equation of the domains of word and image enables art theorists to arrive at the paradoxical conclusion that painting can be more rhetorical than rhetoric itself. Junius states that the best author tries to equal the painter’s powers: ‘he is the best Historian that can adorne his Narration with such forcible figures and lively colours of Rhetorike, as to make it like unto a Picture’. Accordingly, the playwright Jan Vos repeats Horace’s well-known maxim: ‘What we hear, / with weaker passion will affect the heart, / than when the faithful eye beholds the part’, and Van Hoogstraten too states that the testimony of the eyes is ‘far more acute’ than that of the ear. Paleotti explains this preference by stating that painting is ‘closer to nature’ than writing or speech, and that one can therefore more easily create the impression of simplicity and naturalness – which is a prerequisite for persuasiveness – through painting than through rhetoric.

**Painting and moral philosophy**

David van Hoogstraten maintains, in his *Rederykkonst* (1725), that Plato and Aristotle made rhetoric into ‘a queen of people, when they called her Stirrer of Souls’. The ancient Roman theorists of rhetoric, who emphasized the function of *movere*, stirring the emotions, are especially important for the early modern view of rhetoric. Their emphasis is echoed in art theory. Sperone Speroni, in his *Dialogo della rhetorica* (1596), asserts that both painting and rhetoric have the function of exerting an affective influence on the viewer or listener, and of inducing him to feel love, fury or hatred. This suggests that there is more than a demonstration of proof at stake: rhetoric is believed to accomplish a permanent character change in members of
the audience. Paleotti emphasizes that painters are far more capable than orators of inducing a ‘complete change of opinion’, while Francesco Bocchi writes in 1592 that the rhetorical power of painting is such that the beholder ‘becomes another person’.

Some of these observations come from adherents of the ideology of the Counter-Reformation; in chapter IV, we shall see how they relate to prevailing views of art in the seventeenth-century Netherlands. Broadly speaking, the emotional and ethical influence of a work of art was thought to derive from how the scene represented was deemed applicable to the beholder’s own circumstances. Even without employing any complex symbolism or allegory, the seventeenth-century beholder could make an ‘exegesis’ of aspects of reality and infer his own position in society from the actions of others. In this connection, Paleotti holds that ‘where profane paintings are concerned, which depict subjects as different as wars, lands, buildings, animals, trees, plants and so forth, one cannot deny that almost all things, whether occurring in nature or made by Man, if painted in the right way, may be of some practical benefit in one’s life’. Similarly, Zuccari states that one may also infer guiding principles for a virtuous life from representations of the actions of others, both praiseworthy and reprehensible, and thus painting may ‘make one wise, prudent (prudente) and virtuous’.

The orator, like the painter, can only achieve this enduring change of character by projecting a convincing ethos – that is, he himself must impress others as someone of exemplary moral behaviour. Vossius, for instance, holds in his Beginselen that ‘an orator must ensure above all that he radiates prudence, piety and benevolence. For we are easily inclined to believe those who both understand their subject and are well-disposed to us’. It is by creating a shared sense of ‘people like us’ with his audience that the orator maximizes his persuasiveness, and at the same time he must guard against affectation and a surfeit of book learning that would expose his true intentions. Accordingly, Van Hoogstraten believes that the eloquence of the vir bonus or ‘good man’ must be curtailed by the impression of simplicity and prudence. Such speakers are ‘modest and polite … and if one consorts with them, their disposition glows with so much grace and their heart with such piety … that anyone would count himself fortunate to spend his entire life in their company.’

The orator or painter must therefore, above all, be master of his own passions, if he is to sway the passions of others. The painter’s supposed experience of the passions makes him a good judge of human nature. Goeree underpins the usefulness of his Natuurlyck en schilderkonstig ontwerp der menschkunde (Outline of Natural and Painterly Anatomy, 1682), which deals with the human passions as well as anatomy for the artist, by pointing out that ‘Knowledge of human nature is not only of great importance to Drawing and Painting, but also contributes to a civilized society and enhances social intercourse’. Knowledge of how the passions are expressed in the human face is an aspect of communication: ‘Indeed, is this knowledge not also necessary in everyday dealings with our fellow human beings?’

These quotations suggest that the significance of rhetoric in terms of moral philosophy is fundamental to the comparison of painting with the ‘art of living the good life’. The rhetorically trained man who has determined to lead a life of exemplary morals, the ideal of a vir bonus dicendi peritus, is transformed in seventeenth-century art theory into the good man skilled in the art of painting: vir bonus pingendi peritus, to repeat a dictum coined by Allan Ellenius. Leon Battista Alberti provides a fairly literal adaptation of rhetorical theory when he posits
that the ideal painter is a ‘good man and learned in the liberal arts’ (*vir et bonus, et doctus bonarum artium*), and that a painter who conducts himself with humanity (*humanitas*) and affability is frequently better able to win over his public than one who may be more skilled in his craft, but lacks the ability to make a good impression. Likewise, Lomazzo explains that painters can use their understanding of the human passions to act as ‘philosophers’ by being ‘modest, humane (*umano*) and considerate in all their dealings ... as one learns from philosophy’, citing the examples of the ‘sage’ Leonardo, the ‘gymnosophist’ Michelangelo, the ‘mathematician’ Mantegna, the ‘philosopher’ Raphael and the ‘great Druid’ Dürer. ‘They derived their fame not only from their art, but from the humanity (*l’umanità*) of their conduct, which earned them the affection of all who spoke to them.’ This is more than a mere biographical note: as we shall see in chapter III, according to early modern views, the painter’s character is directly related to his work.

The passage in Dutch art theory that comes closest to the formulation *vir bonus pingendi peritus* can be found in Van Mander’s ‘Grondt’. Van Mander explains the affective power of painting to ‘sweetly move’ the viewer’s eyes, heart and feelings in terms of the painter’s capacity to make an impression of ‘piety and honour’. This is an Art above all Arts, which is capable of ‘frequently moving, stirring, even the hearts of peasants’. Van Mander refers to this prepossessing behaviour as a quality peculiar to painters, and contrasts their ‘mild, wise, reasonable words’ with the squabbling of market women. He names Raphael and Titian as perfect examples of *vires boni*, whose ‘noble and pleasant manner’ won favour with the learned and renowned. This moral function makes painting a generally beneficial activity; De Bie believes that ‘this Art consists of three qualities of Nobility, namely political, natural and spiritual’, citing examples of kings, statesmen and churchmen who purportedly practised painting.

The following chapters will discuss various elements that clarify the rhetorical nature of Van Hoogstraten’s theory of art. It will become clear, for instance, how the supposed ‘illusionist’ or ‘naturalistic’ aims of painting are, in his treatise, judged in rhetorical terms. Van Hoogstraten also applies the universal scope that is traditionally ascribed to rhetoric to his own profession, and accords the art of painting the status of ‘universal knowledge’. As will be demonstrated in chapter II, which deals with the concept of *imitatio*, the rhetorical theory of ekphrasis is of great importance in this connection, as well as the supposedly persuasive function of specific themes and styles. It will also become clear that the rhetorical basis is neither exclusive to Southern European views of art nor confined to the genre of history painting. Rhetoric provides a complete theory, from the process of creating a work of art up to and including its effect on the viewer, and is thus also relevant to subjects like landscapes and still-lifes.

It will become clear that rhetoric provides a cohesive thread linking what appear otherwise to be unrelated views. The next chapters will explore in more detail how Van Hoogstraten’s ideas are embedded in an essentially rhetorical culture. This culture supplies his conceptual framework: a framework that establishes meaningful relationships between diverse terms and concepts, relationships based not on the laws of logic, but on those of rhetoric itself. This approach is based on the belief that rhetoric not only determines the structure of the *Inleyding*, but also provides the rational cohesiveness for the ostensibly quite dissimilar terms of art criticism distinguished by Van Hoogstraten.
Seen from this point of view, rhetoric is an important factor in any discussion of seventeenth-century painting that takes treatises from the period as its point of departure. It will become clear that the analysis of distinct artistic terms may be supplemented by the study of the lexical structure within which these terms operate – a structure that is fundamentally determined by rhetoric. Rhetoric is an art-historical aid with the multifunctionality of a Swiss army-knife: in the first place it provides a key to the apparently chaotic genre of treatises on painting; in the second place, it provides a cohesive framework for the diverse words, concepts and commonplaces used by authors such as Van Hoogstraten; and in the third place, it provides a vantage-point for the modern viewer who seeks to understand the seventeenth-century system for judging paintings, so as to work within the discursive structure applicable in the period itself.

Van Hoogstraten’s position in the republic of letters defines the limitations and scope of our study into the ideological background of his views; it also determines the options that were available to him in his project of investing his profession with theoretical legitimacy. The present analysis will take into account the fact that Van Hoogstraten’s text draws on arguments from different origins, which are not necessarily logically compatible or directly related to seventeenth-century painting practice. They are part of an encyclopaedic whole governed not by a system of ‘rationalistic’ aesthetics but by the rules of epideictic reasoning, in which arguments from antiquity are automatically invested with authority. We shall also return to the observation that the didactic foundations of this reasoning were ultimately geared towards an ethical objective. As rhetorical theory seeks to embrace all forms of communication and action, it defines the seventeenth-century view of the artist as *vir bonus pingendi peritus*. In the structure of his treatise, Van Hoogstraten indeed emphasizes the similarities between a *curriculum doctrinae* and a *curriculum vitae*, in a hierarchical classification of the ‘parts of painting’ that ultimately leads to ethical perfection. As we shall see, his views can be linked to ideas about the human passions informed by ancient Stoicism, to the analysis of emotion and hypocrisy in courtiers’ manuals, and to ethical debates that were current when the *Inleyding* was published. In this context, the ethical tasks of painting will be shown to be related to its assumed rhetorical and theatrical powers.

Another matter that will receive attention is the international nature of art theory, and more especially the formative influence of the Italian literary tradition on Van Hoogstraten’s views. As the *Inleyding* is more than simply an idiosyncratic offshoot of the author’s social aspirations, and reflects his express desire to contribute to the tradition of art theory, the present study will analyse Van Hoogstraten’s position in this tradition, proceeding on the assumption that the written sources reflect wider-ranging debates in the studios of Northern and Southern Europe. The analysis will also touch upon matters far broader than the teaching of young painters. Texts such as the *Inleyding* provide examples for topoi and a lexical structure for the ‘civil conversation’ in the studio, which could legitimize the activities of painters and art lovers alike. In this context, it should be noted that Dutch authors within this international genre
were conscious that they were writing in Dutch. This raises the question of whether they were concerned with identifying national characteristics of Dutch painting.

In short, the overview of Van Hoogstraten’s intellectual possibilities presented in this chapter is the first stage in a study of his effort to give legitimacy to the art of painting. The next chapters will explore in more detail how his contentions are anchored in, and informed by, the scholarly, literary and ethical views for which his humanist surroundings composed the framework.121
Chapter II

THE VISIBLE WORLD
Fig. 28 – Detail from Samuel van Hoogstraten, title page to *Inleyding tot de booge schoole der schilderkonst*, Rotterdam 1678.
Chapter II

The Visible World

‘[One can] succinctly but tellingly describe painting, the education of the eyes, the full sister of poetry, as the art of seeing. I truly regard those who are not adept in this scarcely as complete persons. I call them blind people, who look no differently at the sky, the sea or the earth than do their cattle that they let graze with their heads down. They look at those things without seeing them.’

Constantijn Huygens, De vita propria

Van Hoogstraten begins his introductory address ‘To the Reader’ by expressing his desire to invest the art of painting with a status among the liberal arts. He wants to contribute to the tradition of art theory so as to make plain that his profession is more than a craft, since ‘this art encompasses the entire Visible World; and ... there is scarcely a single art or science of which it is fitting for a Painter to remain ignorant’ (italics SvH). The argument that painting requires a thorough grounding in numerous fields of knowledge had already been put forward by Alberti; earlier, Cicero demanded similar scholarship of the orator.

The notion that painting should be elevated so far above a craft because it ‘encompasses the entire Visible World’ is, though, less manifestly a commonplace from the tradition.

The subject of the ‘Visible World’ warrants an initial role in the analysis of Van Hoogstraten’s views about the art of his countrymen. This chapter will adduce various elements of the tradition of art theory to clarify the way the concept of the ‘visible world’ played not just an original, but an essential, part in his endeavour to provide a legitimation for the art of painting.

Van Hoogstraten expressly presents this concept in the design and illustration of his book. The art theory expounded in the Inleyding elaborates on the depiction of the visible world through specific themes; an analysis of these themes will make clear that Van Hoogstraten presents the art of painting as a pre-eminently virtuous occupation and concludes that it is comparable to philosophy as an investigative activity.

We will examine how Van Hoogstraten’s definition of the art of painting as ‘the mirror of nature’ is on the one hand rooted in the older tradition of art theory; on the other, the Inleyding appears to constitute a shift in the conception of nature as a subject of painting. This shift sheds new light on a recent interpretation of artistic ‘realism’ in the seventeenth century,
an interpretation which takes the world view of Calvinism as its point of departure. As we shall see, philosophy, particularly Stoicism, is also relevant.

‘Or the visible world’

In structuring his treatise, Van Hoogstraten employs a range of devices to focus attention on the important role that the depiction of the visible world plays in his art theory. The first and most obvious is the subtitle, Or the Visible World (fig. 1). This subtitle is intended on the one hand to link the Inleyding with its proposed supplement, the Invisible World. On the other it can be conceived as a more precise identification of painting and its ability to depict the whole of the visible world. Van Hoogstraten writes in ‘To the Reader’: ‘That I also call [the book] the Visible World is because the Art of Painting shows all that is visible’.

The illustration on the title page of the Inleyding presents the ‘visible world’ symbolically (fig. 28). The muse Clio, whom Van Hoogstraten associates with the most demanding subject for artists, namely history painting, shows the young painter the object of his initial endeavours, while Melpomene (associated with chiaroscuro) throws light on it with a torch. It is a terrestrial globe partly concealed under a drape. A poem on the facing page (‘On the Title Print’) explains: ‘The Student Painter stands here in the title print ... And Clio shows him the greatest beauties of the Visible World’ (italics SvH). The poem and illustration suggest that by going through the learning process set down in the Inleyding, the pupil will be able to remove the veil covering the globe and thus master ‘the entire visible world’. Van Hoogstraten may have borrowed his symbolism from emblem literature, where it signifies the earth weighed down with sin; this suggests that the attainment of painterly success implies concomitant moral perfection (fig. 29).
A globe of similar dimensions appears in the title print to the last chapter in the *Inleyding*, dedicated to the muse Urania (fig. 30). In this chapter, the reader is deemed to have completed the *hooge schoole* or ‘academy’ of painting, and the rewards of a successful career as a painter are revealed. The globe beside Urania is not concealed by a veil and can consequently be conceived as the visible world, all of whose elements the painter can now depict.4

The globe also appears in Van Hoogstraten’s etched self-portrait on one of the first pages of his book (figs. 31 and 32). Beside the painter, who has portrayed himself quill pen in hand, stands a sculpture of Atlas bearing a large globe. While Van Hoogstraten pictures himself here as the author of art theory, he is at the same time presenting, allegorically, the subject of the art of painting, that is ‘the entire visible world’. In the background there is a second circle, shrouded in mist; an inscription enables us to identify it as the ‘invisible world’ (this is not equally clear on all the states of the etching, see below, fig. 119).

In the first chapter Van Hoogstraten examines the aim and function of the art of painting and its relation to the visible world. He devotes a section to the definition of painting, titled

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4. The specific allusion in the title page to the *hooge schoole* may be related to an apparent reference in the last line of the dedication to the muse Urania, in which Van Hoogstraten claims that ‘die hooge schoole der schilderkonst’ is the ‘hooge schoole der schilderkonst’ of which the reader has just completed the last chapter. This phrase is not repeated in the body of the text, and may thus be a coincidental allusion, or it may be a deliberate play on words, suggesting that the reader has completed the *hooge schoole* of painting and is now ready to proceed to the ‘hooge schoole’ of science, which is the subject of the last chapter. The globe beside Urania is thus a symbol of the visible world, which the reader is now ready to depict, and the invisible world, which will be revealed in the final chapter. This interpretation is consistent with the allegorical nature of the book, in which Van Hoogstraten presents himself as the author of art theory, and the invisible world is represented by the second circle, shrouded in mist.

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Fig. 30 – Samuel van Hoogstraten, *Urania*, title page of Chapter 9 of the *Inleyding tot de hooge schoole der schilderkonst.*
‘Van het oogmerk der Schilderkonst; wat ze is, en te weeg brengt’ (‘On the Purpose of Painting; What It Is, and Brings About’). This begins as follows:

‘Painting is a science for depicting all ideas, or mental images, that the entire visible world can provide: and deceiving the eye with outline and colour ... For a perfect Painting is like a mirror of Nature, making things that are not appear to be, and deceiving in a permissible, diverting and commendable way.’

In ‘To the Reader’ Van Hoogstraten observes straight away that painting is not a craft; it is, to his mind, comparable with the arts and sciences because it can depict ‘the entire visible world’. He urges painters not to confine themselves to one specialism but to become a ‘universal or general master’: to become proficient in all the elements of the visible world. It is this all-embracing character, in his view, that largely sets painting apart from the crafts, which are specialist by their very nature. The universality of painting means that it occupies an exceptional position among the arts and sciences:
'And one must not doubt, says G[erardus] Vossius, that one science is of mutual help to the other, indeed they are lame, unless they form a Round Dance of arts with one another. How then should this our universal knowledge of the imitation of all visible things not be joined with the others? While all [visible things] are understood in the intellect in the same way, and the one as well as the other consist of form and colour. That saying of the Italians, that he who attempts too much achieves little, does not apply here; for the art of painting remains sole and singular, although it reflects the whole of nature.'

Van Hoogstraten believes that the art of painting, which ‘reflects the whole of nature’ (de gansche natuer bespiegelt), should have an exemplary function in the ideal of the ‘unity of the sciences’ formulated by Vossius. This is a popular theme in the seventeenth century. Descartes, for instance, in his Rules for the Direction of the Mind (1628) posits that
Van Hoogstraten does not, though, underpin the intellectual status he accords the ‘universal’ power of painting with a detailed explanation. With a view to gaining greater insight into his argument that the depiction of visual reality is in some way intellectually important, we will examine the relation between painting and the visible world that is set out in the Inleyding.

Earlier studies of the Inleyding lit upon various aspects of this text that supposedly revealed its idiosyncratic character as compared with the international tradition. The Inleyding, it was said, differed from the works of Van Mander and Junius, ‘both generally in its practical and empirical character, and more particularly in its concern with techniques of description and illusion’; the text was seen as having an ‘overarching concern with the illusionistic and imitative aspects of pictorial representation’.

The present argumentation will not emphasize such aspects as ‘description and illusion’, but will rather analyse how Van Hoogstraten shows little interest in a supposed ‘hierarchy of Creation’ in which some elements are deemed more ‘spiritual’ and hence more worthy than others to be depicted.

In the first instance Van Hoogstraten’s proposition that painting can depict the entire visible world can be explained fairly literally. Because everything belongs to the domain of painting, Van Hoogstraten does not deem the study of classical art to be necessarily more meaningful than the depiction of objects of everyday reality. He consequently feels that a study trip to Italy is by no means essential; in fact, it is of no use whatsoever if the young artist has not first become accomplished in depicting the visible world. The teaching of drawing should focus on rendering every part of nature:

‘Learn first of all to follow the riches of nature, and imitate what is in it. The Sky, the earth, the sea, the animals, and good and common people, all serve for our practice. The flat fields, hills, streams and trees provide us with works enough. The towns, the markets, the churches, and thousands of riches in Nature call us, and say: come, you who are eager to learn, observe and imitate us. You will find in our own land so much pleasure, so much sweetness and so much dignity that, once you had tasted it, you would judge your life too short to depict it all. And in the least of objects one can learn to apply all the fundamental rules that belong to the most glorious things.’

The ‘least of objects’, according to Van Hoogstraten, are worth drawing because in them, too, the painter can demonstrate his ability to depict the visible and apply the ‘fundamental rules’ of art. In general the disparate elements of the visible world are of interest to the artist, ‘for there is some grace in everything’. Even the representation of the ugly and insignificant has an essential place in the depiction of the entire visible world, and as such does not have to be condemned out of hand. Van Hoogstraten observes, for instance, on the depiction of horses, that ‘many others of our compatriots of this age have been more passionate about the ugliness,
leanness and unsightliness of them: not that I wholly condemn such, for the material we choose
often compels us to depict unpleasant things, which, if we render them fittingly, become seem-
ly.12 He thus sees no need to idealize nature in all cases: ‘Do not scruple to follow the beauty
that is in nature, but be assured that what is pleasant in life will also make your work loved.’13

Another passage from the Inleyding that should be quoted in this context is the class-
ification into ‘degrees of art’ (genera pingendi) that Van Hoogstraten works out; he formulates
the ideal of the ‘universal master’ who has to be accomplished in all three genres.14 This tri-
chotomy accords the highest intellectual status to the depiction of people in emotional interac-
tion; the first two degrees, that deal with still-lifes and genre painting respectively, nonetheless
also have a theoretical appreciation (we shall discuss the genera pingendi in more detail on pages
191-197). Even trivial objects are worth painting, Van Hoogstraten tells us, provided it is done
in a convincing manner; in Plutarch’s words:

‘Thus we say with Plutarch that we view the Painting of a Lizard, of an ape ... indeed
the most horrible and most despised thing, if it only be natural, with delight and ad-
miration, and say ... that the ugly can yet be made beautiful if it is true to nature and,
as regards the imitation, deserves the same praise as one is bound to give to the most
exquisite thing.’15

Elsewhere, too, Van Hoogstraten describes how ‘the ugly’ becomes ‘beautiful’, worthy of be-
ing depicted, because of the success of the imitation.16 He rejects Erasmus’s observation that
only rare or noble animals are worth depicting; common beasts are equally appropriate sub-
jects for painting: ‘[Erasmus’s] countrymen, however, take their greatest pleasure in painted
calves, pigs and asses ... For however trivial one deems these preferences to be, Clio has placed
them in the second degree of art, and it is more glorious to be the first in rank in the second
degree, than to be in the third [and highest] degree, but pushed far to the back.’17 Successful
imitation apparently transcends the hierarchy of the genera: Van Hoogstraten believes it is bet-
ter to shine in one of the lower ‘degrees’ than to be a mediocre history painter. The ‘universal’
master should, moreover, become accomplished in all the elements of the visible world; the
youthful painter must strive to become ‘master in all the parts of our art’.18 It is in precisely this
universal skill that the painter can set himself apart from the tradesman: ‘It is so that those who
practise art as no more than a cobbler’s craft understand nothing beyond their last; but those
who understand what they make will become aware that all other things are also grasped by
that same understanding.’19

These remarks, revealing a preference for the imitation of nature above that of ideal
beauty, suggest that the Inleyding formulates a specific position in the tradition of art theory
that generally takes the opposite stand. Before establishing Van Hoogstraten’s place in this
tradition, we will examine a striking remark about ‘handling’ or brushwork, and Van Hoog-
straten’s views about the rewards for his labours that await the painter.
‘THE SOUL OF ART’: EXAMINING THE ‘PROPERTIES’ OF THINGS

In both the first chapter, devoted, among other things, to drawing, and the sixth, which deals
with the use of colour and brushwork, Van Hoogstraten repeatedly urges the painter to tailor
his ‘handling’ or manner of painting entirely to the visible world. He stresses that the painter
must not apply himself to following a particular style or developing a style of his own. On the
contrary, he must adapt his manner to what he sees; singular properties of the visible, such as
materials with distinctive surfaces, must constantly redetermine the way he paints.

In the first phase of the learning process, drawing, the pupil must become proficient in
depicting the textures of various surfaces. After devoting two ‘lessons’ to painting, Van Hoog-
straten concludes that ‘the third Lesson is to give each thing its property / according to the
characteristics presented by working from life, / in handling: one must adopt no manner / but
that which flexibly adapts to the grace in every thing.’

Van Hoogstraten usually uses ‘handling’ in connection with the handling of paint: here,
in the context of drawing, he means the differentiated use of lines ‘to give each thing its prop-
erty’. The artist should adapt the way he draws to the visual characteristics of the object he
is depicting: ‘for one must sometimes change one’s handling according to the properties of
things.’

Likewise, when he explains the problems that arise in the use of colour and brushwork,
Van Hoogstraten urges the painter not to rely on routine in his ‘handling’, but always to allow
his brushstroke to be determined by what he sees in front of him:

‘Do not bother too much about learning handling or a manner of painting, but do
persist in becoming more certain in observation ... Thus the hand and the brush will
become subordinate to the eye, in order properly to depict the diversity of things, each
in its own fashion, in the most graceful way.’

The painter must subordinate his manner of painting to his ‘eye and judgement’ in order to
express the ‘diversity of things’ properly:

‘For the floating hair, the trembling foliage or things of that kind require different
kinds of loose handling (lossichet van bandeling); and again, a different sort of brush-
work in the beautiful nude and the gleaming marble. But you will get it all correctly if
only your hand is accustomed to obeying your eye and your judgement.’

The method that involves using varied brushwork adapted to different objects in a single work
can be associated directly with Rembrandt and his pupils. Van Hoogstraten’s remarks bear out
Ernst van de Wetering’s analysis of Rembrandt’s early work, in which the movements of the
brush echo the shape of the things depicted, and Rembrandt’s method of working the texture
of the surface of the paint such that it resembles the surface texture of the objects themselves.

Van Hoogstraten urges the painter to focus on the ‘properties’ of things: ‘One must virtuously
imitate the properties of simple nature.’

In a discussion with Fabritius, so Van Hoogstraten tells us, he expressed his personal
views on the qualities that make a person suitable to pursue the artistic profession: ‘that he is,
as it were, in love with the soul of art: that is to say, examining nature’s properties’. It calls for a ‘very active and reflective mind’.26 This focus on the ‘properties’ of the visible can be regarded as an essential element in the depiction of the visible world, and Van Hoogstraten presents it here as the ‘soul of art’.

Van Hoogstraten’s comments about the ‘virtuous imitation’ of nature can be linked to the specific elements of a painter’s training he identifies, but also to older commonplaces in the tradition of art theory: the comparison of painting with philosophy and rhetoric.

THE PAINTER’S REWARDS: PAINTING AND PHILOSOPHY

The title page of the chapter devoted to the muse Urania has in the foreground an allegorical representation of the rewards for his labours that await the painter (fig. 30). On the left are three putti. One of them is engaged in gathering branches of laurel and represents honour or gloria, another carries a great many bags of money, symbolic of monetary gain or lucrum, and the third, sitting beside a basket of apples, has to be associated with amor and according to the accompanying text must be interpreted as the personification of the ‘satisfaction of the mind’ that the painter’s work brings him. Van Hoogstraten’s explanation reads: ‘[The painter] has threefold fruits from his work: one is the satisfaction of his mind, which he receives through the perfection of his work; the other is reputation; and the third is the benefit that shall come to him either by gift, by sale or by other remuneration’.27

Echoing Seneca, Van Hoogstraten asserts that the second and third of these rewards, ‘honour’ and ‘gain’, are subordinate to the painter’s first and principal motive force: his ‘love of art’. And this, says Van Hoogstraten, is not simply to do with producing important works that contribute to the furtherance of the art of painting. The disinterested love of art also brings the artist contentment, which arises in the first instance not from the completion of the work but from the act of painting itself: ‘Ay such that an attentive Painter, as Seneca teaches us, finds greater pleasure in painting itself than in having painted: for this activity which his work requires, brings with it great pleasure in the work itself.’28 On the sides of a perspective box now in the National Gallery in London, Van Hoogstraten depicted a painter alongside the three putti with their attributes and their banderoles bearing the inscriptions lucri causa, gloria causa and amoris causa (figs. 33-36).29

Junius comments on the characteristics of the artist in the context of the Stoic amor virtutis – virtue should be its own reward. Fame and riches are not consonant with ‘the worthines of these Arts, and of the sufficient contentment they doe finde in themselves’.30 The Stoic connotations of this view are also evident in an emblem by Vaenius in which the same three putti, representing love, profit and honour, are associated with the specific virtue of ataraxia or a detached and balanced state of mind (the emblem is entitled ‘Who is rich? He who covets nothing’) (fig. 37). Whereas Junius cannot reconcile pecuniary gain with the dignity of a liberal art, Van Mander – in his biography of the painter Cornelis Ketel, for instance – uses the same trichotomy as Van Hoogstraten.31

In the Inleyding Van Hoogstraten goes on to contest another concept from antiquity – that painting’s sole function is to gratify the senses and that in consequence it may not be regarded as one of the artes liberales. Only those activities that are instructive and hence encour-
Fig. 33 – Samuel van Hoogstraten, *Perspective Box with Views of a Dutch Interior*, wood, 58 x 88 x 64 cm (exterior measurement), National Gallery, London.
age greater virtue should qualify as liberal arts. Van Hoogstraten accepts that the fine arts cannot easily imbue someone with as much dignity and virtue as ‘true works of virtue and piety’. But, he insists, painting certainly should not be seen as a vice; in any event it no more distracts from the spiritual life than occupations, not unvirtuous in themselves, like war or politics. Van Hoogstraten goes so far as to say that, although in the first instance painting does not have a moralizing function, in a philosophical sense it is a commendable activity: an occupation of a reflective nature. ‘It investigates visible nature,’ states Van Hoogstraten in a marginal note, even describing it as a ‘Sister of reflective philosophy’.\(^{32}\)

Van Hoogstraten is of the opinion that the life of a philosopher, or a painter, is more valuable as a speculative \textit{vita contemplativa} than the \textit{vita activa} of politics and war: ‘for the practice of the noble arts, in silent, observant pursuit of the secrets of nature, corresponds and runs parallel to the exercise of the virtues’, and he continues:

‘Upon which I dare say that it would truly be unjust to scorn a sincere practitioner of the Art of Painting, who pursues it for its own sake and for its virtuous nature. Not all philosophers have been called to state or city government, and nevertheless they are praised highly enough in their disdain for worldly powers by Plutarch ... although they have brought no greater ornament to the world, nor more constancy and pleasure to themselves, than our Painters in their pursuit of this graceful philosophy.’\(^{33}\)
Fig. 35 – Samuel van Hoogstraten, *Gloriae causa*, side of the perspective box in London.

Fig. 36 – Samuel van Hoogstraten, *Amoris causa*, side of the perspective box in London.
The painter who has no other aim in mind but painting itself, in the realization of the virtuous character of this occupation, can be compared, says Van Hoogstraten, to a philosopher who spurns worldly occupations and concerns himself with the contemplative study of his surroundings. The depiction of the visible world, provided it is done ‘for its own sake’, that is to say motivated by a desire to investigate visible nature, can hence be an end in itself.

The comparison of painting and philosophy is a recurring theme in the tradition of art theory; Van Mander, for instance, calls his favourite painter Goltzius a philosopher, as much for his contemplative attitude towards life that places ‘love of art’ above monetary gain, as for his courtesy and decency and for his ‘knowledge of Nature’. Alberti is even convinced that Socrates, Plato, the skeptic Pyrrho and their colleague ‘Metrodorus’ were themselves eminent artists; this remark probably inspired Achille Bocchi’s representation of Socrates as a painter (fig. 38).

As the following will demonstrate, Van Hoogstraten’s interpretation of the traditional comparison of painting to a form of ‘graceful philosophy’ encompasses more than just a rhetorical equating of painting with an intellectual discipline.

**Painting as ‘universal knowledge’**

Van Hoogstraten’s description of painting as ‘universal knowledge’ and his view ‘that there is scarcely a single art or science of which it is fitting for a Painter to remain ignorant’ answers the topical description of the all-encompassing powers of the orator, as in Tacitus’ proposition that ‘rhetoric is the mistress of all the arts’. Cicero says that oratory should know ‘no circumscribed domain’, after all, ‘the rhetorician must be able to skilfully present everything that can arise in a dialogue between people’; for this reason he compares rhetoricians with phi-
Renaissance rhetoricians like Lorenzo Valla seized on this idea to present rhetoric as the most fundamental human occupation. Valla also involves painting in this argument when he stresses that the visual arts and rhetoric are so closely related that they flourish and fall into decline at the same time. This topos serves Paleotti as a point of departure for observing that, just as orators have to be accomplished in all skills and sciences if they are to be able to persuade the people on various matters, so painting – as the ‘book of the illiterate’ – extends to all things, ‘heaven, earth, plants, animals, and human actions’.

Van Hoogstraten also draws upon words attributed to Quintilian which assert that ‘a painter who has once mastered the right way of Imitating, or copying, will easily depict everything he sees: indeed anything he could see in nature’ as an argument in his plea that painting be accorded the status of ‘universal knowledge’.

The art-theoretical tradition stresses that just as rhetoric is the foundation not only of literature but also of many other arts, so too is draughtsmanship not just the basis of painting, sculpture and architecture – it is also indispensable to a great many occupations such as cartography, astronomy and so forth. As Van Hoogstraten also describes in his first chapter, drawing is useful for ‘Military Arts, Architects, Writers, Natural History Writers, Geographers, Astronomers, Physicians, Historians’. Painting is consequently presented in courtiers’ manuals as an essential activity. The early modern conception of the equal foundations of literature and the visual arts legitimates the self-evident way that ideas about a fundamental art like rhetoric can be transferred to painting. Starting from the purported meaning of the concept of graphein, which the Greeks apparently used to mean both writing and drawing, Vossius declares that ‘it is necessary for the painter to know everything, because he imitates...
everything. He is a philosopher, painter, architect and anatomist'. Referring to this same etymology, Goeree bases the superiority of painting over the literary arts on his supposition that writing is based on pictography.

The equivalent of the Greek term *graphike* in the art-theoretical tradition is the Italian concept of *disegno*, which relates both to the mental image or ‘design’ that is the basis for a work of art, and to the actual practice of drawing. Draughtsmanship is not just the foundation of the artist’s education: some authors present it as the basis for all the arts and sciences. Van Mander, for instance, says: ‘Painting, which is founded on Drawing, is the Wet Nurse of all good Arts and sciences’, and he goes on to assert that the liberal arts cannot exist without ‘Drawing that embraces all things’. Goeree speaks in similar terms of drawing as ‘the Womb and Wet Nurse of all the Arts and Sciences’.

Some Italian theorists, particularly Federico Zuccari, attribute a universal status to draughtsmanship, an idea to which Van Hoogstraten’s definition of painting as ‘universal knowledge’ is indebted. In the *Inleyding* Van Hoogstraten repeatedly refers to Zuccari as a painter and draughtsman, not as an art theorist. It is more than likely, however, that while he was in Rome he encountered the debates sparked by Zuccari’s *L’idea de’ pittori, scultori, et architetti*. Zuccari had been the first president of the Roman academy of art, the Accademia di San Luca, where he had many adepts. Painters from the Netherlands like Karel van Mander also moved in Zuccari’s circle and may have been familiar with the theory put forward in his treatise.

*L’idea* is divided into two parts, devoted to what are described as *disegno interno* and *disegno esterno*. Zuccari uses the term *disegno interno* to refer to the mental image, which in his view precedes the *disegno esterno*, the drawing. As all thinking involves the formation of mental images, *disegno* is a universal concept, applicable to all objects and actions: ‘by *disegno interno* I mean the image formed in our mind in order to be able to know anything’. Zuccari says: ‘I want to treat *disegno* in so far as it occurs in all existing and non-existing, all visible and invisible, spiritual and corporeal things ... I shall endeavour ... to show that this [*disegno*] is the universal source of light not only of our knowledge and actions, but also of every other science and skill.’ ‘Following the philosophers,’ he believes, ‘that in its universality *disegno interno* is an Idea and a form in the mind that clearly and distinctly represents the object that it [the mind] has in view’. In the light of the universal significance of *disegno*, Zuccari depicted the concept in the form of a bearded divinity on a ceiling fresco in his house in Rome (fig. 39).

Van Hoogstraten demonstrates his debt to ideas about *disegno* as formulated by Zuccari, when he relates drawing – *Teykening* in his terminology – to the human faculty of forming mental images. This is best illustrated by a passage titled ‘How visible Nature specifically manifests itself’, accompanied by the gloss: ‘the visible part of nature has *Teykening*:

‘In [the] exploration of nature, we only have to consider her visible aspect (*alleen baer zichtbaer deel*), for everything that is visible in nature must provide the arts of Painting and Drawing with their subjects. Thus we immediately see the appearances of things, with their colours, the first of which we shall call forms, or shapes, or by our customary artistic word, Drawing (*Teykening*) ... The particular properties of all things thus appear to us first in their forms and shapes: not as they are described by the natural
philosophers, but only as they determine the outward shapes, like the shell around the egg, and distinguish the bodies they comprise, as if by an external surface, from other things: just as wine contained in a bottle assumes the shape of the goblet, so the shape of the bottle becomes the object of the Painter’s mirroring art, and as such he understands all natural things, and each in particular.”

Van Hoogstraten states that the artist forms an image of the ‘forms or shapes’ of things that corresponds to an inward design or ‘drawing’; this is why ‘all natural things’ can belong to the artist’s domain. Although his abstract interpretation of *Teykening* is very similar to Zuccari’s, Van Hoogstraten parts company with him in that he sees the scope of painting more literally confined to the visible world; Zuccari also includes all ‘invisible’ things in the art of drawing because in his view products of fantasy, like depictions of reality, originate in mental images. Van Hoogstraten apparently subscribes to the ancient Stoic view that the mind is a ‘reflective surface’ or *a tabula rasa* that can only be filled with information provided by the senses, whereas the imagination leads to harmful illusions (see also below, pages 115-117).

Like Zuccari, Van Hoogstraten uses examples to illustrate the value of a mastery of drawing in many different arts and sciences, ‘because there is not an Art nor craft, indeed no occupation at all, in which it does not prove necessary as a second way of Writing’. Zuccari writes ‘that no single science, understanding or activity is or can be this universal light, this nourishment and lifeblood of all human sciences, other than this same intellectual and practical *disegno*, and he even reduces philosophy to *disegno*. In similar vein, Van Hoogstraten asserts that drawing ‘is necessary ... to all people who use their intellect; since vision and judgement are greatly enlightened by the art of drawing.’ His colleague Goeree also emphasizes this intellectual aspect when he describes drawing as ‘judgement and reason about all things that may happen’; its subjects should extend to ‘all the abundant works of Nature’. How many ‘infinite fields are there to walk through in the art of Drawing’, asks Van Hoogstraten, pointing to the importance of drawing in education, because ‘it is concerned with everything nature brings forth’, so that the pupil learns to ‘imitate things exactly as they are’.

Van Hoogstraten starts his third chapter with a passage entitled ‘On Universality in Painting’ (‘Van de algemeenheyd in de schilderkonst’). Here, he stresses that the painter must extend his activities to encompass the whole of the visible world. His arguments are akin to Zuccari’s theoretical justification of drawing. The passage begins:

‘We shall encourage the alert minds to become universal; that is, to depict as many forms of things as may occur: because all of them together and each in particular, imitated in the same manner, are understood in an Artist’s mind ... visible things [are] all understood in the mind in the same way.”

Apparently, Van Hoogstraten was able to call on Zuccari’s views on *disegno* to bolster the authority with which he surrounds his description of painting as an art that ‘reflects the entire visible world’ and is superior to all other arts and sciences.
‘Disegno’ and ‘Idea’

The intellectual and universal foundation of disegno is closely related to the belief that artists are able to penetrate to the fundamentals of nature and distil a fixed core from the multiplicity of phenomena. The development in the theory about the artist’s ability to perceive and represent these ideal forms was the subject of Erwin Panofsky’s classical study *Idea; a Concept in Art Theory* (first edition 1927). As Panofsky pointed out, Zuccari’s theory about the relationship between drawing and imagination adapts the term idea, which is also the title of his treatise, in an idiosyncratic way.

On the one hand, Zuccari’s term idea is a synonym for the internal image or design that the artist forms before he embarks on his work; in the same way Van Hoogstraten uses the term ‘mental image’ (denkbeeld, literally ‘thought image’) as well as ‘idea’ (idee). Van Mander identifies idea with imaginatio in a way that is very reminiscent of Zuccari, ‘Idea, imagination or thought’, and states that drawing is always accompanied by a mental image (‘a preliminary design in his mind’). Similarly, Vasari refers to drawing as the ‘Idea of all things in nature’.

Alongside this identification of idea and imaginatio, Zuccari also uses the term in the more philosophical meaning. Given the universal significance of his idea which, as the correlate of disegno, extends to encompass the whole of the visible world, he is no orthodox Platonist. Indeed, Zuccari explicitly states that he is not using the term idea in the Platonic sense:

> ‘What our intellect knows in a natural and direct way are the essences of material things ... and these essences are not found separate from the individual things, as the divine Plato suggests in his positioning of Ideas, as some assert; but Ideas are in reality only to be found in the associated individual things, for mankind exists only in certain separate individuals, and the essence of the Lion exists only in individual Lions, and the same is true of all other things.’

Zuccari does not conceive of Ideas as assumed Platonic *universalia ante rem* (‘universals before the fact’), the general principles allegedly inhabiting a higher spiritual realm and of which we only see shadows in the multiplicity of the visible world. Nor does he see Ideas as principles that are distilled from phenomena like a sort of mean, *universalia post rem* (‘universals after the fact’). His disegno relates to every conceivable image that the mind can form, from which it derives its all-embracing powers. The all-encompassing scope that he wishes to ascribe to disegno leads rather to *universalia in re*, or a situation in which the essence of phenomena does not exist outside the things themselves. In this situation the Idea has lost much of its ‘universal’ value. With Zuccari, it is difficult to distinguish Ideas from concrete things; every phenomenon, as it were, merits philosophical contemplation. In light of this view it is understandable that in his theory of art Zuccari expressly asserts that artists must rely solely on their senses, and certainly not on mathematical perspective or canonical proportions.

Zuccari strips the concept of ‘Idea’ of much of its Platonic value. In his view, the artist is not capable of penetrating to a higher reality; his job is first and foremost to depict the multitude of objects in the world of phenomena. Zuccari writes:
‘only the outward forms of perceptible, natural things can be imitated by painting: and it can only imitate them in a lifelike and truthful way. And so this visible World (questo Mondo visibile), made by the supreme Creator with such exceptional art, and adorned with such mastery ... is the primary and most essential object of our imitation as painters’.69

Zuccari’s term idea retains its metaphysical connotation only in the universal scope that he grants the artistic focus on concrete individual things. He consequently refers to drawing as a scintilla divina or ‘divine spark’, and reduces Disegno etymologically to Segno di Dio, a sign from God that enables man to know His Creation.70 In view of the similarities that have emerged here between Zuccari’s theory and passages in the Inleyding, it seems plausible that Zuccari’s thinking inspired Van Hoogstraten when he defined painting as ‘the knowledge to depict all ideas, or mental images, that the entire visible world can provide’.71

**Two meanings of ‘ars imitatur naturam’**

Now that it has become clear that, in Van Hoogstraten’s view, the artist may give intellectual attention both to the idealized human form and to other elements in the multiplicity of the visible world, we must address his definition of painting as a ‘mirror of nature’. What does his term ‘nature’ mean, and how is this definition related to the perceived intellectual status of painting as foremost among the arts and sciences?

Before the Inleyding was published, Van Hoogstraten had already put forward the thesis that art ‘mirrors’ or ‘apes’ nature in an allegorical drawing (fig. 40).72 It shows the personification of Pictura engaged in portraying a many-breasted woman sporting the crown of a city goddess. She is Natura, the personification of the natural and the inhabited world; as she poses she holds out to the painter a chalice containing her abundant gifts.73 The scene is attended by two of the by-now familiar three putti; here, with a personification of Fama, they represent the painter’s rewards.74 The proposition ars imitatur naturam, art imitates nature, boasts a considerable tradition.75 Plato likened a painting to a mirror, and Italian art theory habitually describes painting as scimmia della natura, the ape of nature.76 Van Hoogstraten’s formulation echoes a tradition that is far from unambiguous.

We should begin by recalling that Plato’s equation of a painting with a mirror was originally a disparaging judgement: art that imitates the visible world was seen as a worthless copy, two steps removed from true reality, the world of Ideas. Neoplatonist thought developed a view of the imitating of nature with a positive significance. The starting point for this positive assessment is the idea that art works not only ‘after nature’ – produces a copy of the visible – but also ‘in the manner of nature’: the methods and standards the artist uses have their origins in nature itself. The artist recognizes the structural principles underlying nature’s appearance, and creates a work of art by following those same principles.

Jan Białostocki pointed to the influence this view had on the theory of art in his article ‘The Renaissance Concept of Nature and Antiquity’ (1988).77 He cited a number of Italian quattrocento art theorists to show that the term ‘nature’ had more than one meaning during this period. When Alberti writes in his De pictura that the painter must turn to nature in order
to depict faces convincingly, all he means by ‘nature’ is the everyday reality of the visible world. Białostocki described this as a ‘passive’ meaning. But Alberti also uses nature in an ‘active’ sense. He tells us, for instance, that he once thought that the arts had been neglected since antiquity, so that he ‘was convinced that nature, the mistress of things, having become old and tired ... no longer produced many broad and remarkable minds’. Białostocki interpreted this to mean that Alberti also conceived of nature as an active being, as an animated principle that controls organic and human life, the ‘mistress of things’.

Białostocki linked these two definitions of the concept of nature with the concepts of *natura naturans* and *natura naturata* derived from scholastic terminology. While *natura naturans* denotes nature as an active, creative principle, *natura naturata* describes the static result of this creative process. He states that in antiquity the proposition *ars imitatur naturam* could already relate to each of these two notions. On the one hand art was defined as a faithful copy of the visible (*natura naturata*), but at the same time it could be seen as penetrating right to the principles that underlie Creation. This latter view was developed in the Neoplatonism of Plotinus:

*Fig. 40 – Samuel van Hoogstraten, *Pictura Painting Nature*, pen and brown wash. Musée des Arts Décoratifs, Paris.*
'And if someone disparages the arts because they are engaged in imitating nature in their creations, then I must first remark that nature also imitates other things. And then he must know that the arts do not only imitate visible things but ascend to the formative principles from which nature derives.'

Painting ‘after nature’ can, according to this view, take on the meaning of ‘working in accordance with the structural principles of nature’. Neoplatonism assumes an order in nature which is the basis of every part of the Creation; the artist who ‘imitates nature’ accesses this order and thus touches on fundamental cosmological principles. What is more, the work of art, which itself is made ‘in accordance with the laws of nature’, can express these universal principles. Zuccari puts it thus: ‘The reason art imitates nature is because ... in creating art objects, art works in just the same way as nature itself works. And if we also want to know why nature can be imitated, it is because nature is ordered according to an intelligible principle.’

The distinction between natura naturans and natura naturata can be related to the different ways Van Mander uses the concept of nature in the ‘Grondt’. In his commentary on this treatise, Hessel Miedema pointed out that Van Mander presents nature as an animated principle, as that which, for instance, gives painters their talent and is the source of true beauty. The painter can only penetrate more deeply to this ‘true nature’ of phenomena with the aid of sound training and inspiration (spirit, or geest, in Van Mander’s terminology). The following quotation from the ‘Grondt’ exemplifies this line of thought. The passage is glossed with the marginal note: ‘Nature is beautiful, because of divers virtues or gifts she has’:

‘Heaven, being generous and kind,
wanted to add to Noble Nature,
besides other gifts residing in her,
the virtue of beauty, felicitously and skilfully
giving perfect pleasure to the eye;
but when we plough the origin and core,
then we find all manner of reasons why
Nature’s beauty is entirely perfect.’

Van Mander presents ‘Noble Nature’ as a principle that is the source of beauty, but this principle is difficult to fathom; it is only after ‘ploughing the origin and core’ of the beautiful object that perfect beauty and its fundamentals can be found. In line with this train of thought, Van Mander says that the origin of beauty is ‘invisible’, in other words cannot be accessed by the senses: ‘The most beautiful beauty is the invisible / Beauty, honoured as the origin of all beauty’.

Miedema noted that there are indications in Van Mander’s Schilder-boeck that contrayerfeyten, working from life as in portraiture, was treated with contempt. What should concern the painter, according to Van Mander’s Neoplatonic framework, is not visible nature, but the ‘true character’ of things, their ‘intrinsic nature’. Miedema concluded that the expression ‘working from nature’ as Van Mander used it had a meaning opposite to the modern understanding of it, that is to say working from observation. In Van Mander, says Miedema, working ‘from
nature’ (de natuer) means ‘according to the laws of nature’; on the other hand, he used the expression ‘from life’ (naer het leven) to signify working from nature in the modern sense of the term, for example working from a live model. For an illustration of this argument about the painter’s revealing of the hidden laws of nature, we may point to the way Van Mander represented this view of the topos ars imitatur naturam in a painting (fig. 41). It shows a human figure studying ‘Natura’ who, as in Van Hoogstraten’s drawing, is personified by a many-breasted woman with a city goddess’s crown. This personification points at tablets, similar to Moses’s tablets of stone, so it would seem that she is showing the painter the hidden laws beneath her surface. Moses, as one of the earliest philosophers, was generally deemed to have studied nature in an exemplary way.

What is left of these historical connotations of the concepts of ‘nature’ and ‘imitation’ in Van Hoogstraten’s thought? Although Van Hoogstraten used much of the phraseology of his predecessors who adhered to the Neoplatonist concept of nature, few echoes of a distinction between two possible meanings of ars imitatur naturam can be found in the Inleyding.

To start with, we can say that Van Hoogstraten often quotes earlier authors who use the concept of nature in the meaning of the creative principle, natura naturans. Van Hoogstraten repeats a passage that also appears in Alberti about phenomena found in nature where there appear to be images that have come about by chance. He writes: ‘it [is] clear that nature itself appears to take pleasure and find enjoyment in Painting.’ And he also tells us, referring to the
recognizable figures that can be seen in different types of stone, ‘Finally there remains for us to observe how skilfully nature itself sometimes paints’; he concludes that ‘Nature and chance imitate art, as art imitates nature.’

Evidently, Van Hoogstraten was well aware of the additional weight that the concept of ‘nature’ could have in earlier art theory. However, when he describes the painter’s tasks, the way a painting comes about and the purpose of the art of painting, he does not make use of a distinction between *natura naturata* and *natura naturans*. In his theory of art, the depiction of the visible world is not subordinated to an endeavour to penetrate deeper to the ‘true reality’. Nor can we find any passage in the *Inleyding* conveying the meaning of the passage from Zucchi quoted above, in which the structure of nature is compared with the structure of art.

The *Inleyding* contains only the occasional phrase reflecting the view that the artist must endeavour to discover the ‘true’ nature of things. In response to something said by Seneca, who supposedly believed that knowledge of perspective is not necessary in everyday life, Van Hoogstraten counters, ‘but I say that a Painter, whose job it is to deceive the eye, must also know so much about the nature of things that he thoroughly understands why it is that the eye is deceived.’ In other words, if he wants to produce an image with convincing perspective, the painter must have a thorough knowledge of the ‘nature of things’. Here, though, Van Hoogstraten is referring to the mechanisms that make it possible to ‘deceive the eye’; the passage gives us no reason to assume that, in Neoplatonist fashion, he is urging the artist to discover a cosmological structure. What he says clearly relates to the laws of optics, as they were established as part of the quest for natural physical laws in the seventeenth century, and not to the Aristotelian view which holds that each thing develops according to ‘its own nature’.

In this context we have only to repeat our earlier remarks about the status Van Hoogstraten accords to the depiction of the visible. In his description of the artist’s method, he describes one particular aspect as crucial: to express the ‘diversity’ of things, always varying his brushwork according to what he sees so that the hand becomes ‘subordinate to the eye’. When Van Hoogstraten demands that the painter must concentrate on the ‘soul of art’, in other words ‘imitate the properties of simple nature’, he does not mean the deeper fundamentals of nature, just the specific properties of the elements of the visible world.

We might conclude from this that at the time Van Hoogstraten wrote his *Inleyding* the Neoplatonist concept of a structure underlying nature had vanished from the theory of art. To add weight to this hypothesis we can point to some similar elements in Philips Angel’s *Lof der schilderkonst*. Eric Jan Sluijter demonstrated the particular value given in this treatise to the ‘imitation of nature’ in the form of a concern for the rendition of materials, reflections of light and other ephemeral optical phenomena, such as looking through smoke, through the spokes of a rotating wheel or at a burning brand that is being moved quickly. In Angel’s view the painter must discover the specific properties of individual things; he speaks about *eygbentlickbeyt*, literally ‘specificality’ or ‘individuality’ – that which makes things specific – a concept he associates with *veranderlyckbeyt* or ‘changeability’, in other words, ephemeral appearance. Angel describes the difficulty that the painter must overcome to achieve this: ‘Now many may judge this changeability to be much more difficult to imitate than other things; but since we are imitators of life, so we must not fail to take rather more pains (if we can thus get closer to natural things).’ Just as Van Hoogstraten does not give the ‘properties of nature’ a
double meaning, Angel does not suggest anything abstract by getting ‘closer to natural things’. Indeed, he presents painters as no more and no less than ‘imitators of life’: apparently, capturing the ‘specificality’, the wealth of detail differentiating visible things, is the painter’s most essential task.

Van Hoogstraten’s version of the proposition *ars imitatur naturam* lacks the Neoplatonist underpinning that was still the basis of Van Mander’s world view. In the *Inleyding* we can even find a view of the depiction of nature that is diametrically opposed to the earlier conception: whereas Van Mander despised *conterfeyten*, Van Hoogstraten takes the observation that the subject of painting is the visible world as the basis of his argument that his profession is much more than a craft. To his mind, rather than concern himself with the ‘inward’ aspects of reality – what Zuccari calls *disegno interno* – the painter should focus on the outward forms that surround things ‘like the shell around the egg’, Zuccari’s *disegno esterno*. Nonetheless, Van Hoogstraten’s formulations are based on a time-honoured tradition: the implicit intellectual connotations of his definition of painting as the ‘mirror of nature’ give it a certain authority guaranteed by the tradition, even though it has meanwhile been detached from the older philosophical context. His treatise demonstrates how the significance of the term ‘nature’ shifted over the course of the seventeenth century.

That Van Hoogstraten’s definition is without doubt a reworking of the earlier conception influenced by philosophy is evident from the Neoplatonist tone that can be heard in his phraseology: we may recall his definition that painting is ‘the knowledge to depict all ideas, or mental images, that the entire visible world can provide’ (italics mine). It is clear that here his term ‘idea’ (*denkbeeld*) should not automatically be associated with a ‘higher’ world of Ideas that might cast its imperfect shadows on the world of phenomena: it refers first of all to the painter’s ability to form mental images and to mirror the visible world in his mind. This is as it were a reversal of the original Neoplatonist train of thought. In Van Hoogstraten’s theory of art, the term ‘idea’ does not relate to universal principles that are far removed from everyday experience: on the contrary, he is concerned with the visible world and all its diverse elements.

Van Hoogstraten says no more in his *Inleyding* about the philosophical background to this definition and the role of the depiction of the visible world. As he tells us, he was saving his more philosophical reasoning for his *Invisible World*. His thinking may, however, have been dictated by the shift we have already discussed, akin to that which occurred in Zuccari’s work, where Ideas are, as it were, brought down from their transcendental world to coincide with phenomena. In this situation there is essentially no longer any question of philosophical ‘Idealism’ in the proper sense of the word. Zuccari’s and Van Hoogstraten’s theory about the representation of ideas can be regarded as an intellectual mental leap, intended to provide legitimation for an art that studies every aspect of the visible world. After all, when, of ‘all natural things’, ‘each in particular’ may be perceived as an Idea, to repeat Van Hoogstraten’s words, then ‘everything that is visible’ merits philosophical or artistic reflection.

In this connection, a passage from Goeree’s *Inleyding tot de practijck der algemeene Schilderkonst* can shed more light on the way that the inversion of the original Neoplatonist reasoning can be explained, so that attention is directed to the specific details of the visible, rather than to the general principles that might be supposed to underpin them.
'But to add something to what we have already said, which can foster the intellectual esteem for Painting, one must observe that it imitates all of perfect nature, to which it is so strongly linked that the one may not be separated from the other. ... Nature is unfathomably rich in bringing forth a multiplicity of every species, of which we have an Example in so many thousands of People, Animals and Plants: which, although they are of one stock, are not, however, exactly the same as one another; in this, art can be said to possess the same perfection, inasmuch as, in imitating, it brings forth as many forms as it will' (italics mine).95

Goeree stresses the abundance of visible nature, which is expressed in the multiplicity of concrete instances of each ‘species’ (human, animal or plant) that can occur. In Goeree’s view it is not universal fundamental principles that concern the artist; it is the multiplicity of objects which, even if they come from the same ‘stock’, ‘are not exactly the same as one another’ (malkander niet juist gelijkstalig zijn). And the value of art stems from the fact that it can record the same multiplicity of forms – not because it succeeds in reducing the randomness of nature to generalities, but precisely because it records this randomness, it records the way in which things differ from one another.

The assertion that art ‘brings forth as many forms as it will’ has echoes in the all-encompassing scope that Van Hoogstraten accords to art as ‘universal knowledge’. Goeree’s belief that art concentrates on the things that are ‘not exactly the same as one another’ is in tune with Van Hoogstraten’s admonition to the artist to ‘give each thing its property’.

Following on from the passage quoted above, Goeree emphasizes that art is not capable of transcending the beauty of nature; in this connection he cites a passage from the famous poem Oogentroost (Ocular Consolation, 1647) by Constantijn Huygens, in which the poet stresses the beauty of nature in comparison with painting:

‘Two drops are not the same, two eggs, two pears,
nor two countenances either. The power and the glory
of the first Creator are revealed in the eternal difference
of all that was and is, and shall be hereafter’.96

It is in the ‘eternal difference’ (eeuwig onderscheid) of the elements of the Creation that Huygens sees the power of the Creator revealed. In other words it is not solely to be found in a possible cosmological structure underlying Creation. The visible world itself, with all its imperfections and coincidences, is the literal manifestation of God’s power.

Goeree, an erudite citizen of the republic of letters, had good reason to quote these lines in a book about the painting of his day. Huygens was an influential lover of the visual arts, in which he had himself been trained.97 The quotation from his poem Oogentroost provides the philosophical underpinning for an art of painting as propagated by Van Hoogstraten and Angel: a focus on the ‘specificality’ of the many parts of the visible world, on that which distinguishes all things from one another.
The ‘entire Visible World’: ‘naturalia’ and ‘artificialia’

We must add a terminological note to the conceptions of ‘nature’ and the ‘visible world’ as a subject of artistic study that were analysed above. Van Hoogstraten’s visible world and Zucari’s *Mondo visibile* seem to refer not solely to ‘organic nature’ or the landscape but to the Creation as the whole of visible reality, that is to say including man-made objects. When Van Hoogstraten stresses that the artist can depict ‘all ideas, or mental images, that the entire visible world can provide’, he is insisting that the painter is capable of depicting not just the whole of organic nature but also the entire visible component of reality. The ‘visible world’ apparently contains both *naturalia* and *artificialia* – natural things and artificial things. This is the view that also resonates in Zuccari’s use of the term *idea* to indicate the universal scope of drawing. Various references to this concept can be found in the tradition of art theory.

Zuccari believes that painting is a ‘science which ... by imitating and depicting focuses on nature and on those artificial things that are made by human hand’,98 and elsewhere he says that the ‘only real and universal aim of painting is to be the imitator of nature and of all artificial things’.99 His follower Romano Alberti believes that to say ‘painting is an imitation of nature’ does not go far enough, because the universal compass of the art of painting also extends to include artificial things.100 Pursuing the same idea, Paleotti remarks that it is within the power of painting to ‘embrace all the forms of things, such as of a human, elephant, bird, fish, tree, stone, and every other thing, not only in nature but also man-made, as of a church, chalice, garment, book and such things’.101 In the Netherlands, Junius cites a similar list by the orator Dio Chrysostom, concluding that painters ‘study by the force of their Art to expresse all manner of visible things’.102

The encyclopedic character of the *Inleyding*, which dwells at length on utensils, hair-styles, weaponry and the like from classical antiquity and the more recent past, is in itself a plea for the ‘universal’ scope of painting. When Van Hoogstraten describes the domain of painting as ‘the whole of visible nature’, various lexical associations attach to the concept of ‘nature’: it is not only the physical environment created by God but also the things made by man that belong to the ‘visible world’. In early modern thinking, the distinction between nature created by God and objects created by man is in many respects only gradual. A work like Pliny’s *Naturalis historia* does not treat natural phenomena only, it also deals with man-made objects (like paintings), and in early modern collections of curiosities, drinking vessels fashioned from shells or decorated coconuts were classified under the heading of *naturalia*.103 Van Hoogstraten’s expression the ‘mirror of nature’ – Romano Alberti writes *specchio dell’alma natura* – refers in the first instance to this ability of painting to depict all the elements of the visible world without making a distinction on the grounds of origin, beauty or intellectual content.

**The Meaning of the Depiction of the Visible World**

We can now go into more detail about the debate concerning the so-called ‘realism’ of seventeenth-century Dutch art, and assess further the relevance of art theory to this debate. How can the views formulated by Van Hoogstraten about the depiction of the ‘visible world’, the virtuous character of painting, and the imitation of nature be put into the context of the religious function of seventeenth-century art and of iconography? In answering this question, it is
interesting to examine Van Hoogstraten’s ideas in light of Boudewijn Bakker’s recent interpretations (1993 and 2004) of seventeenth-century landscape painting, which built upon an earlier study by Michiel de Klijn (1982). The two authors argued that Calvinism had a positive impact on the development of Netherlandish painting in the seventeenth century. While Calvin’s doctrine did banish the visual arts from the churches, there was no desire to place obstacles in the way of the existing output of secular art. Bakker adduced arguments for a specifically Calvinist appreciation of landscape painting, which was regarded as a form of contemplative awareness of Creation.

If we are to establish a link between the theory of art propagated in the *Inleyding* and possible religious connotations, we must begin by enquiring into Van Hoogstraten’s personal religious views. Born to a Mennonite family, after his marriage to a woman from outside the congregation Van Hoogstraten joined the Dutch Reformed Church – the official Calvinist church. He left little evidence of religious zeal, although his literary publications do include a collection of hymns. Van Hoogstraten’s correspondence with Willem van Blijenberg about the philosophical controversies of his age provides the best clue as to his position on religious issues – he appears to have been moderate in his views. He did not wish to express any extreme ideas and was faithful to the view of the public church: ‘although I have been curious to dispute something, I respect nothing so much as the bonds of the church, and although my own sagacity sometimes assures me of something, still I never want to decide something save what I know that one must believe.

There is every reason to think that Van Hoogstraten’s world view was dictated by the teachings of the official Calvinist church. More difficult to fathom, however, is the relationship between his religious convictions and the views on art set out in the *Inleyding*; regrettably the *Onzichtbare werelt*, the more philosophical supplement to the *Inleyding*, did not survive. Of considerable significance here is that in the *Inleyding*, Van Hoogstraten quotes at length a passage from Calvin’s *Institutes* concerning the relevance to painting of the Second Commandment: ‘Thou shalt not make unto thee a graven image, or any likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth’. This passage is the only time in his writings that Calvin, who did not write a clear-cut discussion of the visual arts, addresses the specific implications that obeying this second commandment has for painting. Van Hoogstraten quotes his words as follows:

‘I am not so superstitious, says Calvin, as to deem I could not suffer any kind of images. But since sculpture and painting are gifts of God, what I do demand is that both shall be used purely and lawfully: that gifts which the Lord has bestowed upon us, for his glory and our good, shall not be defiled by abuse nor perverted to our destruction.’

It is clear from this passage that Calvin does indeed recognize that painting has a meaningful function in society, as one of God’s gifts to mankind. As long as this gift is not misused, it is pursued in the service of God, as is every trade. In the case of the visual arts, however, misuse in the form of idolatry is an ever-present danger. The quotation in the *Inleyding* continues:
‘We think it unlawful to give a visible shape to God, because God himself has forbidden it, and because it cannot be done without, in some degree, tarnishing his glory. ... And the majesty of God, which is far beyond the reach of any eye, must not be dishonoured by unbecoming representations. The only things, therefore, which ought to be sculpted or painted are things that the eye may comprehend. Such may be Histories, which are of some use for instruction or admonition: or physical things, which signify nothing and consequently serve no purpose other than to please the eye.’

Van Hoogstraten’s marginal note to this passage reads: ‘But everything that is seen may be painted’.

The basic principle in the line of reasoning that can be traced here is an essential point of Calvinist doctrine: that God has manifested himself to mankind in two ways: in his Word, Holy Scripture, and in his Creation, the visible world. In the first place, this means that according to Calvinism every believer is able to achieve an emotional relationship with God, without the intermediary of the church or knowledge of theological tradition. Moreover, man does not have to shun the natural world, but may enjoy it; indeed it is incumbent upon him to explore this Creation, in which God reveals himself. Rather than a life lived in religious renunciation of the world, Calvin advocates an active life in which man should worship God by undertaking activities in all areas of life and by acquiring knowledge about every part of God’s Creation. The fundamental principle of Calvinism, that nature – as the ‘Second Bible’ – should be the subject of diligent study, is formulated in the opening lines of the Confession of Faith drawn up during the Synod of Dordrecht (1619):

‘We know [God] by two means. Firstly, through the Creation, preservation and government of the entire world: because to our eyes this is like a beautiful book in which are all creatures, great and small, as if they were letters, showing us the invisible aspects of God, namely his eternal strength and Godhead ... secondly, He reveals himself yet more clearly and perfectly through his holy and Divine word.’

With the belief that nature, as the ‘Second Bible’, is a worthy subject of studious contemplation, the Reformation initially had a positive effect on the development of new ideas about scholarship and scientific observation. It is safe to say that seventeenth-century empirical science and philosophy, thanks in part to Reformation doctrines, found themselves liberated from the bonds of speculative theology; as secular activities, though, they could play a real role in a religious society and perform a function that accommodated the world view of Calvinism. One advocate of the new view of science was Francis Bacon, whose work was well known in the Netherlands in the second half of the seventeenth century; Van Hoogstraten quotes from it several times in the Inleyding. Bacon himself makes the analogy between the two Bibles – Scripture and the Creation. Just as the new religion wished to accept Scripture itself as the only authority, so the new philosophy wished to address itself solely to nature. Bacon urges his readers to approach the Creation, God’s works, humbly and open-mindedly and ‘to discard these preposterous philosophies which have ... led experience captive, and triumphed over the works of God; and approach with humility and veneration to unroll the volume of Creation’. 
As Bakker and De Klijn argued, this Calvinist investigative task not only set in train new scientific and philosophical developments but also made a positive contribution to the development of the realistic visual arts, particularly landscape painting. Topographical realism provided a window on reality but, more than that, a window on God’s Creation. Bakker concluded that many landscapes should not be ascribed a negative, admonitory meaning, but that they have the positive function of focusing the viewer’s mind on God’s goodness and omnipotence, as it is revealed in the Creation, the ‘Bible of Nature’.

In his *Inleyding*, Van Hoogstraten calls painting a way of obtaining empirical knowledge – ‘a science (wetenschap) for depicting all ideas, or mental images, that the entire visible world can provide’, and even refers to the ‘universal knowledge of the imitation of all visible things’.

The kind of science with which Van Hoogstraten was familiar at close quarters was the experimental study of visible and organic nature as practised by the dilettante scientists with whom he sought contact – men like the optician Caspar Calthoff, and Otto Marseus, the collector of biological rarities; the Royal Society was even regarded as the realization of the scientific ideal promulgated by Bacon. Van Hoogstraten’s definition of painting as knowledge that reflects the whole of the visible could be combined easily with a Baconian philosophy that fulfilled the Calvinist investigative task – the study of nature as the ‘Second Bible’.

We have already discussed various passages from the *Inleyding* that point towards a relationship between the depiction of the visible world and a pre-eminently virtuous study of nature; the artist, says Van Hoogstraten, can be compared to a philosopher. The artist’s main motivation should be the satisfaction that springs from the contemplation of nature. To quote further from the passage ‘What Fruits Await an Artist as the Reward for His Labours’:

> ‘The first desire then, which persuades someone to the Art of Painting, is a natural love for this more than commonly beguiling Goddess, who makes her practitioners happy simply and solely by her virtuous reflections in the most beautiful works of the glorious Creator, indeed such that they feel a gnawing in their conscience if they have neglected for some time to serve their loveable Mistress.’

Not only does mirroring the ‘most beautiful works of the glorious Creator’ provide satisfaction and fulfilment, Van Hoogstraten tells us, it also has a virtuous character:

> ‘We do not want to maintain that the sole objective of our Painting should be to prepare the mind for Virtue, since we know a more direct and certain way; but that [painting] keeps no one away from virtue is undeniable: indeed it is abundantly clear that, through the continued mirroring of God’s wondrous works, it brings the sincere practitioner, through his sublime contemplation, closer to the Creator of all things.’

It is not impossible that Van Hoogstraten is referring here to the two ways that Calvin considers man is able to know God: on the one hand through God’s ‘wondrous works’: nature; on the other hand by a ‘more direct and certain way’: the Holy Scripture. Van Hoogstraten was not the only art theorist who adhered to the belief that painting could be a way of knowing God. In his *Schilderkonst der oude*, Franciscus Junius evinces a similar conviction when he rebuts the contention that painting is a useless occupation:
‘Let [those who criticize painting] know, that they are not well advised when they goe about to brand these most commendable recreations with the nick-name of barren and unprofitable delights: for how can that same contemplation deserve the opinion of an unfruitfull and idle exercise, by whose meanes wee doe understand the true beautie of created bodies, a ready way to the consideration of our glorious Creator?’

Similarly, in the poem quoted by Goeree, Constantijn Huygens stresses that the power of the Creator is expressed in the multiplicity of the visible world. In the seventeenth-century discourse about the theory and function of art, the association between painting and the empirical study of nature as the ‘Second Bible’ was probably self-evident. Certainly, expressions of a like kind can be found in the international tradition of art theory. It may suffice to conclude with a quotation from Henry Peacham’s *The Compleat Gentleman* (1634), which lists all the beauties of exotic lands that painting can depict, observing: ‘since [painting] is only the imitation of the surface of Nature, by it as in a booke of golden and rarelimned Letters ... we reade a continuall Lecture of the Wisedome of the Almighty Creator’.

The depiction of the visible world as a study of God’s wondrous works: this proposition suggests an interpretation of the meaning of works of art without obvious narrative context. Paintings representing visible reality in detail can be esteemed as paying homage to Creation. Van Hoogstraten adduces no further arguments for this proposition in the *Inleyding* itself. A liminary poem preceding the *Inleyding* suggests that this view may have gained currency in seventeenth-century artistic circles. The poem, ‘On S.v. Hoogstraeten’s Visible World’, was written by the author’s brother, Frans, and ends with an exhortation to the painters of the Netherlands:

‘The brush must not falter, all the more because nowadays human sensibility (that stands as if confused and stupefied by such an art, the choice out of a hundred) has begun to sing the praises of the invisible Godhead through this painting of visible things and humbly honoured its Creator, who taught man those wonders, or who bestowed on him such rich gifts that he sailed in spirit into the haven of art, and succeeded in representing all that is visible on canvases flat and even.’

In the poet’s view, painting makes people see the Creation as it were afresh, because it ‘confuses’ and ‘stupefies’ the senses with such a convincing depiction of the visible world. An art that examines all that is visible can be regarded as paying homage to the Creator and his works.

In this line of reasoning, the depiction of insignificant objects does not have to be justified by ambiguous moralizing symbolism: the visible world can be studied for its own sake. This conviction can be related to the changed concept of nature as the subject of painting, as
outlined above, a view that attached greater value to the senses as a source of knowledge than to speculations about the principles of Creation. When Van Hoogstraten calls the art of painting a ‘sister of philosophy’ he is in no way implying a metaphysical quest for possible laws, deep below the surface of things, which underlie nature. His take on ‘philosophy’, in contrast, can be better compared with the pre-eminently religious concentration on the empirical world advocated by Bacon. Painting which, as ‘universal knowledge’, presents a ‘mirror of nature’, a reflection of nature that extends to every element of the visible world, acquires the meaning of an homage to Creation.

In Van Hoogstraten’s *Inleyding* the maxim *ars imitatur naturam* is given a new religious significance. The ‘mirror of nature’ that, according to Van Hoogstraten, painting presents, is not a meaningless duplication of *natura naturata*. He is concerned not so much with capturing a fleeting sensory impression as with an enquiring concentration on the singular details of the visible world. More than simply providing a topographical window on God’s Creation, a painting that is composed with a particular focus on the ‘specificity’ (*eyghentlickheyt*) of objects places the emphasis on the ‘eternal difference’ between things, as Huygens puts it, the principle in which God’s power is expressed.

The analysis of the origin of Van Hoogstraten’s conception of the ‘visible world’ has demonstrated that the conclusions about the religious background of landscape painting, as formulated by Bakker, are also relevant to the depiction of visual reality in its entirety. The representation not only of organic nature but of all the visible elements of reality acquires intellectual meaning in the light of philosophical and theological contemplation. Bakker himself suggested that his conclusions about the landscape are also important to other fields of art such as the still-lifes and genre paintings. This is corroborated by the work of Blankert who, as early as the 1990s, had started to link the supposed religious significance of painting trivial objects with the genre painting of Vermeer; his suggestions are apparently vindicated by remarks in Van Hoogstraten’s treatise. However, before drawing our ultimate conclusions we will look more closely at Van Hoogstraten’s concept of philosophy (*Wyigeerte*) in relation to painting.

**The Outlook of Stoicism**

The idea that nature can serve as the ‘Second Bible’ is not exclusive to Calvin; it is a view that was also popular in the seventeenth century among a group like the Jesuits. Indeed, the possible identification between nature and God gave rise to recurring debates in Christian theology. It was especially Augustine’s strict division of reality into the world of man versus the ‘City of God’ that inspired the dichotomy of the visible world on the one hand and the allegorical interpretation of it on the other, and pointed to the contemplative role of the ‘Book of Nature’. Various church fathers, however, rejected this view – that they regarded as heathen – in which nature and God approach each other so closely that the danger of pantheism is never far away. The view that identifies Creation with Creator achieved its most extreme form towards the end of the seventeenth century when it drew harsh criticism from traditional religious quarters.

This thinking is also made explicit in art-theoretical texts; for example, Francesco Bisagni, in his *Trattato della pittura* (1642), asks the rhetorical question: ‘could there in truth
be a single lover of the liberal arts or a sovereign in the world, who does not take pleasure in imitating God and nature (Iddio, e la natura) with the brush as much as he can? Art-theoretical works in which this line of reasoning is followed do not, though, refer to Augustine or other theologians, but to authors of pagan antiquity: the Stoics. Junius approvingly repeats the Stoic identification of God and nature in a quotation from Seneca: ‘what is Nature else ... but God and a divine power infused into the whole world and every part of the world?’ In seventeenth-century Neostoic ideology, the Christological interpretation of nature is embedded in a philosophical view that centres on ‘following nature’. The Stoic reverence for nature as an independent entity, for an unaffected style uncontaminated by the imagination, and for a contemplative activity that is by its very nature healthy and virtuous, forms a complex of ideas that has not been without significance for the tradition of art theory. The fact that ‘secret Christianity’ was ascribed to some authors had a catalytic effect in this; Seneca’s supposed correspondence with St Paul made him a key figure in the endeavour to reconcile this ancient philosophy with a Christian ideology.

Van Hoogstraten was probably acquainted with an adherent of Neostoic doctrine like Du Bartas, who produced a very literal simile stating that the world is ‘a school, in which God himself comes to teach’, a pattern book which ‘without speaking’ is more eloquent than literature. This same comparison recurs in a verse translation of Joseph Hall’s Occasional Meditations (1630): the Schoole der wereld (The School of the World, 1682) by Van Hoogstraten’s brother, Frans. Hall was a Protestant Stoic who also wrote a work with the revealing title Seneca christianus; de vera tranquillitate animi (1623), in which he advocates ‘Senecan’ Christianity with great emphasis on achieving tranquility of mind. A well-known Stoic like Spiegel – with whose work Van Hoogstraten must have been familiar – rejected the use of allegory; he wanted on the contrary to praise ‘the ineffable God’ in nature.

It is above all the combination of the ‘Book of Nature’ doctrine and the Senecan idea that the love of art is more important than achieving fame or material gain that reveals the Neostoic tone in the Inleyding. The same applies to Van Hoogstraten’s reference to Plutarch, when he says that the painter practises art only ‘for its own sake, and for its virtuous nature’, as a form of philosophy that will bring the painter ‘peace of mind’. He makes it plain that the artist must seek tranquillity, even in politically turbulent times. The view that virtue is its own reward is one of the key Neostoic dogmas, and a contemplative occupation like painting consequently needs no further justification. The love of art, like amor virtutis, is deemed an end in itself. In this context De Bie repeats an observation in Plutarch’s Moralia: practising a trade can be a virtuous occupation and contribute to salvation, and this would also apply to painting, ‘since the body and the soul can gain profit from it’.

The contemplation of nature is another theme of the Stoics. Their words provide useful arguments for art theoreticians seeking legitimation for their views on the depiction of nature. In the opening sentence of his treatise, Junius paraphrases Cicero’s maxim that man, unlike the animals, is created ad maioris mundi contemplationem imitationemque, to contemplate and imitate the world. Junius also repeats a similar observation by Quintilian: ‘what is man ... but a creature approaching nearest unto God ... and ordained to the contemplation of the things contained in the world?’ This emphasis on studying nature is an important point for the key Neostoic author in the Netherlands, Lipsius, who stated that all the laws of moral con-
duct can be found in nature; he believed physics and ethics to be closely related. According to Lipsius, knowledge of nature ultimately leads to self-control and virtue.\footnote{159}

The Stoic conception of nature corresponds to classical atomism, which, in its most consistent form, argues that in nature everything is either chance or wholly determined, and leaves no room for free will. This conception of natural determinism leads to an ethics in which man is adjured to ‘follow nature’, in other words that he must endure his fate steadfastly and allow his conduct to be ruled as little as possible by the emotions. Stoic moral philosophy emphasizes resignation, endurance and contemplation since, as Burton’s \textit{Anatomy of Melancholy} stresses, ‘whatever you see and wherever you go, is God’.\footnote{160} The opposition to the Stoics of Church Fathers like Lactantius is directed primarily towards this rigorous \textit{fatum stoicum}.\footnote{141} Whereas the classical Stoics equated God and nature, Lipsius was more circumspect and stated that this was no more than a simile; in his view, God \textit{manifests} himself in all things, without being them.\footnote{142} We shall examine the consequences of this world view for the theory of art.

\textbf{THE BOOK OF NATURE AND THE ELOQUENCE OF PAINTING}

Virtually no research has yet been done into the influence of Neostoicism on conceptions of art in the seventeenth century, although it is generally assumed that Lipsius’s ideas, in Jan Papy’s words, ‘acquired a leading position in European thought and became common cultural property in the Baroque period, obviously influencing scholarship, poetry and art right up to the Enlightenment’.\footnote{143} Courtiers’ manuals formulating the ideal of ‘practical reason’ also borrow from Stoic moral philosophy.\footnote{144} The concrete significance to art literature of the views outlined is difficult to trace, however; one factor here is that there is no question of a clear-cut ‘Neo-stoic school’. The relationship between ancient and modern Stoic ideas and the accompanying terminology is hard to pin down; most fruitful is William Bouwsma’s approach of not referring to a continuing philosophical thread running from antiquity to the early modern period, but rather viewing Neostoicism as one of the forms in which the thinking of antiquity was brought up to date in the early modern period.\footnote{145}

Hessel Miedema pointed to the role of Stoicism in the development of so-called ‘realistic’ aspects of painting in the Netherlands, without working these remarks out in concrete terms.\footnote{146} In the general sense there are obvious parallels – for instance, with the exception of the idea of the close relationship between the Creator and his works, Stoicism is not explicitly religious and Stoic literature does not contain a mythic or poetic explanation of the Creation, focusing on nature instead.\footnote{147} The movement thus links up with the scientific views of Bacon outlined above, and with the moral philosophical ideas in Frans van Hoogstraten’s \textit{Schoole der wereld} in which a code of conduct was sought in elements of everyday life.\footnote{148} The moralizing iconography of early seventeenth-century genre painting, in particular, can be traced back in a surprising number of cases to pronouncements by Stoics like Coornhert and Spiegel.\footnote{149} The metaphors in such works as Otto Vaenius’s emblem books, which refer emphatically to Lipsius’s philosophy, proved ideal for use in allegorical compositions, as did general Stoic ideas of transience and mortality that found expression in \textit{vanitas} symbolism.\footnote{150} This raises the question as to the extent to which matters of artistic invention and style were determined by Stoic views, which will be dealt with in chapter III.
The Stoic courtier’s ethic that true virtue consists not in seeking truth, but in seeking wisdom – the attainment of a virtuous lifestyle – also resonates in treatises that offer a code of conduct for artists. The guidelines for ‘leading the good life’ or eudaimonia are thought to be rooted in nature; in the final analysis the laws of nature are identical to the laws of good conduct. In the Eerlyken jongeling, Van Hoogstraten asserts ‘that more benefit can be gained from the great Book of this world than from Aristotle or Descartes’ and concludes that ‘Politics and Morality, which treat of good morals’, are learned ‘more from custom and experience than from books’. Elsewhere he remarks that only unbelievers refuse to recognize the omniscience of the Creator in his Creation, and ‘their godlessness brings them so far as to ... call into doubt that which is preached by the birds of the air, the simple animals and the insensate things’. And this while the awareness of the divinity manifest in nature is the foundation of all codes of conduct: ‘[t]he fear of God is the beginning of true wisdom, which contains within it all the teachings of Philosophy, of how one should live’.

An example: Philippe de Mornay’s ‘Bybel der nature’

Philippe de Mornay was one of the most eloquent authors to restate the Stoic’s view of nature in the seventeenth century. He is of particular importance in the context of the world view of the Inleyding because he used Stoic doctrine to add force to his Calvinist convictions. Van Hoogstraten was certainly familiar with his Bybel der nature (Bible of Nature, 1602), which he quotes in his treatise. De Mornay’s argument aims to demonstrate ‘that there is a God whose countenance you see shine even in the lowliest of things’. The Dutch translation of the book was reprinted several times in the seventeenth century, and may therefore well have underlain ideas like Van Hoogstraten’s exclamation that, from the contemplation of the visible world, his ‘spirit rose up to glorify the Creator of these wonders’. De Mornay makes a distinction between ‘visible’ and ‘invisible’ worlds and explains how the invisible Creator is visible in his Creation: ‘Because through the visible, the eye manifests and shows the invisible things without which the visible could not exist.’ We shall touch on a number of his views, in which a recurring theme is the Stoic emphasis on sensory knowledge, in theological issues, too. To start with a longer quotation:

‘In accordance with his immeasurable goodness in every respect, [God] has revealed and depicted himself in all things ... in such a manner that anything man could conceive, say [or] write of him is much darker than everything we behold in the World ... For this reason one of the earliest philosophers said ... “That man could not fathom God with human understanding, but could touch him with his hands ... [and that we] understand God somewhat before any use of our intellect, not through any knowledge, but through a certain touch, which is much surer than any knowledge” ... so that the senses themselves, from which man's first knowledge springs, testify to a God.’

What stands out is De Mornay’s conviction that the knowledge of God only exists ‘before any use of the intellect’, or, to paraphrase in modern words, on a pre-predicative level. De Mornay reiterates the Stoic emphasis on the senses as the source of knowledge; the mind is a tabula rasa
which the senses fill with images of the visible world. The implications this metaphor has for painting are expressed in Diego de Saavedra’s well-known emblem ‘Ad omnia’ of 1649, which compares the mind with a blank canvas (fig. 42). Stoic doctrine assumed that Platonic Ideas are not real entities; everything that exists is physical and can be perceived by the senses. It consequently rejects the imagination as a source of knowledge. De Mornay bases his certainty about the existence of God precisely on his trust in sense perception, opposing those sceptics who ‘doubt what they see with their own eyes and touch with their hands’.

Proceeding from this emphasis on the senses as the primary source of knowledge, De Mornay sees the visible world as the most direct expression of God’s greatness, so that it is more eloquent than oratory. Reason itself falls seriously short in understanding God: he stresses ‘[t]hat all we know of the ways of God is that we know nothing ... and as we cannot understand God with the intellect, so we also cannot fittingly name nor utter him’. This gives rise to the realization that God can only be named by remaining silent: ‘the best way to sing [God’s] praise is a still silence’. Thus, De Mornay says, nature itself provides the means of penetrating to the essence of God: ‘the very smallest things that one finds in nature ... prove that there is but one God ... we cannot understand the essence of God: but we behold him in his works’. Indeed, rather than on theological doctrine, a pious person should concentrate on ‘the very smallest things’ (de aldergeringbste dinghen) in nature: ‘[w]hat, then, do we think: that a man could ever fathom nature and the Majesty of God [when] he is stone-blind in the consideration of the least of his works?’ It goes without saying that the paradox contained in the words muta eloquentia, ‘silent speech’, is a recurring theme in the art-theoretical tradition in which the term muta poesis (or libro mutolo) plays a key part: to repeat a phrase quoted earlier, all peoples are expected to understand the ‘silent voices’ of created things, and ‘there is no people or language or grouping of people which cannot understand these voci tacite that come from the things created by God, that represent his greatness and majesty’.

The use Van Hoogstraten could make of De Mornay’s writings is plain. Painting that focuses on ‘the very smallest things that one finds in nature’ would obviously be ‘more eloquent’ than speech to express God’s greatness. Hence it is not surprising to find the Bybel der nature in the artist’y library. The various ideas charted in this chapter, from Van Hoogstraten’s focus on the love of art as the painter’s greatest reward, and on the painter’s attention to insignificant things – obedient to the ‘virtuous following of simple nature’ – to his equation of painting with philosophy and his outlook on Platonic Idealism, inspired by that of Zuccari, can ultimately all be fitted into an ideological framework of Stoic Calvinism like the one developed by De Mornay.

Van Hoogstraten’s concept of the ‘Visible World’ is legitimated by various earlier bodies of thought in which artistic, philosophical and religious traditions all play a part. In the Inleyding itself this concept is prominent in the subtitle and illustrations and it is central to various indications as to the painter’s choice of subject and style. Van Hoogstraten’s ideas on variegated brushwork, on the depiction of inconsequential and even ugly things, and on attention to visual reality as a form of contemplation, show that he adapts traditional notions about the
imitation of nature in an idiosyncratic way. His emphasis on painting as ‘universal knowledge’ and his equating of painting with philosophy are based first and foremost on notions about the universal applicability of rhetoric. His remarks hark back to those formulated by Federico Zuccari, who deploys the universal human capacity to form mental images as an argument for the theoretical emancipation of drawing, upon which, in his view, all other arts depend. His line of reasoning is able to provide legitimation for an art that occupies itself not with ideal beauty and the canonical proportions of antiquity, but with everything that meets the artist’s eye. Zuccari’s modified idealism resonates in Van Hoogstraten’s definition which holds that painting is able to depict ‘all ideas, or mental images, that the entire visible world can provide’.

Because of its enquiring character, Van Hoogstraten calls painting that imitates the visible world a ‘sister of reflective philosophy’. As has become clearer, in this definition he is using a concept of nature that differs from Van Mander’s; his ‘mirror of nature’ is a mirror of the visible world, not a gateway to a ‘true nature’, a higher reality. In Van Hoogstraten’s view, the artist’s primary concern should not be idealized beauty; aesthetic attention should focus on an ‘eternal difference’, on the details that make things different from one another, rather than on universalia.

Fig. 42 – ‘Ad omnia’, emblem from Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, Idea principis christiano-politici, Amsterdam 1659.
We have seen that the supposed enquiring character of painting may be related to Van Hoogstraten’s Calvinist world view and to the view expressed in the Confession of Dordrecht that God has manifested himself not only through Holy Scripture but through nature too. Not only did Calvin not condemn the acquisition of knowledge, in his view the study of nature was actually a pre-eminent means of knowing and worshipping the Creator. This Calvinist view influenced the development of a new philosophical approach: moving away from the mediaeval concept of nature, in which the visible chiefly had meaning in so far as it embodied references to the invisible, Calvin propounded in its stead another way of looking at Creation. An examination of organic and living nature was not simply permitted, it was praiseworthy; the work of the artist, in which the manifold phenomena of the visible world were studied, could be regarded as a very literal interpretation of man’s investigative task as conceived of by Calvinism.

Painting, as a ‘sister of philosophy’, is a sure means of coming closer to the Creator of all things ‘in sublime contemplation’. Van Hoogstraten sees ‘mirroring’ nature not as speculation about cosmological laws, but as devoting studious attention to the different properties of the elements of the visible world. A work of art that is made with attention to the singularities of the different elements of the Creation can assume the meaning of a homage to the Creator; the depiction of the visible world can in itself be seen as a form of philosophical contemplation.
CHAPTER III

PICTORIAL IMITATION
Fig. 43 – Imitation, engraving from Cesare Ripa, Iconologia, Amsterdam 1642.
Chapter III

Pictorial Imitation

‘What does not Dürer depict in one colour; that is, in black lines? Shadows, light, reflections, differences in height … Indeed, he paints even what cannot be painted: fire, rays of light, thunderstorms, sheet lightning, thunderbolts … sensations, all feelings, in a word, the entire human spirit … even, almost, the voice itself. These things he places before our eyes with the most felicitous lines – black ones at that – in such a manner that, were you to fill them with colour, you would injure the work.’

Erasmus, Dialogus de recta latini græcique sermonis pronunciatione

Van Hoogstraten describes the art of painting as ‘a mirror of nature’ and an ‘ape of nature’. Imitation is evidently a key element in his art theory. Early modern views of this theme are fairly complex, and a variety of associations cling to the ideas set forth in the Inleyding. In the Renaissance, the imitation of nature was frequently regarded as inextricably bound up with the imitation of examples and models. Julius Caesar Scaliger’s Poetics goes so far as to discuss these two forms of imitation as variants of the same mode of expression: ‘We have a method of expressing the nature of things, for we imitate what our predecessors have said in exactly the same way as they imitated nature.’ According to Scaliger, the laws of nature discovered by the great masters are expressed in their works in an exemplary manner.

The richly nuanced theory of imitation in the Renaissance was shaped in a debate that endured until the seventeenth century; treatises of poetics were devoted to this specific subject. Vossius lists the most important authors on this theme in his influential De imitacione. Key questions in the debate were: the need for imitation; whether it was better to imitate several models or to focus on one; and whether ideal beauty and optimus stilus were to be found in the artist’s inventive powers, in the idea, or in a selection from tradition. The educated population can be assumed to have been familiar with the general views on imitation: the curriculum at the Latin school was based almost exclusively on rhetorical theory, which revolved around translation, the collection of quotations, and the paraphrasing and explanation of commonplaces.

Recent studies have shown that among the main driving forces behind iconographic, stylistic and technical developments in seventeenth-century painting were mutual rivalries – rivalries related to the debate on imitation. It has become clearer, for instance, how Rembrandt
deliberately positioned himself relative to his predecessors. The reputation of painters could serve as a *pars pro toto* for the status of a city, a country or region, or even a historical period; heated debates might arise about the merits of a particular painter relative to those of his countrymen, of his Italian or French rivals, or of artists from antiquity. Rivalry also played a role in the behaviour of art lovers: one collector’s possession of certain paintings might prompt a rival to make similar purchases. Little research has been done, however, on the theory underlying imitation in seventeenth-century painting. While the concept of *imitatio* has been discussed in relation to Italian art theory, this is not the case for the Netherlandish tradition.

Imitation plays a key role in Van Hoogstraten’s treatise, both in the sense of representing the visible world and in the sense of artistic imitation and emulation. His views are rooted in what may be called an ‘ideology of imitation’, an ideology that is laced with didactic guidelines on the following of examples. Van Hoogstraten’s ideas on the related concept of emulation – rivalry – clarifies his views on artistic progress and hence on the merits of the art of his own age. His views on ideal education, in which the imitation of examples plays a central role, deploy terms like ‘force’, ‘spirit’ and ‘grace’, *imaginatio* and *inventio*: these terms derive largely from rhetorical theory, and are part of his project to place the art of painting on a firm intellectual footing.

**AN IDEOLOGY OF IMITATION**

Seventeenth-century art theory written in Dutch does not mention the term mimesis, a word of Greek origin which is central to views of art and literature in antiquity. Only in the Latin text ‘De graphicæ’ does Vossius describe the ‘mimetic’ abilities of human beings. The playwright Rodenburg uses the Greek term in the early seventeenth century, in a comparison between drama and painting: ‘Poetry is an art of imitation, what Aristotle calls “mimesis”, that is a representation or depiction through metaphor. It is a speaking painting, intended to instruct and to delight.’ Mimesis was apparently an argument in comparisons between poetry and painting. Vondel applied Plato and Aristotle’s views on mimesis to drama, summarizing his own poetics in a few words: ‘He who follows nature closely is a true Apelles’.

In early modern poetical theory, the metaphor of the mirror is used to denote the imitation of someone else’s work – in this case, the mirror of an example. Where Van Hoogstraten focuses on the imitative capacity of painting by calling it an ‘ape’ and ‘mirror’ of nature, he is implicitly presenting one of his arguments for equating it with poetry. Junius writes explicitly that ‘Both [poets and painters] busie themselves about the imitation of all sorts of things and actions … seeing also that Painters doe expresse with colours what Writers doe describe with words; so is it that they doe but differ in the matter and manner of Imitation, having both the same end’.

The early modern view of imitation as the basis of all education, arts and sciences, derives from the Aristotelian view that mimesis is an innate capacity, rooted in nature. Vossius puts it as follows:

‘Painting has its origins in nature. For we have an inborn capacity for imitation, from which we derive great pleasure; it is to this fact that art owes its beginnings. ... Philos-
tratus says [in his *Icones*] that “someone might wish to say that art was invented by the Gods ... but he who investigates the origins of art further will find that imitation is in any case the oldest invention, having been born simultaneously with nature.”

In accordance with these views, Junius opens his book with a discussion of the human capacity for imitation, most notably citing Cicero’s view of ‘the imitative faculty that is wholly intrinsic to the human mind’. According to Junius, imitating the universe is one of mankind’s essential tasks. From this fundamental given, he says, all arts are based on imitation – of our fellow human beings as well as of nature: it is ‘an usuall thing in the whole course of our life, that we our selves study alwayes to do what we like in others’. He believes that ‘[o]ut of this most absolute sort of imitation there doth bud forth the Art of designing, the Art of painting, the Art of casting, and all other Arts of that kind’ and he quotes a maxim of Quintilian, that ‘all such things as are accomplished by Art, doe ever draw their first beginnings out of Nature’.

The assumption that the mimetic arts are embedded in nature itself prompts both Junius and Van Hoogstraten to make various observations. It is mainly the artists from antiquity who followed nature in exemplary fashion – nature to which they were still so close, in their ‘golden age’. Van Hoogstraten recalls the anecdote about artists in Thebes who had to pay a fine if their work was deemed deficient in illusionism. Junius notes that painters may not give free rein to their imagination; it is a misplaced desire for emulation that has impelled painters to depart from nature, which led to the corruption of art. A significant example of this view is Vitruvius’s criticism of the ‘grotesque’ wall decorations of the IVth Pompeian style, which Van Hoogstraten repeats:

‘Vitruvius says that degenerate custom caused men to prefer to depict abominations and monsters in the grotesques instead of showing truthful things, against the custom of the ancients, who embellished their rooms, corridors and dining halls with artful imitations of what was natural. In his view, a ship should look like a ship, an image like a human being, or ... a known or ... natural creature’.

The passage invoked by Van Hoogstraten can be found in Junius:

‘Let the Picture bee an image, saith [Vitruvius], of a thing that is, or at least can bee ... so must also a right lover of Art preffere a plaine and honest worke agreeing with Nature before any other phantastically capricious devices.’

‘Agreeing with Nature’, or with *de eenvoudigheydt der nature* (the simplicity of nature), as the Dutch edition puts it, is a goal that should be pursued by painters and art lovers alike. Vitruvius’s views are only understood in full when they are seen in the context of the beliefs of the ancient Stoics. They took the maxim of *vivere secundum naturam*, living a life that ‘follows nature’, as the basis for a code of conduct geared towards virtue, a view expressed by authors such as Seneca and Plutarch, whose ideas are repeatedly quoted by Van Hoogstraten and Junius. Cicero too believed that *naturam ducem sequi* (‘follow nature’s lead’) should be the basic guideline, both in rhetoric and in human actions.
The exhortations of Van Hoogstraten and Junius to avoid artificiality and to focus on depicting simple objects, from which one may perhaps infer an implicit criticism of contrived symbolism and allegory, may be re-examined in the light of this Neostoic ideology. Van Hoogstraten’s criticism of Haarlem mannerism – the exaggerated physical contortions painted by Cornelis Cornelisz van Haarlem, for instance – may be clarified by this preference for following nature. His criticism targets artists who depart from ‘the true measure of art and Nature itself’ and the works of Hieronymus Bosch, which, ‘in all their unseemly monstrousness, appear to do violence to nature’.29 This conviction eventually leads Van Hoogstraten to posit that in some cases it is better to follow nature than the classics.30 He warns young painters of the dangers of a journey to Italy: ‘I even fear that once you are there [i.e. in Rome], you will err from our teaching which is directed at following nature, and be led astray from the true path by following others.’31 On the other hand, he believes that the ancients themselves deemed faithfulness to nature more important than beauty: the painter Amphiaraos is said to have depicted horses that were covered in dust and sweating profusely: ‘which, for all that it may have deprived them of some of their beauty, nonetheless infused a greater suggestion of truth’.32

Key to the line of argument pursued here is the Stoics’ appreciation of the imitation of nature, in contrast to serious Platonic criticism that describes mimesis as a meaningless copy of a world of mere appearances. In their view, ‘following nature’ is a code of conduct in which the artist can control his own passions, aspires to the golden mean, follows his own nature, and furthermore paints in a way that is accessible to, and recognizable for, a wide-ranging public. These ancient views persist in notions such as the following, by Goeree:

‘a wise practitioner of Art should also know ... that he should concern himself most as- siduously with the contemplation of the natural world, more so than with the study of all the things mentioned earlier [in Goeree’s treatise], and that he must use it at every possible opportunity ... for the natural world is in everything so rich and plentiful, so artistic and ingenious, that our memories cannot possibly comprehend it all, let alone retain it.’33

It will be clear that the above emphasis on following ‘the natural world’ is far from an idiosyncratic artistic preference; it is rooted entirely in views that are supported by ancient authority. Vondel states that ‘the Oldest and best Poets are ... the most natural and the simplest. Their descendants, in seeking to surpass them, were led by their ambition either to boast and bluff or to glaze and gloss.’34 Junius asserts, on the same grounds, that it testifies to misplaced over-confidence to ‘disdaine to meddle with any meane matters, seeing [that] a man may very well shew his wit in small matters also’.35

This view was also elaborated in the art theory of the Counter-Reformation, to ward off accusations that painting was inauthentic or deceptive. Thus, Giovanni Andrea Gilio asserts in his Dialogo ... degli errori e degli abusi de’pittori (1564) that a painter ‘must take care above all else to make [the history that he depicts] simple and pure, because the combination of the poetic and fictitious is nothing but a disfigurement of the true and beautiful, which makes it disingenuous and hideous’.36 Here we can call to mind the view quoted in the previous chapter, that imitation may be valued according to its successfulness – the choice of subject may
even be seen as irrelevant. In 1584, Francesco Bocchi concludes: ‘it does not matter if a figure is strange or deformed and has little grace in and of itself; what matters is the skill involved: if [the subject] has been handled beautifully and tastefully, it will command much praise and appreciation’. In a similar vein, De Lairesse considers ‘that no less art is involved in depicting a coarse subject than a serious one, a peasant than a courtier, a donkey than a horse; since sound knowledge is just as necessary to depict one as the other.’ To cite one last example, the ‘ideology of imitation’ put forward here corresponds to the substance of a famous observation ascribed to Caravaggio (c. 1620): the painter supposedly said ‘that he needed just as much skill to make a fine painting of flowers as to make one depicting human figures.’

The theoretical emphasis on the success of imitation is relevant to Van Hoogstraten’s observation, quoted earlier, that ‘the ugly can be made beautiful’ by virtue of the ‘naturalness’ practised by the painter. In this respect he echoes one of Junius’s conclusions: ‘not only the Imitation of faire but of foule things also doth recreate our mindes ... the Imitation [is] always commended, whether shee doth expresse the similitude of things foule or faire’.

‘Imitatio auctoris’

In seventeenth-century art literature, imitating examples is a more complex subject than following nature: contrary to what one might expect, it involves a greater risk of failure. Ripa’s personification of *Imitazione* or *Naevolginge*, whose attributes of brushes and mask identify her with painting and drama, is depicted with one foot on a monkey, symbolizing *imitatio insipiens*, unthinking imitation (fig. 43). Van Hoogstraten too takes a negative view of ‘aping’ other masters, and Junius rejects the slavish imitation of other artists’ styles as ‘an apish imitation of the outward ornaments’. Angel calls such ‘apish’ imitation *eerdieverij*, theft of honour.

This mindless form of imitation is primarily associated with the procedure of *rapen*, borrowing from the work of others, a subject studied at length by Emmens (1964). The danger of borrowing too arbitrarily is that the result may be a chaotic mess; De Lairesse describes a working method in which borrowings are combined carelessly, which he compares to the pointless chemistry of an alchemist: ‘Indeed, a painter of this kind is not unlike the common Alchemists, who, wanting to make gold, toss everything into the crucible that they know to be capable of melting, brewing it all day and night, squandering everything they have in the world, [and] eventually finding nothing in the all-consuming crucible except for a little foam from I know not what kind of non-metal, with neither colour nor weight.’

The Dutch theorists agree that there are also praiseworthy kinds of *imitatio auctoris*. Van Hoogstraten’s doctrine in this regard derives from Roman pedagogics based on the imitation of models, which formed the nucleus of education at the Latin school. Copying was deemed to be a useful, if not essential, part of the painter’s education as well: ‘Copying all manner of paintings [is] a common and very useful exercise for young pupils, especially if the example is a fine work of art.’ These exhortations were put into practice not only by painters, but by amateurs too. Christiaan Huygens wrote, at sixteen years of age, that he had copied a portrait of an old man by Rembrandt and that his copy was indistinguishable from the original. When Heyman Dullaert took lessons in Rembrandt’s studio as a young man, he was said to have produced works within a short space of time that were indistinguishable from the master’s own
painting. Vondel compares the copying of a master’s work to translating the classical poets: ‘translating work by the celebrated Poets helps an aspiring Poet, just as the copying of skilfully executed masterpieces helps a painting apprentice’. He comments that an aspiring artist must copy a master’s ‘handling and lines’ until ‘a connoisseur when facing works by both / cannot tell the pupil from his master’.

For studying draughtsmanship, artists probably used sketchbooks with paper specially prepared for erasable drawings in silverpoint. The material from these books could be inserted into a composition as if ‘quoting’ from a stock of visual tropes, a procedure described by Leonardo, comparable to the use of quotation collections by pupils at Latin school. As Dutch art theory makes clear, this form of borrowing is a matter of careful selection. Van Hoogstraten advises: ‘If you find a good print, it will not always be necessary to copy every part of it, but learn early on to differentiate [and select] the [various] virtues of art’. He therefore concludes, following Van Mander: ‘It is said that properly cooked rapen [turnips; also means borrowings– transl.] make good soup, but those who are always following will never progress’.

What is the ‘proper’ way to cook these turnips? Early modern art theory frequently emphasizes that the ideal form of imitatio auctoris is to emulate a number of different painters. In the Inleyding, Goltzius is praised as an artist who imitated the ‘handling’ of different masters. However, this should be no more than a means towards an end: as Goeree emphasizes, emulating more than one master ultimately enhances the painter’s ability to imitate nature. He maintains that ‘a wise man should borrow the best from each other artist’, criticizing painters who emulate only a single master; ‘indeed, they abandon nature, the very best guide, while devoting themselves to I don’t know what kind of teacher.

To clarify the praiseworthy form of imitatio auctoris, Van Hoogstraten uses the analogy of a bee gathering nectar from different flowers and combining it into one kind of honey. A similar analogy, expressed by Junius, is that of the human digestive system, in which different kinds of food are consumed, blending into a single nourishing substance. Intrinsic to the metaphor of digesting food and making soup from rapen is the concept of taste, or good judgement, necessary to arrive at the right decision. Van Hoogstraten uses Cartari’s term giudicio, and quotes: ‘A learned man must possess good judgement in choosing the good and rejecting the bad’. Angel too writes that for the procedure of derivation or borrowing, the artist’s ‘good judgement’ is essential, and Houbraken considers that De Lairesse possessed this faculty, ‘for to avail oneself of someone else’s ingenuity, such that what has been derived does not stand out like a new patch on an old beggar’s cloak, requires good judgement.

Judgement (oordeel) or discernment (opmerken), the capacity to make the eclectic process of imitation result in one single artwork, is closely related to the painter’s capacity to present a virtual reality to the viewer’s eyes. Thus, Van Hoogstraten states that ‘the habit of discernment’ enables the painter to arrive at a strongly illusionist use of colours. A painter’s giudizio dell’occhio, or ‘eye and judgement’ (oog en oordeel) in Van Hoogstraten’s terminology, is bound up with his observation of nature. Thus, Titian, whom Van Hoogstraten describes as ‘such a man, who dedicated himself entirely to following nature precisely with his brush and paint’, trusted more to his ‘judgement’ than to his ‘handling’.
IMITATION AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE

The purpose of selective imitation in the artist's training is to teach the pupil to distinguish the various 'parts of painting' to which Van Hoogstraten has devoted the different chapters of his treatise. The aim is not to adopt someone else's working method; although a pupil may master another artist's 'handling' as an exercise, this must not be seen as an end in itself. Junius writes that in the process of emulation a painter must never lose sight of his own temperamental inclinations. The benefit to be derived from emulating another artist's virtues is ultimately self-knowledge:

‘we shall ... perceive how necessary it is that we should duly examine our owne abilitie and strength, before we undertake the Imitation of such workes as doe excell in all kinde of rare and curious perfections ... for every one hath within his own brest a certaine law of nature, the which he may not neglect; so are also the most ill-favoured and gracelesse Pictures most commonly wrought by them that venture upon any thing without considering to what their naturall inclination doth lead them most of all’.

Adherence to ‘a certaine law of nature’, in the sense of remaining true to one’s own character, links up with Stoic doctrine (it is a key point, for instance, in Coornhert’s philosophy, where it relates chiefly to moral conduct). Goeree quotes Cicero in this connection: ‘It is most advisable, says Cicero, that we should be led by our own nature, and that we pursue the Arts wholly in accordance with the rule of nature’ (italics mine). Imitation would be pointless if the painter were to try to adopt something from another that was at odds with his own natural abilities. The importance of understanding one’s own qualities inspires Van Hoogstraten to explain how painters choose their particular specializations. One should seek to establish a potential apprentice painter’s temperament while he is still young: ‘minds must be led towards their natural urges’. An artist’s capacities are apparently closely related to the ‘motions of the mind’ to which he is most inclined; traditional art theory links them more specifically to the temperamental and astrological make-up that influences the kind of work the painter will produce. Lomazzo’s Tempio, for instance, contains an outline of a systematic classification of a total of seven artists’ temperaments and the respective virtues in which these seven types excel; the author emphasizes that imitation must be adapted to the artist’s natural disposition.

By following one’s own nature one will be able to excel in a particular specialism, which will benefit art as a whole. Van Hoogstraten writes: ‘There is only one art of casting, says Cicero, in which Myron, Polykleitos and Lysippos each excelled in his own way ... although these Artists were considered very different in the work they produced, there was no reason to wish that each one had not remained true to his own handling’. He concludes: ‘What appears unattainable in art as the product of one man’s ingenuity may yet be achieved by a host of Noble minds, each one following a different path as chosen according to his innate inclination and taste’.

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THE IMITATION OF EXAMPLES AND THE IMITATION OF NATURE

As we have seen, in Van Hoogstraten’s view the painter must attune his ‘handling’ to the visible world rather than imitating someone else’s style. In accordance with this conviction, Junius echoes the ancients in stating that the painter must ultimately find a style of his own, which cannot be imitated. Van Hoogstraten, who also stresses the importance of an inimitable ‘handling’, says explicitly that following examples must ultimately be subordinated to the imitation of nature; if this is done, ‘the manner of handling will be inimitable, and your work will be indistinguishable from nature in the parts of painting’. This point of view is traditionally represented by Caravaggio, who purportedly regarded nature as his master so literally that he did not feel the need to compete with any other artist. Van Hoogstraten is expressing this view when he notes that ‘Caravaggio said that all works of art that were not painted from life were trifles (Bagatelli) .... Since there can be nothing better, nothing good, except for following nature alone.’

Van Hoogstraten discusses the making of sketches after examples in his chapter on drawing, in which he paraphrases a sentence from Van Mander: “tis life that holds the books all painters need; / to seek the truth ’tis life that they must read.” And to keep to this maxim, it is not necessary to restrict oneself to the beauty of the human figure: ‘For almost every part of nature can adequately feed this discernment and whet one’s sharpness of eye’. Although the imitation of great masters is an essential part of the learning process, according to Van Hoogstraten, an accomplished master should place this experience in the service of following nature:

‘I would not discourage painters from sometimes imitating good things done by some-one else, be it the ancients or foreigners ... One should follow the works of other masters in order to learn how to make masterpieces. And Lysippus, who was initially only a mediocre coppersmith, had learned this [most important lesson] from [his master] Eupompos, who, when asked which master’s handling one should try to emulate, pointed at the market, which was full of people, and said that nature itself was the great master one should follow.’

Van Hoogstraten summarizes here the paradox inherent in his ideology of imitation: the following of other masters is an essential part of the learning process, but it is aimed at nothing else but the realization that the true ‘mistress’ of all art is ultimately nature itself.

IMITATING THE INIMITABLE

Van Hoogstraten discusses the ideal of an ‘inimitable handling’. How, in practice, should one construe the paradox of imitation: that the painter must focus on what is ultimately inimitable in his example? The perfect form of imitation – imitatio sapiens – is reflected in the personification in Bellori’s life of Van Dyck: in this case, the female personification of Imitazione tramples a monkey, symbol of thoughtless ‘aping’ (fig. 44). Her attribute, a mirror, alludes on the one
hand to the function of painting – that of offering the viewer a ‘mirror of Nature’, and on the other hand to the process of imitation as a form of self-analysis.

As their texts make abundantly clear, according to Van Hoogstraten and Junius, the ideal form of imitation is not about copying specific lines, colours or brushwork. Instead, these authors discuss how one should follow the ‘force’ or ‘spirit’ of an example. Junius maintains:

‘As many then as desire to expresse the principall vertues of the best and most approoved Artificers, must not content themselves with a slender and superficial viewing of the workes they meane to imitate, but they are to take them in their hands againe and againe, never leaving till they have perfectly apprehended the force of Art that is in them, and also thoroughly acquainted themselves with that spirit the Artificers felt whilst they were busie about these workes’ (italics mine).\(^{81}\)

What is meant here by the terms ‘force’ and ‘spirit’? They denote aspects that Van Hoogstraten says cannot be found in a copy, but only in an original:

‘let no one imagine that he will find in copies that perfect force of Art, that is contained in the original works … of eminent Masters. For this is impossible, unless some god were to have blessed the imitator with the same spirit as the master.’\(^{82}\)

The ‘perfect force of Art’ is only to be found in the originals; likewise, the ‘spirit’ that stirred the example’s maker cannot be captured by imitation. Junius too asserts that the essence of the work cannot be reproduced just by copying lines and colours:
‘rash and inconsiderate beginners fall to worke upon the first sight, before ever they have sounded the deep and hidden mysteries of Art, pleasing themselves wonderfully with the good successe of their Imitation, when they seeme onely for the outward lines and colours to come somewhat neere their patern: and therefore doe they never attaine to that force of Art the originalls have’ (italics mine).  

Elsewhere, Junius says that imitators should be concerned not with the ‘superficiall’ features of a painting in terms of craftsmanship, but with its spiritual essence: ‘the true following of a rare Masters Art, doth not consist in an apish Imitation of the outward ornaments, but rather in the expressing of the inward force.’ The *Inleyding* explains why a copy cannot be entirely successful: it will always betray that it has not been made ‘after nature’. ‘Nature’ may be construed in two senses here: the original is closer to nature both in the sense of visible reality and in the sense of the artist’s innate talent: ‘There is always a charming vitality in originals that is lacking in copies: for however well a copy may have been executed, it will nevertheless reveal, in details here and there, elements that appear to originate not in nature but in painstaking labour’ (italics mine).

To illustrate the paradoxical nature of imitation, Van Hoogstraten uses the concept of ‘grace’, which he defines as an ‘inimitable force of suggestion’ that is needed ‘to surpass those things that are generally deemed unsurpassable’. Grace is the quality possessed by the original and lost in the copy; a quality that cannot be obtained by practice or training, but solely by ‘divine gifts that are to be obtained only … from Heaven’, states Van Hoogstraten. Even if every ‘part of painting’ is wholly accomplished, only the Graces can ultimately bring a work to completion: ‘grace consists of the meeting of all the parts of painting’. Junius uses the term ‘grace’ to clarify the inimitable qualities of works that can only be described as ‘ineffable, inimitable, supernatural, divine Artifice’.

‘Grace’, the concept to which the eighth chapter of the *Inleyding* is devoted, can be regarded as the most systematic element of Van Hoogstraten’s art theory, in which the other elements that he distinguishes are brought together (see above, pages 49, 54, 69). At first sight, however, it is also the most elusive element. Grace is defined in terms of negatives – ‘inimitability’, ‘I know not what’, a quality that is purportedly impossible to inculcate with training or rules. The elements ‘force’ and ‘spirit’, which the imitator is urged to identify in his example, appear to be related to it.

How can a painter focus in practice on the inimitable ‘spirit’, ‘force’ and ‘grace’, which he evidently cannot capture by ‘copying lines and smearing colours’ (Junius: ‘t nae-trecken van Linien en ’t opsmeeren van Coleuren)? How can the imitator reach the ‘deep and hidden mysteries of art’, without focusing on the ‘outward ornaments’? To answer this question, we need to review a notion of the work of art and the role of the viewer that is rooted in antiquity and that was crucial to shaping seventeenth-century Dutch art theory.

**PAINTING AS VIRTUAL REALITY**

The notion of the paradoxical nature of *imitatio auctoris* – which is ideally geared towards inimitable aspects such as ‘force’, ‘virtue’ and ‘grace’ – is based on a theory from antiquity focusing
on the emotional response of the beholder, who is deemed to sympathize completely with the depicted figures. In accordance with this view, the imitator should not focus on imitating the work of art, but on reconstructing the original reality that inspired his example. And this focus on another reality is not confined to the sense of sight: the imitator should become affectively and physically involved in the reality that is conjured up.

This theory of affective involvement is a fairly literal elaboration of views that were developed in the Second Sophistic from around AD 200. The writers of this ancient philosophical school include Philostratus, his grandson Philostratus the Younger, Callistratus and Lucian. ‘Ekphraseis’ or descriptions of images play an important role in their writings. For this reason, these authors are frequently quoted by Junius and Vossius as well as in the *Inleyding*.90 The Second Sophistic implicitly developed a consistent theory of visual representation that relies heavily on the theory of rhetoric.

The Sophists’ theory assumes that a work of art is fundamentally incomplete. The artist has supposedly recorded a mental image in the work of art, and it requires an effort of the viewer’s imagination if he in turn is to summon up this image. The artwork thus acts as a stimulus for the imagination. When the original mental image is evoked again, the art object itself, as no more than a medium, fades away.

This theory is not made explicit in Philostratus’ *Icones* (image descriptions), but in his *Life of Appolonius of Tyana* (II, 22). In a key example, he explains that it is possible to make a drawing of a black man without actually making the skin colour dark; the painter can draw on his evocative powers to suggest the hue. Van Hoogstraten paraphrases the passage from Philostratus as follows:

‘A Drawing, although made without colour, consisting solely of outlines, light and shade, says Philostratus, deserves the name of Painting all the same, if we see in it not only the likeness of the persons depicted in it, but also their movement, fear and shame, boldness and diligence: and although it may sometimes consist only of simple lines, it can nonetheless indicate sufficiently the form of a black or white human figure. Such that a Moor, even if drawn in white, will appear black.’91

The passage makes it clear that details of craftsmanship such as colour are of minor importance in an ideal imitation. Van Hoogstraten uses it to conclude his chapter ‘On the Purpose of Painting’; by giving it this central position, he acknowledges the importance of Philostratus’s views for seventeenth-century theories of the beholder’s response.

This response theory is central to Van Hoogstraten’s ideas on imitation. For a better understanding, we will consider the importance of imagination to the seventeenth-century notion of the viewer’s affective involvement, and to the related mental faculties of *inventio* and *memoria* of artist and beholder alike. Ultimately, the viewer’s experience of a painting becomes an immersion in a virtual reality. What is more, not only sight but the other senses too are deemed to be affected by the virtual reality of the painting. As we shall see, these beliefs suggest that the viewer’s reaction fulfils the role of necessary complement, making it possible for the consummate artistic moment to take effect.92

In analyzing Van Hoogstraten’s ideas we must bear in mind that the ancient theory of
the presentation of an event ‘to the mind’s eye’ pervaded more areas of seventeenth-century life than the visual arts alone. In courtiers’ manuals, it is seen as a requisite for conversation. The ability to tell a story so graphically that the listener feels as if he is actually experiencing the event himself and could ‘touch the objects with his own hand’ is an important quality for a courtier, and attests to worldly wisdom or urbanitas.93

**Imaginatio, memoria, inventio**

On the basis of the Aristotelian theory that ‘the mind never thinks without images’, early modern psychology sees the capacity to form mental images (in Dutch: *denkbeelden*, literally ‘thought images’) as the basis for all higher intellectual processes.94 That is why Van Hoogstraten and Zuccari compare draughtsmanship, *Teykening* or *disegno*, to a general intellectual activity, as a foundation for all branches of learning. Their assumption rests on the central notion that the artist first imprints what he wants to depict on his mind in the form of a mental image; Van Hoogstraten states that ‘the entire Art of Painting stems from the Artist’s inner power of imagination, as another Pallas [Athena, who was] born from the brains of Jupiter ... since a wise master will produce not just a sketch but a complete image of what he intends to make in his mind before he begins’.95

These mental images were regarded as more than representations of the objects observed: it was believed that the objects themselves, with all their details, were actually present in the artist’s trained imagination. According to Aristotelian theory, objects emit specific ‘spirits’ that affect the power of imagination when they enter the eyes and thus exert an affective ‘action at a distance’. The images observed leave behind an impression in the imagination, even when the object of observation is no longer there. Quintilian says that through these mental images, or *fantasiae*, ‘the images of absent things are presented to the mind in such a way that we believe we are seeing these things with our own eyes and that we are present with them’.96 This affective view is the basis for the topos that a painting ‘makes the absent present’. Van Hoogstraten refers to ‘the power of our innate imagination ... which acts as to paint absent things in the mind’.97

The pervasiveness of these views concerning the imagination in the seventeenth century is demonstrated by Descartes’s opinion that the power of imagination, unlike the faculty of reason, is linked directly to the body’s sensory and physical functions. According to Descartes (and to Goeree, who repeats him), reason is capable of reflecting on certain things without necessarily visualizing them – he gives the example of a chiliagon (a thousand-sided polygon), which is too complex to be visualized, although we may conceive of it clearly as an unequivocal mathematical object.98 By contrast, every form of visualization supposedly appeals to the ‘mind’s eye’ and relates the object of thought to the physicality of one’s own body. In his *Principia philosophiae* (1644), Descartes opposes the ‘power of imagination’ – or *kracht van inbeelden*, a term that is also used by Van Hoogstraten – to ‘the power of understanding’.99 He states: ‘I consider that this power of imagining which is in me [differs] from the power of understanding ... when the mind understands, it in some way turns towards itself and inspects one of the ideas which are within it; but when it imagines, it turns towards the body and looks at something in the body which conforms to an idea understood by the mind or perceived by the senses’.100
Descartes’s distinction between reason and imagination gives rise to the assumption that there are two forms of communication. The first is intellectual in nature, and focuses on conveying impersonal philosophical views. The second works primarily through images, manipulating the audience affectively and arousing physical reactions. This is the level on which rhetoric – speech designed to elicit affective response – and the visual arts operate.

The Cartesian emphasis on the physical component of communicating through images shows that the image theory of the Second Sophistic, with its emphasis on the imagination, remained topical in seventeenth-century philosophy that criticized classical thought in other respects. Treatises on painting emphasize that, given the physical element involved in shaping mental images, a disproportionate use of the imagination will disrupt a painter’s temperamental constitution. Ripa, for instance, writes that a painter ‘constantly has images of the visible objects in his mind ... in consequence, he becomes anxious and melancholic, and all his spirits are burned and consumed, as Physicians relate, which leads naturally to this particular sickness ... in Man.’ The main danger of melancholy, according to Van Hoogstraten, is posed by the activity of ordineren or composition – in other words the contemplation of the virtual three-dimensional space, which places disproportionate demands on the imagination: ‘it is above all in composition that one must beware of melancholy’. He suggests a number of ways in which the artist may ward off melancholy, such as going on journeys, dining in a large company, and drinking alcohol.

Early modern mnemotechnics, the art of memorizing – a vital skill of any orator and an indispensable part of intellectual life – was an elaboration of this concept of thinking in images and the possibility of educating through pictures. It consisted largely of visualizing topoi, commonplaces with an obtrusive visual quality which could help to conjure up elements of a speech vividly before the listeners’ eyes. The method was inspired not only by the presumed visual basis of thought but also by the relatively few possibilities that existed in ancient times for converting verbal utterances into text and for disseminating texts. The classical passage from Cicero states:

‘the most complete pictures are formed in our minds of the things that have been conveyed to them and imprinted on them by the senses, but ... the keenest of all our senses is the sense of sight, and ... consequently perceptions received by the ears or by reflexion can be most easily trained if they are also conveyed to our minds by the mediation of the eyes.’

Van Hoogstraten describes memory as an important asset for an artist; indeed, he calls the goddess of memory, Mnemosyne, the mother of the Muses. He praises painters like Elsheimer and Rubens who commit the artworks they see to memory, so as later to be able to imitate them: Elsheimer ‘does little by way of drawing, but sits in Churches and elsewhere, gazing steadily at the work produced by great masters, imprinting it all on his mind.

A third concept related to the process of making mental images, after imagination and memory, is the rhetorical notion of inventio, the painter’s choice of subject matter (translated by Van Hoogstraten into Dutch as vinden, the ‘finding’ of topoi and arguments). Junius, for instance, links inventio to the faculty of the imagination. In line with the Aristotelian view on
thinking in images, Van Hoogstraten posits that *inventio* consists of the processing of images stored in the memory. He urges young painters to study prints: ‘In this way you can learn how to enrich your mind from time to time with new materials, thus yielding in turn inventions of your own.’\(^{111}\) Apparently, *inventio* never takes place in a vacuum: in practice, it often involves ‘finding’ material where one has stored it: in a notebook or drawing pad.\(^{112}\) In the original rhetorical context, this means selecting specific commonplaces to impart greater persuasiveness to one’s speech. The analogy with painting was taken to be very direct, as is exemplified in Vossius’s emphasis that in both painting and rhetoric, ‘one must start by finding the arguments; then the arguments that have been found must be placed in a specific relationship to one another’.\(^{113}\) The choice of a particular topos, of a variation on a particular topos or the invention of a new example, with a view to the emotional manipulation of the public and hence the persuasiveness of one’s argument, was highly valued as an intellectual skill in theories of the rhetorical and literary process. The theory of combining and arranging commonplaces became, as ‘dialectic’, a separate discipline, *ars dialectica* (Van Hoogstraten calls it *redenkonst*, the art of reasoning).\(^{114}\)

The importance of *inventio* and of mental images (*denkbeelden*) as the starting point of the working process is manifestly not a licence for the unfettered imagination; on the contrary, it has to do with the intense contemplation of one’s predecessors’ work. The key premise here is that an ideal imitation does not focus on the example’s formal qualities, but on a mental evocation of the reality as seen or envisioned by the original artist. Van Hoogstraten praises painters who, ‘accustoming their thoughts in such a manner’, first convey the scenes they want to depict fully to the mind’s eye and see them ‘painted in thought-images’.\(^{115}\) Artists who allow themselves, on the other hand, ‘to be carried away shamefully by a strange ferocity of their capricious minds’, in the words of Junius, are flouting the injunction to follow ‘the plain simplicity of unalloyed nature’ that is essential if one is to retain credibility and hence persuasiveness.\(^{116}\) Junius contrasts poetry with painting in this respect. While a poet may allow his imagination to roam free, a painter has no such licence. There is nothing wrong with a poet’s verses possessing ‘a more fabulous excellencie ... altogether surpassing the truth’; but ‘in the phantasies (*verbeeldinghen*) of Painters, nothing is so commendable as that there is both possibilitie and truth in them’, to achieve the effect of *evidentia*, the rhetorical ability to present a narrative vividly.\(^{117}\) Goeree explains how this mental image should be the object of the ideal imitation:

‘One must look at Drawings, Sketches and Prints with one’s mind, not use one’s hand and eye to steal fragments from them, far less to slavishly imitate them, and ... to keep constantly looking through the spectacles of another. But ... one must attempt to impress only the [drawing’s] virtues upon one’s mind, by looking and looking again, contemplating, reflecting and ruminating, and to store them, by frequently thinking about them; so that your Mind may transform them from the inventions of another into your own’.\(^{118}\)

Clearly, imitation is a ‘re-creation’ of the *inventio*, the reality that met the eyes of the older artist or that was envisioned in his imagination. Not only artists but art lovers too are encouraged to look at paintings in this way in seventeenth-century treatises. Junius, for instance, presents a
practised power of imagination as a quality needed by the art lover, quoting from Philostratus’ *Life of Apollonius Tyaneus*: ‘such as doe contemplate the workes of the Art of painting ... have great need of the imaginative facultie’. It may be clear by now that he requires no ‘great imagination’, but the capacity to summon up a virtual reality. The central position of this concept in Juniuss’s theory is clear from the personification of ‘Imagination’ on the title page of *De pictura veterum*, which follows the precepts given in Ripa’s *Iconologia*: a woman with a cluster of tiny figures springing from her head, who takes the young painter by the hand (fig. 45).

‘As if he were another bystander’: The response theory of ekphrasis

The process of ekphrasis clarifies the above-mentioned theory of response to works of art. In ancient literature, ekphrasis – a central concept in Philostratus’s *Imagines* and Lucian’s *De Callumnia* for instance – is never a description of a painting, but always a description of the scene depicted, a reconstruction of the reality that confronted the artist. Ekphrasis can be called an ‘exercise in suggestive description’: the author was expected to describe a scene as if he were present during the event concerned or perhaps had even taken part in it.

In this theory of sympathetic involvement, the viewer is allotted a central role. The viewer must take the painting as a point of departure for a contemplation of the subject depicted, as if this were reality itself. Juniuss, for instance, thinks that an art lover must appraise paintings as if he were confronted with the things themselves rather than with painted objects; he states ‘that wee should not onely goe with our eyes over the severally figures represented in the worke, but [that] we should likewise suffer our mind to enter into a lively consideration of what wee see expressed; not otherwised than if wee were present, and saw not the counterfeited image but the reall performance of the thing’ (italics mine).

Juniuss’s term ‘reall performance’ exemplifies how looking at works of art was deemed similar to the experience of a play. Van Hoogstraten is echoing his words when he writes that the work must appeal to the viewer such that the latter believes himself to be present in the scene depicted, and thus be involved affectively: ‘So that the work will thrill the viewer, as if he were another bystander, with one voice, terrify him with a violent action, and gladden him by showing something cheerful’. The painting is expected to immerse both painter and viewer of his work in a virtual reality; the beholder’s power of imagination is essential if the illusion is to work. Juniuss writes:

‘Here it is furthermore required, that all those who meane to enter into a judicious consideration of matters of art, must by the means of these Images accustome their mind to such a lively representation of what they see expressed in the picture, as if they saw the things themselves and not their resemblance onely’ (italics mine).

Juniuss emphasizes that not only the artist, but the art lover too must train his capacity of forming mental images; indeed, a beholder can only appreciate a painting if he can compare it to the images of reality he has stored in his memory. There must be some common ground in the experiences of artist and viewer, if the painting is to have the desired effect. Only then
Fig. 45 – Joseph Mulder after Adriaan van der Werf, title page to Franciscus Junius, *De pictura veterum*, Rotterdam 1694.
can some degree of virtual interaction occur between painter and viewer. On the basis of early modern psychology, this interaction is construed quite literally, given the assumed physical component of the power of imagination. The painter is expected to impose his own inner world and experiences, including his temperament and character traits, on his work, in a fairly unconscious, almost automatic way. The viewer is subsequently moved, in an affective and physical sense, by the figures, colours and forms that are displayed to him. Referring to this assumption, Goeree states that if the work of art conveys a mental image to the mind’s eye, viewers are ‘moved no differently than were they to have witnessed these things in their entirety with their own eyes’. Junius concludes that this form of immersion in another reality is made easier by the physical involvement of imagination and the ‘presence’ of images in the mind: artists and art lovers alike should train their imagination in order ‘to have a true feeling of [works of art], rightly to conceive the true images (verbeeldingen) of things, and to be moved with them, as if they were rather true than imagined.’ He illustrates the role of the viewer’s imagination by describing in detail an ancient battle scene: ‘at the mere sight of this scene, his thoughts are stimulated so vigorously that with a little use of his imagination he will see the entire state of the battle before him.’

The theory of ekphrasis clarifies how it happens that, in an ideal imitation, the medium fades away. The supposed ‘disappearance’ of the artwork is exemplified by Goeree’s statement that those who look at paintings, ‘the subjects of which are confined to visible Things’, must be prompted to move from gazing at what is visible to contemplating the ‘invisible’ human motives. The viewer must eventually completely forget that he is gazing at paintings or works of sculpture, but should believe that it is a virtual reality that confronts him: the painter must devote himself to means:

‘by which Figures can be created in Paintings such that the Viewer can set aside all thoughts of Canvas and Panel, Paint and Oil, or Wood and Stone and Copper (if the work has been cast or modelled), and be possessed of the Idea that he has before his Eyes not Painted or Cast, but Natural Living Human figures.’

Van Hoogstraten, in discussing this view of ideal imitation, gives the specific example of artists who try to copy sculptures from antiquity, but fail to attain this mental ‘re-creation’ of reality. He observes, ‘instead of the spirit of their predecessors coming to their aid with a graceful lifelikeness, their statues changed to stone’. Evidently they did not succeed in imitating that quality that enables the viewer to forget that he is gazing at a work of art, so that their statues ‘changed back’, as it were, into stone objects. Instead of providing a virtual reality, they drew attention to the effort of craftsmanship that the work had demanded.

This theory of sympathetic involvement, involving both mind and body, also helps to clarify the ideas on the paradoxical nature of imitation that have been quoted above: the imitator, like the spectator, must not essentially focus on the work of art, but on the spirit and ‘living grace’ of the original mental image. When imitating a work of art, one must not simply copy lines and colours, but always remain mindful, while doing so, of the illusion of space, atmosphere and movement that was envisaged by the painter of the original.
Performativity

The viewer’s supposed involvement with a work ‘as if he were another bystander’, and the role of the painter as a narrator who was present at the event depicted, are part of a more general theory about the performatve nature of the art of painting. Performativity will be understood here to mean that in experiencing art, the event takes place that the work describes or depicts. We shall interpret the term in the sense of Junius’s formulation that the spectators do not see ‘the counterfeited image but the real performance of the thing’. The image theory of the Second Sophistic is based to a large extent on the assumption of this performatve effect. In the ideal situation, the painting is the event depicted; the viewer is ‘present’ at the scene, just as the painter was present while painting it. In the seventeenth century, this effect is frequently interpreted literally: the viewer is deemed to be transposed to a virtual reality by what may be
called an act of magic. Goeree, for instance, refers to the ‘almost Supernatural Magic whereby one makes from Dead and Lifeless material Human images that are certainly motionless, but nonetheless appear in numerous ways to move. In which one imagines one hears the Dumb Speaking ... and in which even while they remain within our Sight, they nonetheless appear at the same moment to swiftly flee from it.’

The metaphor used for the virtual reality that the painter summons up before his eyes is that of the theatre. This comparison, which Van Hoogstraten uses on several occasions, should be construed literally rather than figuratively. This is exemplified by his discussion of imitation in the chapter on painterly composition, which is dedicated to the Muse Thalia, ‘Mistress of comedies and farces’. He relates that the ideal imitation should focus not on another master’s ‘handling’ but on composition or *ordinnantie*, the choreography of the figures depicted in a virtual, three-dimensional setting. To create an *ordinnantie*, the painter must conjure up

*Fig. 47 – Rubens, Diana Discovers Callisto’s Pregnancy, 1630–35, canvas.*
a stage to the mind’s eye: ‘Let us now open the princely Theatre ... draw the curtain within ourselves, and first depict the historical action in our minds’. This is more than a metaphor; indeed, aspiring painters are encouraged to engage in play-acting as a useful exercise; Thalia demands of a painter that his mind be completely open to this kind of dramatic *praemeditatio*. As becomes clear from Van Hoogstraten’s chapter on composition, painterly invention relates in large measure to the choreography of the figures, the spatial composition that the painter forms in his mind before he starts painting. Thus, this chapter encourages pupils to train their faculties of imagination.

To analyse what this theatrical analogy means in practice, we may look at the most striking example that Van Hoogstraten gives of a painter who uses older works to fine effect. This is Rubens, who produced many drawings after sculptures from antiquity as well as fairly literal copies of Italian masters such as Titian. These include his imitation of Titian’s *Diana and Callisto* and his free adaptation of Caravaggio’s *Entombment* (figs. 46 and 47, 48 and 49). Even a superficial comparison of originals and copies reveals that what Rubens adopts from his examples is not their ‘handling’; indeed, Rubens retains his own specific brushwork. What is of more interest to him is *ordinnatie*, the spatial choreography of the figures. Besides Rubens, Van Hoogstraten also praises his own master, Rembrandt, for his skilful *ordinnatie*. The latter’s imitations after Lastman, and his drawing of the Last Supper based on a print after Leonardo, demonstrate that the painter was not interested in the tonal qualities of his example, but in the placing of the figures, whereby the scene’s surroundings could be altered more or less at will (figs. 50 and 51). Van Hoogstraten relates the following anecdote to illuminate Rubens’s method:
‘When Rubens was ... in Rome, one of his industrious companions rebuked him for copying and drawing so few Italian Paintings, and for spending all his precious time walking, looking and sitting still, saying that to be a great master in art, one must labour night and day. But Rubens retorted laughingly with the well-known saying, “I am busiest when you see me idle”.”

The paradoxical expression, ‘I am busiest when you see me idle’ helps to clarify the notion that in an ideal imitation the medium fades away: the imitator does not copy lines and colours but tries to evoke the original reality that met his predecessor’s eyes. Hence we see that Van Hoogstraten praises Rubens for the power of his imagination.

To give another example: Rubens’s version of Raphael’s portrait of Castiglione also shows that the Flemish master did not set out to copy the painting, but to paint Castiglione himself again (figs. 52 and 53). In so doing, he followed both the ‘nature’ that was originally before Raphael’s eyes and his own nature, and did not attempt to adopt Raphael’s ‘handling’. It is in this context too that we should understand another comment that Van Hoogstraten...
Fig. 50 – Anonymous after Leonardo da Vinci, *The Last Supper*, 16th century, engraving.

ascribes to Rubens: namely, that only a few will benefit from borrowing from old masters.142

Another consequence of the supposed performative nature of the art of painting is the suggestion of interaction. The figures depicted not only appear to move in three dimensions, they are also expected to address their public, an assumption that is expressed in the commonplace in art theory that the work appears to ‘speak to the viewers’. This topos may be linked to specific painterly virtues. For instance, De Piles links the effect of ‘speaking likeness’ in particular to chiaroscuro: ‘A painting in which the lines and local colours are mediocre but are supported by skilful chiaroscuro will not allow a viewer to calmly pass it by, it will call out to him, arrest him for at least a moment.’143 In this context, De Piles relates that visitors took Rembrandt’s portrait of his maidservant for the girl herself, an anecdote that may be linked to paintings like Rembrandt’s Maidservant (1651), now in Stockholm, which bears similarities to works attributed to Van Hoogstraten (figs. 54 and 55).144 Rembrandt’s work is described in similar terms by Houbraken, who mentions a portrait that was ‘so artfully and forcefully elaborated that even the most forceful brushwork of Van Dyck and Rubens could not match it, aye the head appeared to protrude from it and speak to the beholders.’145 According to a comparable commonplace, the work appears to follow the viewer with its eyes: De Lairesse mentions a portrait of a woman painted such that ‘her eyes appeared to gaze at every viewer’ and continues: ‘The reason for this is that ... such images were so profoundly congruent with human forms that they appeared to be not painted but to be made of flesh and blood, aye as moving figures.’146

In the context of his notion that a work of art is an immersion in a ‘reall performance’, Junius gives several descriptions of the way in which the painter or writer becomes wholly absorbed in the image he conjures up in his mind’s eye. He dwells on Ovid’s account of Phaeton’s fall from his father’s chariot, and states that it is so lifelike only because the poet has ‘made himself present’ in the events he describes:

‘would you not thinke then that the Poet stepping with Phaeton upon the waggon hath noted from the beginning to the end every particular accident ... neither could he ever have conceived the least shadow of this dangerous enterprise, if he had not been as if it were present with the unfortunate youth’.147

It is Junius’s art-theoretical ideal that painters and writers alike become ‘present’ in the scenes they portray. The Dutch edition of his book is more specific still, stating that the artist should ‘reconstruct the matter with his imagination’ (door ‘t verbeelden t’achter baelen) in order to ‘make himself present at the scene, in a manner of speaking’ (dat hy zich selven aldaer in maniere van spreken, ver-tegbenwoordighet baudde). That is, of course, the most direct form of performativity: the painter ‘is’ what he ‘makes’.

A common metaphor that thematizes the assumed identification of the artist with his work, in terms of body and mind, is the comparison of the creative process to pregnancy. Van Hoogstraten describes the painter’s mind as ‘pregnant with rich thoughts’148 and calls paintings the maker’s ‘offspring’, in which certain of his characteristics are visible.149 This metaphor is rooted in the early modern explanation of the similarity between parents and children as a product of the mother’s imagination. If she received certain strong stimuli from her imagination during conception or pregnancy, it was believed, the child’s physical constitution would
bear traces of it. Van Hoogstraten gives the example of an adulterous woman who, fearful of her husband’s wrath, embedded his image so firmly in her imagination that her illegitimate child looked even more like her husband than did his own children. The anecdote illuminates the early modern belief that the painter could make himself literally, physically, present in his work by the sheer force of his imagination.

The seventeenth-century notion that body and mind are closely linked also supposes a direct relationship between character and environment. This means that painters who want to produce lifelike representations of specific human beings must first spend some time in their company. De Lairesse writes that ‘those who spend their days among vulgar and immoral people are generally vulgar and immoral; conversely, those who consort with the upright and virtuous will themselves become virtuous’. He also urges painters to identify wholly with their subject: ‘imagine that you are yourself each person in turn whom you are to depict’. The view that the painter’s relationship to the figures he depicts possesses a sympathetic, physical quality is reflected in the exhortation that in the ideal imitation, the artist should ‘follow his own nature’ – ideally, the artist is ‘present’ in his work.

**Fig. 52 – Raphael, Portrait of Baldassare Castiglione, ca. 1514-15, canvas, 82 x 66 cm. Musée du Louvre, Paris.**
It is in this context that we should understand the view that not only the painter but the viewer too must share some common ground with the painting, if the most complete form of persuasion is to be achieved. Junius writes not only that ‘no body can with any good reason praise a painted horse or bull, unless he doe conceive that same creature in his mind, whose similitude the Picture doth expresse.’ He also explains that artists and viewers should be able to recognize themselves in the figures depicted. He draws a comparison with a comedy in the theatre: ‘It is altogether needfull ... that a man whom these [comic] lines should take, be well acquainted with the things [themselves]’ – that is to say, the actor must be acquainted with the night life, he must have associated with ‘young roarsers’ and have been caught up in brawls. Apparently, the painter must be a man of the world in order to paint in a manner that will be intelligible to a large proportion of the public; his persuasiveness is based on the assumption of a shared ethos. The *vir bonus pingendi peritus* or ‘good man skilled in painting’ can only persuade his viewers and change their character by appearing natural and straightforward, in short, by ‘being himself’.
Fig. 54 – Rembrandt, *Young Girl at a Window*,
1651, canvas, 78 x 63 cm, 1651. Nationalmuseum, Stockholm.
Synaesthesia

The belief that the medium fades away in an ideal imitation should not lead one to conclude that seventeenth-century theorists see a painting as something imperfect, which will necessarily fall short of what the artist initially conceived in his mind. On the contrary, a good work of art is believed to stimulate the imagination through all sorts of illusionistic, persuasive and affective means, such that the image becomes more than a mere painting: it comes to life such as to bring the other senses too into play. Ultimately, the viewer hears the painting speak, sees it move, and his other senses too are mobilized; in short, he is immersed in a performative illusion.

In this context, the most obvious figure of speech from the literature of art is the observation that motionless painted images appear to move; Van Hoogstraten praises Leonardo’s Mona Lisa for this quality: ‘in the hollow of the throat ... one seemed to see the pulse throb’. A well-known anecdote from antiquity, about the artist Theon who had a clarion sounded at the unveiling of his painting of a soldier, shows that image and sound could ideally be combined to evoke an even more persuasive virtual reality. Philostratus himself waxes particularly lyrical on the synaesthetic facets of artistic illusion; describing a painted garden, he asks: ‘do you notice something of the fragrance of the garden, or are your senses numbed?’ When he evokes an image of horses, he states that ‘they whinny fast, nostrils raised, or do you not hear the painting?’ The Inleyding repeats Philostratus’s astonishment ‘that art brings forth so much,
that from the flared nostrils [of these horses], from their pressed-down ears and taut limbs, one perceives their keen desire to flee, even though one knows that they are motionless'. Elsewhere, Van Hoogstraten takes a synaesthetic description of Venus, including sound, scent and movement, as his point of departure for a painting: ‘Who will not imagine the most enchanting elegance if he reads Virgil’s words on Venus? “Thus speaking, she departed, looking back over her rosy neck, a divine fragrance like ambrosia wafting from her hair, her robe trailing behind her, and her tread that of a true goddess”’.158

A commonplace frequently cited in this context suggests that the person depicted is sleeping, or is not moving or speaking at this precise moment for some other reason. In the Inleyding, Van Hoogstraten quotes a poem by Giovanni Strozzi about Michelangelo’s personification of sleep in the Medici Chapel in Florence: ‘The night, who sleeps here now ... who does not think she lives, / And softly rests? Or is there something missing? / Ah wake her then, and you shall hear her speak’.159 A similar trope recurs when Jan de Brune refers to Philostratus’s description of a painting of a sleeping satyr: here, the spectators are urged to speak in hushed tones so that they may continue to enjoy the spectacle.160 Similarly, Goeree tells of a painting of a sleeping Venus with an inscription stating that the goddess must not be woken, ‘lest, opening her Eyes, he would be unable to close his own [because of the seductiveness of her gaze]’.161 It is above all the subject’s eyes that are described as so powerful as to magnify...
the painting’s affective influence to the fullest extent. These remarks relate to a debate in art theory as to whether sight and its affective influence derive from beams of light emanating from or entering the eyes. For example, the 1644 Dutch translation of Ripa includes a passage from Ficino alluding to the affective influence of the ‘spirits’ that are ‘emitted’ by the eyes. This view may be illustrated by one of Otto van Veen’s emblems, which shows a woman’s gaze boring into her lover’s heart in the form of arrows (fig. 56). It is clear from Goeree’s comment that this heart-piercing effect is ascribed not only to the lover’s eyes, but also to those of the painted eyes in a work of art.

The image may exert such appeal as to stimulate the viewer’s sense of touch: Van Hoogstraten describes an image of the ancient warrior Hector that was ‘filled with such a lively spirit (levendigen geest) that the beholder had the desire to touch it’. Michelangelo too, who ‘doted’ on the sculpture of a river god in the Vatican museums, came to touch it out of desire for its beauty, as the Inleyding describes. On the other hand, De Brune reports that he shrank from laying hands on the painting of a lady, lest he harm her body: ‘I scarcely dare to touch / That comely flesh for fear to bruise or scratch: / For she is not a painted figure, she lives, and true to tell, / She can utter sounds that will o’erpower each viewer’s soul’. Samuel Pepys, who mentions Van Hoogstraten in his diaries as a skilled painter of trompe-l’œil, writes of being barely able to suppress his desire to touch the painted drops of water on the fruit in one of the artist’s still-lifes.
The supposition that the viewer is transposed to a virtual reality by the strong affective power of the painting means that by depicting just a single moment from a story, the skilled artist is expected to summon up the entire history to the mind’s eye. In fact, the very focus on one affectively charged, suggestive moment is deemed to have greater power to transpose the viewer instantly to a complex narrative situation. This evocation before one’s eyes of a narrative sequence underlies many ekphrastic descriptions in ancient literature, such as that of the images on Achilles’s shield in Homer’s *Iliad*, which is repeated in the *Inleyding*. On the basis of these ancient ideas, Junius analyses the way in which the viewer is swept into a narrative sequence by the sight of a single image, concluding: ‘Our outer senses need present only the beginning of a story to our mind, and our active wit will soon readily comprehend the entire story, as a sequence of events’. Here again, the author refers to the characteristic distinction between ‘outer senses’ and the inner realm of thought, which early modern psychology regarded as intimately connected.

In the seventeenth century, the supposed performative and synaesthetic effect of art was reinforced by hanging curtains in front of paintings, a practice that is demonstrated in various images depicting domestic interiors or art collections (figs. 57-61). If the viewer was taken to a covered painting and the curtain was drawn at the right moment, this strengthened the illusion that the action depicted had been in progress for some time and the viewer was confronted with a split second in a narrative sequence. Ancient theory was used to legitimize this practice, drawing on anecdotes such as the contest between Zeuxis and Parrhasios, in which Zeuxis went to draw the curtain to see his rival’s painting, only to discover that the curtain itself was the...
painting. A clarion might be sounded at this moment of revelation, as already noted. Junius
dwells at length on the painter Theon, who, ‘having made the picture of an armed man who
seemed to runne most furiously on his enemies that depopulated the country round about, he
did thinke it good not to propound the picture before he had provided a trumpetter to sound
an alarme somewhere hard by’, at the same time as ‘starting to draw the curtain that kept the
work concealed’.\footnote{Van Hoogstraten relates that painters contemplating a historical scene ‘draw a curtain’
in their mind’s eye in a similar fashion, in order to start by first ‘painting the events in their
minds’.\footnote{That the effect of sudden revelation on the persuasiveness of the image was well un-
derstood in the seventeenth century, is clear from a letter in which the famous French painter
Nicolas Poussin advises an art lover that to achieve the most satisfying effect on the viewer, it
is best to draw aside the paintings’ covers one at a time.\footnote{Accordingly, Huygens writes that
if a viewer is shown a painting of Medusa that is normally kept behind a curtain, ‘he will be
shocked by the sudden terror’ of the confrontation, but at the same time undergo the moving
experience of its vivid lifelikeness.\footnote{This practice indicates just how literally the comparison

FIG. 59 – Gabriel Metsu, \textit{Woman Reading a Letter}, 1665, canvas, 52 x 40 cm. National Gallery of Ireland, Dublin.
between painting and the stage could be understood in the seventeenth century. How the theory of classical tragedy influenced Van Hoogstraten’s ideas will be explored more fully in chapter IV (see below, pages 188-197).

The viewer’s reaction

In the ancient theories that have been outlined here, the viewer’s own power of imagination is seen as a necessary complement to the painting. Accordingly, seventeenth-century treatises on painting contain abundant descriptions of the public’s reactions to works of art. These reactions have little to do with assessments of stylistic qualities or choice of subject; they are
generally described in terms of the viewer’s ‘astonishment’ that ‘strikes him dumb’. With the physical transportation to another reality, the spectator is believed to lose control of his senses, and to be unable to express his reaction in words.\textsuperscript{177}

Here the theory of painting builds on a belief from antiquity, as expressed most notably in the treatise \textit{On the Sublime}, attributed to the third-century scholar Longinus.\textsuperscript{178} Van Hoogstraten cites Longinus’ central principle of the ‘sublime’ in a passage from the \textit{Inleyding} with suggestions for painters on ways of conjuring up mental images.\textsuperscript{179} He translates the Latin term ‘sublime’ as ‘truly great’ (\textit{waarlijk groot}), a quality which he defines as ‘that which appears before our eyes each time anew as if fresh; which is difficult, or rather impossible, to banish from our thoughts; the memory of which seems to be constantly, and as if indelibly, engraved on our hearts.\textsuperscript{180} This concept thematizes the notion that a good work of art should conjure up a mental image before our eyes that stays on the retina, in a manner of speaking, an image that becomes permanently ‘present’ in the imagination and brings about an emotional transformation.

According to Van Hoogstraten’s theory, the ‘truly great’ cannot be described in the same reasoned way as the ‘parts of painting’; it can only be made more explicit by describing the viewer’s reaction. In seventeenth-century reactions to paintings, the concept of ‘astonishment’ (\textit{verwondering}; Junius’s English edition speaks of ‘astonishment of wonder’) is frequently em-

\textbf{Fig. 61} – Rembrandt, \textit{The Holy Family with the Curtain}, 1646, panel, 49 x 69 cm.
Kassel, Staatliche Kunstsammlungen, Gemäldegalerie Alte Meister.
phasized. One example is Jan Orlers's allusions to the work of Rembrandt and Lievens, in his description of the city of Leiden (1641). Van Hoogstraten describes reactions to paintings in terms of an ineffable experience: the viewer perspires profusely, and finds himself embroiled in a ‘terrifyingly confused inner struggle’. Imbued with ‘a vivid sense of inexpressible joy’, he is so moved that he is almost incapable of averting his eyes from the work, and on his way home, his eyes are ‘drawn back to the memory of that rare sight’. Van Hoogstraten describes paintings the sight of which made viewers turn pale, and others that people did not dare to touch. The popularity of these remarks suggests that the spectator’s involvement in a work of art was deemed total and completely direct, at a physical level that precedes verbal articulation.

The ‘confusion’ or ‘inner struggle’ aroused by the experience of a work of art is assumed to be closely related to the experience of deceptive verisimilitude and physical immersion in a virtual reality. So it is understandable that the words ‘astonishment’ and ‘lifelikeness’ often occur in the same breath. Van Hoogstraten’s term ‘inexpressible joy’ is apparently a fitting response to this transportation to a virtual reality, in which the medium, and therefore the possibility of speaking in the customary vocabulary of art criticism, fades away.

The examples of these extreme physical reactions show that the viewer’s response is described in terms of the affective ‘action at a distance’ that the painting is thought to exert with its purportedly magical powers. Dutch art theory tends to stress the connection between pictorial lifelikeness and the work of art’s power of ‘enchantment’; a physical attraction that can even be described in terms borrowed from love lyrics. The work of art is believed to ‘utterly consume a viewer at first sight’; paintings ‘have the force ... to attract art-loving spirits from the remotest regions’. It is sometimes supposed that this emotional attraction of the image can only be achieved if the artist himself has a comparable affective relationship with his sitter; the image is most persuasive when the artist was in love with his model. The Inleyding adduces the example of the frescoes in Palazzo Chigi in Rome, where ‘[Raphael] of Urbino worked when he was in love; Venus inspired him to depict Venus in the most beautiful fashion ... what appears impossible can be achieved by love, since minds are most alert when the senses are enamoured’. Van Hoogstraten recalls that Apelles is said to have based his image of Venus Anadyomene on his lover, Campaspe. Likewise, Lucas de Heere relates that Hugo van der Goes fell in love with his model and therefore produced a masterpiece; De Heere compares this situation to Praxiteles’s love of the courtesan Phryne. A similar commonplace compares Pictura to the painter’s lover or wife, while his works of art are called his children.

Van Hoogstraten repeatedly describes the compelling qualities of the art of painting in terms of sensory temptation. Paintings make ‘one’s sight fall in love with their charms’, the eyes become ‘saturated’ at the sight of a work of art, since ‘gracefulness rouses one to love’. These seductive qualities also present certain dangers. In the tradition of art theory, painting’s presumed enticing nature is linked to the bias of certain painters towards superficial ornamentation and indiscriminate naturalism. The Venetian painter Giorgione, for example, is described as an artist who was so much ‘in love’ with the beauties of nature that he abandoned...
himself to sensual and ultimately sinful naturalism. In contrast to these views formulated in Italy, Van Hoogstraten emphasizes the commonplace ‘in love with nature’ approvingly: recalling his discussions in Rembrandt’s studio, he mentions saying to Fabritius that a painter must needs be ‘enamoured of the beauties of graceful nature he is to depict ... [and] that he is, as it were, in love with the soul of art: that is to say, examining nature’s properties’.

Akin to the tropes of the ‘astonishment’, ‘confusion’ and ‘charm’ caused by painting is the idea that the viewer can become so involved in a scene that his reaction is not only unrelated to the vocabulary of art criticism but transcends language altogether, and is definable only as a _je ne sais quoi_ (Van Hoogstraten uses the Dutch phrase _ik en weet niet wat_). In art theory, this reaction on the viewer’s part is equivalent to the concept of grace, which Van Hoogstraten describes as an overarching quality, subsuming the painter’s various virtues, which defies further specification. A good account of the elusive quality of grace is provided by the theorist Giovanni Maria Morandi in a 1681 lecture to the St Luke’s Academy in Rome: ‘since the heart has no fixed standards like those of the intellect, grace is something that one does not learn, but feels, and takes from nature: grace is a _je ne sais quoi_ that pleases, enchants and seduces, and disposes the spirit to heavenly joy’. It seems that grace affects the human emotions rather than the faculty of reason, and is therefore not subject to the rules of art; it is ultimately found only in ‘nature’. ‘Nature’ is ambivalent in this context: it probably refers to the artist’s natural inclinations as well as to the natural world on which he bases his depictions.

Similarly, Junius refers to the viewer’s reaction to a work of art as an ‘incomprehensible pleasure’; the viewer is supposedly ‘speechless’, or cast into a dream world. He describes how ‘great rings of amazed spectators together’ are led ‘into an astonished extasie, their sense of seeing bereaving them of all other senses; which by a secret veneration maketh them stand
tongue-tyed’. This effect of astonishment is aroused primarily by the work of art’s lifelike quality: viewers are struck by an ‘unspeakable admiration’, ‘believing that in these silent lineaments of members they doe see living and breathing bodies.’ Apparently, the moment of painterly evidentia transcends rhetoric, and the reaction to it is therefore ineffable: ‘surpassing the power of speaking ... uneasie also to them that are very eloquent ... for every one of these things is apprehended by sense, and not by talke.’

Silence may thus be construed as the most eloquent – or at least the most appropriate – reaction to a masterpiece. The significance of the visual arts lies precisely in their ability to appeal to this prepredicative level of response. Seventeenth-century philosophy located this response not in the seat of the faculty of reason, but in the ‘sensible’ region where the imagination and the passions are located, which mediates between the physical and mental powers. Thus, Simonides’ allusion to the art of painting as muta poesis can be construed in a very positive sense. Paintings embody the rhetorical virtue of brevity in exemplary fashion: their ‘mute poetry’ is so concise that they require no words at all. Junius writes of the effect of great works of art as transcending speech: ‘Incredible things finde no voice; ... some things are greater, then that any mans discourse should be able to compasse them.

Some art theorists maintain that it is precisely the fact that the visual arts operate on the physical, prepredicative level that may give them an edge over literature. The little poem quoted by Van Hoostraten on Michelangelo’s ‘sleeping’ statue has a parallel in the writings of Giovanni Battista Agucchi of 1610. Agucchi’s text on a Venus painted by Annibale Carracci describes explicitly a viewer’s reaction to painting’s ability to transport him to a virtual reality, in the context of a discussion of the adequacy of language to describe visual impressions (fig. 62). Agucchi believes that ekphrasis is fundamentally inadequate: some works of art are ‘so perfect that the pen is powerless to describe them’ (troppo più perfette elle sono, che la penna a dichiarare non arriva).

The description begins with set commonplaces: exclamations of desire to touch the painting on the one hand, and a professed reluctance to rouse the sleeping goddess on the other. The conflict this produces is characteristic of the state of confusion induced in the viewer, in which his sight and other senses are dazed (ingannatone il senso e la vista). It is the complete immersion in a virtual reality that makes it so hard to capture the impression evoked by the painting in words: ‘we can scarcely conjure up outstanding works of art in our mind, and we can certainly not express them with our weak faculty of intellect’. Agucchi concludes that his description is ‘as if ... the paintings were covered by a coarse-grained veil, so that viewers can see them only with difficulty: these descriptions may be appreciated in a similar manner by the reader’. Just as a veil in front of a painting shields it from being seen completely, language intervenes between image and viewer; descriptions of paintings provide only indirect access to them.

The belief, expressed by Agucchi, that works of art operate on a prepredicative level explains the foundations of the seventeenth-century view that art has a physically salubrious effect and that it can also be harmful to the body if such an effect is deliberately sought. The various ideas regarding ‘astonishment of wonder’, ‘confusion’, ‘attraction’, ‘inexpressible joy’ and je-ne-sais-quoi should ultimately be understood in the context of something very different from the modern conception of ‘aesthetic appreciation’. Seventeenth-century texts referring to
the salubrious function of art describe it in terms of a form of life fulfilment that follows from the Stoics’ ideas about human emotions and their appreciation of ‘living according to nature’. In a world view governed largely by natural determinism, true happiness can be found only by ‘adapting to nature’ – that is, by resigning yourself to the influences of the passions, so that they do not control your behaviour. Goeree, whose adherence to Stoic ideas has already been touched on, states in his book on painting, for instance, that ‘this is a gift that Human Beings alone have received from God, that they are able, through Virtue and Reason, to restrain all untamed passions, and moreover, with a well-ordered mind, seek the eternal good’. Starting from the basic principle that man should suppress all excessive emotion and recognize that he is a part of the natural world and that his passions are functions of physical operations, it is a Stoic proposition that the _summum bonum_ can be found only in nature. This viewpoint helps to clarify the assumption mentioned in the previous chapter, that when a painter follows nature, he finds complete fulfilment in the activity of painting itself. In an orthodox Stoic view, this is the maximum in terms of an ‘aesthetic experience’ that an artist can attain. This profound concentration on nature yielded by the art of painting operates on a different level than aesthetic experience in a modern sense: it is healthy for body and mind, as it helps one to see that while human passions are unavoidable, they need not be allowed to govern one’s behaviour.

A similar proposition applies to the beholder of a work of art, if he recognizes and appreciates the painter’s capacity for studying nature. Then he may realize he himself is similarly ruled by the principle governing Creation and human conduct, according to Seneca’s proposition in _De vita beata_, which Junius repeats: ‘what is Nature else ... but God and a divine power infused into the whole world and every part of the world?’ This view of the virtues of the _vita contemplativa_ explains Van Hoogstraten’s belief that ‘any man of honourable intentions’ would choose the career of an artist rather than that of a soldier or politician, whose lives are governed by the affects. Indeed, their deeds are influenced by ‘wrath, injustice, and sinful desires’, while the arts, ‘in quiet, observant contemplation of the mysteries of nature, are consonant with the exercise of the virtues.’

In the seventeenth century, discussions of the concept of grace bring together the various elements of artistic experience, artist, artwork and beholder. In Van Hoogstraten’s theory, the different ‘parts of painting’ are all subordinate to this elusive concept that transcends the rules of art. ‘Grace’ is applicable not only to the painter’s ultimate ability to make his work look natural and convincing, but also to the liveliness of the figures he depicts and to the intensity of the beholder’s reaction. This is exemplified by Roger de Piles’s description of the reaction of speechlessness as an effect of the work of art on the viewer that appears to defy rules (and to have nothing whatsoever to do with concepts like ‘beauty’ or ‘aesthetic experience’): grace ‘startles the observer, who sees the effect but does not grasp its true cause.’ He adds to this explanation that grace is a specific passion of the viewer, a necessary complement to the work of art: ‘grace can only move the heart when the latter is suitably predisposed.’ As scholars of early modern artistic terminology have noted in the past, grace is essentially not a quality of the artist himself; it is ultimately the public that bestow grace on him and his work. In Dutch art theory, we encounter this notion when Houbraken quotes the caption that Anna Maria van Schuurman wrote to her self-portrait: ‘what [the image] may lack in art will be offset by your
goodwill (*gratia* in Van Schuurman’s Latin; *gunst* in Dutch). For the rest, grace, as the ‘unspeakable way of Art, delicatly, divinely, unfeisably’ referred to by Junius, can be fathomed only by the indirect route of the viewer’s response. When De Piles adds that ‘a painter can take grace only from nature’, it is clear that in the experience of grace the three ‘moments’ – artist, the figures depicted, and viewer – all overlap, in the sense that they ‘follow nature’ and hence meet in a virtual reality.

The central importance of the issue of ‘lifelikeness’ in seventeenth-century texts about painting, as well as the deliberate play with illusion and the puncturing of illusion that characterizes many paintings of the period, are difficult to evaluate properly for modern viewers, who are used to interpreting paintings as art objects with an inherently problematic relationship to reality. Today’s viewer takes it for granted that a work of art has a reality of its own. Seventeenth-century spectators, in contrast, were more than willing to forget that they were looking at a fictional work, or rather to engage in ‘a willing suspension of disbelief’: Junius speaks about ‘the sweet allurements of Picture, and how we suffer our hearts wittingly and willingly to be seduced and beguiled ... to be so possessed with things that are not, as if they were’. Indeed, Coleridge’s phrase, which Arthur Wheelock related to seventeenth-century painting, is less explicit than the theory of the seventeenth century that refers to a complete mental and physical shift to a virtual reality. It is precisely the currency of the topical praise of the ‘living image’ that demonstrates its relevance to seventeenth-century views about art; not that painted figures were believed to be literally equivalent to living human beings, but the initial conditioned response to a painting was always to play the game: ‘It is as if I were there!’ or ‘The image is speaking to me!’ ‘I wanted to touch this fruit, and it was not until I stretched out my hand that I realized the deception!’ ‘Even my dog thought that this painted dog was real!’ In 1635, the theorist Pierre le Brun described this attitude as the most important ‘manner of speaking’ about art: ‘To discuss splendid paintings, one must speak of them as if the things [depicted] were real, not painted’. That these expressions are rooted in time-honoured ways of thinking can be clarified with the aid of the term ‘similitude’, which can be seen as an early modern equivalent of ‘performativity’. The notion that the painter or viewer was physically present in the work of art derives from analogical thinking that posits close relationships between the different levels of reality, ranging from the material objects of everyday life, through spiritual forces working ‘at a distance’, to the most abstract principles – the ideas in the mind of God. Not only could physical objects be interpreted as *spiritualia sub similitudine corporaliwm*, so that they could incorporate abstract intellectual concepts in a completely literal fashion (as the flame of a candle could be a similitude of the light of the Divine intellect), but physical qualities too were seen as direct expressions of affective states, and works of art were deemed directly analogous to their makers. And not only were certain things believed to be connected in an analogical relationship, things were in some cases thought to take on the qualities of other things, such as to be transformed into them by means of ‘action at a distance’. Just as environment was deemed to influence character, so too were images held to possess a strong affective power to achieve a change of character, by remaining behind, imprinted on the imagination: indeed, the viewer was expected to become the image (and again, the metaphor of love of art to love for another
person is relevant: as in the case of lovers ‘each takes on the other’s qualities’, so the viewer was expected to take on the artwork’s qualities). Thus, the power of imagination plays a constitutive role in the artistic moment; not only is the viewer’s disposition indispensable to the consummate experience of lifelikeness, but the work itself also influences the viewer’s imagination. De Piles writes that the painting must attract the viewer and induce a mode of conversation: ‘A true painting must draw in the viewer by the force and great truth of its imitation, and ... the surprised viewer must respond, as if entering into a conversation with the figures that it depicts.’

The terminology of painterly actio or ‘handling’ also points to a moment at which the viewer’s imagination is actively involved in the painterly illusion. Allowing a brushstroke to remain visible, or leaving parts of the painting unfinished, makes a direct appeal to the beholder’s imagination, involving him more directly in the constitution of a virtual reality. ‘What is achieved with difficulty will be seen with difficulty’ (Moeilijk gedaen, moeilijk om te zien) writes Van Hoogstraten – the effort an artist invests in his work becomes an aspect of the viewer’s appraisal of it. This appeal to the beholder’s imagination for the completion of the work of art may also explain why a viewer may be overcome by a powerful desire to paint for himself; the Inleyding gives the example of Polidoro da Caravaggio, an apprentice mason who decided to be a painter instead after seeing an artist at work. We have already discussed the view expressed by Junius and Borghini that art lovers should also be regarded as artists. Elizabeth Honig recently wrote that certain paintings in which specific types of ‘handling’ can be distinguished make an explicit appeal to the art lover’s powers, so that the locus of the artistic moment shifts from the work itself to the beholder. A similar effect is described by Junius, who notes that the sight of preparatory sketches may induce in viewers the belief that ‘their minds will collaborate with that of the active Artist, if their minds are impelled by an implicit inclination to explore the ceaseless stirrings of his deeply learned thoughts.’

From this perspective of quite literally construed ‘similitudes’, analogies between ‘levels’ of reality that the modern art critic would regard as fundamentally different, the seventeenth-century beholder was prepared to immerse himself wholly in the painting as a performative object: the painting was what it depicted, looking at it was to experience it, in the same way that the process of painting coincided with experiencing the event. The viewer would feel attracted by the beauty of Venus, whom Raphael had been able to depict so convincingly only because of his passion for her. For art theorists, this way of describing a painting’s genesis also provided a way of indicating its effect on those who saw it: ultimately, the beholder himself became the besotted Raphael.

This discussion cannot be concluded without recalling once again the fundamental importance to art theory of the theory of rhetoric. According to the ancient rhetoricians, persuasiveness is achieved only along the lines of similitudo: only by oneself epitomizing virtue can an orator rouse his listeners to be virtuous themselves; only by painting ‘naturally’ and ‘true to one’s self’ can the painter change the viewer into his own likeness. In seventeenth-century art theory, this confrontation with a new reality is described as a total immersion in the artistic moment, as evoked by the physical movements and colours depicted, an immersion sometimes described as ‘natural Magic’. In this performative process, the beholder is allotted an affective and even physical role, sometimes quite involuntarily. As modern aesthetics too maintains, the
The strongest form of persuasiveness is not illusion, but the reality of the emotion that is felt. The passions thus play an essential role; we shall discuss their importance in detail in chapter IV.

‘A GRATIFYING INDULGENCE IN DISPARATE PARITIES’

Returning to the tension between *imitatio auctoris* and *imitatio naturae*, we still need to answer the question: what is the importance of studying other masters’ works in this doctrine that revolves around conjuring up a virtual reality? The theory concerning the importance of the
imagination, the role of the viewer, and the fading away of the work of art as medium in an ideal imitation, underlies the paradoxical nature of seventeenth-century views of imitation. Van Hoogstraten even emphasizes that the imitator must try to attain an ‘inimitable’ style.\textsuperscript{230} The paradox of ‘imitating the inimitable’ is expressed most notably by Junius, who states that ‘such things as doe deserve to be most highly esteemed in an Artificer, are almost inimitable’; he concludes that ‘we comprehend the immense power of their merits primarily from the fact that it is impossible for us to imitate them.’\textsuperscript{231}

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The painter can show in his work that he understands the paradoxical nature of imitation, and that he is doing more than ‘copying lines and smearing colours’, when he makes certain changes in relation to the original. By doing so, he shows that he, like the art lover, does not focus merely on the craftsmanship that has gone into the painting, and that he is capable of conjuring up his predecessor’s original mental world to his mind’s eye. Van Hoogstraten urges the painter to vary a chosen theme: ‘stage the events and every person in it in your mind first’ (speel de historyen, en yder personaedie eerst in uw gedachten). This procedure is called for in using other painters’ compositions: ‘it is well for an Artist to revere the prints and drawings of former Masters: for besides reinforcing the esteem for art as a whole, he will constantly come upon objects that rouse his mind and prompt him to think of new inventions’.\textsuperscript{232} Similarly, Junius notes that

‘Those who indulge with unfeigned delight in the contemplation of others’ work will sometimes take to imagining certain scenes, turning them and altering them [in their minds] in numerous ways, much as a piece of wax may assume many hundreds of different shapes as it is endlessly kneaded.’\textsuperscript{233}

By making changes to the original in his version, the painter demonstrates that he has been able to evoke the mental world of his example. He may then achieve true emulation as it existed among the authors of antiquity; Van Hoogstraten compares imitation in painting to Virgil’s emulation of Homer: ‘Although one may say that he sometimes imitates him, one cannot say that he ever steals from him. Roused by the same spirit, he appears to run the same race of honour’.\textsuperscript{234} In this context, the imitator must ensure that his work provides a recognizable variation on his example, as Junius writes:

‘A good Artist must try above all to ensure that his work does not appear to correspond in all ways with the Paintings of other celebrated Masters; should it come about that the entire appearance of his work displays a certain similarity to earlier pieces by other Artists, he must then contrive to ensure that this likeness appears to have been achieved not by accident but by design. … I believe that such Artists are superior to others, who diligently practise the old Art in new subject-matter, adroitly filling their paintings by these means with a gratifying indulgence in disparate parities’ (italics mine).\textsuperscript{235}

By using these ‘disparate parities’, the painter can refer to the paradox of imitation. Countless examples of imitation related to this belief can be identified in seventeenth-century painting practice. Rembrandt probably had his pupils practise ordinnantie by constructing small-scale
models of the scenes they were to depict, using tiny dolls, after which the scene could be drawn from different vantage-points. This helped pupils become skilled in taking their scenes and ‘turning them and altering them in numerous ways’ in their minds, a practice that Van Hoogstraten describes in his treatise. It can be argued from the theoretical views outlined above that any change in the spatial position of a figure, for example in Rembrandt’s pupil painting another version of Abraham’s Sacrifice, would be prompted not by views regarding tonal composition or the way the painted surface should be divided up, but by the pupil’s desire to show that he had succeeded in conjuring up to his mind’s eye his master’s original mental image (fig. 63 and below, fig. 71).

In this context it is striking that there is a similarity between Junius’s exhortations to the imitator and his views of art lovers’ activities. The different readerships addressed in the Inleyding, too, are expected to benefit from the same advice. Van Hoogstraten does not state explicitly, like Borghini, that art lovers are also artists, but some of his recommendations can be understood in that light.

For artists, and more notably still for art lovers and collectors, identifying a borrowing from another work may be, in Junius’s words, a source of ‘gratifying enjoyment’. The game of ‘disparate parities’ or ongelycke gelijckheyt – the painting strikes a familiar chord with the viewer, but is at the same time a model of varietas within the limits of a familiar motif – becomes an intellectual activity that tests the art lover’s memory and his knowledge of art history.

In the same way that the artist who takes to imitating models must seek to acquire ‘experienced and practised eyes’ (ervaerene ende wel gheoeffende ooghen), the art lover too must become skilled in recognizing this form of imitation:

‘There are certain eyes that one may call, following Aelianus, ... “artful eyes.” For indeed it does not suffice for us to have eyes in our heads like other people; we must also seek to acquire those that deserve to be called, in the words of Cicero, “eruditi oculi,” that is, “learned eyes.”’

‘Learned eyes’ (Konst-gheleerden ooghen) are a prerequisite for an art lover and collector, if he is to be able to recognize significant allusions to the history of art, forms of rivalry between contemporaries, and probably also painterly variations on certain literary themes; as such they are essential to the productive ‘symbiosis’ that characterizes the relationship between painter and art lover in the seventeenth century. Consequently, Junius believes that the art lover’s verdict is a decisive factor in artistic progress.

Emulation and the History of Art

Just as Virgil supposedly based himself on Homer in order to arrive at a vision of his own ‘in the race of honour’, the painter must use the work of old masters and contemporaries to arrive at ‘new inventions’. Like Junius, Van Hoogstraten calls attention in this regard to the limitations of following others; anyone who confines himself to copying the example of his predecessors will foster stagnation in art. In this context, inventio, the choice of subject matter, is a concept that enhances the artist’s reputation, fuelling rivalry. Indeed, Junius urges the painter not to
confine himself to imitating examples but also to make inventions of his own, even if they do not correspond to the ideals of antiquity; he disparages pusillanimous artists whose slavish adherence to antiquity deters them from innovation, and asks himself ‘what Antiquitie it is they appeale to’. One must never invoke the copying of ancient examples as a justification for conservatism, writes Junius; in studying the ancients, painters should also emulate their powers of innovation. Van Hoogstraten too makes this point: ‘He who seeks to deceive the ignorant by slavishly imitating antiquity is deceiving himself; since those who are always following will never progress.’ He ends by asserting that painters should draw inspiration from the classics precisely to make inventions of their own.

This concept of productive emulation leads Van Hoogstraten to identify ‘zest for rivalry’ as the driving force behind great peaks in the history of art. His frequent repetition of the names of painters from antiquity and of their accomplishments is intended partly to encourage painters of his own day to compete with these illustrious examples; but he also compares the virtues of Italian, German and Dutch painters, and appraises the painting of the Dutch Republic in the light of that produced in France and Italy. He gives examples of envy (nijd) between painters and its results: (productive) ambition or (destructive) slander. It is particularly good for art in general, he states, if masters cherish each other’s work and buy it for substantial sums, as Rembrandt did with the prints of Lucas van Leyden. Making and ordering copies of other artists’ work is a way of paying tribute to them and can do much to boost an artist’s reputation.

Hence, in the context of teaching pupils, Van Hoogstraten admonishes young painters to be ‘roused by the honour and glory of the great Masters’: ‘allow your emulation to be freely kindled’. This advice should be taken in its most general sense: artists must compete not only with their competitors but also with celebrated predecessors, as Junius states. He describes emulation as an extrapolation of the human propensity for mimesis, as an innate capacity that is utterly ‘consonant with [human] nature’: ‘Virtue doth naturally affect glory, and studieth ever to out-goe his fore-runners.’ In this context, Van Hoogstraten repeats approvingly a similar assertion by Dio Chrysostom: ‘It is impossible for us to excel in anything ... unless we vie with the most outstanding of all’. He concludes: ‘to be sure, it cannot harm two runners that they should run against one another in competition. This noble envy will drive worthy spirits to the heights.’

Emulation evidently encourages greater illusionism in painting: ‘It was emulation that stirred Zeuxis to excel in Painting such that the birds were deceived by his grapes ... the same ardour roused Raphael Urbino to surpass the great Buonarotti: and spurred Michelangelo to ascend to incomparable heights’. In this context, the Inleyding alludes to several different rivalries between painters: Van Hoogstraten repeats the story about the drawing contest (Trekstrijt) between Apelles and Protogenes as well as a different battle between Parrhasios and Euphranor in the depiction of flesh colour, a modern equivalent being a ‘painting contest’ between three landscape painters, Jan van Goyen, Jan Porcellis and François Knipbergen. In a passage on ‘the Beginnings, Rise and Fall’ of the art of painting, Van Hoogstraten discusses the way in which Dutch painters have developed in relation to their Italian counterparts, noting that the Van Eyck brothers were already producing ‘mature’ paintings when art in Italy was still ‘green’. He is generous in his view of early sixteenth-century Dutch masters: in compari-
son to Italy and Germany, he states, ‘our Land too was not infertile’.254 But Van Hoogstraten reserves his greatest praise for his own contemporaries: ‘The Netherlands, amid the ravages of war, have nourished an abundance of superb spirits in these recent times.’

Besides contributing to national pride, productive rivalry makes it possible to create work that can match the authority of the classics.255 Van Hoogstraten’s attitude to his own time may be summarized by his claim that ‘the art of Painting in our state is flowering at its height, like in a new Greece.’256 He deems this flowering capable of producing an age to rival, or even surpass, the ‘true age of painters’, that of Alexander the Great, the greatest patron that ever lived.257 Pursuing this comparison, the Inleyding describes Dutch painting as a great treasure, ‘the property of our Fatherland’, capable of challenging ‘both France and Sikyon’; Sikyon is here used as a pars pro toto for the world of classical Greek culture.258 With these phrases, Van Hoogstraten emphasizes that the art of his own day is linked as a living tradition to that of antiquity, and that the ideas from antiquity that he quotes are also relevant to the work of his contemporaries.259 The juxtaposition of anecdotes about trompe-l’oeil feats from the Hellenistic period with similar tales from Van Hoogstraten’s own surroundings serves to emphasize the parallel: just as a partridge in antiquity responded to a partridge painted by Protogenes as if it were real, Dirk van Hoogstraten’s goat was similarly deceived by a painting.260 Not only Raphael’s art was ‘a mirror of the true antiquity’; the illusionist painting for which Van Hoogstraten praises himself in more or less oblique terms is firmly rooted in antiquity, as is the depiction of ‘the entire visible world’ in general.261

Notwithstanding Van Hoogstraten’s efforts to write within the wider European tradition of art theory, he demonstrates his full awareness of the idiosyncrasies and merits of the conceptions of art cherished in his own country. These merits, however, are described in the Inleyding in terms derived from antiquity. When Van Hoogstraten writes that Dutch painters are content ‘to follow common nature’ (de gemeene natuur te volgen), he is not so much adopting a position opposed to views of art from antiquity as elaborating the ideal of the naturam sequi as developed in rhetorical theory and Stoic ideology.262

‘Following nature’ is a cohesive factor in Van Hoogstraten’s views of pictorial imitation, a thread binding together diverse aspects of depicting the visible world and aspects of the use of examples. Our analysis of his concept of imitation has illuminated the way in which his didactic views are related to what are essentially ethical ideals, embedded in the ancient Stoic doctrine that ascribes central importance to ‘living by following nature’. We have seen that, in the seventeenth century, living according to the natural order is a guideline not only in the scholarly or artistic quest for recta ratio, but in human conduct in general.

Van Hoogstraten shows that as an activity geared towards imitating nature, painting fully merits its place among – perhaps even foremost among – the other liberal arts, such as poetry, which are originally mimetic in nature. More than any other art, painting is capable of realizing a key aspect of rhetorical theory – the evoking of a virtual reality. Artists are urged to follow both their own nature and ‘nature’ in the sense of visible or virtual reality, while making stylistic devices and skills invisible. This ethos of ‘naturalness’ is what ultimately makes the painter’s work persuasive.
Imitators are urged to focus on the ‘force’ of their example and the ‘spirit’ of the artist underlying it – paradoxically, these are precisely the elements that ultimately resist imitation. The fundamentally inimitable quality of ‘grace’ is closely related to the artist’s nature: it is his judgement or *iudicium* that enables the artist to unify the different ‘parts of painting’ as distinguished by Van Hoogstraten, in a stylistic quality that is in turn wholly consonant with nature and can therefore be classified as *altera natura*. This inimitable quality, which is not specified any further, strikes spectators dumb and arouses in them the specific emotion of astonishment (*verwondering*), an emotion resulting from the persuasiveness and verisimilitude of the image. According to the originally Stoic theory of ‘following nature’, this idea of the viewer’s reaction leads ultimately to a concept of aesthetic experience that is determined by adherence to the natural order, which is deemed to be not only the *sumnum bonum* of experiencing art but also the most complete fulfilment of life.

Van Hoogstraten is in general very positive about the work of his fellow-countrymen; the art of painting, he says, has arrived in ‘a new Greece’. It will by now have become clear that this comparison is not intended in a purely figurative sense: he believes that only the uncorrupted and unembellished representation of nature can lead to an art of painting approaching that of the ancients. This kind of ‘realism’ is hence the perfect imitation, both of nature and of the most admirable examples.

We have seen that the image theory from the Second Sophistic, which is central to Van Hoogstraten’s ideas, allots a crucial role to the imaginative power of both painter and viewer. The next chapter will address the issue of how the viewer can be physically changed, quite literally, through the power of imagination – bearing in mind that a work of art impinges not only on his senses but on his inner being as well. This explains how the art of painting is thought to bring about a complete change in one’s world view, an important ethical goal in seventeenth-century art theory. Through the imagination, the activity of imitating an example becomes a meeting with that example; this makes it possible for the depiction of a historical event to be invested with moral significance.
Chapter IV

THE DEPICTION OF THE PASSIONS
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*What benefit is it, after all, in finite beings, to search continuously with intellectual research for complete understanding of the eternal Creator? While it is the case that acquiring such useless, indeed unattainable knowledge never makes the knower wiser than he was before, indeed, that in the search for the useless, one inevitably neglects that useful knowledge, the knowledge of oneself, that one might have acquired.*

Coornhert, Zedekunst

In the introduction to his *Schoone Roselijn*, Van Hoogstraten equates his painting with his writing on the grounds that they have a common aim – to depict the human passions: ‘Poetry is a sister, indeed a part, of my Goddess *Pictura*, and consequently I changed my hand, but not my mind [when I exchanged the brush for the pen], contemplating, reflecting on, and considering the emotions and passions of men.’

The quotation illustrates how in Van Hoogstraten’s theory of art, the passions play a role in the comparison between painting and poetry or drama, and in his project to raise the intellectual status of painting. The painter-poet consequently describes the representation of the passions as the ‘noblest part of painting’. Here he is following in the footsteps of his predecessors: Van Mander calls the depiction of the passions the ‘heart and soul of art’, and Junius believes that the ‘Ancients’ who were educated in various sciences took the greatest pains with the study of human passions. Vossius goes so far as to apply to the painter the epithet *pathopoios*, maker or designer of the passions. In the context of artists as pre-eminent experts on human character, Van Hoogstraten sees Rembrandt as a man whose skill in portraying the passions set him apart from others: his esteem for his teacher is bound up with his views about the rhetorical function of painting, which we shall now examine more closely.

As the previous chapter emphasized, the seventeenth-century theory of pictorial imitation is based to a significant extent on Aristotelian psychology, which holds that images have a physical effect that acts ‘at a distance’ upon viewers in such a way that they are transported into a virtual reality. The passions play a key role here: they are deemed to reside on the same mental level as the imagination – a level between the mental and the physical. Emotions are fundamental to rhetorical theorizing about persuasion: in contrast to the fiction of the narrative
account, emotions are real experience, irrespective of whether they are evoked by something actual or something imaginary, and therefore they involve the viewer more deeply in the story. Hence, it is not surprising that the passions are discussed in detail in writings that are indebted to the theory of rhetoric: not just art literature, but courtiers’ manuals and moral philosophy too. Art-theoretical instructions for portraying man’s inner life often go hand in hand with more general admonitions to the painter to keep his own passions under control. ‘Knowledge of the passions’ or, in Van Hoogstraten’s words, an insight into ‘which inner motions cause outward ones’ is not only a requirement for the artist if he is to make his work persuasive, but also for his judgement of human nature in general and, above all, for an understanding of his own actions.

Thinking about the passions in the age of the ‘Inleyding’

In the light of the general significance of the passions and their adaptation in scientific, scholarly and artistic contexts in the seventeenth century, a correct assessment of Van Hoogstraten’s ideas requires a short introduction to this subject.

For his adaptation of the Latin and Italian theories about the affects, Van Hoogstraten tends to stick to the word hartstocht, although he sometimes uses lijding (passion) and now and then beweging (movement) as synonyms. The term hartstocht was widely used in the seventeenth century: it is literally the tocht – the movement or urge – of the heart, the seat of human feelings. With his preference for translating foreign ‘artistic terms’ (konstwoorden) into Dutch, Van Hoogstraten does not as a rule use the term passie or Van Mander’s term affect. Occasionally we come across the word motus in the Inleyding, in relation to physical movement. Van Hoogstraten’s terminology derives from the Italian affetto and moto and the Latin terms passio, affectus and motus, which are also used by Junius in his Latin version, and by Vossius. In the Dutch version of Junius’s treatise we find the word beroerte used to mean the same as Van Hoogstraten’s hartstocht.

The term hartstocht was used for the first time by Coornhert in a handbook of moral philosophy: his Zedekunst, dat is wellevens kunste (Ethics or the Art of Living Well) (1630), modelled on the examples of Cicero and Seneca. Later the term also appeared in medical textbooks like Johan van Beverwijck’s Schat der ongesontheyt (Treasury of Ill-Health) (1642). Van Hoogstraten’s terminology may be borrowed in part from Van Beverwijk’s Schat, for which he provided illustrations.

In the seventeenth century the passions were a focus of intellectual interest, playing a central role in Neostoicism and the philosophy of Descartes and Spinoza alike; the passions were seen as the connecting element between the domains of the physical and the intellectual, of physics and ethics. Among the best-known titles were Lipsius’s De constantia (1584) and Descartes’ Traité des passions (1649), which influenced psychology in Western Europe from the second half of the century onwards. The passions were also important in Spinoza’s philosophy; his Ethics (1677) devoted a lengthy chapter to them.

Van Hoogstraten’s Inleyding is a rewarding source for a reconstruction of the significance of the passions to the art of painting in the seventeenth century. On the one hand the work incorporates ideas that can already be found in Van Mander, while on the other more
modern thinking plays a role, influenced by Cartesianism and by the theory of tragedy. Van Hoogstraten is not so explicit here as Goeree, who uses Descartes’s work for his own Mensch-
kunde, refers to that of Spinoza, and is evidently well aware of modern views about the pas-
sions. It was only towards the end of the seventeenth century that ideas about classical drama,
largely originating from France, and the associated convictions about the passions reached
a wider readership in the Dutch Republic by way of the publications of Nil Volentibus Ar-
duurn. De Lairesse, for example, based his passion theory on that of Nil, and on the work of
LeBrun, who provided a codification of Descartes’ ideas applied to painting. Finally, 1713
saw the publication of Houbraken’s Philaletes brieven, a number of orations on the passions
in which LeBrun’s views were repeated; the author referred to the ideas about art held by his
teacher, Van Hoogstraten. Codifications like LeBrun’s come at the end of a progression in which the passions are
studied and represented in the arts in ever more systematic ways. In the sixteenth century al-
legorical parerga or ‘painterly accessories’ were often used to symbolize the defining emotions
and character traits of the various actors in the painting or on the stage. Van Hoogstraten still
says that the painter has the option of making his characters’ emotions visible with the aid of
allegorical by-work, or for example by means of their clothes, and recommends Ripa’s emblem
book. The passions are closely associated with the temperaments and can accordingly be
portrayed by means of the traditional astrological iconography. Lomazzo, for instance, takes
astrology as the basis for his endeavour to develop a passion theory geared to painting. The
passions are subdivided into a small number and conceived in a direct relationship to age,
origin and social position; in this context, Vossius refers to the four Ciceronian passions, ‘in each
of which one must take especial note of how this passion is moved and how it is stilled’. Van
Mander adds to this number.

It was not until the advent of seventeenth-century mechanistic philosophy that thinking
about the passions was conceived as a theory that encompassed the whole of human emotional
life. Descartes saw the body as a machine whose movements are analogous to the corpuscular
movements of the surrounding physical world (a view repeated in detail by Goeree). The
philosopher Thomas Hobbes was consistently pursuing the mechanistic world view when he
stated that the soul is not in principle separate from man’s physical and emotional powers:
‘[n]either in us are there anything else but diverse motions; (for motion produceth nothing
but motion).’ Proceeding from the profound relationship between body and soul, the pas-
sions themselves had to be seen as physical phenomena. In the strict separation of body and
soul postulated by Cartesianism, the passions performed the essential function of intermediary
between the two domains.

Van Hoogstraten describes how the ability to depict the passions was initially the result
of pictorial inventions: the thirteenth-century painter Cimabue, for instance, would not have
known how to represent the passions, and so had to clarify them with the aid of captions. Through subsequent careful study of such aspects as glance, features and posture, painters
learned to capture their different nuances. Finally, artists who took these developments further
endeavoured to express as many different, preferably conflicting, emotions as possible in a
single figure.
Throughout the seventeenth century, thinking about the passions was largely governed by Aristotle’s division of the human inner self into three parts or ‘degrees’. Van Hoogstraten records the division in his treatise:

‘The Philosophers, treating of the soul, say that it is of a threefold nature, or that one can descry three degrees of effects: the first they call growing, and this is said to be the cause of development in all herbs, plants, trees, minerals, and other such increasing yet insensate things. The second they call the sensitive and motive, and this they ascribe to every species of living animals, fishes, birds and humans. The third they call the thinking, the Reasoning, or the Rational, and all humans are said to be endowed with this.’

Van Hoogstraten tells us that he intended to elaborate on this distinction in his Invisible World, the book that did not survive. The Aristotelian trinity was common in the seventeenth century: nature itself was divided up according to this classification, and the human soul was likewise considered to be made up of three parts. The ‘vegetative’ (groeijende) element of the soul, which Van Hoogstraten calls the ‘growing’ function, was deemed to control the bodily functions of nutrition, growth and reproduction; the intellectual component (redewikkende or redelijke in Van Hoogstraten’s terminology) housed the capacity for rational thought. The sensitive (gevoelige or heroerende) part was thought to include, among other things, the imagination and the passions.

In considering the role of the passions in Van Hoogstraten’s ideas about art, it is important to begin by observing that the sensitive soul houses both the passions and the imagination, which is supported by the memory. The passions not only lodge in the sensitive part of the human soul, they also have their origin there. The sensitive soul was thought to have an ‘external’ and an ‘internal’ component: sensory perception was apparently not confined to actual ‘external’ observation; it was expected to have a moment of ‘registration’ in the internal senses, followed by an analysis of the implications of what is being seen. This ‘internal storage’ is often indicated in art literature by the term idea or sometimes disegno, in the sense of ‘design’. Federico Zuccari’s theory of drawing (discussed above, pages 100-101) states that ‘internal design’ (disegno interno) in the broadest sense of the term can be conceived as the intention of an action. What is of primary interest to our discussion is the concomitant notion that the internal senses automatically entail an inclination to approve or reject what is perceived, and that this basic inclination is the incentive for a passion. Aristotelian theory posits, by way of the close relationship between imagination and passion, that every image formed in the imagination assumes the form of an appetitus, a ‘movement’ of the passions and an intention of the human will; every image consequently automatically acquires an ethical component. Images, therefore, can fulfil a direct function in moral philosophy much better than concepts; it can even be said that adages in ethics only acquire a practical meaning when they are conceived of, for instance, in the form of an image (or, more literally, in an image of the adverse consequences of not observing an ethical guideline). We may recall the early modern view that philosophy does not acquire meaning until it is used in a practical application in life (reason is practical
reason); given this idea, visual art can play an essential role as, in Van Hoogstraten’s words, a 
‘sister of philosophy’; in Vossius’s words, the painter becomes an *ethopoios*, a maker of human 
character.

It should be noted here that seventeenth-century moral philosophy is dominated by 
the belief that the passions should be controlled by reason. As inferior impulses emanating 
from a lower region of the soul, the passions have to be kept in check: this is one of the central 
tenets of Neostoicism. The ancient Stoics regarded the virtue of *ataraxia* (imperturbability) 
as key. This view plays a part in the seventeenth-century rhetorical tradition in the sense that 
only someone who is able to regulate his own passions is deemed able to move the passions of 
another, and hence to persuade him. Van Hoogstraten writes:

‘The first and most important general rule is that one should moderate the passions 
and motions of the mind ... let us be Lords of ourselves, and master our appetites and 
desires, if we want to gain the good will of others. For it would be unjust for us to en-
deavour to overcome the emotions of others and yet not learn beforehand to conquer 
our own will ... an alert man ... guards against becoming such a slave to his passions 
that he cannot also attune them to anyone whose good favour he wants to obtain.’

As Hessel Miedema pointed out, an understanding of the passions and an admonishment to 
regulate their effects are ethical guidelines in Van Mander’s ‘Grondt’. At various points in the 
*Inleyding*, Van Hoogstraten, referring to Seneca and Cicero, advocates resolve, patience and 
moderation. He is evidently familiar with Stoic thinking about imperturbability, and regards 
it as essential for an artist to be fully aware of human emotions so as to be able to represent 
them in his work: the passions are, in fact, a means of moving the viewer in a positive sense.

Goeree also reveals that he is aware of the idea that God has made man such ‘that he can 
suppress all untamed passions by Virtue and Reason, and can control and order ... his mind, 
which is a basis for all the liberal arts’. According to Neostoic ideas, untamed passions, like an 
unbridled imagination, should be restrained; however, as we shall see at the end of this chapter, 
Van Hoogstraten’s treatise allot a specific positive role to one element of the ‘sensitive’ part of 
the soul: the artist’s temperament.

**BODY AND MIND, ACTIONS AND PASSIONS**

Early modern ideas about psychology are based, as we have seen, on the belief in a close 
relationship between body and soul. As Goeree observes, this relationship is determined by 
God: ‘Thus the Creator has willed that ... through the mediation of [bodily] Actions, the 
state of Mind and the Passions will not remain concealed in men’s faces’. Accordingly the 
painter must not tell his sitter any sad stories, for they will leave their mark on his or her face, 
comments De Lairese. And it is not only fleeting emotions – innate tendencies are also 
thought to be reflected in a person’s appearance: this explains the importance of physiognomy 
for knowledge of the human psyche.

In classical rhetoric, physiognomy was regarded as a standard means of sketching or 
defining someone’s character; in treatises from the late Middle Ages onwards the relationship
between body and soul was illustrated with specific examples. Cardanus, an author quoted in Vossius’s ‘De graphice’, wrote a Metoposcopia, or the art of the ‘reading of faces’ (1550, published for the first time in Paris in 1658). In the seventeenth century Constantijn Huygens published a Characteres, a collection of character descriptions that included physiognomic observations. This genre of character definition in which physiognomy played a major part continued until well into the eighteenth century.

Physiognomy provided the artist with a broad field in which to work. To start with there was the genre of the ‘grotesque heads’ like those by Leonardo and Pieter Brueghel; in the seventeenth century, depictions of faces of this kind were often referred to as tronies. Physiognomy and the associated depiction of the passions also played an important role in history painting and in portraiture; although in the latter case, of course, only a minimum of facial expression could be shown. Van Mander put physiognomy into his chapter on the ‘affects’; Vossius similarly treated physiognomy and emotion together. Some authors devoted entire chapters to the subject: the whole third part of Gaurico’s treatise on sculpture was on physiognomy. Van Hoogstraten may have been borrowing from Dürer’s books on human proportions when he similarly chose to devote a separate section to kroostkunde or ‘the art of [recognizing] family resemblance’, the term he uses for physiognomy, as part of the second chapter on the human body. He cites and paraphrases, among others, Aristotle, Scaliger and Paracelsus, and refers to the obscure physiognomist Zopyrus.

Van Hoogstraten defines kroostkunde as a science which enables the practitioner to ‘read’ from someone’s features not only his origins but also his ‘mind’ and disposition, and even his past and present, in a formulation that has an affinity with Gaurico: ‘physiognomy is a science of identifying people’s nationality, descent, mind and disposition’ from the particulars that are discerned in their faces or heads. He begins by citing some contradictory examples, specifically Aesop and Quevedo – literary giants who despite their physical deformities were nonetheless possessed of noble minds. Socrates, too, was said to have coupled his satyr-like appearance with a fine intellect; in the Stoic interpretation he would have had the bad character traits revealed by his misshapen body, but had risen above them through resolve. These counter-examples provide the painter with an ethical guideline, as an ‘incentive ... similarly to refuse to give in to our innate faults.’

Innate defects are deemed to have their effect on the level of the sensitive soul; reason alone is capable of curbing them. The animal kingdom is consequently an important aid in physiognomy; when control of the body is wrested from the rational soul by the passions, man reveals himself in his animal form: ‘One becomes most aware of the difference [in the appearance of different people] in the stirring of the emotions: for then the faces become so much more like the animals they resemble.’ In his Menschkunde Goeree provides a specific interpretation of this notion in a series of illustrations in which animals’ heads are compared with faces.

The notion that physiognomy could at the same time reveal the past and predict the future is also an earlier concept, rooted in the esoteric traditions in which chiromancy and ‘chirology’ also feature, a tradition that Van Hoogstraten does not mention although he does refer to the natural philosophy of Paracelsus that was influenced by esoteric ideas. Van Hoogstraten adds to his definition of kroostkunde that ‘indeed it goes even further, and it is believed by many’
that 'the fortune or misfortune that hangs over someone’s head' is predicted by physiognomy. He reports the idea that in antiquity ‘past and future histories, their life and death’ could be read from Apelles’s portraits, a practice supposedly confirmed in the seventeenth century by kroostkundigen – physiognomers – who were said to have foretold the manner and time of Charles I’s death from Van Dyck’s portrait of the king. Van Mander rejects physiognomy as a serious area of attention for the painter because of this connection with esoteric theories. Van Hoogstraten, though, does not immediately consign it to the realm of fable, evidently because of his epideictic approach in which, to a large extent, ‘the end justifies the means’. Apparently, he agrees with Junius who also believes that it is possible to ‘foretell the houre of death’ from a portrait.

In view of the popularity throughout the seventeenth century of physiognomic literature and of tronies or ‘character heads’, physiognomy’s predictive features and its power to conjure up the past were a far from negligible factor in the considerable attraction it held for the general public. The predictive aspects of physiognomy may well have had significant connotations in the seventeenth-century predilection for character heads and self-portraits. The self-portrait, in which the artist not only recorded his own likeness but also did it using the the ‘handling’, the brushwork typical of him, was regarded as a particularly meaningful and estimable example of the expression of character. Van Hoogstraten’s comment that according to some physignomers ‘past and future histories’ could be read in a sitter’s features might mean that we should look at his own self-portraits and those of his teacher, Rembrandt, in a new light. The anachronistic view that portraits may be expressive of the sitters’ psychology makes way for the perhaps much more radical, ‘magic’ notion that past and future events alike leave their traces in the human countenance.

According to seventeenth-century art theory, it is not only a person’s origins and future that can be read in his face; the face is also the part of the body in which the emotions are most strongly expressed. Van Hoogstraten calls the face the ‘mirror of the mind’ or ‘mirror of the heart’; Van Mander refers more specifically to the eyes as the ‘mirror of the soul’. Van Hoogstraten identifies the ten different elements of the face, with reference to Pliny; Van Mander likewise speaks of ‘ten or rather more’ different components. These features may clearly reflect the passions: ‘These motions of the mind are detected most plainly in the countenance’.

Facial expression is an essential element of persuasion; Van Hoogstraten describes the ‘mien’, the demeanour, as ‘the soul of words’. Apparently, speech lacks conviction without the right facial expression; the expression makes the argument ‘live, such that all who hear it delight in it ... because one then captures two senses at once through the eyes and ears’. Here rhetorical theory supports the theory of art: the visual is deemed to be more persuasive than the verbal, since it speaks more directly to the audience’s imagination and thus transposes what is present in rhetoric in the form of words and concepts into the domain of emotion and action. In his autobiography Huygens is loud in his praise of portrait painters, not just because they make deceased family members ‘present’ to such an extent that we feel as if we can talk to them, but also because they enable him to see characters of whom he has only heard tell. He concludes: ‘physiognomy is a unique revelation of a man’s soul’.

Physiognomy alone, however, is not enough to determine character in all cases. While
courtiers’ manuals like Van Hoogstraten’s *Eerlyken jongeling* certainly stress getting to know someone’s inner self on the basis of his outward appearance, they also emphasize the possibility of concealing one’s state of mind. Here the courtier is going against what is considered the natural order of things, in which every emotion is given immediate expression. As the *Eerlyken jongeling* describes, this form of dissimulatio is an indispensable skill in social life in general.\(^{61}\) In this connection, Goeree explains that society is founded on the fact that man’s intentions are visible in his outward appearance, and hypocrisy (*Geveynstheyd*) is consequently to be greatly disapproved of: it is ‘utterly abhorred ... by him who has entirely united the Human Body ... with his Mind’.\(^{62}\) The seventeenth-century fascination with hypocrisy is exemplified by the work of Jan de Brune, which contains ‘thoughts’ (*Gedachten*) on a variety of subjects for civil conversation and is shot through with anecdotal examples of feigned emotions. In a section titled ‘Appearances are Deceptive’, he advises his readers not to go by appearances only: ‘A fine body promises a fine mind; but the countenance may also belie the heart.’\(^{63}\) At this moment in our discussion, we can only point out that the ability to simulate emotion, so that appearance and reality seem not to be in accord, leads to an ambivalent attitude towards artists – they are seen as skilful deceivers who may emotionally manipulate their public (this will be elaborated on in more detail in chapter VI).

**Inner self and outward appearance**

One connecting thread in early modern art theory is the supposed sympathetic relationship between man’s inner self or ‘character’ and the things on which this character could exert an influence – a concept that is not self-evident to modern readers. This was not just about someone’s deeds in the present, past and future. An artist’s paintings, for instance, were treated as his ‘children’ and deemed to display the qualities that could also be discerned in the painter’s character; Michelangelo could thus explain his childlessness by declaring that his works of art were his offspring.\(^{64}\) Van Hoogstraten tells us that, as an artist’s children, paintings would have particular traits by which they could be identified as his; these ‘typical qualities’ could consequently serve as a guide for art lovers. The passions specific to a given painter were deemed visible and recognizable in his work: ‘the very earliest painters also chose different paths, and the particular inclinations of their minds were always revealed in their works.’ This essentially means that each of these artists concentrated on a different ‘part of painting’; indeed, Van Hoogstraten is not referring here to the expression of individual psychology:

‘thus it is that all Artists are driven, each to something particular to him, so that one recognizes their works as if by a special mark, just as one generally observes the characteristic features and the physiognomic traits of the parents in the children. And even though these qualities can rather be called anomalies than absolute certainties of art, they are ... a pleasant diversion for art lovers.’\(^{65}\)

Inner self and outward appearance are seen as intimately related. Van Hoogstraten reports: ‘It is generally said that Painters often display in their work the faults that they have in their person. ... The reason is supposedly that our internal feelings readily correspond to our outward
Therefore, the skilled painter of fish still-lifes at the same time ‘enjoys eating fish’; Michelangelo purportedly called a painter of cattle a bull, and he explained this with the conviction ‘that all Painters can best make their own likenesses’. Here Van Hoogstraten is elaborating on a topos of art literature where the artist is identified with his works. As Savonarola observed:

‘they say that every painter paints himself [ogni depintore depinge se medesimo] [...] he paints himself in as many [things] as he, being a painter, [concerns himself with]: in other words [that he paints everything] in accordance with his own mental concept [conzepto]; and although the images and the figures that painters depict are different, still they all correspond with his concept [seondo il concetto suo].’

In this passage concetto clearly means more than just ‘concept’; it is that part of the painter’s character that recurs in all his works. The idea that the ‘painter always paints himself’ can be more readily understood in terms of the theory of rhetoric; Van Hoogstraten notes that the rhetorician must ‘be what he says’ in all his communications: ‘one must first consider who one is oneself’ before speaking. In line with this conviction, the highest praise that Huygens can give to rhetoricians is that they never dissimulate – praise he also accords to artists; he states that the portraitist Michiel van Mierevelt demonstrates simplicity and naturalness both in his manner of painting and in his style of speaking: ‘No one has been able to state that [Van Mierevelt] was not himself (dissimilem sui) ... with him art is fully attuned to nature and the whole of nature is captured in his art (Mireveldii omnis in natura ars est, omnis in arte natura) ... When one looks at his actions, one sees that they echo his manner of painting. In the treatment of difficult subjects his behaviour, attitude and language are plain’. All these ideas derive from the rhetorical conviction that naturalness has the greatest power to persuade: qualis vir, talis oratio.

This identification of artist and work explains why in many cases artists’ biographies are called on to substantiate the description of characteristics of their work: Sandrart and Houbraken describe how Brouwer’s nature is in accord with his choice of low-life subjects, and Baldinucci links Rembrandt’s ‘slovenly’ lifestyle with his ‘rough’ manner of painting. Artists may also have contributed to the creation of their own personae by emphasizing this consonance. In effect, his is a literary topos; Euripides, it was said, dressed in rags in order to write convincingly about his ragged heroes.

In the context of the topos that ‘every painter paints himself’, the notion that the ideal artist ‘is’ what he ‘makes’ thematizes seventeenth-century ideas about the performative character of the activity of painting (see above, pp. 140-146). In a 1991 study, Celeste Brusati showed that this idea of the artist’s ‘presence’ in his work is an important factor in still-lifes by Van Hoogstraten and other seventeenth-century painters who want to stress the performative nature of their work to draw attention to their skill. One of the ways they do this is to incorporate a self-portrait or an image of themselves in a mirror in the still-life; Van Hoogstraten places objects that refer to his identity – such as his literary work or a medal that the Habsburg
Emperor gave him – in his still-lifes that are at the same time a display of his craftsmanship and skill; this is a process in which artist, subject and mode of representation ultimately coincide (compare fig. 64). Brusati suggested that this performative concurrence of the artist’s character and work is an important artistic ideal.76

The alleged close relationship between the painter and his work is based on the performative theory expressed in the concept of similitudo, which we examined in the previous chapter. This theory assumes not only the artist’s ‘presence’ in his work but also an interaction between the artist and his work. We have discussed in chapter III (see above, pages 156-157) how painters are described as having an affective relationship of seduction and love with their models – and no less with the art of painting itself. While the artist allegedly records his own ‘internal’ emotions in his ‘external’ work, the work itself is expected to sweep him along emotionally to such an extent that it can actually have a physically beneficial effect: Junius writes about artists who sing while they work, ‘seeing the workman is still refreshed and encouraged by the spirit infused into him by an unexpected succele, bestirring himselfe as if the things themselves and not the images were a-doing’.77 According to Van Hoogstraten, when he was very old Titian painted ‘as if he became young again in art’;78 Frans Floris reportedly said

Fig. 64 – Samuel van Hoogstraten, Feigned Letter Rack Painting, canvas, 63 x 79 cm. 
Staatliche Kunsthalle, Karlsruhe.
‘when I paint, I live, and in idleness I die’, and the ancient painter Protogenes found that his art was an effective substitute for food.79

Passion and action

Van Hoogstraten says that the movements of the body reflect the movements in the face: ‘these motions of the mind are most clearly discerned in the countenance, whose contortions are imitated by those of the body: so that when one has mastered the ability to imagine the motions of the countenance, one will be able the more easily to represent those of the body’.80 The chapter on the passions or lijdingen in his treatise is consequently followed by a chapter on doeningen, literally human ‘actions’, conceived as particular facial expressions and bodily attitudes that are closely related to the passions.

As the seat of the human psyche, the heart is expected to be directly influenced by the passions, which can cause it to beat faster or slower. Affected by heat or cold, for instance, the body can literally swell or shrink, and it can also change colour. We frequently find descriptions of this phenomenon in classical writings, as well as in the works of authors like Coornhert.81 Van Hoogstraten paraphrases Seneca’s De ira, on the characteristics of rage:

’an enraged man ... with a grim and menacing countenance ... changed colour ...; angry men, their eyes burn and glisten ... their countenance is red with blood that wells up from their deepest viscera; their lips quiver, and their teeth chatter, and their hair bristles ... their whole body shudders and is terrifyingly threatening, their face is ugly and swollen and a perversion of itself.’82

This close interrelation between inner and outer ‘motions’ provided artists with the possibility of depicting the effects of human passions very directly. Junius writes: ‘every commotion of the minde ... hath a certaine countenance of his owne by nature’.83 Examples of changes in complexion caused by the passions accordingly abound in the work of Van Hoogstraten, Junius and Van Mander.84 The physician Eristratus, for instance, was said to have observed the sick youth Antiochus to see whether his face changed colour as a result of ‘the affects or the internal forces’.85 It is similarly in this context that we must understand the ancients’ discussions of sculptors who were able to depict specific passions in their statues by adding certain metals to their alloys, thereby changing the colour.86 But it is not just a question of the emotions changing the colour of the complexion: this sympathetic relationship also works in reverse, and the look of a particular colour can have an emotional effect on a person’s mind. The painter consequently has to be cautious in his use of colour which, as the ‘soul’ of the painting, gives ‘life’ to otherwise inanimate drawings.

Early modern psychology places great emphasis on the role of spiritus or ‘spirits’ in the communication between body and mind. Spirits are thought to be ethereal fluids formed in the heart from blood. They are thus prone to be influenced by the passions: allegedly, the heart swells with joy and this drives the spirits from their place; when grief causes the heart to contract, they are trapped. In turn, the spirits exert pressure on the limbs in the same way as they themselves are moved in the heart: thus the body automatically goes into action.87 This is the
One complication is that the terminology used to describe passions and actions is not always systematically defined in painting treatises. De term *motus*—motion or movement—is used arbitrarily for emotion and physical movement alike. In view of this state of affairs, we have only to consider that the ‘movement’ of the mind and the movement of the body were regarded as essentially two functions with the same cause. One exemplary consequence of this is the association, formulated by De Lairesse, of different gestures and movements of the body with a particular social class and code of conduct. Ultimately, the significance of bodily movements is not confined to the level of the passions. Van Hoogstraten gives it a specific interpretation: hand gestures can be such a direct expression of someone’s inner being that they are more expressive than speech and can be seen as a ‘universal language’.

The metaphor of ‘body language’ or *sermo corporis* is a popular one in the art-theoretical tradition: Achille Bocchi, for instance, believes that the face reveals human emotions by ‘speaking silently’ (*favellare tacitamente*). This statement is apparently part of the general theory about painting as the ‘book of the illiterate’ – which allows the elements of the Creation to ‘speak’ for themselves to a wide audience.

**Passionate Persuasion: ‘beweeglijkheid’ and ‘enargeia’**

The direct relationship that is deemed to exist between states of mind and postures of the body has a parallel in the idea that a depiction of an emotion arouses the same emotion in the viewer. The affective power of painting stemming from this idea means that art is often credited with greater rhetorical force than literature. Dolce, for instance, believes that ideally ‘[painted] figures should move the minds of the spectators, agitate some of them, hearten others, move them to piety or disdain ... exactly as the poet, historian and orator do’. The significance of *ut rhetorica pictura*, in regard to the affective power of the painting, was recognized by the ancient rhetoricians themselves: the passions played a part in the development of theories about a life-like and graphic style in literature as well as in painting. Quintilian talks of orators who lent force to their arguments by showing their audiences paintings. While Junius compares the effect of art with the ‘soul-stirring power of oratory’, Goeree believes that the power of painted ‘Actions and natural events far surpasses the rhetoric of the Orators’.

We will examine some rhetorical aspects of the depiction of the passions, focusing in particular on the early modern notion that paintings, orations and stage performances are all essentially performative events.
able to express them; while one should never undertake a picture without showing in it a certain movement or inner inclination’. 97

Van Hoogstraten underpins ideas about emotion in the *Inleyding* with citations from literature: this is another argument for the validity of applying the conceptual apparatus of rhetoric to painting in this context. Van Hoogstraten admits that he occasionally turns to literature for help and acknowledges, for instance, that poets need resort to far fewer tricks than artists to record the passions: ‘Colouring [of the face of a young woman overcome by emotion] is certainly easier for Poets than for us Painters’. 98

The supposed performative nature of the painterly illusion and the sympathetic relationship between the artist and his work make it crucial that an artist who wants to depict a particular passion should actually have experienced it himself. Quintilian asserts that the orator has to be moved himself if he wants to move his audience. 99 Similarly, before a painter can express emotions on canvas, he must have been through them first, both physically and mentally: one way of achieving this, says Van Hoogstraten, is to act them out on stage. He encourages aspiring young artists, when depicting the passions, to ‘play this most artful role’, and to transform themselves into actors to do it:

‘If one wants to gain honour in this noblest area of art, one must transform oneself wholly into an actor. It is not enough to show things indistinctly in a History; Demosthenes was no less learned than others when the people turned their backs on him in disgust: but after Satyurus had recited verses by Euripides and Sophocles to him with better diction and more graceful movements, and he had learnt ... to mimic the actor precisely, after that, I say, people listened to him as an oracle of rhetoric. You will derive the same benefit from acting out the passions you have in mind, chiefly in front of a mirror, so as to be actor and spectator at the same time.’ 100

Artists who want to portray emotions must, like orators, learn to be actors and use their own faces as their first objects of study. Van Hoogstraten gives the example of the actor Polus, who reputedly dug up the bones of his own son as part of his preparation for playing Electra on stage. 101 Just how literally painters had to take these admonitions emerges from a passage in which he advises pupils to study their own feelings of joy and sorrow so that they can get to know the ‘outward’ effects of ‘inner’ emotions: ‘Thus you should take comfort in art if you are afflicted by grief, and if something agreeable happens to you; this is the time to observe the inner feelings and outward movements these events cause’. 102 This advice may have been inspired by Rembrandt’s experiments in representing his own facial expressions in front of a mirror (figs. 65–68).

This experiential knowledge of the passions culminates in a persuasive movere so that the viewer experiences the same emotion that is being presented to him on stage, or in a painting, in accordance with Horace’s dictum: *si vis me flere, dolendum est primum ipsi tibi*. 103 Alberti refers in this regard to the idea that ‘in nature nothing attracts more strongly than similar things’. 104 Van Hoogstraten cites Horace’s pronouncement on poetry, and applies it to painting:
Fig. 65 – Rembrandt,
*Self-portrait with Eyes Wide Open*, etching.
Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam.

Fig. 66 – Rembrandt,
*Self-portrait with an Angry Expression*,
1630, etching. Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam.

Fig. 67 – Rembrandt,
*Self-portrait Laughing*, etching.
Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam.

Fig. 68 – Rembrandt,
*Self-portrait with Open Mouth*, etching.
Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam.
‘It is not enough for a picture to be beautiful, it must have in it a certain moving quality (beweeglijkheid) that has power over those who see it; as Horace sings about poetry:

“A beautiful poem will not easily move me
but kindness can transport heart and soul.
One smiles, or weeps, the viewer follows the trail:
so if you want me to cry, you must cry first.”

Van Hoogstraten concludes: ‘and so it is with Artists, they do not stir the mind if they omit this beweeglijkheid. Beweeglijkheid is apparently a concept that relates equally to the artist’s methods and to the effect of the painting on the viewer. We shall examine this term in more detail.

It appears relevant to the principal area of common ground between the artist and the orator: their endeavour to achieve a graphic, persuasive style. Quintilian associates this style with the theory of the different styles of speaking, the genera dicendi: these genera may also be applied to painting, as they relate to various ways of representing the passions.

The concept of ‘beweeglijkheid’

With movere always in mind, the theory of rhetoric emphasizes the importance of graphic, evocative speech. The technical terms for this are the Latin demonstratio and evidentia; Quintilian also uses the Greek enargeia. The terms are linked to the virtue of perspicuitas – clarity – one of the four ‘virtues of speech’ (virtutes dicendi). We shall examine how this regard for a graphic manner of speaking is adopted in art literature and applied to the style of the painting: when the beholder is caught unawares by a clear, single event, he is expected to be involved in the scene emotionally, with little further effort. Perspicuitas consequently often assumes the meaning of a requirement of ‘unity of time, place and action’ in a work of art. This requirement derives from Aristotle’s rules for tragedy, which became more popular in Dutch poetics during the seventeenth century; this was also reflected in the literature of art. The most explicit comparison between stage and painting in this regard was drawn by Jan Vos, who wrote in the preface to his play Medea: ‘A judicious painter will not paint more on a panel than happened in one place and at the same time. A Play that paints a telling picture must have the same quality.’

The demand for unity of action is not, though, the only aspect associated with the requirement for clarity. Characteristically, Van Hoogstraten uses the neologism oogenbliklijk or oogenblikkig – momentary or instantaneous – to describe the qualities of perspicuity, and he refers to an oogenbliklijke daedt or oogenblikkige beweeging – a momentary action or instantaneous movement (it is hard to give a literal translation of oogenblikkig, a term that does not occur in modern Dutch; it relates to the ‘wink of an eye’). To create an effect that takes viewers by surprise and involves them in what is depicted, a painter must focus on presenting what happens in a single moment, in obedience to Horace’s maxim: ‘demonstratio means that the subject is portrayed in such a way that the event and the thing itself appear before our eyes’. Van Hoogstraten notes that ‘a play differs from a Painting in that it comprehends a particular time, place or action in every act: whereas a Painting shows just one momentary action or scene’. Elsewhere Van Hoogstraten cites this distinction to explain why artists have more freedom than the writers of histories:
‘Once the matter you have before you is fixed in your mind, take, as you choose, an instantaneous action, for a Painter’s choice is freer than a History writer’s, because the latter is bound to treat things from the ground up, whereas an artist comes in suddenly either at the beginning or in the middle or at the end of the Story, as he wishes and sees fit. He depicts either the past, the present or the future, and is only obliged to show, out of the eternal parade of events, that which can be seen at a glance.’

This unity of action serves evidentia, in which the passions play a fundamental role. Van Hoogstraten observes, for instance, that an ‘instantaneous movement’ has the greatest emotional effect on the viewer:

‘Whether one wants to paint just one figure, or many together, one must take care only to show an instantaneous movement which in particular expresses the action of the History; as Horace says: “Create every work, as is fitting, singly and unequivocally”. So that the work will thrill the viewer, as if he were another bystander, with one voice, terrify him with a violent action, and gladden him by showing something cheerful: or else he is moved to compassion by an injustice done; and takes satisfaction in a just act.’

The ‘unequivocal’ image satisfies the requirement of perspicuity – the term Van Hoogstraten uses is eenweezich, literally ‘of one nature’; and he adds eenstemmich – ‘with one voice’. The passage quoted is glossed with a note in the margin: ‘Depict a single and momentary action’.

Van Hoogstraten concludes: ‘It is not enough to show things indistinctly in a History: it must be possible to grasp the narrative context at a single glance. To achieve this effect the artist has to devote considerable attention to the passions, and this applies even to refined, subtle emotions: ‘Here it is essential, above all, that the actions or movements of the body correspond to the stirrings of the mind, even in representations of almost static figures.’

These ‘static figures’ could perhaps be a reference to the genre painting of the second half of the seventeenth century, as practised by Van Hoogstraten himself and painters like Terborch and Vermeer, in which the emotions of the figures are a key factor, even though they can only be detected in the most discreet expressions and gestures: the tendres passions rather than the grandes passions (figs. 69, 59, 60).

In the analysis of the highly emotive single moment, classical rhetorical theory makes a distinction between the terms energeia and enargeia, which are not etymologically related. Energéia refers to the ‘movement’ of the image in all the senses of the word we have already identified: both physical movement and the ‘motions of the mind’. Enargeia refers to the capture of a single moment that shows the viewer events as if he himself is present. The only use of the Greek term enargeia in early modern art theory is found in Gaurico, who also uses the related term energitikoteron for the impression that the work of art makes on the viewer. In seventeenth-century painting treatises, the distinction between the two terms is subordinated to the fact that they both relate to a process intended to bring about a virtual reality. In this context, it is telling that Junius uses energia to conflate the meaning of the two Greek concepts: it describes the combined effect of a stilled moment and strong affective power.
Whosoever therefore conceiveth these images aright, propounding unto himselfe the truth of things and actions, the same is likely to be most powerfull in all manner of affections: seeing his endeavors shall bee waited upon by a vertue knowne by the Greeke name “Energia”. Tully [Cicero] calleth it “Evidence” and “Perspicuite”. This vertue seemeth to shew the whole matter; and it bringeth to passe, that the affections follow us with such a lively representation, as if we were by at the doing of the things imagined.

In the Dutch edition of his treatise he translates *energia* as *uytdruckelickbeyd* or *duydelickbeyd*.\(^\text{122}\) *Energia* is all about playing on the viewer’s emotions: ‘It is then in vaine an Artificer should hope to be both powerfull and perspicuous, unless he doe alwayes propound unto himselfe the worke in hand as if all were present, and that principally when he is to expresse any thing wherein he meeteth with some notable Affections and Passions of the minde’.\(^\text{123}\) The fusion of the concepts of *energeia* and *enargeia* that occurs in Junius’s theory is typical of the transformation that the classical rhetorical terms undergo when they are applied in seventeenth-century art theory. This theory adopts primarily the rhetorical ideas about the effect of a painting on the viewer (the level of *actio* and *elocutio*), while the aspects of the orator’s creative process are assigned a less central role.
Consistent with Junius’s use of *energia* as a function of the image that leads to greater affective involvement, Bellori uses the term to praise a Mercury painted by Raphael who ‘detaches himself with so much *energia* from the surface [of the painting] that he breathes words and talks to everyone who approaches and stops to look at him’. In Van Hoogstraten’s art theory the most obvious terminological equivalent to this concept is *beweeglijkheid*, a quality that, by addressing the spectator’s emotions, persuades him that the depicted figures are alive, they move and speak. As we have seen, he writes: ‘It is not enough for a picture to be beautiful, it must have in it a certain *beweeglijkheid* that has power over those who see it .... And so it is with Artists, they do not stir the mind if they omit this *beweeglijkheid*.’

Junius mentions an exemplary scene that is able to move the viewer to tears: Abraham sacrificing his son. He writes that ‘Saint Gregory Nyssen after an ample and most pathetical [beweghelick] relation of Isaac his sacrifice, hath added these words; “I saw often in a picture,” sayth he, “the image of this fact, neither could I looke upon it without teares, so lively did Art put the historie before my eyes”’. This anecdote occurs repeatedly in the tradition of art theory. Rembrandt and his pupils’ exercises in rendering Abraham’s sacrifice in an ‘instantaneous’ manner – Rembrandt himself seems to have used such a fast ‘shutter speed’ for his ‘snapshot’ that the knife falling from Abraham’s hand has been captured in mid-air – were probably conceived with a view to achieving *beweeglijkheid*, specifically choosing the moment when Abraham realizes the true outcome of his ordeal (fig. 70). Van Hoogstraten was probably among those who made sketches of the subject. The dramatic moment when, with the sword poised to strike, the protagonist pauses briefly to consider the coming act of violence is presented in the theatre as an example of a suggestive, graphic effect. Rembrandt used a similarly fast shutter speed in another work in which the protagonist sees that he has made a tragic mistake: in *Belshazzar’s Feast* we are shown the moment when Belshazzar realizes that he should not have used the precious vessels looted from the Temple in Jerusalem. The woman on his right tips her goblet, and the wine it contains is frozen in time as it spills (fig. 71).

When the beholder is moved emotionally and transported physically into another reality, the artist, like the orator or actor, is in a position to bring about a change in character. In this context, Aristotle identified two effects that are the aims of tragedy, *horror* and *misericordia*: seeing a dreadful event causes emotions of terror in the audience, while a staged affliction may fill the audience with compassion for the protagonists. His theory underwent a revival in the Netherlands in the seventeenth century, chiefly in the writings of Daniel Heinsius. We find the two terms in art theory when Van Mander explains that the artist can use a minor character to ‘compassionately’ (*medelydich*) draw the viewer’s attention to ‘some disgrace’, or to ‘something terrible’ (*schrickelijck*) that is taking place. The *Inleyding* talks about the painter’s aims of ‘terrifying’ (*doen schrikken*) and ‘moving to pity’ (*met medelijden bewegen*): he believes, as we have seen, that the work should move the beholder such that he is ‘terrified by a violent action [...] or moved to compassion by an injustice done’.

In the *Inleyding* there is an express reference to emotional scenes with a sad ending: ‘Seneca also says that a tremendous Painting of a tragic outcome touches our mind’. Indeed, picturing a tragic event can be very functional; ‘Painters and Tragic Poets best adorn their Pictures and Plays by depicting divers sorrows and lamentations.’ And the viewer can also be moved by feelings of justice, when he ‘takes satisfaction in a just act’, or by a desire for venge-
Fig. 70 – Rembrandt, Abraham’s Sacrifice, 1635, canvas, 193 x 132 cm.  
The State Hermitage Museum, St. Petersburg.
ance when he empathizes with the characters he sees portrayed. In the Latin edition of his treatise Junius writes that the artist can achieve the highest rhetorical objective: ‘the crowd are entertained when they behold [his work], they are diverted by Painting, they are cheered or saddened, laugh and admire, and, when Painting inspires them with emotion, they are moved to compassion or hate (ad misericordiam aut odium inducitur).’

A key moment in tragedy, when the effect of horror or misericordia is most powerfully felt, is the moment when a protagonist recognizes a tragic mistake – as when Oedipus realizes that the man he has killed is his father. The technical term for this is peripeteia. At this moment the protagonist is thought to undergo a complete reversal of his feelings. Vondel uses this in his plays, describing it as a ‘change of state’ (Staetveranderinge); art historians have associated this term with the work of Rembrandt and his pupils. Van Hoogstraten is clearly familiar with this dramatic principle – he applies it in his own work for the stage. In the Inleyding he expresses this principle as ‘shock and change’ (schrik en verandering). Strikingly, he believes that the portrayal of an emotional change can bring about a comparable change in the viewer. He tells us that seeing a painting of someone who had changed in character ‘reformed’ a licentious girl, visiting her lover, and led her into more virtuous ways: ‘the Girl, beholding this noble scene, suffered such shock and change that she turned around and went straight home again’.

Fig. 71 – Rembrandt, Beshazzar’s Feast, ca. 1635, canvas, 167 x 210 cm. National Gallery, London.
In the literature of art, the portrayal of a sudden revulsion of feeling wins the greatest praise: the essential task here is to picture different emotions at the same time in a single figure. The tradition of art theory contains countless examples of this, supported by references to antiquity. Van Hoogstraten repeats the topical description of a dying mother who wants to stop her child from feeding at her breast, in whom both ‘maternal precaution’ and ‘distress and sorrow’ have to be portrayed. The ancient sculptor Demon was said to have captured ‘conflicting emotions’ (strijdige driften) in a personification of the city of Athens. Here, Van Hoogstraten explicitly refers to poetry, which has an easier job of it when it comes to expressing ambivalent passions.

The moment of ‘shock and change’ is also related to the term anagnorisis, sudden recognition or insight, which derives from the theory of tragedy. In the context of this notion, Lomazzo cites as an example the scene in which Joseph’s father is confronted with his son’s bloody clothes. When the work of Rembrandt’s circle is analysed in terms of subjects like this, we find that the drawings attributed to Van Hoogstraten alone include numerous examples of moments of revelation, shock, sudden apparitions and miracles, among them Supper at Emmaus, Noli me tangere and Abraham’s Sacrifice (figs. 72-74). ‘An unexpected thing has extraordinary force’, concludes Jan Vos in reference to Jan Lievens’s Raising of Lazarus, a subject that Lomazzo also presents as an example of sudden emotional impact. Vos is probably referring specifically to the way Lievens concentrates the action on Lazarus’s ghostly hands (fig. 75).

After thus establishing the importance of the passions in Van Hoogstraten’s ideas, we have to answer the question: what was the overarching function ascribed to the emotional aspects of art? We will examine comparisons of painting with the theatre and with history writing.

ETHOS AND PATHOS

In rhetorical theory, perspicuitas, evidentia and playing on the emotions of the viewer fit into the framework of the three distinct styles of speech. For an impassioned plea Quintilian recommends the ‘grand’ style (genus grande); he also identifies the ‘mediocre’ (genus mediocris) and ‘humble’ styles (genus humile). This classification is derived from the three functions of drama identified by Aristotle, which are used in the theory of rhetoric to provide a systematic clarification to functions of oratory. In the seventeenth century, Vossius writes of three argumentative ‘Elements of Proof’, namely “Reasons, Morals and Passions”, which the Greeks call Logoi, Aethae and Patae. This tripartite division, which was deliberately kept vague, served to classify the various styles. The ideal artist was expected to have mastered all three levels; Junius says that ‘he is the best Artist, who is best provided of all these things’. As we shall see, however, it is only ‘passions’ and ‘morals’ that are discussed in concrete terms in Van Hoogstraten’s treatise.

The division into the three ‘styles’ or genera has a parallel in the distinction between the three tasks of the orator, in which arousing emotions is accorded a central place. Alongside instructing (docere) and delighting (delectare), classical rhetoric has a third function – moving the observer (movere). Roman theory, in particular, which places by far the greatest emphasis on epideictic rhetoric, presents movere as the most important aim and function of oratory, and
Fig. 72 – Attributed to Samuel van Hoogstraten, *Supper at Emmaus*, pen and brush in brown ink, 15 x 17 cm. Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam

Fig. 73 – Samuel van Hoogstraten, *Noli me tangere*, 1650, pen and brown ink, 20 x 20 cm. Rijksmuseum Kröller-Müller, Otterlo.
it is this theory that resonates loudest in the early modern period. Paleotti equates the tasks of the artist and the orator because the most important function of both is changing a person’s convictions (what he calls flectere). Junius cites from Cicero’s De optimo genere oratorum: ‘It is [the artists’] duty ... that they should teach; it is for their owne credit that they should delight; it is altogether requisite that they should move and stirre our minde.’

Van Hoogstraten was the first author to specifically link the tripartite classification of the genera dicendi to the different subjects of Dutch painting. Félibien had previously associated the taxonomy with an artist’s choice of subjects in general. It is not clear whether Van Hoogstraten was familiar with Félibien’s work; it is more likely that his source was a textbook of rhetoric he might have read at school. Vossius, for instance, defines ‘three ways or Styles of Oratory’. To his mind, the ‘High-Flown Style’ is appropriate for ‘Heroic and tragic things’ and is ‘capable of stirring the Passions’; the ‘Humble Style’ is suitable for simple matters and aims, among other things, for ‘witiness’, while the ‘middle Style’ has an intermediate function between these two extremes. Van Hoogstraten adapts this division to the art of painting in his passage devoted to ‘the three degrees of art’, when he writes that the third degree differs from the second chiefly in that its subject is human emotions: ‘the Paintings, then, that belong to the third and highest degree are those that show man the noblest passions and decisions of Rational beings’. He expressly bases his classification on ‘the philosophers’, although he turns not to Aristotle’s theory of tragedy, but to the philosopher’s division of nature into a vegetative, a sensitive and a rational component.

The classification in Félibien and Van Hoogstraten clearly focuses in the first instance on the artist’s choice of subject and not directly on his style. The depiction of the passions is, though, capable of breaking through the hierarchy of the classification. It is not necessarily the choice of subject that determines whether or not a painting belongs to the highest ‘third grade’; what matters is the successful portrayal of human thoughts and feelings, says Van Hoogstraten: ‘one may find History Painters enough ... they do not all belong to the third degree of art, unless one can discern in their works the aforementioned Rational or human souls’. It is consequently the artist’s innate capacity for representing ‘vegetative’, ‘sensitive’ or ‘rational’ aspects of nature that largely determines which of the three degrees he specializes in.

Various art historians have tried to relate the modern classification of art genres (still-life, landscape and scenes of history and everyday life) to the theory of the genera dicendi, and thence, if possible, to come to some conclusion about the contested issue of the development of ‘realism’ in Dutch painting. For our analysis, it is not necessary to examine the different attempts to establish a strict system based on this classification – a system that by its very nature is foreign to the epideictic, undogmatic character of Van Hoogstraten’s treatise. It does, however, throw light on Van Hoogstraten’s views about the aims of art to consider his association of the passions with the ‘third degree’, which corresponds to the rhetorical esteem for an argument aimed at stirring up emotion – movere – in the genus grande. He appears to agree with Vossius, who, when discussing the artist as pathopoios in ‘De graphice’, seems to be pointing to pathos as the most important function of classical tragedy.
Fig. 74 – Samuel van Hoogstraten, *Abraham’s Sacrifice*, 1641, pen and brown ink. Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam.

Fig. 75 – Jan Lievens, *The Raising of Lazarus*, 1631, canvas, 103 cm x 112 cm. Art Gallery and Museum, Brighton.
Pathos: painting and theatre

How does tragic pathos relate to the function of the painting of the affects? In rhetorical theory move res or flectere, arousing feelings in the viewer, serves the persuasive force of the argument and ultimately brings about a change in character. Echoes of this view live on in the early modern theory of poetry and art. Van Hoogstraten himself explains his activities in drama and painting with the observation that ‘contemplating, reflecting on and considering people’s affects and passions’, he had ‘distinguished between good and evil, raised honour and virtue to heaven, and shown the Reader shameful acts in a horrifying way for his instruction’. Apparently, the dramatization of human passions presents a virtuous moral example or one that inspires revulsion.

How does this form of emotionizing drama create its effect? The Aristotelian concept of tragedy postulates the cathartic or purifying function of depicting emotive events. In the seventeenth century the working of the cathartic experience is expressed most elaborately in Lipsius’s Stoic theory: the beholder is expected to empathize with the characters being portrayed, and this physical sensation can have a curative effect. Purportedly, painting works in a similar way: Van Hoogstraten remarks in regard to a work by Filippo Lippi that art has the power ‘to make the most barbaric hearts meek, and to arouse goodwill and love, well nigh contrary to nature’. His ideas about ‘terror’ and ‘compassion’ accord with a remark in Vondel’s Lucifer, a play that Van Hoogstraten was certainly familiar with because he refers to it in the Inleyding: ‘the aim and object of the true Tragedy is to move people through terror and pity’.

Of all the Dutch playwrights, Vondel is the most explicit about the visual preconditions for this physically beneficial effect of the depiction of the passions, stressing that too graphic a staging can have an adverse effect on the audience’s imagination, and that it is particularly dangerous for pregnant women and the unborn foetus:

‘s since seeing stirs the heart more than hearing an account of the event, the staging of the tragic act should be such that … without showing grotesque and gruesome cruelties, and causing miscarriages and deformities by alarming pregnant women, it provokes compassion and terror, so that the tragedy may achieve its end and object, which is to moderate these two passions in people’s minds … cleanse the spectators of faults, and teach them to endure the calamities of the world more calmly and more equably.’

Vondel repeats the topical idea that the mother’s imagination is most prone to visual stimuli that may lead to physical deformations. By contrast, the cathartic effect on the mind brought about by ‘compassion and terror’ (medogen en schrick), and not by excessive stimulation of the imagination is deemed to bring about a change in character that leads to equanimity. The alleged salubrious qualities of painting thus spring from its affective impact; as Giovan Battista Armenini states, the eye is sometimes ‘the cause of [the viewers’] being moved towards true piety […] and God-fearing, and all these things are medicaments and excellent remedies for their health’. In the Netherlands De Bie writes that ‘this Art […] has such force that it not only charms curious and Art-loving Minds but can move the greatest Sinners, and Barbaric hearts, even immovable and implacable Tyrants, curb thoughtless tongues, put to shame those who follow their own
Opinions and reconcile bloodthirsty or vengeful people’. In art theory, here is one exemplary scene which is supposed to bring about this change in character, and to inspire girls with filial piety: the image of Pero, who breastfeeds her father in prison. Junius, for instance, recommends it as a pre-eminent choice of subject matter. This state of affairs may have prompted Van Hoogstraten to draw this subject himself; it was painted, for instance, by Dirk van Baburen, a painter Van Hoogstraten commended for his choice of subject (figs. 76 and 77).

Van Hoogstraten believes that certain artists have a natural aptitude for seeking out ‘the tragic and pitiful’ and moving ‘the mind to compassion’. He praises painters who move the viewer to tears and give their work ‘the greatest lustre’ by portraying sorrow. At the same time he acknowledges that one cannot depict anything and everything, and that decorum must be observed. In this context, Junius quotes the example of Medea, who murdered her own children when her husband married another woman, which was one of the subjects staged in full graphic detail by Jan Vos in the Amsterdam city theatre: ‘Discretion is here also a great point, but very often neglected by them that observe Truth and occasion too much: for as in Tragedies, so likewise in Pictures, all things are not to be laid open before the eyes of the spectator.’ Van Hoogstraten, paraphrasing Horace, condemns the depiction of ‘violent actions’ (felle daden) that shock viewers excessively. In a similar vein, Huygens uses the term horror in his autobiography to describe a painted head of Medusa; while this horrific image may well be
pleasing to the eye in its lifelikeness (vividitas) and beauty, Huygens would prefer to see it in someone else’s house.\textsuperscript{170} The arousal of the viewer’s emotions is evidently intended not to appal him but to transport him into a virtual reality and thus achieve the greatest possible persuasiveness, to paraphrase a statement by Vasari.\textsuperscript{171} Van Hoogstraten repeats a topos to illustrate this – an anecdote about a depiction of the ancient king Agamemnon, who covers his face with his cloak during the sacrifice of Iphigeneia, his daughter: apparently, the chief protagonist himself cannot bear to watch the grisly event. The anecdote implies that the viewer identifies to a degree with the principal character; the spectator, after all, is also a witness to this ghastly episode.\textsuperscript{172}

\textit{Ethos: painting and history writing}

Bringing about the strong ‘pathetic’ emotions of terror and compassion is just one of the aims of depicting the passions; Van Hoogstraten identifies another: to present a moral example. In the passage from \textit{Schoone Roselijn} quoted above he combines showing ‘shameful acts’ in a ‘horrifying’ manner with the object of raising ‘honour and virtue to heaven’. He maintains that by presenting visible examples of virtue, painting is more able than literature to have an instructive effect. Apparently, this view is shared by Vossius, who asserts in ‘De graphice’: ‘all the works of nature and of the arts are better presented to the eye (\textit{ob oculos ponantur}) by the painter’s brush than by the pen of the author of natural or political history’.\textsuperscript{173} For the same reason Van Hoogstraten prefers painting, in Quintilian’s words: ‘The Painting, a silent work, always retaining the same appearance, penetrates and moves the mind such that it oft-times seems to surpass the power of rhetoric’.\textsuperscript{174}
The title page of Van Hoogstraten’s chapter dedicated to Clio stresses the competition between painting and the writing of history. Clio holds a book by Thucydidides (fig. 78); in Plutarch there is a comparison between Thucydidides’s writings and Euphranor’s paintings founded on the argument that history writing and painting both have the same objective – to conjure up events in a graphic, lifelike manner. The elevation of painting above historiography because of its greater rhetorical power is found for the first time in Basil, whom Van Hoogstraten approvingly cites: ‘But hear how St Basil raises the force of Painting above his own oratory: “Stand up now, oh illustrious Painters, who depict the outstanding deeds of the Warriors, glorify now through your art the image of the wounded General: ... I go my way, defeated by you all in the Painting of the courageous acts of the Martyrs”’. 

At various points in his work Vossius describes painting as silent historiography (and history writing as painting that speaks). This comparison is based on the notion that the aim of history writing is to inspire in the reader a desire to emulate; Van Hoogstraten also commends painting for its ability to preserve the ‘memory of illustrious persons’. Vossius writes: ‘This must expressly pertain to the praise of painting: ... it does the same as the writing of history. For painting also passes on great deeds to posterity. Because of this, even those who cannot read the histories learn these things from paintings. Furthermore, like written histories, painted representations spur the viewer to strive for virtue and honour.’ In the same spirit he argues:

‘History serves, after all, not only to contemplate examples; it also arouses the desire to emulate and kindles the spirit to attain virtue. It gives not only knowledge but also will-power, and makes us not only spectators but also actors. This is why [Cicero] rightly described it as a mirror of human deeds, although not an ordinary mirror that only reflects our own image, but a mirror like the one, so we read, that Archimedes made long ago. For just as that mirror set fire to far distant objects with astounding power, so our minds are also set aflame to emulate the examples that have lived a very long time before us. ... The same power is also clearly manifest in cold stone or in wax, in silent statues and masks.’

In the context of the comparison between historiography and painting, Van Hoogstraten emphasizes the importance of illustrating history books: ‘for the pleasure of seeing [people from the past] seems to double our attention, and [we] look upon their deeds as if they happened in our own time’. His view, quoted earlier, that the artist must be ‘at the same time actor and spectator’ is expressed differently by Vossius: to his mind, the reader of history becomes ‘not only a spectator, but also an actor’. Apparently, spectator and artist perform a similar function in the process that leads to the consummate artistic experience. The supposed affective relationship between the artist and his public makes possible a performative illusion in which both painter and viewer share.

In sum, the function of beweeglijkheid discussed above is repeated here. Showing an ‘instantaneous act’ with a highly emotive charge is expected to bring about a change of character, or a mental purification in the Aristotelian sense; the example of historical events is supposed
to move the mind to emulation. The alleged therapeutic effects of pity or horror and the importance of virtuous examples give painting, as, in this sense, an equal to drama and historiography, an important ethical function. Its visual nature actually makes painting ideally suited to this purpose so that it surpasses its sister arts in effectiveness. Bearing this observation in mind, we can reiterate Van Hoogstraten’s descriptions of painting as the ‘mirror of nature’ and ‘sister of reflective philosophy’ and his conviction that ‘it would truly be unjust to scorn a sincere practitioner of the Art of Painting, who pursues it for its own sake and for its virtuous nature’.\textsuperscript{182} Although this remark relates to the painter’s contemplative focus on the entire visible world, the ability to hold up a mirror to human passions in the same way as historiography does is an important element of the philosophical aspects of art, and one that explains the artist’s assumed role as \textit{ethopoios}.

Of course, painting’s supposed ethical function creates obligations for artists. The ‘power over the beholders’ (\textit{macht over d’aenschouwers}) that a painting exerts is a dangerous weapon, as we learn from the reactions of Protestant critics of painting like Camphuysen.\textsuperscript{183} The Muses are portrayed as treacherous seducers; Boethius emphasizes that the ‘thorns of the emotions’

\begin{figure}
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\caption{Samuel van Hoogstraten, \textit{Clio}, title page of Chapter 3 of the \textit{Inleyding tot de Hooge schoole der schilderkonst}.}
\end{figure}
drive their public mad. But at the same time the depiction of the passions can have the positive effect of fully engaging the viewer in the mental image presented to him by the artist: ‘the beweeglijkheid of the vivid Affect’ delights the heart, according to Junius, ‘changing the whole nature of our inner motions, through gentle violence (een soet gheweld), thus that they accord to what is on show in the Painting that is present’.

**The Depiction of the Passions and Pictorial Realism**

As we saw in the previous chapter, Van Hoogstraten’s description of painting as the ‘mirror of nature’ was closely bound up with his ideas about poetry, which was also regarded as a fundamental mimetic activity. We will now examine some facets of *naturam sequi* in the light of the comparison of painter and rhetorician. We shall see that various aspects are involved in a supposedly ‘realistic’ kind of painting: it must be recognizable so as to facilitate a strong affective impact, it must speak to a wide audience, and it must use the ‘Book of Nature’ as the most important source of knowledge and inspiration. Cicero had already associated the definition ‘mirror of nature’ with the theatre, but the version most familiar to the modern reader is Hamlet’s speech: ‘the purpose of playing, whose end, both at the first and now, was and is to hold, as ’twere, the mirror up to nature; to show virtue her own feature, scorn her own image, and the very age and body of the time his form and pressure’. The comparison can be traced back to Terence, who wrote in one of his plays: ‘look, as if in a mirror, at people’s lives’ and was also made by Vossius, among others, in the seventeenth century.

In the *Inleyding* the depiction of the passions is one element of the wider framework of the importance accorded to the depiction of the visible world. Here Van Hoogstraten echoes the words of Van Mander and Junius. In the conception of the sixteenth-century *Rederijkers*, the ‘Chambers of Rhetoric’ that united amateurs who wrote poetry and drama, the passions could be shown on stage and in paintings by means of allegorizing parerga or by-work. They advised poets and artists to consult iconographic manuals. However, seventeenth-century authors stress that an artist can only base the passions on a thorough study of nature. Apparently, literature, the works of the ‘philosophers’ and even a master’s training are not enough. The same holds for physiognomy; Van Hoogstraten mentions several authors who have written on the subject, but refers artists ‘chiefly to their own ideas’. Good painters consequently excel unconsciously in depicting the passions; Van Mander says: ‘The depiction of Affects is used more by great Masters than they know’.

Van Hoogstraten endorses Van Mander’s assertion that it is only possible to learn about the passions by working from nature. Van Mander tells us that even his own didactic poem can be of little help here: ‘For Nature shows more of what acts on the Affects than one can describe’. The natural course of events after all is that the emotions immediately manifest themselves in one form of physical expression or another; indeed, ‘Nature cannot lie’. Van Hoogstraten warns against a ‘spiritless’ (geesteloze) rendition devoid of grace and against forced or exaggerated bodily movements, which disrupt the effect of the ‘living image’: ‘in order to get on to the right path, and to continue on it with certainty, an artist must turn to living nature and see how far he is permitted to go in [depicting] movements.’ Similarly, Goeree observes that for the depiction of the passions ‘no exercise is of more use to the Painter than
to sketch, attending closely, many things from Life, and chiefly those things that appear to him by chance and in silence here and there’, that is to say at moments when he can observe his models without their noticing, in order to select carefully the ‘best moment’ (beste ogenblick), in which the emotions are shown most characteristically.\textsuperscript{196} That knowledge of the passions was traditionally seen as a function of the observation of nature is exemplified by the curriculum of the Accademia del Disegno in Florence, which included the passions as a form of ‘natural philosophy’ (what Junius calls a \textit{natuur-kondighe erwaerenbeyd}).\textsuperscript{197}

Encouraging artists to get out and mix with people is a second element of the relation between emotions and pictorial lifelikeness. Van Mander ends his chapter on the affects by emphasizing that aspiring young artists should not rely solely on training – they must follow nature.\textsuperscript{198} He tells the story of the legendary Eupompos: this sculptor, when asked by Lysippos who his teacher had been, replied that he had had no master and, gesturing towards a crowd of people, stated that nature herself is the best teacher. This anecdote, which comes from Pliny, occurs repeatedly in Dutch art literature, but Van Mander specifically associated it with the passions.\textsuperscript{199} Junius echoes this notion when he says that the world around us is the best textbook:

‘A wise and prudent observer of the things that one should emulate always keeps his eyes on the people among whom he lives; aware that the lesson he has to learn is most clearly spelled out in each particular person as if in a clear and legible Book.’\textsuperscript{200}

In these observations we can hear echoes of Leonardo’s encouragement to artists to make character sketches as a collection from which to ‘quote’ when painting. In this context, Lomazzo recounts that Leonardo went so far as to visit prisoners to draw their features.\textsuperscript{201} There are several surviving drawings of everyday scenes by Van Hoogstraten himself, showing figures and spectators gesticulating and quarrelling, which may well be illustrative of this practice (fig. 79).\textsuperscript{202}

Art theory often links depicting individual emotions to the concept of \textit{varietas}, the variety and multiplicity of the visible world.\textsuperscript{203} Van Hoogstraten cites Timanthes’s famous image of Iphigenia’s sacrifice, which reportedly pictured the different types of grief felt by the onlookers, and praises Rembrandt in this regard: ‘I recall that, in a certain finely composed work by Rembrandt depicting St John Preaching, I saw wonderful attention of many different kinds in the spectators: this was extremely commendable’. This comment probably refers to Rembrandt’s grisaille, now in Berlin (fig. 80);\textsuperscript{204} Van Hoogstraten himself may also have practised portraying the preaching of John the Baptist.\textsuperscript{205} Junius observes that an artist is easily recognized in a company of people:

‘He converseth with all sorts of men, and when he observeth in any of them some notable commotions of the minde, he seemeth then to have watched such an opportunitie for his studie, that he might reade in their eyes and countenance the severall faces of anger, love, feare, hope, scorne, joy, confidence, and other perturbations of our minde.’\textsuperscript{206}
Spending time out in the world and moving among all kinds of people enables the artist to build insight into the nature and range of the human passions, as Van Mander observes about Michelangelo.\textsuperscript{207}

In Van Mander’s didactic poem this observation is accompanied by an admonition to listen well to common people. They, after all, as Vossius wrote, become ‘not only spectators but also actors’, and it is only when they recognize themselves in the passions that are depicted that the artist’s persuasive efforts succeed. Van Mander writes of the depiction of the emotions: ‘The advice of the common folk in this regard can be very beneficial’.\textsuperscript{208} In the literature of art, there are many anecdotes about the judgement of painting by laymen, among them the stories of Apelles, who was corrected by a cobbler in his rendition of a sandal, and Phidias, who listened unobserved to what people passing by were saying about his work; Van Mander says that artists must pay heed ‘to the judgement of the common people.’\textsuperscript{209} A similar view of the opinion of the unlearned as a measure of the effect of painting can be found in the \textit{Inleyding}: ‘The judgement of strangers, wise men and louts, of the jealous, the well-willing, and the impartial stimulates the mind. Indeed peasants will sometimes point out a fault in your work, as Dürer says, although they will not be able to teach you how to correct it.’\textsuperscript{210} This is a topical observation; Agrippa of Nettesheim, whose work Van Hoogstraten consulted for the \textit{Inleyding},\textsuperscript{211} generally prefers the opinion of the ignorant to that of the ‘scholar corrupted by the sciences’; he describes how hard it is \textit{not} to be convinced by ‘ignorant people who speak not from scholarship but from their spirit (\textit{idiotae, qui non ex humana sapientia, sed ex spiritu loquebatur}).’\textsuperscript{212}
Involved in these pronouncements is, again, the ethos that is supposed to lead to the greatest power of persuasion. This is created by responding to the public’s expectations with appropriate decorum. When addressing a general audience, the orator has to speak understandably and simply. Goeree says that an ‘honest Artist’ is happy to expose his work to ‘the judgement of the whole World’, and asserts that it is important ‘that one ... behaves wisely in listening to every man’s opinion, even that of the ignorant’, giving the example of the artist who, when he was asked who his master was, ‘named no one, but pointed with his finger at the People standing around; indicting that the judgement of the common Man had made him careful to contrive his art well’. Painters should appreciate it ‘when the mass of the people examine their works closely’. In the context of this conviction, we may recall the view that painting is superior to rhetoric because, as the ‘book of the illiterate’, it can influence a wide and uneducated public, drawing directly from the ‘Book of Nature’: when it comes to depicting the passions too, every individual is, in Junius’s words, like ‘a clear and legible Book’ to the artist.

This notion of the artist as a good judge of human nature is rooted in the rhetorical idea of the orator as *vir bonus dicendi peritus*, the speaker who succeeds in persuading his audience by being a pattern of good morals himself. The possibility that painting conveys a moral message can

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Fig. 80 – Rembrandt, *The Preaching of Saint John*, ca. 1634-35, canvas, mounted on panel, 62 x 80 cm. Gemäldegalerie, Berlin.
similarly be explained in light of this ideal. The painter’s success in influencing his public’s world view is directly related to his skill in portraying ‘characters’ and temperaments in accordance with the categories determined by decorum, which also encompass age and social status. The recognition of the known and familiar in the depiction of characters, and the associated sense of sharing knowledge of nature and human morals with the orator, evoke in the audience a feeling of benevolence that gives the artist a greater chance of rhetorical success.

This suggestion of a shared ethos also has to do with aspects of style, indicated in rhetorical theory by, among other things, the concept of brevitas. The appreciation of a plain, unpretentious style is associated, for instance, with the preference for writing in the vernacular. In his literary work Van Hoogstraten expresses his preference for writing in Dutch, a factor that linked the scholarly circle of friends to which he belonged. A simple style, stripped of empty rhetoric, is the most effective way, in Van Hoogstraten’s paraphrase of Gregory, ‘to teach people in an understandable manner’. In this sense De Lairesse compares the painter’s method with that of writers who appeal to the general public by using their mother tongue – authors like Hooft, Huygens and Vondel, who are renowned ‘for the power and purity of their language’: ‘Is it not a grave error to want to use foreign words in a language that is rich enough in itself?’ The virtue of vivere secundum naturam is, of course, linked to the liking for plain, unvarnished language; in the context of this Stoic ideology, Lipsius associates brevitas with the virtues of modestia and magnanimitas.

When this ethos of recognizability is seen as a key factor, it becomes clear that the genera pingendi can also be conceived of as opportunities for the artist to tailor his style and his public to one another; for successful persuasion, the artist’s own nature and that of his public must be attuned to each other. In the Eerlyken jongeling Van Hoogstraten elaborates this idea in regard to persuasive speech: if someone wants to convince, he must first get the measure of his listeners, he will not succeed ‘unless he first considers and assesses the latter’s nature, inclination, and how broad his understanding is: so that he directs his oratory neither too low nor too high, but in accordance with the extent of his [listener’s] wit’. The genera pingendi, says De Lairesse, are inextricably bound up with the artist’s social environment.

In Van Hoogstraten’s theory, the artist has not only to paint an event ‘as if one saw it happening’, but also to present to the public ‘the motions of the mind and the body ... and the people as if one knew them’. A similar conviction is expressed by Angel, when he commends Rembrandt’s painting of Samson’s Wedding both because it accurately presents the historical reality and because ‘the emotions were such as are found in our present-day parties’ (fig. 81). When the viewers recognize themselves in the figures portrayed by means of appropriate decorum, artist and public share the same ethos and the performativity of painting is complete. This results in a moment at which the artist’s natural preferences, the style and subject matter of the picture, and the viewer’s disposition come together and, ideally, coincide entirely, in a consummate illusion in which maker and viewer ‘meet’ in a virtual reality.

Only according to the paradox of the libro degli idioti can painting have a universal ethical function and exercise a purifying or otherwise psychologically salubrious effect on the beholder. The artist must come across as unaffected, unschooled and natural. In his definition of painting Van Hoogstraten says that it is ‘justly called the book of the Illiterate’, ‘working with penetrating effect on the sight of people of all kinds’, in other words that it is capable of
affecting the emotions of a large and disparate public. This rhetorical capacity possessed by painting is thoroughly explained by Francisco de Holanda. Painting, in his view, achieves enargeia better than poetry and reaches a larger public:

‘Painting satisfies not only the cultured man but equally the simple-minded, the villager, the old woman. And foreigners, such as Sarmatians, Indians and Persians, who could never understand the verses of Virgil or Homer because they remain mute for them, experience immense pleasure in seeing such a work and comprehend it immediately. Indeed, these barbarians cease to be barbarians and understand, thanks to painting’s power of expression, what no poem or metric verse could ever teach them.’

‘Barbarians cease to be barbarians’: painting can apparently bring about a permanent change in the unlettered. De Holanda goes on to conclude ‘that painting actually has more power than poetry in causing greater effects, and has greater strength and force to move the mind and the soul to joy and laughter as well as to sorrow and tears, with more effective rhetoric’. It is interesting to note that elsewhere in this work De Holanda stresses that it is specifically the art of the Netherlands that appeals to an illiterate public. He attributes to Michelangelo the view that Netherlandish painting is suitable for ‘women, particularly very old or very young women, monks and nuns and certain nobles who are devoid of any feeling for true harmony’ and that
it moves them to greater piety. We will return in more detail to the Southern European attitude towards Dutch art in chapter V.

**The Ideal Painter of Passions: Rembrandt as ‘Pathopoios’**

In Van Hoogstraten’s theory, the depiction of the passions occurs at the ‘sensitive’ level of the human soul that supposedly mediates between bodily and purely mental functions. Nevertheless, various elements involved in the process of depicting the passions give him cause to describe this aspect of his profession as ‘the noblest part of art’. The innate qualities or ingenium of the artist are fundamental to this evaluation: purportedly, if the aptitude is not there, no amount of practice and theory can make up for the lack. At one and the same time, the passions have their origin in the sensitive soul and an effect on the sensitive soul. This notion works through into the thesis that the painter has to have a particular affective sensibility which can assume the extreme form of furor poeticus or poetic frenzy. On the one hand, the artistic temperament and poetic inspiration are explicitly linked to the depiction of the passions, on the other, poetic frenzy and an overwrought imagination can themselves assume the form of a specific passion.

*The painter’s passions*

Given the assumption that anyone who wants to move his audience must himself participate in the performative illusion, it follows that the orator must have a certain affective sensitivity. The artist, too, must to some extent allow himself to be carried along by the sensitive part of the soul. Whereas according to the Stoic notions inspiring Van Hoogstraten’s book complete surrender to powerful emotions or unbridled fantasy is to be deplored, in a diluted form this is nonetheless a valuable, even a necessary precondition for effective persuasion. Van Hoogstraten does comment that there are few who can engage in this with impunity: artists who have ‘a true talent’ for ‘subjects ... that have more than animal movement in [them]’ are ‘very thin on the ground’. Junius regards painters who concentrate on the passions as ‘true Artists’, that is to say ‘learned spirits’, who are very different from ‘common journeymen’, the painters who churn out works by the dozen (dozijnwerkers).

Van Hoogstraten and Junius describe how, in the mental process of artistic invention, the praemeditatio in which the reality that will be depicted is summoned up in the mind’s eye, the painter experiences all sorts of perturbations on the ‘sensitive’ level of his soul. Physiologically speaking, an ‘untamed mind’ causes the spirits to want to move in excess from the heart, in which they originate, to the outside. The specific ‘artist’s affectation’ that is generated has a physical expression which corresponds with the manifestation of rage as it is described in treatises on moral philosophy: the blood rises to the head, and the mind seems to seek a way out of the body. The mind becomes ‘pregnant’ and ‘heated’, it is ‘stretched’ and moves ‘upwards’. It is therefore important to give the artistic temperament space: one of the resources Van Hoogstraten recommends is the physical space of the Dutch countryside: ‘one must let the soul walk in the open air, so that it becomes greater, and looks at the Sky with an unfettered mind’.
The ‘love of art’ that is aroused in the process of invention can assume such exaggerated proportions that physical measures actually have to be taken if the bodily health of the artist is not to be jeopardized. The ‘heat’ generated by the sensitive soul has to find an escape route in a ‘magnificent’ invention. Junius writes of ‘the rapid movements of [the] heated mind’ of ‘the ancient Masters’, ‘movements’ of the artistic temperament that can be associated with the virtue of *energeia*. He also believes that an experienced artist may allow himself to be swept along by his emotions: ‘we are sometimes also to follow our stirred passions, in which heat doth for the most part more than diligence’. This state of heated inspiration is related particularly to the depiction of the passions (*beroerten*):

> ‘so are then these commotions of our mind by all means to be drawne out of the truth of nature: and it standeth an Artificer upon it, rather to trie all what may be tried, than to marre the vigorous force of a fresh and warme Imagination by a slow and coole manner of Imitation.’

This physiological theory of ‘heated spirits’ assumes that it is a precondition for a vivid invention that this warmth is diverted to the painting quickly: Van Hoogstraten warns artists that their minds will ‘cool’ if they leave their work untouched for too long. It is in this light that we can also explain his view that most Dutch painters have a ‘cold’ temperament, which purportedly makes them better suited to the careful rendition of details than the Italians. The terminology Van Hoogstraten uses to write about the ‘movements’ of the artist’s mind and the ‘stirrings’ of his spirit is the same as that with which he describes the passions to be depicted in the painting.

The state of untamed invention linked to the depiction of the passions can be equated with the ideal of the *furor poeticus* – poetic frenzy – that underwent a revival in the seventeenth century in Vossius’s treatise *De artis poetica* (1647) and elsewhere. Van Hoogstraten refers explicitly to what he calls *Poëtische geest* in the passage in which he discusses observing the passions in front of a mirror: ‘But here a Poetic spirit is required in order to imagine another man’s role. Anyone who does not feel this must certainly step back, for he will never master the thing unless some God or Poet lends him a helping hand.’ The very fact that diligence and practice are not enough when it comes to depicting the passions, says Van Hoogstraten, defines the exceptional quality of artists who nonetheless achieve it. He paraphrases Seneca’s idea that only the ‘affected’ mind moves ‘upwards’ and is capable of the extraordinary, and cites Plato’s conviction that it takes ‘Divine inspiration’ (*Godlijke aenaedeming*) or a ‘Poetic frenzy’ (*Poëtische geestrijzing*). There is much in the same vein in Junius, who gives the artistic imagination a connotation of insanity (the Dutch edition speaks about the artists’ *Tuymelgbeest*, their ‘freely raging spirit’). He talks about artists ‘impelled by the sudden heate of a thoroughly stirred Phantasie, or rather transported as by a prophetical trauence (*Prophetische raesernye*)’: ‘their minds being once in agitation cannot containe themselves any longer, but out it must whatsoever they have conceived; it is not possible for them to rest, untill they have eased their free spirit of such a burden’. Van Hoogstraten is somewhat more circumspect than Junius in the sense that he urges artists to aim for a degree of moderation and not to wholly lose sight of the Senecan virtues of temperance and constancy. He also points to the dangers of wine, which
Fig. 82 – Rembrandt, The Resurrection, ca. 1639, canvas, 92 x 67 cm.
Bayerische Staatsgemäldesammlungen, Alte Pinakothek, Munich.
is to some extent useful – it ‘moves the mind upwards from below’ – but is more likely, in his view, to cause either wanton recklessness or fuddled lethargy.\textsuperscript{244}

Seventeenth-century art theory also assumes that a certain temperamental sensitivity is required of the viewer: the ultimate function of the depiction of the passions is to move the viewer’s ‘sensitive soul’.\textsuperscript{245} Here we may recall the idea of the Second Sophistic that the beholder is a participant in a virtual performance in which the work of art plays only a mediating role. The theory of the passions presupposes that the viewer has no choice but to take part in the illusion, when he is carried away body and soul by the reality of the emotions that are evoked; Van Hoogstraten describes the power of the painterly illusion as an effect ‘that leaves one powerless to believe other than that one saw the living Image of the minds and souls themselves’.\textsuperscript{246} ‘Taken to the extreme, this means that the beholder is expected to ‘become’ the work, as ultimately he takes on the work’s qualities: Lomazzo says in so many words that a painting of a figure eating makes the viewer feel hungry and a sleeping figure makes him sleepy; similarly the Antwerp author Carolus Scribanius writes in 1610 that the spectators of a painting of St Sebastian feel the martyr’s pain in their own body.\textsuperscript{247}

The ability to portray and evoke emotions is described as a function of the artist’s innate aptitude and imagination. Depicting the passions is therefore one of the most important qualities that makes an artist more than an artisan. Consonant with the role of the passions in painting described above, the artist as \textit{pathopoios} is not only a moral philosopher and expert on human emotions and an observer of nature, he is also driven by an inspired mind that is not granted to every ‘journeyman’.

\textbf{Rembrandt as ‘pathopoios’}

One complication in identifying Van Hoogstraten’s artistic preferences is that he rarely takes a stand for or against a particular artist or style, and consequently mentions his contemporaries far less frequently than he refers to the artists of antiquity; in this he is following the example of Quintilian, who did not wish to contaminate his theory by discussing living orators.\textsuperscript{248} We have seen that the art literature of the seventeenth century develops an image of an ‘ideal painter of the passions’ who combines well-developed powers of observation with an unfettered imagination. Now, strikingly, when he identifies the different rhetorical qualities of artists, linked to their exemplary practitioners, Van Hoogstraten describes Rembrandt as the painter who stands out above all others in the depiction of the passions: whereas Rubens supposedly excels in ‘splendid compositions’ and Van Dyck in ‘grace’, Rembrandt focuses on the ‘passions of the soul’.\textsuperscript{249} We have already seen how highly Van Hoogstraten esteemed Rembrandt’s painting \textit{St John Preaching}, now in Berlin, because of the variety in its depiction of different states of mind. It is therefore possible that Van Hoogstraten adopted his terminology to do with \textit{beweging} and \textit{beweglijkheid} from his time as a pupil in Rembrandt’s studio. In a letter to Constantijn Huygens of 1639, Rembrandt wrote that he had sought to attain ‘the greatest and most natural \textit{beweglijkheid}’ in his Passion series.\textsuperscript{250} When we interpret this term in the context of Van Hoogstraten’s usage in the \textit{Inleyding}, it is obvious that it relates to the dramatic action in the scene: an ‘instantaneous movement’, where Rembrandt has shown – as he did in \textit{Abraham’s Sacrifice} – the moment when one of the soldiers drops his sword, a device that produces a ‘certain
Fig. 83 – Rembrandt, *The Raising of the Cross*, ca. 1636, canvas, 96 x 72 cm.
Bayerische Staatsgemäldesammlungen, Alte Pinakothek, Munich.
beweeglijkheid which has power over the beholders’ (fig. 82). In this letter Rembrandt moreover presents himself as pathopoios: an artist who plays on human emotions and is at the same time filled with a divine inspiration for his work and elevates himself above the simple ‘journeyman’. Clearly, a Passion series is the ideal locus for an artist to show exactly what he is capable of in this respect; Van Hoogstraten says that artists depict ‘in the bitter suffering of Christ, his mother Mary, as the one who was closest to our Saviour, with the greatest emotion (beweeging) that is possible’,251 and in the same vein De Bie describes ‘a Passion of Christ that was painted so wonderfully and remarkably expressively that no hardened heart in a sinful person could be found but that it must needs be moved when the work was shown to him’.252

The term beweeglijkheid, literally ‘moving quality’ or perhaps ‘movability’, must be understood in the light of the theory of the motions of the mind – not only those of the figures portrayed, but the viewer’s and those of the artist himself as well. By giving his figures affective ‘movement’, the artist can conjure up a virtual reality in which the emotions of the artist and those of the viewer interact, and work of art, artist and viewer are united in a performative
Fig. 85 – Rembrandt, *Judas Repentant*, 1629, wood, 76 x 101 cm. Private collection, England.

illusion. Rembrandt emphasized this ‘affective identity’ of image, artist and viewer by incorporating his self-portrait in the painted *Raising of the Cross* and the etched *Descent from the Cross*: just as the artist is assumed to be present in his work as another ‘bystander’ or even ‘actor’, so the viewer is involved bodily in the scene (figs. 83 and 84). To repeat Junius’s description of the effects of ‘Energia’: ‘This vertue [...] bringeth to passe, that the affections follow us with such a lively representation, as if we were by at the doing of the things imagined.’

Van Hoogstraten is not alone in his opinion of Rembrandt: Huygens similarly praises the artist precisely because of his skill in rendering emotion. Huygens regards Rembrandt as superior to Lievens in ‘liveliness of the affects’ (*affectuum vivacitas*), particularly commending Rembrandt’s *Judas* for the ‘different passions contained in a single figure and expressed as a unity’ (fig. 85).

Rembrandt has, he says, succeeded in surpassing both antiquity and Italy, entirely in accordance with the ‘specialism’ identified by Van Hoogstraten that sets his teacher apart from Italian and other Netherlandish masters.

Dutch art literature contains various references to Rembrandt’s ability to play on the emotions of his viewers and place them in a virtual reality. Houbraken praises Rembrandt’s *Christ in the Storm on the Sea of Galilee* because ‘the features and the emotions of the people ... [are] depicted as true to life as is conceivable’, quoting Vos’s description of the emotions in the painting *Haman and Abasverus at Esther’s Banquet* (fig. 86). Houbraken also refers in somewhat oblique terms to Rembrandt’s ability to paint a telling ‘snapshot’ (an *oogenblik* or a view ‘in the blink of an eye’) in an emotional narrative: Rembrandt managed through his ‘attentive contemplation of the variety of Affects’ to show how the disciples at Emmaus, when Christ suddenly disappeared, were ‘transported by astonishment and wonder’, staring at the empty
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the depiction of the passions

In light of Houbraken’s recognition of Rembrandt’s reputation as *pathopoios*, it is telling that he also mentions Rembrandt’s liking for mingling with ‘common people’, seeing this as a deliberate choice inspired by the ideal of *bonneteté* set forth in courtiers’ manuals. Indeed, Van Hoogstraten’s view of his master as a specialist in the ‘passions of the soul’ is echoed widely. Writing at the same time as Houbraken, De Piles observes that Rembrandt ‘knew full well that in Painting one could, without much trouble, deceive the eye by showing motionless and inanimate bodies, but not satisfied with this fairly common device, he sought instead with the utmost diligence to impress the eye with living figures’. In 1720 Lambert ten Kate placed Rembrandt’s work in the *genus medium* because of the ‘low’ subjects he chose, but commended him, too, because ‘by means of an artful arrangement of light, to make these things stand out better’, he customarily gave ‘his simple figures speaking liveliness and passions’.

Rembrandt may have fashioned his own self-image on the notion of the ideal painter of passions, as when he depicted himself in his *Self-portrait as Zeuxis* (fig. 88). By identifying with this legendary portrayer of emotions, Rembrandt might have been making the same art-theoretical statement contained in the message he sent the stadholder by way of Huygens: that he endeavoured to achieve ‘the greatest and most natural beweeglijkheid’ in his works.

Huygens’s remark about the picture of Medusa is interesting in this context. While admiring it for the emotion of *subitus terror* it evoked, he admitted that he would not want a painting like that in his own house. A similar sentiment could explain his refusal of the *Blinding of Samson*, a painting which Rembrandt probably offered him (fig. 89). In Scaliger’s *Poetics*
'the putting out of eyes’ was actually cited as an ideal scene for tragedy, highly appropriate for the emotional *demonstratio* expressed by Rembrandt in this painting.²⁶⁴

Given Van Hoogstraten’s emphasis on the depiction of the passions, Rembrandt unarguably features as an exemplary artist in the *Inleyding*. In the next chapter we will see how Van Hoogstraten’s esteem for colouring and chiaroscuro, which also affect the emotions of the viewer, can be related to the work of his teacher.

◆

The portrayal of the passions is evidently of great significance to Van Hoogstraten’s views about depicting the visible world. Knowledge of the human psyche is more than just another argument to stress the intellectual status of painting; the passions are crucial in the rhetorical idea that a painting is a virtual reality which should influence the viewer’s ethos. In this case, too, there are no grounds for supposing that the theory pits the painting of the passions against respected concepts from antiquity: it is precisely on the authority of the views of authors like Quintilian and Cicero about the ethical duties of the orator that Van Hoogstraten bases his theory.
According to seventeenth-century courtiers’ treatises like Van Hoogstraten’s *Eerlyken jongeling*, the same rhetorical ideas determine the courtier’s ability to control his passions, to such an extent that he can even go against the natural order and hide his true intentions. We have seen that the artist, too, must be a master in simulating passions, and specifically in deceiving his public: a deceit that enables painting, like tragedy, to contribute to the viewer’s mental health.

The dichotomy between inner self and outward appearance, inherent in early modern psychology, plays a key role in art theory. The Aristotelian idea stresses first and foremost the closeness of the relation between the ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ domains. According to the supposed ‘action at a distance’ taking place between different mental and physical levels, the most literal interpretation can be given to the notion that the artist ‘is what he makes’. It follows from this idea that important elements of the artist’s self-image are associated with the depiction of the passions. His knowledge of human nature, his unfettered imagination and his ability to empathize with powerful emotions without compromising his own peace of mind govern the qualities of the artist as *pathopoios*. These qualities ultimately serve his task as *ethopoios*, someone able to bring about a change in character.

We have seen how, in the context of effecting this emotional change in the public, the theories of classical tragedy and rhetoric place the emphasis on a graphic presentation, which is denoted with the concept of *enargeia*. In Van Hoogstraten’s theory of art this term is deemed to be directly applicable to painting. The momentary affective impression that leads to a displacement into a virtual reality is achieved primarily by means of an illusionistic snapshot of the visible world. With his notion of ‘instantaneous movement’, Van Hoogstraten successfully uses rhetorical theory to describe aspects deriving from Rembrandt’s studio and provide a legitimation for them. This is not simply a justification after the event, as the concept of *beweglijkheid* that Rembrandt himself used in the 1630s tells us.

As an authority on human passions, the artist is also an authority on the general public, on the people he must manage to persuade of his own ethos. Recognition of the known and familiar and the associated sense of sharing a knowledge of nature and the human soul with the artist combine to generate the greatest power of persuasion. Thus, the Stoic emphasis on an unaffected and ‘realistic’ ethos is transposed to Van Hoogstraten’s passion theory.

In the next chapter we shall see that the affective power of art is important not just to the portrayal of human figures who, in Vossius’s words, fire the viewers to emulation like Archimedes’ mirror, but also to the depiction of transient elements of the visible world. When the artist responds to the ‘mute eloquence’ of the natural environment, even his depictions of landscape may be beneficial to the viewer’s body and mind.
Chapter V

THE ELOQUENCE OF COLOUR
Fig. 90 – Samuel van Hoogstraten, *Terpsichore*,
title page of Chapter 6 of the *Inleyding tot de Hooge Schoole der Schilderkonst*. 
Chapter V

The Eloquence of Colour

Rhetoric [is] nothing but ... an art of persuasion, and of stirring the inclinations; charming the souls of the unthinking with ... well-wrought gaudery, and deceptive semblance ... [by] those strumpet’s cosmetics of exposition ... yet all those who fill people’s ears with empty rhetoric, instead of with the simple words of the truth, will have to give account on judgement day of those things that they, lying to God, have vainly spewed out.

Agrippa of Nettesheim, Van de onzekerheid en ydelheid der wetenschappen en konsten

An artist’s powers of persuasion do not depend solely on the representation of human figures in a dramatic context. He can also, says Van Hoogstraten, add to the persuasiveness of his work by means of his painting manner, his style. Indeed, the early modern theory of art postulates that colours and tonal values have a direct emotional effect. While passions are deemed to affect the complexion, so, conversely, the sight of colour is believed to have an immediate effect on the inner being.

The title page of the sixth chapter of the Inleyding, which is devoted to colour, shows a painter in the act of depicting a female nude, flesh colour being one of the most difficult tasks for a painter, and two pupils grinding pigments (fig. 90). This illustrates the fact that Van Hoogstraten’s term *verw* refers to both the optical hue and the raw physical material of paint; unlike modern Dutch, which differentiates between *verf* and *kleur*. We shall elaborate on the wide lexical scope of this term by studying a key concept like *ornatus* (ornament), with which rhetorical theory classifies the figures of speech the orator uses to ‘enliven’ his discourse; these do not arise out of *inventio* but occur on the level of style (*stilus*). In contrast to the abstract connotations that cling to *ornatus*, we will discuss the merits of two different kinds of brushwork, the ‘smooth’ or ‘fine’ manner as against the ‘loose’ or ‘rough’ manner in the context of painting technique. As we shall see, however, this technical debate also touches on more general ideas regarding the essence of painterly illusionism and the way the sense of sight functions.

It will become clearer that the assumed rhetorical and technical aspects of colour are specifically relevant to discussions about the qualities and shortcomings of Netherlandish art: the international theoretical tradition explicitly associates of the art of the Netherlands with
the colouristic powers expressed in landscape painting. The vocabulary Van Hoogstraten uses to discuss landscape is dictated to a significant degree by his views on the persuasive powers of colour. His designations for describing colouristic effects reflect the ambivalent attitude towards Northern painters in traditional art theory: praise of their virtuosity in handling and spatial effects alongside a condemnation of their empty seduction of the senses; their art as exemplary of rhetorical and poetic licence as well as of vanity and transience. In this context, we will analyse how specific concepts, like *ornatus, brevitas* and *schilderachtig* – or picturesque, an idiosyncratic term in Dutch art literature – are employed to underpin the legitimacy of a relatively new genre like landscape painting. As we shall see, a certain focus on the deceptive nature of the visible world is inherent in the vocabulary used in talking about colour. Where the landscape functions as a *pars pro toto* for the whole of nature, we encounter expressions that are relevant to Van Hoogstraten’s ideas on the status of the depiction of the visible world. Here painting relates to theology: ultimately, the ‘silent rhetoric’ of the visible world is deemed to be a means of focusing the viewer on the eternal ‘invisible’ world.

**Paint as Flesh**

Van Hoogstraten’s ideas about colour derive in large measure from the paragone, the traditional comparison between drawing and colour that is a recurrent theme in the tradition of art theory. This comparison is based on the notion that *disegno* speaks to the intellect, whereas *colore* works on the emotions and hence on the body. Indeed, in light of the dual meaning of Van Hoogstraten’s term *verw*, it is clear that in early modern thinking colour almost automatically has a material component and relates closely to the painter’s craftsmanship rather than to his intellectual qualities. A topical remark associates the affective impact of colour with the supposedly alchemical invention of oil paints: Lomazzo, for instance, writes of the use of pigment by North Italian painters, who were the first artists in Italy to adopt the new technique on a large scale, as ‘the alchemy of the Venetian painters’.

The comparison between painting and alchemy thematizes the view that just as alchemical transubstantiation transmutes one material into another, so painting transforms dead pigment into living beings in a virtual reality. This comparison is grounded in the conception of alchemy and painting as two occupations that fall between the ‘liberal’ and the ‘mechanical’ arts since they have an intellectual as well as a material component. The metaphor of colour is a key concept in comparisons between painting and alchemy, such as those that provided Protestant opponents of idolatry with arguments to demonstrate the treachery of painting and the dangers it posed. At the same time, though, the creative labour that pervades the great ‘art-work of Creation’ can also be portrayed positively in these terms. In Sonnet 33, Shakespeare describes how the morning sun gives the different elements of the landscape their colour by an ‘alchemical’ process: ‘Full many a glorious morning have I seen / Flatter the mountain-tops with sovereign eye, / Kissing with golden face the meadows green, / Gilding pale streams with heavenly alchemy’.

The term *colores rhetorici*, or ‘colours of Rhetorike’ as Junius states, referring to the figures of speech with which the orator brings his argument ‘to life’, is understood by some authors in the light of alchemical transubstantiation: with its aid, after all, the rhetorician can
bring about a change in the character of his audience. The metaphor of colour is used in a very literal sense here: when a poet writes about colours, he may at the same time refer to the physical and hence the affective characteristics of the person he is describing, in accordance with the supposed relationship between outward complexion and inner motions of the mind. In poetry, too, colour is more than a metaphor: it is regarded as a means of describing states of mind very directly.

Van Hoogstraten consequently believes that colour has more affective and illusionistic ‘force’ (kracht) than drawing. ‘The bare Drawing ... has nothing like such a motive force as the colours: because only they, through the deceit of a vivid likeness, are able to stir our souls.’ He speaks of ‘colour that most ravishes the eyes’ and describes the power of colour to ‘beguile the ignorant’. Colour does not so much affect the intellect, but works on the emotions (ontroert het gemoed) and it even has a physically healing function: Van Hoogstraten compares colour harmony and harmony in music, and because the sight of colour ‘strengthens and delights’ us, we ‘experience a curious kind of pleasure in seeing the most glittering colours’. Van Mander says: ‘Colour heartens and startles people [...] Colour makes them sad and cheers them up’ and helps to cure melancholy.

At the basis of these traditional views lies the association of specific colours with specific humours, an idea to which Van Hoogstraten may have been inspired by the writings of Agrippa of Nettesheim. He repeats, for instance, Seneca’s view that ‘the colour green refreshes unhealthy eyes’, and associates colours with the ‘temperaments of our bodies’: ‘Red means sanguine, blue choleric, white phlegmatic and black melancholic.’ He also ascribes specific colours to the four elements. Lomazzo draws a very literal conclusion from this notion when he states that certain changes in the constitution of the humours bring about certain colours in the face and in the body. Purportedly, these forces act with particular vehemence on pregnant women, who if they look at one colour too much will give birth to a child that colour. Junius believes that ‘a convenient colour doth pleasingly beguile our phantazie’, and in effect, we should conclude that Van Hoogstraten’s observation that colour ‘charms, indeed bewitches’ can be taken fairly literally.

Van Hoogstraten says that while drawing is the basis of painting, colour is its ‘soul’, in other words, it is what gives the image the suggestion of life. Contrary to the accepted position in the Italian tradition, he thus does not say that the intellectual principle of disegno is superior to sensual colorito. In this paragone he favours colour and brushwork, which he deems able to create a lifelike impression: ‘If Drawing is prized as the body, then Painting must be the mind and soul, like the divine fire that first kindled life in Prometheus’s image’. His emphasis on the persuasive effect of painting leads Van Hoogstraten to regard colour as more essential than drawing: this flies in the face of the Italian tradition, which by and large associates drawing with intellectual ‘form’ and colour with physical ‘matter’.

In line with this view, Van Hoogstraten associates his chapter on colour with the planet Jupiter, the most important deity in the ancient pantheon. Citing Van Mander’s words, he concludes: ‘Drawing is highly placed ... but painting or colouring, which extends to everything, is to be esteemed above it. It is colour that gives true perfection.’ Only colour, after all, is able with its affective powers to summon up another reality before one’s eyes: ‘if the colouring is wrong, even though the strokes and lines might be correct, they do not do what they otherwise
could, that is, show nature accurately and faultlessly, which true Painting in its perfect form boldly promises.\textsuperscript{19} In the \textit{Inleyding} colour is associated with persuasiveness, which is described in the rhetorical sense as ‘naturalness’: it is linked with ‘pure \textit{natueraldikheit}’, to being ‘faithful to nature’, and to working ‘from life’.\textsuperscript{20}

Where ‘natural’ colouring is concerned, Italian art theory reserves a special position for \textit{incarnazione} – incarnadine, or flesh-colour – which is deemed to give the human figure ‘life’. Van Hoogstraten follows this tradition when he states that ‘all the great masters by whom the art of colouring was held in regard, used all their powers to follow nature in this aspect above all: in [painting] nudes and faces.’\textsuperscript{21} To his mind, the flesh-colour must first and foremost be ‘natural’: the association with the ‘thousand variables’ of nature dictates the degree of difficulty of depicting the skin.\textsuperscript{22} The etymology of the word \textit{incarnazione} has been studied in the context of Cennini’s theory of art: without drawing conclusions about the theological meaning of the Word’s ‘becoming flesh’, it is not going too far to say that in Cennini’s \textit{Libro dell’arte} (c. 1390) incarnadine does involve a sort of incarnation of the paint.\textsuperscript{23} Van Hoogstraten’s comparison of colour to the ‘divine fire’ that gave life to the first man is certainly in line with this idea. Here again, we encounter an ancient commonplace: the terminology relating to the rendition of the skin plays a similar role in literary theory: only ‘blood, colour and flesh’ can make a style of writing or speaking natural and lifelike, as Lipsius puts it.\textsuperscript{24} A striking variant on this metaphor of transubstantiation is expressed by Jean Puget de la Serre, a prolific French author whose work is quoted in the \textit{Inleyding}. In his view, not only may paint be transformed into flesh, but also flesh into paint. He has little good to say about pictures at all and considers only the \textit{Imitatio Christi} as a laudable form of imitation, concluding that in this form of imitation the nails in the Cross are his brushes, and Christ’s blood serves as his paint.\textsuperscript{25} These examples may illustrate the theologically controversial connotations of the terminology surrounding incarnadine; they are probably of significance in the historical development of the use of the oil medium: when this technique was first introduced it was used exclusively on areas other than the skin. Human flesh was doubtless regarded as the hardest and most essential part of the painting and one that could not, in the first instance, be contaminated by the dangerous allure of the new and powerful medium. Technology remained subordinate to theology until the properties of the new material were more generally understood; eventually, in a remarkable reversal of values, oil became the pre-eminent means of depicting the human form.\textsuperscript{26}

Van Hoogstraten associates the use of incarnadine with his teacher, Rembrandt, ‘who holds this part of art in admirably high esteem’.\textsuperscript{27} In the tradition of art theory it is above all Titian to whom this same praise goes; De Piles compares Rembrandt to Titian because of their comparable skills in rendering convincing \textit{carnations}.\textsuperscript{28} Indeed, Dolce writes that Titian achieved greater perfection in flesh tones than the painters of antiquity; allegedly, this was the result of his faithful adherence to nature: ‘he moves in parallel with Nature, so that all his figures are alive, move, and the flesh appears to pulsate (le carni tremano)’.\textsuperscript{29} Accordingly, Dolce describes ‘a flesh-colour so true to life that it appears living, not painted’ by Titian, and he repeats Pordenone’s remark that ‘Titian used flesh instead of paint in that nude’: in other words, Titian’s powers of persuasion were such that paint had been ‘transubstantiated’ into flesh.\textsuperscript{30} Van Hoogstraten concurs with these ideas when he praises Titian as ‘such a man, who had given himself over wholly to nature, so as to imitate nature punctiliously with brush and
and observes in similar terms to Dolce that the skilled artist ‘mixes the colours such that they appear flesh’. The identification of paint (pittura or colori) and flesh (carne) that is said to occur in Titian’s art is particularly relevant to his painting The Flaying of Marsyas, now in Kroměříž, in which the satyr’s flayed skin is rendered in a characteristic ‘rough’ manner so that brushstrokes and paint layer are still recognizable as such (fig. 91). A similar identification of the ‘skin’ of the paint surface with human skin is also part of Rembrandt’s workshop practice and probably an important motivation for the brushwork in his late self-portraits, where the pores of the skin are ‘repeated’ in the porous texture of the paint layer, as Ernst van de Wetering pointed out.

To the painter, of course, living, naked flesh was deemed to represent a source of sensory allure and deception, and it was presented as one of the greatest hazards from which aspiring young artists had to be protected during their studies. Van Mander links ‘the power of Colours’ directly to the fatal charm of women’s ‘mouths, cheeks and lovely eyes’. The deception inherent in these enticements is revealed in the realization that the human body is ultimately no more than the vain and transient ‘outward appearance’ of things, in contrast to the enduring ‘inner being’, the immortal soul. Camphuysen warns painters: ‘You paint the body, but not the body’s eternity; / Nor distinguish the strident sound of the last trump [at the Resurrection], nor the spirit.’ We will return to the idea that painting is a pre-eminently vain art, which exposes the superficiality of the visible world, in chapter VI.

**The Cosmetics of Colour**

Van Hoogstraten stresses not just the affective but also the deceptive properties of colour. He associates colour with ‘ravishing the eyes’ and recounts several anecdotes about viewers who were ‘deceived’ by colour. This equivocal view of colour, as the ‘soul’ of painting on the one hand and as a medium for deceit on the other, is reflected in the term verzierlijk. This is Van Hoogstraten’s adaptation of the Latin ornatus which means ‘ornate’ (when used as an adjective) or ‘ornamentation, embellishment’ (when used as a noun). He deploys the term as an epithet for his teacher: ‘the verzierlijken Rembrandt, my second Master after the death of my Father Dirk’. The verb versieren – embellish, decorate, adorn – and derivatives of it also occur repeatedly in Van Mander’s Schilder-boeck. In the past Van Hoogstraten’s phrase has been construed as a reference to Rembrandt’s skill in inventing narrative scenes; in what follows I shall propose another interpretation, one that ties in with Van Hoogstraten’s approbatory remarks about Rembrandt’s abilities as a colourist.

When the term ornatus is used in art theory, it appears as the opposite of beauty. Beauty is seen as a property of the object, be it in the visible world or as a product of the imagination, which the painter depicts. Ornatus, in contrast, is an added value that the painter only achieves in the ‘handling’ stage, or the rhetorical actio. Indeed, art theory appears to borrow from rhetorical theory where it regards ornatus as one of the most important ‘virtues of speech’ (or virtutes dicendi).

The ancient rhetoricians use ornatus to refer to the colores rhetorici or ‘rhetorical colours’, the figures of speech with which the speaker makes his argument more persuasive. They stress that figures of speech must be used with moderation, in such a way that the artifice remains concealed: rhetorical theory makes a literal comparison with the pigments and colours used in make-up.
Cicero states that oratory is able to imitate the ‘brightness’ (lumen) of life itself by means of ‘colours’ or figures of speech, which ‘makes it possible in the highest degree to mark out and illuminate what we are saying with stars of light’. This question of ‘throwing light on’ an argument is, he argues, closely bound up with the orator’s ability to ‘summon things up before the eyes’ and to speak so evocatively that the audience believes they are actually present at the event. In this context ornatus is one of the orator’s most important virtues, which he uses to bring his argument to life.

A similar creative or magical significance surrounds the etymology of the Greek word cosmos, which literally means ornament: it refers to the notion that the Creator ‘embellished’ his Creation with colour, light and other ornaments. Junius begins his treatise with a reference to this cosmological ornament: ‘The good and great maker of this Universe created the world after so glorious and beautifull a manner that the Greekes together with the Romanes, a consent also of the Nations perswading them thereunto, have called it by the name of an Ornament.’ In the Latin original Junius links the Greek term kosmos with the Latin ornamentum. The commonplace given such a prominent place by Junius is echoed in Van Hoogstraten’s assertion that ‘nature paints and ornaments birds and sea creatures’ with colour (italics mine).

Similarly, Lomazzo associates ‘cosmic’ ornament and colour when he writes about ‘the painting with which God Almighty ... decorated and embellished the universe ... by giving the heavens and the stars colour.’ Ornatus is apparently interpreted as a cosmological quality of the visible world.

In art theory, ornatus and its Dutch equivalents like verziering and opsmuk are associated with colour, as the added embellishment of the foundation laid down by drawing. Junius refers to veruw-cieraten, ‘colouristic ornaments’, with which the painter can portray human emotions: ‘coloured pictures for all that, as they shew a more lively force in the severall ef-
fects and properties of life and spirit, so doe they most commonly ravish our sight with the bewitching pleasure of delightsome and stately ornaments.\textsuperscript{51} Van Hoogstraten makes a clear distinction between the successful rendition of flesh-tones that derives its success from its ‘naturalness’, and the recognizably artificial ‘cosmetic’: “The nature of soft-fleshed paint is so appealing that no make-up can come near.”\textsuperscript{52} Van Mander, who also uses the term \textit{versieren} in connection with colour,\textsuperscript{53} conceives the metaphor so literally that in his chapter on colour he treats the depiction of jewellery (\textit{sieraden}, a word that has the same root as \textit{versieren}).\textsuperscript{54}

The most literal equation of painterly colouring and the colours used in cosmetics is given by Dolce, who urges artists to make their colour natural with a reference to Propertius’s criticism of his sweetheart’s only too obvious make-up.\textsuperscript{55} He consequently observes, continuing the passage cited above about Titian’s perfect use of colour, that this painter never allowed his colour to descend into ‘artificial’ ornament (\textit{ornamenti affettati}), but focused with ‘masterly consistency’ on ‘the warm softness and delicacy of Nature’: Dolce concludes that in Titian’s work ‘light and shade always perform harmoniously and become softer and diminish in the same way as this happens in Nature herself’.\textsuperscript{56} Lomazzo likewise warns that male figures must be portrayed without too much ornament, although he uses the term \textit{ornatus} in a positive sense for Titian’s female figures.\textsuperscript{57} It is interesting to note that the Dutch artist Lucas van Leyden appears in the index to the \textit{Trattato} as \textit{Luca d’Olanda ornato pittore}; he is the only artist Lomazzo commends with the adjective ‘ornate’ in the index.\textsuperscript{58} Lucas was Rembrandt’s chief role model during his years in Leiden; we can only speculate about a connection between Lomazzo’s characterization of this master’s work and Van Hoogstraten’s usage of \textit{verzierlijk} for Rembrandt.

In art theory, the term ornament is connected with a gender-related vocabulary that contrasts ‘subjective’ grace with the supposedly ‘objective’ quality of beauty. Traditionally, the stylistic virtue of \textit{gratia} is associated with the assumed seductive character of painting. Grace is described as a ‘feminine’ kind of attractiveness which has a treacherous character that shows only on the outside, whereas ‘masculine’ beauty is said to arise out of physical health and good proportions and is consequently seen as more essential. Aversion to cosmetic, superficial, feminine charm is, indeed, a Stoic theme; Seneca illustrates this with the down-to-earth maxim that ‘golden reins do not make a better horse’.\textsuperscript{59} In this context, Junius contrasts masculine \textit{ornatus} with effeminate \textit{fucus}: ‘The dignitie belonging to a man must be stout and uncorrupted; it cannot abide an effeminate smoothnesse, nor such a colour as is procured by choice painting; seeing bloud and strength must make it goodly and faire’.\textsuperscript{60} Likewise, Van Hoogstraten describes a portrait of Helen of Troy, the most beautiful of women, by a pupil of Apelles who did not have his master’s sense of moderation, robbing her of her natural beauty by a superfluity of outward ornament.\textsuperscript{61} Goeree directly associates \textit{verciersel} with deception: beauty, he says, must be simple, and so much true to itself ‘that it is not easily achieved by a cosmetic embellishment’; ornament can only be an effective ‘bewitchment of the eyes’ where it acts as ‘a wise and well used Adornment’.\textsuperscript{62} He refers for confirmation of this view to Cicero’s opinion that ‘feminine beauty’ consists in women’s ability to suggest that ‘they are pleasing in the eyes of Men because of it; and spur them to caresses’. This view of the affective power of a woman’s physical grace was supposedly why, in antiquity, it was regarded as ‘less of an offence to have abused a Beautiful woman than an Ugly one’.\textsuperscript{63}

In conclusion, we can observe that \textit{ornatus} is a key term for authors who emphasize the
deceptive nature of painting itself, whose allure they equate with that of feminine charm. De Brune, for instance, compares the deceit of women who adorn themselves with cosmetics to that of a painting: these ladies ‘are nothing but paintings, made to deceive the eyes’. Shakespeare similarly compares the ‘mystery’ of painting with the concealing make-up of prostitutes. Ornat us, closely associated with grace, presents a subjective illusion: it is what has to persuade the beholder of an impression of the attractiveness of things: ‘to persuade our souls in regarding them, such that one truly greets them as beautiful’, as Goeree puts it. He explains how grace affects the passions: ‘the efforts of our heart [are] as it were drawn to it’. According to this idea, grace is a rhetorical effect that derives not from innate physical proportions but ‘from a sweet and charming gesture or motion of the Eyes, Mouth and Hands that expressly accompanies the caressing tones of the tongue’.

**Ornatus and chiaroscuro**

This broad lexical analysis of colouristic ornament clarifies Van Hoogstraten’s use of the epithet verzierlijk to describe his master, Rembrandt. It embraces an associative, but lexically very rich combination of a well-considered use of strong colour (the colores rhetorici) and chiaroscuro (lumen), which do not exceed the norms of nature. Although colouring relates to outward appearance and a beautiful semblance, Rembrandt’s work does not create an impression of artifice, but entices viewers to enter a virtual reality. Van Hoogstraten speaks with particular approbation of Rembrandt’s use of colour, particularly as far as flesh tones are concerned, and his skill in capturing reflected light – his ‘true element’ – and in the ‘arrangement of shadows and lights’.

Vondel, too, probably makes the connection between ornatus and Rembrandt’s chiaroscuro in his poetry. In a passage that Seymour Slive believed applies to Rembrandt, Vondel describes painters who, as ‘sons of darkness’, prefer ‘ornamented shadow’ (versierde schaduw).

Van Hoogstraten’s well-known observations about Rembrandt’s skill in tonal composition require some elaboration. Chiaroscuro cannot automatically be isolated as a separate quality within his theory. In early modern art theory there is usually no systematic distinction between contrasts in tone and colour, and chiaroscuro is seldom regarded as a virtus pingendi in its own right, but rather as part of the concept of colorito. What does get a separate chapter to itself in Van Hoogstraten is the use of light. This seventh chapter is dedicated to Melpomene, whom he calls the tragic Muse; this would seem to accord proficiency in rendering light and shade a substantial role in a painter’s power to bring about a change – as the tragic poets do – in the public’s character. The position of this chapter in the Inleyding, treating light as the most important ‘part of painting’ before the umbrella concept of ‘grace’ is discussed, is revealing in this respect. More explicitly than Van Hoogstraten, Angel defines chiaroscuro as a means of touching the viewer emotionally and by means of this supposedly magic ‘power’ transporting him into a virtual reality: ‘for shadows being brought together in their proper place have such enchanting power ... that [they] make many things, which can scarcely be imitated with Brushes and paints, appear to be very real’. In this respect chiaroscuro may even have greater affective powers than colour, as De Piles’s words reveal: ‘A picture whose composition and local colours are mediocre, but enhanced by the device of chiaroscuro, will not let the viewer pass by quietly; it will call to him and make him stop for a moment at least.’
Lomazzo is very eloquent on the subject of the particular affective function of light and shade. He may have based what he writes on Agrrippa’s theories as to the way occult forces ‘act at a distance’. Lomazzo refers in this respect to Titian’s ‘awesome and acute’ light and tells us that light has a ‘healthy’ effect. The influences on the mind that light is deemed to effect stem from its alleged divine origin: visible light is interpreted as the most direct earthly manifestation of God’s presence. On a more metaphorical level, it is related to the ideas in the mind of God that ‘enlighten’ man’s understanding of the world. The divine light, says Lomazzo, reveals itself to mankind ‘through the light of the active intellect’. In an Aristotelian formulation, he posits that light lends actuality to the potential: for instance, light gives things their colour and the associated properties that can have a beneficial effect on people (una certa virtú beneficia e generante). If, on the other hand, the light cannot reach objects, the resulting darkness will be a mental torment because things are not seen in their full essence. All things, he says, are positively ‘activated’ by light, which gives them ‘life’ with its warmth (col vivifico calor suo).

In this context, the doctrine of similitudo that links aspects from the material world to aspects from the immaterial world in a ‘chain of being’ would mean that the beneficial properties of the divine light are directly comparable to the heat of a fire, which is the earthly ‘likeness’ of the divine light; indeed, Lomazzo compares the tonal values that the painter uses to make his figures lifelike to ‘the heat of a fire that does not burn, but illuminates and enlivens everything with its warmth’.

Interestingly, Lomazzo prizes Netherlandish painters in particular for their skill in representing light, especially in their rendition of flesh colour: the ‘ornate’ Lucas van Leiden, Jan van Scorel, Geerten Gossaert and Joachim Patinir, ‘painters who have always followed nature with order in this regard (accostandosi sempre con ordine al naturale delle cose)’. Lomazzo describes the practice of painting a reflection of a collar on the jaw in portraits, which is very common in Dutch art; his attention to such details raises the question as to how great an influence his Trattato might have had on the Dutch theorists from Van Mander onwards who were interested in lighting and reflection, an influence that may have been exerted indirectly or by word of mouth.

Van Hoogstraten uses the term kracht – force – for the overall effect of colour and tone. This is an equivalent of the Italian word forza, which Zuccari reserves for ‘colouring and working with light and shade … that lends figures such spirit and vitality that it makes them appear living and true (il colorire, ombreggiare e lumeggiare … che dà talora alle figure tale spirito e tal vivezza, che le fa apparire vive e vero)’. Van Hoogstraten describes Rembrandt’s Night Watch in an exemplary way, as ‘so forceful that, so some believe, all the other works appear as playing cards beside it’; in other words, the rest of the paintings in the Stadsdoelen are just of so many schematic puppets, whereas Rembrandt is able to give his figures life (fig. 92). This term runs parallel to the praise bestowed on Rembrandt by other authors; De Lairesse points to the popularity of Rembrandt, an artist he commends ‘in regard to both his naturalness and his force of projection [that is, the ability to bring things forward out of the picture plane]’. Some people might therefore wonder: ‘was there ever a Painter who came so close to nature in the force of colour (kracht van coloriet), by his fine light … And is this not enough to entice the whole world?’ Like the orator’s vis verborum, the magical power to convince his auditors, Rembrandt’s ‘force of colour’ succeeds in transporting viewers into a virtual reality, which is the first task for an artist who wishes to fulfil an ethical function.
‘ROUGH’ VERSUS ‘FINE’ BRUSHWORK

The lexical scope of the term *colore*, used to refer to colour as an optical quality as well as to pigment and its binding medium, means that the discussion about the merits of *disegno* and *colorito* has an impact on the debate as to whether or not the brushstroke should be left visible.  

This is a recurrent theme in Dutch art theory. Contemporary authors use the terms *net* or *fijn* – ‘smooth’ or ‘fine’ versus *ruw* or *los* – ‘rough’ or ‘loose’. ‘Loose’ painting relates primarily to the swift, visible brushstroke, and ‘rough’ painting to the use of variations in the thickness of the paint layer as an illusionistic device, as practised first and foremost by Rembrandt.  

The distinction between ‘rough’ and ‘fine’ derives in essence from a line of verse by Horace, which Van Hoogstraten quotes: ‘You may look at this Painting from close by: / And the other has a more pleasing appearance from further away’.  

De Lairesse also discusses the two manners, actually beginning his treatise with the observation: ‘The Handling of the Brush is of two kinds, very different from each other, for the one is fluid, and tender or smooth; the second is robust and quick, or bold.  

The preference for one kind of brushwork or the other is one of the principal points in Dutch artistic theory on which there can be said to be a clear debate. Rembrandt’s manner, where the brushstroke is often visible and the very surface structure of the paint is used to illusory effect, raised the most questions for his contemporaries – and for modern art historians too. Another discussion in the same context revolved around the virtues of the ‘smooth’ painting style of the so-called Leiden ‘fine painters’ (*fijnschilders*), the followers of Gerard Dou, whom Van Hoogstraten fiercely criticizes at several points in his treatise.  

He regards the art of his country that produces this ‘unnecessarily finicking work’ as highly objectionable (although the work of Dou himself appears to be an exception). He criticizes painters who finish their works with ‘a smooth stiffness, or precise finickiness’ that only pleases ‘mindless’ art lovers. Van Hoogstraten even reckons a successful artist like Gerard van Honthorst to be one of those painters who are ‘lulled to sleep’ by the money they make working with a ‘stiff smoothness’. As the contrasting example of a ‘loose brush’, Van Hoogstraten here commends not his teacher, Rembrandt, but Peter Lely. In this context, we may recall the observation that Van Hoogstraten’s theoretical preferences are not reflected in his own practice: from the moment he left Rembrandt’s studio we know of no surviving works in which he manifestly chose to paint in the ‘rough’ manner.  

His treatise should therefore be read more as a reworking of literary topoi than as an account of his own studio practices. As we shall see, Titian’s reputation was important in this regard and probably lured authors like De Lairesse and De Piles into making their definite pronouncements about Rembrandt.

Emmens pointed out that the roots of the opinions of the two ‘manners’ can be traced back to rhetorical theory, which makes a distinction between an ‘Attic’ and an ‘Asiatic’ style.  

As we shall see, the appreciation of ‘rough brushwork’ in art theory can be understood more clearly in the light of the theory of rhetorical persuasion, in which a preference for an absence of artifice and an ethos of naturalness are important factors. Responding to similar rhetorical notions, early modern art theory posits the existence of a close relationship between the artist’s inner character traits and the way they manifest themselves on the surface of his work. In Van Hoogstraten’s view of ‘rough brushwork’ we can identify four elements, all of them bearing on rhetorical persuasion: they are virtuality, rhetorical *brevitas*, performativity and complementarity.
**Virtuality**

Most of the early modern treatises of painting describe leaving the brushstroke visible as an artistic device that serves to bring about greater persuasiveness. This supposition may be explained in the light of the effect described in the previous chapter, whereby the viewer conjures up a scene in his mind’s eye and experiences the image as a sort of snapshot, without paying heed to the craftsmanship that underlies the work of art. As Huygens remarks about Rembrandt’s working methods, what matters is to produce an overall effect in which everything is reduced to a single key moment (*compendio effectum dare*). The importance of the ‘rough’ manner can be argued on the basis of the theory concerning the evocation of an effect of sudden lifelikeness; when the painting is looked at in more detail, after all, the brushstroke will appear to be recognizable as such.

Van Hoogstraten describes the ‘loose manner’ in terms of a broad, visible brushstroke, where the artist mixes the paint on the canvas, not the palette, and in many cases even leaves it unmixed so that optical mixing can occur: ‘Then take with liberty brushes, so many as can be held in one hand, and let each stroke be single, leaving the colours almost unmixed in many places; for the distance and the thickness of the air will cause many things, that are in reality not assimilated, to seem to blend’. He also asserts that, using this rapid technique, a couple of small but judiciously placed brushstrokes will suggest an outline and do away with the need to draw contours completely: ‘it is also not always necessary to indicate the outside by means of a contour; for sometimes a few strokes apart from one another can depict this much more substantially’. He urges artists not to concern themselves too much with small details of shadows that will only be evident ‘from nearby’, for they will run the risk of lapsing into ‘the fiddling of smooth gradual diminution’ in which urgency and lifelikeness are lost. In his view, the rough manner gives a ‘playful movement of the brush, without ever causing colours to melt into each other or to gradually diminish’. Making areas of colour merge into one another, in contrast, leads to ‘a dreamy stiffness’ that suggests not life but a sort of half-sleep. The effect of subtle transitions of shade and colour can also be achieved with a ‘full brush’; in other words a swift manner with broad strokes, trusting to the eventual optical mixing, as Jordaens and Titian were said to have done: ‘It is better to seek smoothness with a full brush and, as Jordaens used to say, to slather away lustily, paying little heed to blending things smoothly.’

Here rhetorical theory, which holds that greater simplicity has greater powers of persuasion, is in accord with artistic practice. The rough manner may leave some areas of the painting less finished than others: this is a response to the fact that human vision does not see everything with the same sharpness: it focuses on points that attract the attention. Van Hoogstraten describes this effect: ‘in the same way that a man, catching sight of his friend from a distance or meeting him in twilight, straight away sees his appearance in his mind and recognizes him, so a rough sketch can often create such a great impression on beholders that they can see more in it than is actually there.’ The result of leaving the work partially unfinished is that the viewer experiences a psychological reaction, filling in the missing pieces in his mind. This phenomenon, known nowadays as the ‘reparative impulse’, may add to the painting’s ‘recreative’ effect of diverting the mind and also provokes a form of interaction between the viewer and the painting so that the viewer’s belief that he is being confronted with a virtual reality is reinforced – he is now, after all, taking an active part in this reality. In view of this appreciation
of the beholder’s share, Junius mentions the high regard in which unfinished work was held in antiquity, and we find this same regard in Van Hoogstraten. Junius describes a similar method of not drawing complete outlines, but only suggesting them; when the viewer can ‘understand them with the mind, rather than distinguish them with the eyes’ he becomes more closely involved with the artistic illusion.\(^\text{96}\)

**Brevitas**

Rhetorical theory provides both a clarification of the effect of the rough manner and a legitimation, grounded in tradition, for painting in this way. The rough manner was thought to satisfy a preference for the minimum of stylistic and illusional devices that would, in a ‘golden age’ or *aetas aurea*, have been enough to guarantee maximum success. Junius stresses that over the centuries a misplaced quest for emulation led to increasingly more useless ‘ornament’, an excess of gilding and artificial, cosmetic additions.\(^\text{97}\) Rhetorical theory uses the concept of *brevitas*, brevity, in this context.\(^\text{98}\) This denotes something different from mere stylistic purity, *puritas*, one of the ‘virtues of speech’ along with perspicuity, decorum and ornament; purity is reserved for an unequivocal style of speaking. Brevity, in contrast, is something of a problematic quality that runs the risk of lapsing into *obscuritas*, a text’s lack of clarity when it provides too little information. Brevity serves emphasis: saying a great deal in a few words.\(^\text{99}\) The concept marks a text as being intended for a limited readership.\(^\text{100}\)

Where *brevitas* is concerned, the classical theory of rhetoric holds that the orator should not use too many figures of speech, particularly those that are too far-fetched and too obviously recognizable as such. The particular danger of important elements like copiousness and ornamentation is that, if they are overused, they can destroy the impression of lifelikeness. Borrowing from this rhetorical theory, Van Mander says that good artists ‘Avoid abundance or Copia, / and give pleasure in doing just a few things, but doing them well’;\(^\text{102}\) and he observes that kings generally need fewer words than lawyers: a single word is sufficient to settle an argument if it is spoken with the necessary authority.

In rhetorical theory this warning is grounded in the ideology of ‘following nature’ and the aversion to artifice: it is only when he manages to convince his audience that he is wholly himself, that the *vir bonus dicendi peritus* can deliver an effective argument. This suggestion of naturalness alone enables the orator to win his audience over on the assumption that they share the same set of ethical ideas with him.\(^\text{101}\) Van Hoogstraten’s ideas on brushwork can be explained in the light of this impression of sincerity; he states, for instance, that ‘an artist’s brush must always be honest, and never false, in order to properly express virtue and truth’.\(^\text{104}\)

At stake here is the performative premise that the artist ‘is what he makes’. This may be explained by pointing out how, in his autobiography, Huygens commends a number of painters and a number of preachers in surprisingly similar terms. The autobiography propagates a general preference for *natura* as against *ars*. Huygens praises Rembrandt and Lievens, and a scholar like Cornelis Drebbel, for their humble origins; he even goes so far as to say that the two artists did not need any training, and that only the most common people knew the names
of their teachers. Elaborating on this notion, he attacks school rhetoric and handbooks with rules for speaking. To his mind, the best examples of orators are the preachers John Donne and Johannes Uytenbogaert: they ‘seem to have been born with rhetoric’ (cum eloquentia nati videbantur); they are ‘true to themselves’ (sui similis) and the further they are removed from artifice, the more strongly they are able to persuade (quo ab affectatione remotiores essent, efficacius persuadebant). Huygens illustrates the paradoxical rhetorical preference for unpractised oratory with Tacitus’s observation that Drusus Tiberius ‘although inexperienced in speaking, had a noble character’. As we can see from Huygens’s opinion of Van Mierevelt, whom he praises for his naturalness in both painting and speaking, this is of course professed artlessness: Van Mierevelt ‘deliberately hides behind a mask of ignorance and in so doing makes it very difficult for experts’.

This emphasis on ingenium above ars is the central object of discussion in Juan Huarte’s Examen des ingenios para las sciencias, a text translated into Dutch in 1659 and quoted in the Inleyding. This author asserts that rhetoric – that is to say, rhetoric that is recognizable as such – is distasteful to right-minded people: ‘the putting together of pure and smooth words is not to be found in men of great understanding’. In this context, Huarte compares Socrates’ awkward, un rhetorical manner of speaking to a ‘roughly’ (rou) painted picture that in fact conceals true wisdom and ‘excellent work and painting’. ‘Rough’ painting, he asserts, is a sort of captatio benevolentiae: the seeming absence of a sophisticated style wins the audience over to the painter or orator. Aristotle, for instance, was said to have deliberately written in ‘an obscure, rough style (rouwen stil) [...] to ensure that his works would be held in greater respect’. He wrote ‘thus ponderously and carelessly, without including any embellishment of his words, or any fine manner of speaking’. Plato, too, supposedly used a ‘hard and rough style’, a model of brevitas that even descends into obscuritas: Huarte refers to ‘the brevity into which he compresses his works, the obscurity of his reasoning’. As a prime example of the paradox of ‘unrhetorical rhetoric’ Huarte cites St Paul, whose lack of education enabled him to speak with great persuasive force, despite the fact that ‘his innate ability was not trained sufficiently to learn foreign languages, and to express them with perfect and refined polish (netticheydt), and add all the necessary ornaments’. For a direct analogy in the context of the art of painting itself, we may point to the ‘handling’ in Rembrandt’s Self-portrait as St Paul (1661, Rijksmuseum): here, the artist consciously sought a ‘rough style’ (the paint has been applied very thickly indeed in the Apostle’s hat) in contrast to ‘refined netticheydt’, perhaps to harmonize form and content and ally them to the reputed oratorical style of the subject (fig. 93). Agrippa, whom we discussed in the previous chapter, writes as Huarte does about the deceptiveness of both painting and rhetoric. He warns against the affective powers of ‘deceptive probability’, the ‘finery’ and ‘strumpet’s cosmetics’ of ornatus, which, he says, acts on ‘the minds of the unthinking’, who are ‘deceived’. He declares that the ‘unpolished’ argument is more persuasive: ‘lies are couched in embellished words, so that they can command people’s minds, but the speech of Truth ... is simple, bearing no traces of adornment or semblance’. He repeats the words of Theophrastus who supposedly said ‘the rough may speak with all the most eminent and eloquent men, provided they speak with authority and reason’.

More general aspects of pictorial style are also associated with the idea that the rhetorical artifice has to be concealed behind the appearance of roughness. In this context, for instance,
Paleotti recommends artists not to idealize their models, ‘obeying the maxim of the historian, who recounts the fact as it was, and not that of the orator, who often makes things appear more beautiful or exaggerates’. He thinks that the painter should not yield to cosmetics in the way they are used by women ‘who wish to be portrayed with a painted face ... and alas believe that by this means they become more beautiful, which is ridiculous’. Even ‘if there are defects, inborn or caused by accident, that have seriously deformed the face’, the painter must depict them for the sake of persuasiveness. Like his Italian predecessor, Van Hoogstraten expresses...
his dislike of an excess of ornament in a comparison with the cosmetics used by ‘damsels': artificial ornament actually causes them ‘to lose that which they seek with such fervent desire’. He states that there can actually be a ‘forced looseness (losticbeyt)’ in outward appearance, ‘this all too forced casualness’ that provokes disgust ‘because we see that everything is artificial’. Contrast this with pure ornatus, which wins over the beholder: ‘the simple adornment, which gives joy to the heart’.

Van Hoogstraten asks: ‘What adorns pale Amaril? ... the gleaming forehead varnished? / Or red paint on her cheeks?’ Make-up is obviously a waste of effort – the natural affective power of the eyes has a greater effect: ‘her demure eyes set the heart afire’. Junius, too, speaks of the problematic character of artistic ornatus, warning the artist that it is ‘for the most part better to decke his worke in a rug [rough] gowne, than to adorne it with strumpet-like ornaments.’ From this rhetorical position, Junius likewise criticizes a ‘neat’ or ‘fine’ manner; the artist must take care that when ‘he hiteth the maine and weightiest points of art aright, in making of an entire body, the same needs not trouble himselfe much about the neatnesse of some little haires, and of the uttermost ends of the nailes.’ This ‘neatnesse’ loses its persuasive power because of an excess of artifice.

**Performativity**

The terminology with which brushwork is described as ‘handling’ needs some explanation. Dutch handeling has a wider meaning than English ‘handling’: it also signifies ‘act’ or ‘action’, as in the various acts (handelingen) of a play. The lexical field covered by handeling clarifies the early modern conception of painting itself as an ‘act’ in which paint is transformed into a virtual reality. In this regard painting is a performative art, like the theatre and rhetoric: in these arts ‘words are transformed into deeds’ in the sense that linguistic concepts are converted into an emotional argument that ought to change the audience affectively. Dutch rhetorical theory, as developed most authoritatively by Vossius, uses the term handeling or actio to describe the orator’s ability to involve his audience in his argument, appealing to mind and body and all five senses. In the moment of actio his words become virtual reality, just as the actor becomes his character. This assumption is a recurring topos in the poetic tradition: Lipsius, for instance, remarked in a letter, ‘fundo, non scribo’ (‘I pour my heart out, I do not write’).

According to the parallel between painterly handeling and rhetorical actio, the ‘rough’ manner enables the painter to demonstrate performatively that he ‘is’ what he ‘makes’. These ideas about the artist’s relationship to his work are influenced by the notion as expressed by Van Hoogstraten that, as his ‘children’, an artist’s works reflect his personality traits and physical characteristics, and that a painter’s biography and work are inextricably linked (see above, pages 145, 146, 179). ‘Handling’ is an altera natura that is rooted not just in the artist’s mind, but in his body.

In Van Hoogstraten’s words one ‘should not seek to obtain a specific handling, just naturalness’. This is why Cornelis Ketel can paint with his fingers and feet, ‘to demonstrate that the master, not the brush, is the Painter’, an anecdote that Van Hoogstraten evidently regarded as important since he depicted Ketel on the title page of the chapter devoted to colour (fig. 94). Junius’s remark that the artist must follow nature such ‘that in the true and just simplic-
ity of his works one believes one sees not Art but nature itself must presumably be conceived in the same way. Here Van Hoogstraten disagrees wholly with the historian Pieter Cornelisz Hooft’s statement that an artist can use three stylistic modi, a ‘gold, a silver and a copper brush’: he believes that painters must always focus on nature.

In his theory, the choice of the rough or the fine manner is essentially a function of the artist’s character: the rough manner signifies an ‘alert’ nature, whereas working in a style characterized by ‘stiff smoothness’ is a side-effect of the sleepiness that comes with a lack of creative urge. The artist, like the orator, is adjured to maintain the pace and ‘heat’ of the imaginatio that has been set in motion, and not to spend too long on one work. Van Hoogstraten repeats the traditional assessment of Homer’s style, which is described in rhetorical theory as ‘rough’: he praises it because ‘one could see that [his works] were made lightly and without great toil’, and contrasts it with the works of Antimachus, which show evidence of having been created ‘in a dejected way and with much racking of brains’. While the speed and alertness that come with inspired frenzy may lead to highly successful art, the melancholy into which the artistic temperament can all too rapidly descend after a burst of furor poeticus is capable of ruining a work.
This theoretical emphasis on performativity calls to mind an expression in the courtiers’ literature, in which *handeling* is essentially identified with the painter’s trademark (in Dutch: *handelsmerk*). It occurs in a work by the Spanish Jesuit Balthasar Gracián, whose *Arte de prudencia* (*The Art of Worldly Wisdom*) of 1647 was translated into Dutch and widely read in the Netherlands; it is quoted, for instance, by Houbraken. Developing his views about outward appearance, Gracián concludes among other things that what matters is not what one does but how much fame one can achieve by doing it. It therefore makes sense to look for a ‘gap in the market’, for example by finding an idiosyncratic ‘handling’. This is how the classical authors set about things: Horace left the epic to Virgil, Martial left the lyric to Horace, and so on:

‘They were all out to be the first in their genre. Talent is able to disregard not art, but the mediocre, and to find in old art a new way to greatness ... An ingenious painter saw that Titian and Raphael had gone before him. Their fame was all the more alive because they were dead. ... He started to paint with rough brushstrokes (*pintar a lo valentón*). People asked him why he did not paint in a smooth and polished manner (*a lo suave y pulido*) so that he could emulate Titian, and he wittily replied that he would rather be first in roughness than second in delicacy (*que quería más ser primero en aquella grosería que segundo en la delicadeza*).’

In contemporary painting treatises this identification of handling and trademark is particularly evident in the reception of Rembrandt, as we have seen in De Piles’s view that ‘each Brushstroke … makes one admire the truth of his Genius’. Houbraken tells us that Frans Hals laid in his portraits ‘thickly and impasted’, and then added the final touches with the words ‘now we must put in the master’s touch’. He also stresses that Rembrandt’s idiosyncratic manner, which, indeed, he does not fully endorse, was a deliberate choice inspired by the artist’s wish to be different from the great Italian masters.

Stylistic roughness – Gracián’s *grosería* – was an appropriate means not only of giving a painter an identifiable trademark but also of enabling him to present himself as a ‘rhetorical’ artist, aware of the performative aspect of art. It also let a painter compare himself with classical artists who purportedly suffered so severely from artistic *furor* that they never finished a work, leaving all they did in a ‘rough’ state. Lomazzo, for instance, describes artists ‘who derive such extreme delight from invention that they do not have the patience to finish any work they begin’. Van Hoogstraten argues that some paintings by Protogenes ‘were marred by their neatness’, and concludes: ‘I believe that one drives the grace out of one’s work if one paints over it too often’. The notion of performativity also determines the theory about a related aspect of handling: the work itself may reveal the way it was made. The rough manner, after all, leaves the movements of the hand visible – at least to some extent. That seventeenth-century viewers appreciated the recognition of these movements is illustrated by Junius’s conclusion that art lovers often take greater pleasure in seeing the sketching process than in the end result; he explains this by citing the Senecan view ‘that it is a greater pleasure for Artists to work than to have wrought’.
Complementarity

The most explicit appreciation of the ‘rough’ manner in Dutch art literature is found in Van Mander’s admiration – based on Vasari’s opinion – for Titian’s ‘handling’, which was simply chaos when viewed from close up, but highly suggestive (levendich) from the right distance: ‘lastly [Titian] made his things with bold brushstrokes and patches, so that they were not perfect from nearby, but were highly effective (goeden welstandt hadde) seen from afar’. In the Grondt Van Mander says that Titian’s method ‘with patches and rough strokes’ only evokes the right effect of ‘naturalness’ when one ‘was at some distance ... away ... from it’. Van Mander expresses a degree of regard for this approach in which chance seems to have free rein but which in fact hides consummate skill: ‘concealing the labour with great Art’.

In the Inleyding, the painter ‘leaves unassimilated the broad brushstrokes on the panel, which from a distance have all the greater [suggestive] force’. He associates this approach with Titian’s age and deteriorating sight. Here he is essentially echoing rhetorical theory when it holds that a change in style can be explained in terms of the age of the artist.

Van Mander’s statements make clear that a proper appraisal of Titian’s work requires two viewpoints: the view from a distance that makes the illusion work, and the close-up inspection that reveals the artist’s mastery. This ‘double perspective’ is also analysed by other art theorists; Félibien, for instance, discusses it in relation to Rembrandt’s manner. He points first to the exceptional aspects of Rembrandt’s ‘rough’ handling, and then to the effect of space and ‘force’ that it creates when the work is viewed from the right position:

‘often he simply used broad strokes of the brush, layering thick colours one on top of another, without blurring and blending them together ... Although not all are graceful brushstrokes, they are very forceful; and when one views them from an appropriate distance, they give a very good effect and suggest a lot of roundness [i.e. spatiality].’

For some theorists the admiration for Rembrandt’s style is an extension of their appreciation of Titian: De Piles, De Geest and Félibien all compare the two masters and their styles. De Piles writes that the ‘two perspectives’ are particularly remarkable in Rembrandt’s case: ‘in Rembrandt’s work, [the brushstrokes] are clearly distinguishable when looked at close at hand, but seen from the right distance they seem to blend very well because of the precision of his touches’.

Van Mander’s adaptation of Vasari’s view underlines that both perspectives are possible, and at the same time recognizes the paradox inherent in the rough manner, that a seemingly effortless surface is in effect the result of an intricate, hidden artifice. It is this paradoxical character of the rough manner, which aims for greater illusionism and at the same time focuses the attention on technique, that plays a role in seventeenth-century art theory which we shall discuss under the heading ‘complementarity’. The rough manner gives scope for two different but complementary ‘perspectives’ on the painting: on the one hand from a position at which
the illusion takes effect, and on the other with a view to the recognition of the brushstroke. The rough manner thus questions the possibilities of artistic persuasiveness itself, and is a factor in what Klaus Krüger called *Illusionsbrechung*, literally the ‘puncturing’ of the illusion: deliberately focusing attention on the illusory character of the work by means of specific painterly artifice. Leaving the brushstroke visible may thus play a part in the context of the paradoxical idea, expressed in art theory, that artists should not evoke a virtual reality too convincingly, otherwise their work might be mistaken for nature itself and they might miss their chance of glory. The Dutch art theorists also call attention to the material nature of the painting, its essence as panel and pigment, and to the craftsman’s handiwork which is far removed from the intellectual aim of painting: to evoke a virtual reality. At one point, for instance, Van Hoogstraten describes the painting as ‘a shape that is spotted with various paints’, and Camphuysen as a ‘canvas or board / daubed with paint’ and ‘a work that is in itself just strokes and shadows’.

In his treatise for art lovers of 1635, Pierre LeBrun presents the paradox inherent to rough brushwork thus: ‘How is it possible for a brush to produce so much sweetness with such rough strokes, and with such crude colours?’ The most eloquent description of the possibility of taking both complementary points of view, however, comes from Boschini: ‘What a miracle, this sorcery that is painting! ... this is what I [think that I ] see: lines, hairs, scars, pockmarks, small imperfections, wrinkles and hair: ... But from here I [actually] see everything and see that there is nothing [left of the illusion]. I see thick paint, a rapid movement of the brush.’ He describes in detail a method whereby the artist deliberately leaves this material character of the painting visible. The painter Jacopo Bassano, who ‘hated diligence and smoothness’, was said to have applied a ‘chaos’ of colours, which were just a jumble when seen from close by. The harmony of the whole, when viewed from the right distance, derives from the ‘dissolving’ of this confusion into the order envisioned by the painter. According to Boschini, the perception of chaos that organizes itself into an image brings with it a specific intellectual pleasure: a literal ‘recreation’, a reordering of the mind.

The high esteem for the painter’s manipulation of the ‘two perspectives’, says Van Mander, arises out of the artist’s ability to hide his artifice, as in the case of Titian. The ‘rough’ manner appears to take less time and effort than the ‘smooth’ approach, but, as Van Mander’s judgement of Titian makes clear, behind this seeming artlessness there is a lot of skill. The classical passage on which art theorists fall back for this ‘feigned carelessness’ is found in Castiglione’s courtiers’ manual, which explains how not only in painting, but in ‘every human action’ the artifice must remain concealed to create the suggestion of greater mastery. He gives an example from the history of art: Apelles allegedly accused Protogenes of too much affectation. Castiglione contrasts affectation with his concept of *sprezzatura*, which he explains as ‘a single uninterrupted line, a single brushstroke drawn with ease, in such a manner that it seems as though the hand, without being guided by practice or any rule of art, moves towards its goal of its own accord, obedient to the painter’s intention’. In the same way Ripa compares painters and orators because of their skill in concealing their artifice:
‘Just as it is a great art among Orators or Rhetoricians to do their work so that it seems there is no art in it, so it is with Painters who are able to paint so that their art does not show, except to those who know’.  

Junius makes a connection between celare artem and the concept of grace, which he describes as ‘a certain sort of carelessness’.  

He defines grace as ‘the effect of a carefully disguised and cleverly concealed Art’, and says that ‘the greatest power of Art [is] ... that the Art is carefully concealed’.  

Van Hoogstraten describes various instances of dissimulatio like this, and concludes that ‘the highest art [lies] in the semblance of negligence’.  

He contrasts ‘the unhappy artificiality, and dullness, in which everything is forced and melancholy’ with ‘a kind of free casualness that yet conceals the art ... and makes all things naturally, as if without thinking about it ... this is also why it is said that an orator can have no greater accomplishment than to present his argument unaffectedly, as if it had just come to him, otherwise he neglects a great advantage with his audience.’  

The author does warn his readers that this is a risky approach: too casual is much worse than too careful.  

In simulating carelessness in painting, worldly prudence is, again, an important virtue, with which the situation in the ‘great Court of this world’, the public’s mood, and the style adapted to it, are adequately judged.  

This issue of the complementarity of viewpoints makes clear how the ‘rough manner’ reveals an area of tension that is inherent to the art of painting. An artist who knowingly works ‘with patches and rough strokes’ is calling attention to the distinction between on the one hand the formless matter of the painter’s craft, which is revealed on close inspection, and on the other the mind of the artist, which organizes everything in order to evoke a mental image, a virtual reality. The rough manner operates on a fault line between ‘nature’ and ‘art’ and deliberately leaves scope for chance to play a part. This, says Van Hoogstraten, explains both nonfinito and leaving the ground and underpainting visible:  

‘This is why great masters also sometimes left unfinished things that were fortuitously apt when first laid in, for fear that they would spoil them. It may be, for instance, that the ground on your canvas or panel may be opportune in the colouring and, with the aid of a few dabs, may make your task easier.’  

In his chapter on ‘handling’ Van Hoogstraten also discusses Protogenes’ method of throwing a sponge at the panel he was working on so as to create the successful illusion of foam on a horse’s mouth.  

He relates the painter’s manipulation of chance elements to the stylistic virtue of facility, gehackelikheyt: ‘it is as if [...] the eye makes out certain forms in rough sketches of random objects, as we are accustomed to do in a fire in a hearth’. In this context, he discusses the landscape painter Jan van Goyen’s method of looking for recognizable forms in a panel covered with arbitrary colours – a ‘Chaos of paint’ – a method that likewise involves deliberately playing with the ‘two perspectives’. Art and nature work together here: the method makes it clear that art and nature, appearance and reality are not involved with one another in
a one-to-one relationship. It is the painter’s imagination that creates a bridge between the two extremes, and the viewer’s imagination is an additional prerequisite if the illusion is to work.

The two perspectives of a virtual reality on one hand, and technique on the other, complement each other in the diverting deception of painting. The rough manner evokes the desired astonishment (‘astonishment of wonder’, in Junius’s words) in the viewer when he realizes just how thoroughly his senses have been deceived; the less the work of art corresponds on closer examination to the reality it conjures up, the greater the effect of surprise and delight. This view is expressed most clearly by Galileo in his exposition on the paragone: ‘the further the means by which one imitates are removed from the things that one is imitating, the greater the astonishment caused by the imitation’. Galileo compares this with the pleasure we feel ‘when actors use diverse means and a manner of portrayal that is different in all ways from the actions that are being portrayed’. These statements illustrate that in painting, the performative character of the artwork makes the ‘rough’ manner effective. Precise agreement with the subject is not necessary; what matters is to create an illusion.

The effect of ‘astonishment’ that is generated by the complementarity of two opposites, such as tangible paint versus an imagined three-dimensional space, can have a pleasurable, recreative function. A painting made in this way is like a game in which semblance is unmasked as such; Junius stresses the playful character of celare artem or the ‘hiding of the artifice’. The admiration for the rough manner can therefore also be regarded in the light of Van Hoogstraten’s contention that painting is able to deceive the public ‘in a diverting way’. The different concepts we have identified in regard to the painterly virtue of loose brushwork – grace, sprezzatura, facility and brevity – are valued in a related way as part of the courtly treatment of dissimulatio, wilful dissembling. As we have seen, the ability to feign, to disguise one’s true intentions, is an important quality for a courtier, and one that is associated in literary theory with, for instance, irony.

Ernst van de Wetering explicitly linked the courtly concept of sprezzatura with Rembrandt’s studio. It applies particularly to Rembrandt’s portrait of Jan Six, in which the artist suggested the subject’s hand and cuff with a few brushstrokes that are manifestly visible for what they are. Six’s portrait is made to appeal to the taste of a highly sophisticated connoisseur, someone able to recognize and appreciate the rhetorical virtue of brevity. According to the theory of performative ‘handling’, by painting with seeming carelessness Rembrandt is not just advertising himself as being skilled in dissimulatio, he is also identifying his model as a man familiar with this courtly virtue. Van Hoogstraten does not explicitly associate the ‘rough manner’ with his teacher. But one of his pronouncements on a different subject, that of literature, may be of some relevance: his opinion of Tacitus’s style, which sums up the aspects of brevity, facility and obscurity:

‘Among the Latin [authors] (so the worldly wise say) Tacitus occupies first place, and who can encompass so many things in so few words better than he ... He is truly admirable, appearing as if it does not really concern him, he so excellently and without any confusion gives his true account, and never deviates from his strict composition, in order to teach, just as silk-embroiderers arrange the gold and silver in their work ... It
is true that, because he is profoundly succinct and somewhat obscure, a quick mind is needed to understand him, which is why he is also criticized by some.\textsuperscript{176}

Brevitas, we thus learn, aims at encompassing many things in a few words (the rhetorical concept of \textit{emphasis}), and at achieving a seeming artlessness, a stylistic virtue that leads to a greater impression of truth in a story (\textit{waragtige vertelling}), providing that the material is ordered in a good composition (\textit{schikken}); at the same time, extreme brevity can sometimes result in \textit{obscuritas}, so that it is primarily the select group of devotees with a quick mind (\textit{gauw verstant}) who can appreciate the value of this method.

The debate about the connotations of the ‘rough’ versus the ‘fine’ manner of painting is important for a better understanding of Van Hoogstraten’s dislike of painting with ‘smooth stiffness’ and ‘precise finicking’, which cannot always be reconciled with his own practice as an artist. His serious condemnation of ‘finicking work’ correlates directly with his remarks about the rhetorical qualities of the ‘rough’ manner. Paintings without visible brushstrokes lack one of the central aspects that make painting interesting as ‘commendable deception’: the deliberate playing with appearance and reality and with the puncturing of the illusion. Van Hoogstraten’s high regard for sketches and for a swift, ‘alert’ approach are linked to this.

We may conclude our discussion of rough and fine brushwork by observing that Van Hoogstraten’s theoretical appreciation of a particular ‘handling’ cannot be seen in isolation from his admiration for a particular choice of subject. His positive view of a rapid, broadly conceived method and of simulated nonchalance explains not only his attacks on the ‘smooth’ manner of the ‘fine painters’, who ‘paint themselves blind ... with unnecessarily finicking work’,\textsuperscript{178} but also his aversion to the rendition of a great many details in the subject chosen. Van Hoogstraten accuses the proponents of the ‘precise’ style of focusing on almost invisible minutiae: ‘some have now taken the desire for precision so far that, even in pictures two spans wide ... they pointlessly depict almost invisible things’.\textsuperscript{179} In this he agrees with Boschini, who in championing the rapid brushstroke mocks painters who focus on insignificant things and describes them as pygmies.\textsuperscript{180} Not only does Van Hoogstraten’s condemnation of ‘finicking work’ in style and choice of subject prove to be a commonplace of art theory, it also appears that his aversion to an excess of inconsequential detail does not derive directly from a preference for proportionate beauty based on classical antiquity, but rather and predominantly from an artistic ideal that regards rhetorical persuasiveness as key.

\textbf{The Colours of the Dutch Countryside}

In early modern art theory, and likewise in the \textit{Inleyding}, the specific properties of colour are associated with one subject in particular: landscape painting. It is here that the qualities and shortcomings of Netherlandish artists are deemed to be revealed. We will try to work out a ‘theory of landscape’ on the basis of Van Hoogstraten’s views of the rhetorical and emotional effect of colour. In this process, we will identify the specific artistic terminology that does not relate directly to history painting, the ‘degree of painting’ where the depiction of the passions is accorded a clear effect and function. This leads on to an explanation of the way ideas about the persuasiveness of the image may have been important in legitimating a relatively new genre.
like landscape, which is described in art literature from Vasari onwards as the subject in which Netherlandish artists excel.

Van Hoogstraten’s passage ‘On Landscape’, which is devoted exclusively to this subject, is part of his chapter on colour and is followed by the passage on ‘Handling or Manner of Painting’. The conceptual interweaving of skills in colour and in the rendition of landscape is evident from, for instance, the author’s judgement of Titian. He praises the master for his incomparable ‘handling’ but also reports that when Titian took some Dutch painters into his house and tried to emulate their works, he succeeded in surpassing them in landscape painting: ‘which alongside his great judgement in imitating life made him the best Landscape Painter in the World.’ Indeed, his is a topical construct: Paolo Pino, in his *Dialogo di pittura* (1548), reports emphatically that he had seen landscapes by Titian that surpassed those of the Netherlandish painters. The traditional praise of Titian often mentions both his abilities in painting flesh and his skill at landscapes. Lomazzo writes, for instance, that ‘Titian coloured mountains and plains in particular with a magnificent manner ... in flesh tones he achieved just as much beauty and grace, with his blending of colours and his shades that are true to life and seem to live, and one sees in his [method] principally softness and tenderness’. Lomazzo uses similar terms praising the painter in his *Rime*: ‘He has been unique among the world’s painters in giving living spirit and colour to paintings, and he surpassed everyone in painting landscapes’. As we shall see, colour is a connecting thread in the theoretical esteem for both landscape and flesh in which a painter like Titian was deemed to have excelled.

In her dissertation *Towards an Italian Renaissance Theory of Landscape* written in 1998, Karen Goodchild explored the way that the regard for the landscape in Italian art literature is intimately related to the reputation of Netherlandish artists and their use of colour. Van Hoogstraten refers to this tradition when he says that ‘even the Italians have long had to concede that the Netherlanders outdo them in landscapes’. The commonplaces that accreted around Netherlandish painting are summed up in Pino’s opinion of the landscape art of the *oltramontani*, the Northerners, who excel in the landscape because they concentrate chiefly on ‘depicting the countryside in which they live’: ‘this part of a painter’s activities is very fitting and delightful for himself and for others; and the method of depicting landscapes in a mirror, as the Northerners do, is very appropriate’. Lomazzo provides a list of exemplary landscape painters, and most of them are Netherlandish – artists like Joachim Patinir, Herri met de Bles, Jan van Scorel, Gillis Mostaert, Pieter Breugel and Lucas van Leyden, who all feature in the *Inleyding*.

As Goodchild convincingly demonstrated with the aid of references to the work of Vasari and others, the opinion of Northern landscapes formulated in Southern Europe also has a negative component rooted in the paragone debate between the ‘poles’ of drawing and colour. Vasari describes the painted landscape in the prejudiced vocabulary of the paragone, making it clear that this area of painting belongs first and foremost to the domain of *colorito*. With their abundance of details and their emphasis on atmospheric perspective, Dutch landscapes, he asserts, lack *disegno*, focus solely on the natural environment and conjure up no more than a cosmetic illusion. This complex of views is related to the technological debate about the invention of oil paint. It was said that this Netherlandish technique pitted a deceptive art with seductive, magic powers against the pure conception of art based on the *disegno* of antiq-
uity. Van Hoogstraten, for instance, says that Van Eyck only discovered oil paint ‘after long, alchemistic research’, a view he shares with Vasari, who for this reason also describes Van Eyck as a ‘sophist’, seeking intellectual misdirection.\footnote{191}

Michelangelo’s view of this new medium, as recorded by Francisco de Holanda, is decidedly negative; Van Hoogstraten refers to the opinion attributed to this master with the remark that Michelangelo regarded painting in oil as only fit for women.\footnote{192} In De Holanda’s account, Michelangelo asserts that the art of the Northerners is only suitable for women and the feeble-minded, and has a strong emotional effect on them: ‘Netherlandish art appeals to women, particularly very old or very young women, monks and nuns and certain nobles who are devoid of any feeling for true harmony’. Northern landscape art, he argues, concentrates only on the ‘outside’ of things and on deceiving the eye: ‘in the Netherlads they paint to deceive the gaze directed at the external [...] their panels are nothing but materials, ruins, green fields, shadows of trees, rivers and bridges, which they call landscapes’.\footnote{193}

De Holanda believes that their interest in details means that Netherlandish painters focus on too many different subjects and achieve perfection in none of them. Van Hoogstraten refutes this traditional opinion – ‘the saying of the Italians that who tries too much, achieves little’ – and calls on the theory of the humours to explain the difference between Netherlandish and Italian art: their cold, phlegmatic nature means that the Dutch have great patience so that they can concentrate on these details, whereas the hot, sanguine Italians are more accomplished in visualizing intellectual inventions.\footnote{194} In Van Hoogstraten’s view, it is precisely the universality of painting that is its greatest quality. It can be argued that with this remark he is implicitly choosing the ‘universal knowledge’ of Netherlandish painting over the more focused art of the Italians.

Van Hoogstraten’s regard for landscape painting is closely bound up with the esteem in which he held the ‘universal master’ skilled in all ‘degrees of art’, and his description of painting as ‘knowledge’ directed towards imitating ‘the entire Visible World’. In Van Hoogstraten’s fourth chapter, in which he discusses landscape, he also deals with a multitude of \textit{naturalia} and \textit{artificialia}; separate sections are devoted to specific areas such as different hairstyles, buildings, clothes, household goods and animals, with the aim, typical of the \textit{Inleyding}, of providing a complete summary of all elements of the visible world. He notes that an artist may call on the help of a specialist when it comes to landscape \textit{parerga}, but that the ‘universal’ master must also become adept at this ‘by-work’ himself; aspiring young painters must, after all, strive ‘to become masters in all the elements of our art’.\footnote{195}

The landscape was thus conceived as a valuable part of a \textit{virtuoso} painter’s work, and was probably a factor in the endeavours of an artist like Rembrandt to develop into a \textit{pictor absolutus} who could measure up to Rubens and Titian. At precisely the time when Rembrandt was producing his small but substantial ‘oeuvre’ of landscapes, he was engaged in developing an international artistic persona, and by means of self-portraits and in other ways was carving out a place for himself alongside an artist like Titian.\footnote{196} Van Hoogstraten himself was faithful in practice to his theoretical dogma: Houbraken writes of his universal skill and mentions landscapes by his hand. These have probably not survived.\footnote{197}

In examining this appreciation of the landscape as part of a painter’s ‘universal’ expertise it has to be borne in mind that the painted landscape is seen as a \textit{locus} for poetic licence.
Indeed, the poetic freedom to experiment with figures of speech and other stylistic ‘ornaments’ is interpreted in art theory as a theoretical motivation for colouristic experiment. The identification of landscape painting with Northern European *colorito* means, on the one hand, that the landscape – in which, after all, the emphasis is on sensory pleasure rather than on any intellectual component – is accorded a low theoretical status. It can, though, be demonstrated that on the other hand the landscape does have a certain advantage: it provides scope for artistic freedom, for colouristic virtuosity and for chance: for a ‘dialogue’ between ‘Mother Nature’ and the artist’s own innate ability.

As we shall see, the comparison *ut pictura poesis*, which legitimizes painterly experiment, also means that landscape is judged with the aid of a number of terms from rhetorical theory.

*The rhetorical landscape*

The chapter in which Van Hoogstraten treats the landscape is dedicated to Erato, ‘the Goddess of Love Poetry’, whom he praises for having inspired Sappho’s amorous poems. This Muse, associated in the *Inleyding* with the planet Venus, holds sway over the places where the ‘ladies of the court ... sigh for love’, and she leads the reader ‘among the shady trees, or into the airy meadow; because the Meadow Nymphs ... make the Woods and Mountains echo with love songs.’

This placing of the landscape elements of a painting in an amorous context is not without significance, as we shall see; it is related to the identification of colouristic ‘ornament’ with feminine seduction. A comparison between poetry and painting is essential here; Van Hoogstraten’s section entitled ‘On Landscapes’ contains a great many poetic passages: adaptations of Virgil, Tasso, Hooft and Van Mander, and some ten passages that are not attributed to an author and may be based on Van Hoogstraten’s own experiences during his travels. He explains these poetic aids thus: ‘Whose artistic spirit would not burst forth with something extraordinary when he hears the Poets sing of the landscape in such Painterly words?’

In a passage on ‘Poetic landscapes’, Van Hoogstraten makes a comparison between painter and poet, citing the creative licence they both enjoy when treating the landscape: ‘where the Poet plays, the Painter likewise has free rein’. He continues, perhaps surprisingly, not with an exposition of painting the Arcadian landscape but with an exhortation to young artists to ‘head for the woods’ to study the various facets of the visible world ‘each according to its own properties’. He also believes that artists have ‘more freedom’ in the landscape than they do, for instance, in paintings of architecture, ‘which are governed by stricter rules’. Here he is echoing the Italian tradition, in which the painted landscape is regarded as a place where poetic and artistic aims meet. Giorgione’s landscapes, for instance, with their figures who appear to do little more than enjoy their colourful surroundings could thus be described as ‘poetic experiments’. The landscape, specifically, provides scope for practice in the ‘colours of Rhetorike’, prompting the comparison between the painted landscape and poetry; thus Lomazzo compares Ariosto and Titian: ‘here Ariosto colours, and demonstrates in this use of colour that he is a Titian’.

Studies into landscape descriptions in Dutch seventeenth-century poetry reveal a tendency to sing the praises of the countryside through a comparison with paintings and the painter’s contemplative observation of nature. The description of the landscape, which had
a place in pastoral and georgic literature, is thus the locus of the *audendi potestas*, the ‘freedom to experiment’ in which artists and poets are alike, according to the comparison in Horace’s *Ars poetica*.

In this context, Leonardo goes so far as to turn the accepted paragone on its head when he says that in the landscape ‘the poet, too, wants to be called a painter’. Similarly, Gilio remarks that ‘poetic licence is expressed in many things’, following this with a long list of pastoral elements: ‘different sorts of trees ... mountains, hills, valleys, meadows, fields, rivers, pools, springs, streams, fish, animals, birds of diverse species’ and so forth. What is striking in the context of Van Hoogstraten’s notion of painting as ‘universal knowledge’, is the connection Gilio makes between poetic licence on the one hand and the painter’s ability to depict different elements of the visible world on the other.

Landscape descriptions in poetry treat not only the ‘ordered’ nature of the cultivated parkland of the seventeenth-century aristocratic outdoor life that Van Hoogstraten illustrates on the title page of the chapter dedicated to Erato but may equally extol wild nature (fig. 94). We see this, for instance, in Sannazaro’s influential *Arcadia* of 1504, a work familiar to Van Hoogstraten who reports it was the basis for his novel *Hoegaenveld*; Van Mander also refers to it:

> ‘In general tall trees with spreading branches, produced by nature in awe-inspiring mountains, give greater pleasure to those who behold them than plants cultivated and pruned with a skilled hand in luxuriant gardens (*le coltivate piante, da dotte mani espurgate, negli adorni giardini*) ... Who can doubt that a spring, surrounded by green plants, rising naturally from a rock, is more pleasing to us than any fountains, works of art of the whitest marble and glittering with much gold?’

In its cultivated and uncultivated forms, the landscape serves Van Hoogstraten as scope for experimentation and thus for emulation, with the emphasis on making colouristic discoveries:

> ‘If the orchard, white with blossom, promises an abundance of fruit, then, Young Painter! do not let lazy sleepiness rob you of this invaluable time, but begin things that have never been seen before. Paint for me then the green grass as the dew drops from it, and the fresh flowers from life; you will find colours that no Painter ever captured in a work. ... Having done common things for long enough, he who feels the spur of a desire for honour, turns his hand to something higher, and quickly discovers a rare and new find.’

The poet and painter’s creative ‘play’ with the subject of the landscape can, it seems, be conceived as a source of relaxation and diversion, not only for the viewer, but for the painter himself. This view is expressed by De Piles:

> ‘Of all the pleasures afforded to those who practise the various skills involved in Painting, executing a Landscape seems to me both the most tangible and the easiest: for in its wide range of subject matter the Painter has more opportunities than in any other form of this Art to derive satisfaction from the choice available to him.’
These poetic ideas about landscape are related to the fact that the seventeenth-century viewer could evaluate this new subject in rhetorical terms. Landscape painting was credited with certain affective qualities and with an affective impact, as an extension of the affective power of colour. This is linked to the supposed performative effect of a painting: the person looking at the painting behaves as if he is actually present in the countryside he sees. The ekphrastic descriptions of landscapes found in many writings on art theory are typical of this thinking. Junius, for instance, tells us that an art lover looking at a landscape made by a painter is contemplating nature itself. Van Hoogstraten describes in an uncompromisingly ekphrastic manner a painting of a desert in Armenia that provokes sensations of heat and thirst in the viewer. In his poem On a Storm, his friend Joachim Oudaen describes how the sight of a painted storm struck fear into his heart and how the ‘motions of his mind’ were whipped up by the ‘commotion’ in the painting:

‘The very sight
Seems, in the storm (so vivid is the art)
To enmesh us too;
The misty light,
The cloud-shrouded sun, sown at its thinnest,
Seems to agitate us,
With inward fear, and heartache.’

The most famous description of nature in the literature of art is probably Aretino’s letter to Titian of 1544, in which he reverses the usual order: Aretino describes a landscape by comparing it with a painting made by Titian. He writes that the sky looked exactly as one would want it to in a Titian painting, and the houses, although they were real houses made of real stone, looked as though they were painted (benché sien pietre vere, parevano di materia artificiata): in Aretino’s words reality at that moment is so ‘lifelike’ that it appears to be virtual. The quotations from Oudaen and Aretino indicate how the painted landscape was allotted rhetorical properties that were without question important for its emancipation as a genre with its own intellectual status. These connotations must have been among the factors that persuaded artists such as Rembrandt to take it up.

According to early modern natural philosophy, the affective power of landscape painting can be explained on the basis of the conviction that nature is itself animated. The affective powers of natura naturans are supposed to impact the beholder, in line with the belief that the beholder of particular affects is in turn touched by the same feelings. Leonardo therefore sees nature as itself affectively moved, and exhorts artists to take note of ‘cheerful places’ and the ‘jokes of the winding rivers’. In a characteristic summing-up he describes ‘ruins in mountains, terrifying and frightful places that strike fear into the hearts of the beholders, and then pleasant, sweet and delightful spots with flower-filled meadows of different colours that are stirred by gentle ripples and by the soft movements of the winds’. But it is above all to flowing water that Leonardo attributes an animated, and thus affective, quality: ‘the raging water expresses its anger, and sometimes, beaten by the winds, flies from out of the sea ... and hunts down everything that stands in the path of its destruction’.
In the Italian tradition of art theory, Lomazzo coins the term *motus*, motion or movement, for the affective qualities of the landscape, making a distinction between a vegetative *motus* expressed in the movements of plants, and an ‘elemental’ *motus* revealed in the movements of, for instance, water and fire.223 These forms of *beweeglijkheid* – that ‘moving quality’ – are deemed to act on the viewer in the same way as the sight of human passions.224 Van Hoogstraten himself describes a painting by Palma il Vecchio – ‘a magnificent Shipwreck in a terrible storm at Sea’: ‘Here we see the skill of the Captain, the oars bending with the power of the rowers, the violence of the winds, the heaving and breaking of the waves, the lightning from the Heavens, and the Painter’s elevated mind, so wonderfully intertwined that the whole piece appears to move when one looks at it.’ In this case Lomazzo’s *moto elementale* is assumed to fill the painting: the different affectively ‘moving’ components work together – the elements of water and air with their literal ‘elemental motion’, the physical movements of the rowers, the active mind of the helmsman, and lastly the ‘motions of the mind’ of the artist himself, who conjured all this up in his mind’s eye and experienced it, with the result that the painting itself has a ‘moving’ effect on the viewer.

The conception of nature as animated principle makes clear that it is not just the tonal and colour qualities that give the painted landscape its supposed affective powers, the painter’s imitative skills are also crucial: after all, it is nature itself that has an affective impact on human beings. For instance, painted water is ascribed a soporific effect; Junius describes ‘sweet brooks running with a soft murmuring noise, holding our eyes open with their azure streams, and yet seeking to close our eyes with the purling noise made among the pebble-stones’.226 Ultimately, the bright colours of visible nature are thought to imbue the landscape with healing qualities. Tellingly, Van Hoogstraten begins his section on the landscape with Plutarch’s observation: ‘The most pleasing colour of all ... restores and delights the sight in its liveliness and joy; the only way to describe this therapeutic colour is to compare it with ‘a landscape of a thousand broken colours ... when sweet spring renewes the meadows and fields, and the woods lift up their new-leafed crowns’.227 The notion that the painted landscape has a restorative function is set down authoritatively in Robert Burton’s *Anatomy of Melancholy* (1621), which describes how a sick man is refreshed both by looking at nature and by the virtuous reflection of the ‘Second Bible’: ‘A sicke man sits upon a greene banke [...] and feeds his eyes with a variety of objects, hearbes, trees, to comfort his misery, he receaves many delightful smells, and fills his ears with that sweet and various harmony of Birds: good God what a company of pleasures hast thou made for man?’ The author continues by observing that, like the landscape itself, paintings of it can have the same beneficial effect, particularly works by ‘many of those Italian and Dutch painters, which were most excellent in their ages’.228

Burton describes in this context the decoration on Achilles’s shield, referring to a famous ekphrasis that is also cited by Van Hoogstraten.229 Achilles was said to have been cured of his melancholy by gazing on:

‘Sunne, Moone, Starre, Planets, Sea, Land, men fighting, running, riding, women scolding, hils, dales, townes, castles, brookes, rivers, trees &c. with many pretty landskips, and perspective peaces; with sight of which he was infinitely delighted; and much eased of his grief ... Who will not be affected so in like case, ... to see those excellent land-
skips, Dutch-workes, and curious cuts of [Egidius] Sad[e]lier, of Sprange[r], Albur[tus Dürer, Goltzius, [Vredeman de] Vrintes &c. such pleasant pieces of perspective[?]

A telling aspect of Burton’s theory is that the all-encompassing scope of the depiction of the visible world, which is described by Van Hoogstraten in much the same way, is associated with the healing effect of contemplating the Creation. Van Hoogstraten reflects this idea when he puts forward his prescription for melancholy – go out into the countryside. This exhortation recurs in his chapter on landscape painting; in the poem ‘To Lovers of Landscape’ he describes the countryside as a remedy for melancholy brought on by too much study.

**Universality and ‘veranderlijkheid’ in landscape**

The rhetorical pattern from which the theoretical appraisal of the landscape derives is governed not by the paragone between *colorito* and *disegno* alone, but also by that between painting and sculpture. While the strongest argument in the paragone against painting is its mendacious nature – it is described as a ‘semblance without being’ that is far less durable than sculpture – the strongest argument in favour of painting is that it can also portray all sorts of ephemeral phenomena. It is, above all, oil paint’s ability to render reflections and textures that is decisive. De Brune, for instance, stresses in his version of the paragone that painting is ‘much more universal’ than sculpture and is able ‘to imitate everything one can see, which is impossible for Sculptors’. In this context we may repeat Angel’s most elaborate argument that the painter, in contrast to the sculptor, can concentrate on a multitude of details in colour and light, such as multicoloured animals and materials that reflect light in different ways:

‘Painting [is] much more universal [than sculpture] because it is able to imitate Nature much more abundantly: for as well as depicting all sorts of Animals, such as Birds, Fish, Worms, Flies, Spiders, Caterpillars, it can also show all kinds of Metals: distinguishing between them, such as Gold, Silver, Metal, Copper, Pewter, Lead, and the rest of them. One can depict by it the Rainbow, Rain, Thunder, Lightning, Clouds, Mist, Light, Reflection, and other such things.’

Angel follows his remark with a list of different forms of lighting and reflection. It is striking that in his summing-up he mentions the surface of reflective metals in the same breath as a notoriously ephemeral phenomenon like ‘horses foaming at the mouth’. Elsewhere in his treatise Angel uses the term *veranderlijkheid* – literally ‘changeability’ – to index the singularities of the expression of surface textures, reflections and other ephemeral phenomena associated with colour. Although this term is related to the rhetorical virtue of *varietas*, Angel does not mean the same as the *verscheidenheid* – variety – that has to please the eye, the term usually used by Van Hoogstraten and Van Mander. The term *veranderlijkheid* refers more specifically than *verscheidenheid* to the constant flux to which the visible world is subject. It is related, for instance, to Ripa’s assertion that links the ‘veranderinge [that] is diverting for all things’ with the impossibility of relying on routine in depicting shot (or *ibangeant*) fabrics, which constantly reflect the light in different ways. The representation of satin and other reflecting fabrics
was a specific concern for Dutch painters, among whom Gerard ter Borch deserves special mention: apparently, fabrics like these could only be painted from life, and their successful rendition demonstrated a highly specialized artistic skill.

In early modern art theory, the ability to render variables that affect the sense of sight, such as reflected light, smoke and mist, is often put forward as an argument in praise of painting. Van Hoogstraten also describes how painters are able to represent different weather conditions, mentioning Rubens among others. He may well have known Oudaen’s numerous poems about weather phenomena; these introduce a painter referred to as ‘Neun’, who, when he painted ‘torrential rain and a rainbow’, was so carried away by the virtual reality he had created that he was actually drenched. In the context of capturing fleeting atmospheric effects, Varchi bases painting’s claim to superiority on its focus on ‘light, sky, smoke, breath, clouds, reflections and other infinite phenomena, like the sunrise, dawn, night, the colours of water, the feathers of birds, the hair and the flesh of humans and of all animals, sweat, foam, and other things that the sculptors cannot do’.

In the paragone, it is specifically the concept of colour that can prove painting’s claim to universality by making snapshots of ephemeral phenomena. Bisagni argues: ‘the miracle of colour ... shows the difference between each animal ... and it distinguishes the people of every region; ... as for the elements, it shows flames, water, springs, clouds, lightning, thunder and hail, and almost all the virtues of colour are contained in these things’. He concludes that painting can portray the whole of Creation, indeed, ‘that there is nothing created by God that one cannot represent with colour’ and regards this as the greatest praise that can be bestowed on one of the arts.

That colouristic variety is seen as an inherent element of the beauty of landscape probably needs no explanation. Castiglione, for instance, explicitly associates the power of colour with the painted landscape. In his view, the sculptor ‘can in no way express that golden-yellow hair, nor the gleam of arms, nor a dark night, nor a thunderstorm, nor lightning and fiery flashes, nor the burning of a town, nor the break of day, with its rosy glow: and in short he cannot really show us the sky, nor the sea, nor the earth, nor the mountains, nor the meadows, nor the forests, nor the rivers, nor towns and houses, all of which the Painter can do.’

The ideas about landscape can be worked out in such a way that the countryside functions as *pars pro toto* for the multiplicity of the visible world that can be reproduced with colour. As Van Mander observes about colour, ‘in sum, colour visibly captures here / everything in the World created by God’, and he expands at length on the countless different (differenticb) colours of the landscape. It is striking that Van Hoogstraten explicitly does not wish to go into the paragone between painting and sculpture because – as he tells us – the two arts developed from drawing like ‘twins from a single conception’. Perhaps his exhaustive descriptions of everyday objects, hairstyles, dress and different sorts of lighting in the various chapters of the *Inleyding* render a summary like those provided by Angel and Castiglione redundant.

Junius gives a summing-up of the landscape painter’s subject; this can be seen as an ekphrasis of a non-existent series of generic landscape paintings. It includes a compilation of the
various characteristics of colouring: the rendition of ephemeral details, such as light, sunrise and sunset; the universal ability of the painter; and special colour effects like the rainbow:

‘[Art lovers] doe marke the wide heaven beset with an endlesse number of bright and glorious starres; the watery clouds of severall colours, together with the miraculously painted raine-bow; how the great Lampe of light up-rearing his flaming head above the earth, causeth the dawning day to spread a faint and trembling light upon the flichering gilded waves; how the fiery glimmering of that same glorious eye of the world, being lessened about noon-tide, lesneth the shadowes of all things; how darkness some night beginneth to display her coal-black curtain over the brightest skie, dimming the spacious reach of heaven with a shady dampe ... pleasant arbors and long rows of lofty trees, clad with summers pride ... thick woods, graced between the stumpes with a pure and grasse-greene soile, the beames of the Sunne here and there breaking thorough the thickest boughes, and diversly enlightning the shadie ground.’

Apparently, as one of the skills of the ‘universal master’, specific landscape effects are certainly not an unimportant area of interest for seventeenth-century Dutch artists wishing to rival their predecessors in Southern Europe.

Art theory even emphasizes that a certain temperament and emotional sensibility are as indispensable in depicting the landscape as they are to the portrayal of human passions. Since landscape is not subject to the strict decorum of history painting, the painter’s ‘motions of the mind’ can be expressed fairly directly indeed. Van Hoogstraten associates sensitivity to a specific area of art with a division derived from the theory of rhetoric: the three ‘modes’ or modi. Like the genera dicendi, this division supposes a ‘high’, ‘low’ and ‘intermediate’ manner. This classification is closely related to the term decorum: the painter, like the orator, has to adapt his style to the subject he chooses and take account of his natural talent.

Writing about this classification, Van Hoogstraten notes that ‘the most eminent Painters also always have one thing that they do best’. One might concentrate on details, another will place the same sort of image in a composition with strong chiaroscuro, and ‘intensify it wonderfully with well-placed shadows (schikschaduwe) and rhythmically ordered figures (beeldesprong).’ A third ‘follows the Roman refinement of Raphael and Angelo’ and believes that ‘the control of light and shade is a brittle crutch: and erroneously that to beautify one thing, one must darken the other’. Art historians have often called upon the division of the modi in order to explain the rise of new genres; the division was studied by Gombrich, for example, as one of the most important legitimizing principles for the theory of landscape painting. The fact that an artist like Rembrandt chose to paint landscapes with bold chiaroscuro and classical staffage might perhaps be explained as a decision to pursue a landscape modus that was in keeping with his temperament, in which ‘the control of light and shade’ acquires a value in its own right as a style element (compare fig. 95).

In his description of a ‘painting contest’ Van Hoogstraten explicitly applies to the landscape a tripartite classification strongly allied to his theory of the three modi. Here we have three landscape painters, each obeying his own nature, developing totally different painting styles. In the contest between Knipbergen, Van Goyen and Porcellis (mentioned above, page
165), Van Hoogstraten again identifies three manners among the landscape painters, arriving at a different classification. Whereas the first manner is apparently based on routine, and the last on contemplation of an ideal mental image, chance plays a major part in Van Goyen’s work:

‘having roughly splashed all over his panel, here light, there dark, more or less like a multicoloured Agate, or marbled paper, [Van Goyen] looked for all sorts of fortuitous drolleries in it, which he rendered recognizable with little effort and many small brush-strokes ... and in short his eye, trained to see forms that were concealed in a Chaos of paint, directed his hand and understanding so skilfully that one saw a complete Painting before one could rightly perceive what he had in mind.247

In this case landscape appears to offer scope for playing with the effects of chance: the painter is able to turn ‘a Chaos of paint’ to his own ends so that a convincing illusion is created. Here Van Hoogstraten uses the metaphor of the gemstone: Van Goyen apparently lays in his painting like ‘a multicoloured Agate’. This is a key commonplace in the theory that deals with the image made by chance. In a very literal way, this commonplace had a practical application in the images of landscapes in certain cabinets of curiosities, where stones were treated with a solution of chemicals to create a fanciful silhouette that can be recognized as a landscape.248 Gemstones were also used as grounds for paintings, part of the pattern on the stone being left

Fig. 95 – Rembrandt, Landscape with a City on a Hill, ca. 1638, panel, 52 x 72 cm. Herzog Anton-Ulrich Museum, Braunschweig.
The example of gemstones illustrates how natural and artificial objects can be combined to create works of art; Junius writes of ‘instances of Paintings that nature, in imitation of Art, seems to pour forth from her generous breast by chance’, and uses the example of precious stones to demonstrate that nature itself inspires man to paint.\(^\text{250}\)

Van Hoogstraten too describes ‘agate paintings’, stones that ‘nature’ has given the form of a recognizable object, and various gemstones which, with their distinct ‘properties’ are believed to express certain ‘essences’.\(^\text{251}\) This remark exemplifies that the magic effect ascribed to gemstones in the early modern period is closely linked to their colour. As the Inleyding tells us, certain elemental qualities are inherent to particular coloured stones.\(^\text{252}\)

In his painting treatise, Lomazzo explicitly sets out the affective power of the colours of gems, comparing their effect with that of alchemy; in 1565 the art theorist Dolce even wrote a complete lapidarium, a treatise on precious stones.\(^\text{253}\) Van Hoogstraten does not question in any way the belief, still widely held in the seventeenth century, in precious stones’ ‘action at a distance’. On the one hand the strong affective force of gems is directly related to their splendour and colour, and linked to the awareness of the deceptive allure of these stones. On the other, the stones are associated with chance, nature, and the painted landscape. These various topoi recur in a passage in the Inleyding where the author speaks of ‘blushing dawn, so graceful in her splendid, many-coloured attire’ while ‘the golden Sun and Moon and Stars garland the gold-embellished Sapphires in the blue Azure’. As the colours of gems are ‘nature’s painting’, so sunset itself is the Creator’s work of art, giving rise to a colouristic harmony that has a salutary effect and ‘seems to refresh our eyes’.\(^\text{254}\) There is also a more obvious technical connotation attached to the association of colour and gemstones: lapis lazuli was used to make the costly pigment ultramarine. For our analysis it may suffice to point out that the topoi of ‘nature who herself paints’, the supposed affective impact of inanimate objects and the tension between ‘nature and art’ are all brought into the debate about the power of colour.

The concepts of changeability and chance, and the painter’s virtuoso handling of them, lend the landscape a status of its own as an area for experimenting with colour. The art historian Mark Roskill suggested that in his landscapes Rembrandt also used the method Van Hoogstraten ascribes to Jan van Goyen.\(^\text{255}\) There was in any event a clear justification for this approach in the theory of art, associated with ideas about the modi and about the artist’s natural aptitude.

A PAINTERLY ART

A central concept in the complex of ideas that surround the evaluation of landscape painting is schilderachtig – painterly or picturesque. This difficult term relates, among other things, to the multiplicity of effects that can be rendered with colour, which are essential to the seventeenth-century evaluation of the painted landscape. It also relates to the painter’s universal skill at depicting precisely those ‘changeable’, ephemeral properties of the visible world. In the Netherlands, the term schilderachtig is found for the first time in Van Mander’s treatise of 1604, later it was used by De Bisschop, Van Hoogstraten and De Lairesse.\(^\text{256}\)

In a 1995 article Boudewijn Bakker showed how the painter and poet Gerbrant Bredero uses the term schilderachtig as a synonym for ‘following nature’. The poet states that the way he works derives in its entirety from his training as a painter. It obeys a ‘painterly maxim’ to the
effect that the best painters are those who come closest to life – painters who do not ‘record poses unknown to nature, or twist and bend the joints and limbs’. The *naturam sequi* that can also be a guiding principle in literature is, according to Bredero, a specific painterly virtue. Von Sandrart uses the term *schilderachtig* in a similar way to indicate that Rembrandt’s choice of subjects was not based on scholarship and that he preferred ‘simple matters, matters not running into curious pondering, matters that were agreeable to him, matters that are *schilderachtig* (as the Dutch call them)’ – matters, in short, that Von Sandrart regards as ‘pleasantnesses selected purely from Nature’.

In the *Inleyding*, *schilderachtig* acquires particular significance in the light of the para-gone: the term emphasizes the specific characteristics of painting as against other forms of art such as literature. Van Hoogstraten refers to ‘a painterly eye, more skilled at depicting than describing’, deriving from this the suggestion that painters can learn from poets when they hear them ‘sing of the landscape in such a painterly manner’; Van Mander concludes, on the same grounds, that Sannazaro had described a landscape in a ‘painterly’ way. The use of *schilderachtig* in the context of descriptions of nature indicates that the landscape genre is the ideal field in which the painter can exercise his colourist virtuosity.

**The painterly and the beautiful**

As a term of artistic judgement that puts the following of nature above the depiction of idealized beauty, *schilderachtig* provides an alternative to a canon based on antiquity and, in Van Hoogstraten’s words, to the ‘noble selection’ exemplified in the history piece. The term can be used to refer to elements of lower-ranked subjects like the landscape. This is exemplified in Jan de Bisschop’s description of how artists lose themselves to such an extent in their *schilderachtig* subjects that they start to prefer ugly models: they believe ‘a misshapen, old, wrinkled person is more painterly and preferable in art than a shapely, fresh and youthful one; a tumbledown or unfit building than a new, well-crafted one; a beggar and a peasant than a nobleman or King’. Although Van Hoogstraten uses *schilderachtig* in an entirely positive sense, his theory certainly does not betray a preference for ugly subjects. He does, though, believe that every part of the visible world is worth depicting. In ‘painterly composition’, he says, it is important to do justice even to inconsequential objects: ‘the least thing that one turns one’s hand to should be rendered with its proper significance’.

The specific ‘painterly’ ability that characterizes the true artist is that he can do justice to the multiplicity of the visible world and make it the subject of his work. As a concept, *schilderachtig* expresses the idea that art may be judged not solely in terms of the supposed beauty or ugliness of the subject, but also in terms of specific pictorial qualities such as colourist skill.

Although De Bisschop points out the dangers of deliberately choosing a picturesque subject, he does express the view that every part of the visible world possesses a certain beauty: ‘for because Art is a depiction of all that is visible, so beauty, too, has a place in that whole, and has bounds as wide as art itself. And it should therefore be sought not just in people, but also in beasts of every kind, in buildings, in landscape, in sky, in water and everything that one depicts’. Like Van Hoogstraten, he believes that painting extends to the whole visible
world, including *naturalia* and *artificialia*. However, there is a marked difference between De Bisschop’s ideas and those of his younger colleague Van Hoogstraten. De Bisschop predicates the existence of an ‘ontological hierarchy’; he believes that the artist should seek the best possible version of even the most insignificant things. This notion is no longer present in the *Inleyding*; Van Hoogstraten, after all, stresses that the worth of imitation for its own sake lends the depiction of inconsequential and even ugly things a certain validity (see above, pages 89, 127). This idea is taken to its most radical conclusions by Goeree, who, in his discussion of the role of beauty in an artist’s choice of subject, even goes so far as to explain the view that beauty is a relative phenomenon. In his opinion, the beauty of an object depends on a comparison with other objects and also on the judgement of the viewer, a conclusion that is reached ‘when one takes Beauty only in certain respects or relations that things have to one another, and considers that many things depend on people’s different perceptions’. The art-theoretical term *schilderachtig* seems intended to circumvent the discussion as to whether or not beauty ‘anchored in nature’ exists. Apparently, the artist’s preference for framing specific moments in the multiplicity of contingencies in the visible world, creating a selection that cannot be evaluated with the words beautiful or ugly, is captured with the term *schilderachtig*.

In his section ‘On Defects and Ugliness’ Van Hoogstraten explores the depiction of ugly things, which has a part to play in, among other things, the context of comic scenes in painting and literature. Citing examples from Van Heemskerck’s *Bataafsche Arcadia* (*Dutch Arcadia*, 1657) and the work of Sidney and Cervantes, he refers to ‘fair ugliness, that would give enough work for [Adriaan] Brouwer [an artist famous for his depictions of low-life scenes, intended to evoke laughter] to try to surpass their improper properties’. Goeree also discusses this paradox of ‘fair ugliness’. Under the heading ‘Some ugliness is also fair in Art’, he argues that ‘one may call many things beautiful in Pictures that are ugly and repulsive, even deformed, in real Life’, because the delight in the imitation for imitation’s sake makes them so.

This paradoxical praise of ugliness must not be seen solely in a humorous context. This becomes clear from the beginning of the section on ugliness in the *Inleyding*, which quotes from De la Serre’s book *Het onderbouw der goede geesten, op d’ydelheden vande werelt* (*Discussion of Bright Minds about the Vanities of the World*, 1658). Devoted entirely to the unmasking of all forms of human vanity, this text acquired some popularity in the Netherlands. Van Hoogstraten was particularly interested in the chapter ‘On the Vanity of Beauty’. He endorses the view developed there that ideal beauty in women (with the exception of the Mother of God) does not exist: ‘There is still always a small flaw that clouds the clear glass of their mirror’. When Van Hoogstraten calls De la Serre ‘a shrewd assay-master’, this is a double-edged remark: the *Ydelheden* describes feminine beauty only to conclude with a summing-up of the blemishes concealed beneath that outward appearance. On closer inspection, believes De la Serre, the forehead of the admired woman is ‘no more nor less than a mirror of the Churchyard: For the wrinkles are so many tracked paths leading to the grave’. In reality, the eyes are ‘full of pus and matter that seeps from their red corners’, and the seemingly charming mouth is nothing but ‘a fountain-head of saliva and a thousand other impurities’, while the white teeth are ‘small bones’.

De la Serre concludes that physical beauty is only a transient outer shell. Van Hoogstraten describes in similar terms how great ugliness lurks in the seemingly idyllic ‘Dutch
Arcady’. The function of the ‘fair ugliness’ he refers to in this regard is patently to point up the vanity of the visible world and of supposed physical beauty. The purpose of the ‘praise of ugliness’ might be to make a vanitas comment on physical and pictorial beauty. As will become clearer in chapter VI, this ambiguity in the thinking about the ‘lower’ genres, and the paradox of ‘praising the unpraiseworthy’, are relevant to various aspects of Van Hoogstraten’s theory.

The painterly and the transitory

We have already encountered the concept of diversitas in regard to quotations from Goeree and Huygens: the ‘eternal difference’ between things in the visible world from which the omnipotence of the Creator can be seen (see pages 106-107). Goeree positions these comments in a discussion of the picturesque (‘The Word “Painterly” Wrongly Used’) and it is interesting in the context of this concept to return to the notion of diversitas. As we have seen, the terms veranderlijkheid and verscheidenheid are used in art theory, where veranderlijkheid, ‘changeability’, comes close to the philosophical term diversitas and has connotations that are bound up with the atomistic complexity and transience of the visible world, while verscheidenheid is equivalent to the rhetorical varietas, the variety that contributes to the pleasing appearance of a work of art (see above, page 105).

The topical emphasis on ‘diversity’ is related in art theory both to the great variation in human appearance and to the landscape. Goeree emphasizes that the magnitude of the diversity of human faces is evidence of God’s greatness. He links this reasoning to a view of mathematical infinity: the ‘variety [of human faces] [is] as great ... as the number of fractions between two Numbers could be or be conceived; that is, according to our ‘Thinking, infinitely large’. In his passage on the landscape Van Hoogstraten urges painters to look particularly at the ‘dissimilarities’ between the different trees and plants and to depict all things ‘each with its own properties’. Varietas recurs in the Inleyding in the context of composition, but relates primarily to the use of colour and the handling of paint. Van Hoogstraten speaks of the ‘landscape of a thousand broken colours’.

Goeree takes his link between diversitas and the picturesque from Huygens’s Oogenstroost. In this text, Huygens analyses how the concept of schilderachtig is being used, taking as his point of departure his observation that no two drops of water, two eggs, pears or faces are the same and that ‘The power and the glory / of the first Creator are revealed in the eternal difference / of all that was and is ...’. The term schilderachtig is apparently so general that it has often fallen victim to misuse, when people use it to describe not a painting, but the landscape itself so that the divine power of Creation is confused with mankind’s infinitely inferior artistic powers. People should not wrongfully seize upon the commonplace Deus pictor to judge nature according to the standards of the paintings made by man, as Goeree stresses yet again: ‘otherwise the Painting would be the original, and perfect nature a mere Copy’. The passage makes it plain that it is precisely the contingencies of the visible world – water drops, fruit, faces and the like – that are assessed with the concept of schilderachtig by seventeenth-century artists.

The way that Goeree and Huygens associate the term schilderachtig with the philosophical awareness of the multiplicity of the visible world calls to mind a well-known passage from
the tradition of art theory: Bellori’s description of the followers of Caravaggio as ‘naturalists’, a coinage we find echoed in Scannelli that requires some explanation. In his condemnation of artists who ‘glory in the name of Naturalists’ (si gloriano del nome di Naturalisti), Bellori reaches for his most extreme weapon: he compares them to the philosophers of antiquity who were adherents of atomism. According to him, these artists are ‘like Leucippus and Democritus, who [state that] bodies [are] solely put together by chance, with very vain atoms (che con vanissimi atomi a caso compongono li corpi)’. He accuses the atomist philosophers of focusing on contingencies, not universalities, while denying the importance of Platonic Ideas. With their emphasis on chance and fundamental diversity, he asserts, these philosophers are like the artists who focus on naturalezza. They even regard the senses as more important than the mind, thus initiating the decline of painting ‘by depriving the mind of its job and ascribing everything to the senses ... they condemned painting to [individual] opinion and to talent [rather than rules of art]’.

Goeree and Huygens’s use of the term ‘painterly’ in connection with the ‘eternal difference’ makes it clear that it could serve to put a positive spin on a denunciation like Bellori’s of artists whose work was based on chance and contingencies. Bellori’s criticism of classical scepticism seems to refer implicitly to the revival of atomism in seventeenth-century mechanistic philosophy. The way modern ‘naturalistic’ painters were connected to the concept of the picturesque and to seventeenth-century philosophical atomism is exemplified by Vondel’s Bespiegelingen van Godt en Godsdiens (Contemplations on God and Religion, 1662), a work in which artists who concentrate on ‘painterly’ subjects are compared with the modern philosophers who reinstated classical atomism, by which Vondel means Spinoza, for one.

Vondel, with whose literary work Van Hoogstraten was certainly familiar, comes out strongly against atomism in his Bespiegelingen. Like Bellori, he mentions Leucippus and Democritus: they are the exemplary atomists of antiquity. Critics of the ‘new philosophy’ in the seventeenth century often use their names in a pejorative sense, comparing them with the modern philosophers they also call ‘Epicurists’: thinkers who are said to couple an immoral ethos to their assumption of the transient and chance foundations of reality.

As a metaphor for the atomism of modern philosophy, Vondel uses the subjects chosen by the painters of his day, who do not trouble themselves about the ‘rules of art’, about ideal beauty or about other principles of composition, but appear to give chance free rein. In the chapter titled ‘That the World Did Not Come about by Chance, and out of Whirling Particles’, he attacks philosophers who argue that the world is made up of ‘brute chance / the coalescing of indivisible particles / and dust’. He believes that structure is brought to this chaos by an ordaining mind. He will not accept that ‘dame Nature or any savage chance’ is a fundamental principle, pointing instead to the omnipresence of God; ‘Without hand and paint Nature cannot paint a landscape / What can this brute chance do? Only brutalize.’ Vondel compares atomist philosophers with artists who choose ‘painterly’ subjects. Leucippus himself, he says, gave painters the idea of going in search of an old, dilapidated and plundered house. They were to look at the house through a telescope (the exemplary attribute of modern physicists) and focus on ‘chance’ details. According to Vondel, they were supposed to evoke:
‘In cobweb and in dust …
What diversities of round and straight lines manifest themselves
flourish after flourish! …
What skilful draughtsman
observes so many heads, so many figures!
...It seems that Raphael’s spirit or Titian’s arose,
or the ingenuity of [Michel]angeio, Bassano or Veronese.’

In this ironic passage the great artists admit that they are outdone by the beauty of chance:
‘they stand shamefaced, and cry that the materials / of pure chance surpass nature and life
itself’. In his attack on this predilection for ‘diversities’ and coincidences, Vondel cites the
classical anecdote about the role of chance in painting: Protogenes throwing his sponge at his
painting. Vondel finds nothing to commend this method.

Vondel associates the ‘diversities’ that the artist aims for with the world of minute
particles seen through a microscope. This identification of a world view based on contingencies
with specific schilderachtig elements can be traced back to the tradition of art theory. Painting’s
supposed concentration on the purely ‘outward’ aspects of reality is a recurrent topos in the
paragone between painting and the other arts. Varchi observed that painting, unlike science,
focuses on ‘inessential’ – in other words contingent – things: ‘art is a productive occupation …
that focuses on those things that are not necessary (quelle cose che non sono necessarie) … One says
“those things that are not necessary”, because all art revolves around contingent things, that
is to say things that can equally be or not be (che possono essere e non essere egualmente)’. In his
discourse on the paragone, Galileo commented that the power of painting, which concentrates
by its very nature on outward appearance, consists in the fact that it can depict the ‘infinite’
number of changing manifestations of things.

It is clear from Vondel’s remarks that, in the seventeenth-century debate about art, the
‘modern’ subjects chosen by artists were associated with simultaneous developments in philo-
sophy. (His outright criticism of the so-called ‘new philosophy’ and of modern painting alike
finds no echo in Van Hoogstraten; when Van Hoogstraten compares artists and philosophers,
it is always in a positive light, as we will discuss in more detail at the end of this book.) Philo-
sophical atomism remained a contentious issue at the end of the seventeenth century. Criticism
of it was largely silenced by the emergence of physico-theology, which held that the ordering
hand of God could be recognized everywhere, even (or perhaps pre-eminently) in the world
of the smallest particles. At the same time, the principle of diversitas was an important factor in
the philosophy of Leibniz, who visited Spinoza in The Hague in 1676. There is an illustration
showing Leibniz using two leaves from a tree to demonstrate that no two elements of Creation
are absolutely identical (fig. 96). It illustrates how the principle described by Huygens as the
‘eternal difference’ became a key aspect of his philosophy.

Before we move on from these connections between transience and the schilderachtig, we
should note that the atomistic view of reality that gives rise to a concept of the contingency and
vanity of the visible world is not just accepted thinking in mechanistic philosophy – it also ties
in with the Neostoic world view that left its mark in Van Hoogstraten’s writings. The classical
Stoics based their ideas on the atomism of Epicurus and Democritus; their doctrine is founded
on a far-reaching belief in fate: the *fatum stoicum*. The theme of free will is a problematic point here: if everything is the result of colliding particles, there can be no room for free will and so in essence there is no possible redemption other than divine mercy. This is why Stoic dogmata focus on the vanity of earthly existence, like *non omnis moriar* (I will not die entirely), *in morte vita* (only in death is [true] life), *virtus immortalis* (virtue is immortal) or *finis coronat opus* (the end is the crown on the work).\(^\text{287}\) Pascal’s famous remark, ‘How great is the vanity of painting, which attracts admiration for its resemblance to things that are not even admired in the original!’\(^\text{288}\), reveals how the awareness of the fundamental impossibility of the pictorial likeness, the vanity of this art in general, and its focus on ‘atoms’, on contingencies, can be combined in a single train of thought.
We may infer from Pascal’s well-known aphorism that it is above all the particular sort of painting that concentrates on simple, marginal and ‘lower’ subjects that should be regarded as fundamentally vain. It was precisely those paintings with ‘painterly’ subjects, landscapes and still-lifes, that had such an inherent connotation of vanity and transience. The concepts of ‘painterly’ and ‘eternal difference’ can be interpreted to refer automatically to the vanity of the visible world. Philips Angel, for instance, associates veranderlijkheid with vanitas. He urges painters to choose the subject ‘where the greatest Glory is to be got, seeking it in Nature which is so abundant in its changeability’, preceding this with the observation that ‘there are no things here below on which the Sun shines that are ensured of enduring for ever: for they are subject to changeability, nothing maintains an immovable self-sustaining position, except only unchanging everlasting God’. Frans van Hoogstraten elaborated upon this idea in his Schoole der wereld, in a passage ‘On Contemplating a “Painterly” Landscape’; it has the motto: ‘That worldly beauty and pleasures are as nothing to the beauty of Heaven and the joy of the Blessed’. Jan de Brune also considered the concept of veranderlijkheid in a landscape context, remarking: ‘Everything in the world is uncertain and changeable. Mountains change into valleys and valleys back into mountains.

Painterly subjects and the rough manner

The analysis of the term ‘painterly’ would not be complete without an observation about the relationship between the Italian word pittoresco and the Dutch schilderachtig. The posited relationship between colour and landscape prompts the hypothesis that there is a degree of lexical overlap of the two terms. The Italian term pittoresco refers to the ‘loose’ or ‘rough manner’, leaving the brushstroke visible, and to the function of chance in the creation of pictorial illusion. In the subjects described as schilderachtig in the Dutch tradition, chance and the veranderlijkheid of the colours of the objects depicted, particularly in the landscape, are central. The selection of a painterly subject can probably not be seen in isolation from a particular style that is carried through into aspects of the brushwork, the handling; Philip Sohm studied this with regard to the English usage of the term ‘picturesque’.

We have already seen how the choice of subject and style were related in the debate about the ‘rough’ versus the ‘fine’ manner. It has become clear that in the landscape genre a painter can allow himself considerable licence in both the ‘painterly’ choice of subject and in colouristic virtuosity. Van Hoogstraten consequently examines ‘the Handling or Manner of Painting’ immediately after his passage on the landscape in the chapter on colour. Among other things, he associates the representation of the landscape with making rapid sketches and laying in the composition roughly in contrasting tones, with leaving the underpainting visible and with the use of chance elements. He encourages young artists to: ‘Make your pen strokes loose, and without restraint depict only the grace and shadows of things. This manner is also the most suitable for drawing the Landscape from life.

In the light of these various connotations, we may conclude that the Dutch vocabulary surrounding the concept of schilderachtig is closely interwoven with, and a further differentiation of, the painter’s alleged universality – his ability to depict the variety, changeability, and ‘eternal difference’ of the visible world.
THE MUTE RHETORIC OF THE VISIBLE WORLD

The supposed persuasive powers of colour and tone are essential elements in the judgement of the painted landscape in rhetorical terms. Hence the discourse about colour, with its affective as well as deceptive properties, is closely related to more general ideas about the rhetorical qualities of the ‘Book of Nature’, the visible world in general.

Titian’s reputation in art theory as both a colourist and a landscape painter was probably a crucial factor in Rembrandt’s exercises in the painted landscape, which may have been part of a specific modus in which great persuasiveness was ascribed to the ‘control of light and shade’. In his letter to Titian, Aretino compares the beauty of the landscape with the painter’s skill in chiaroscuro: ‘I turn my eyes to the sky, which has never since it was created by God been adorned with such a magnificent painting of shadows and lights’. Ornatus and varietas appear as terms to describe the colourist powers of God as ‘painter of Creation’. In his Schoole der wereld Frans van Hoogstraten writes that ‘all the manifold objects of Creation around us … are each in a particular way engaged in adorning themselves, and they endeavour together, graced with so many ornaments, to be pleasing in men’s sight’. The landscape described in this poem is compared to a painting. The same thinking is found in Van den Bos’s translation of Castiglione, who believes that painting is a valuable pursuit for a courtier because it concentrates on the work of the Creator, by whom the ‘structure of the Heavens … is adorned with so many glittering stars’. Van den Bos sums up cosmic ornatus:

‘The earth amidst so many seas, studded with mountains, valleys, trees of every kind, flowing with rivers, sown with countless plants and beautiful flowers, can rightly be called a beautiful painting painted by God and nature: imitating which, it seems to me, is no small glory, and one which one cannot easily achieve without having knowledge of many things.’

The link between the supposed rhetorical effect of painting and the pleasing atmosphere of the rural environment is summed up by Junius. In his view, all human rhetoric is feeble in comparison to the powerful persuasion of God as painter, as Creator of the cosmos, the ornamentum of the visible world. Junius concludes that the painterly variety of bountiful organic nature is not equalled by the orator: he argues that ‘no man is so well able to speake, but Nature is still a great deal better able to paint, especially when shee meaneth to make her selfe some sport in the midst of her jolly fertilitie’.

We can add to Junius’s remark the paradoxical notion in art theory that the ‘Book of Nature’ has greater rhetorical power than Scripture itself. We have already discussed Paleotti’s idea that all peoples can understand the ‘silent voices’ of created things: ‘there is no people or language or condition of men that cannot understand these silent voices which come from the things created by God and embody his greatness and majesty’ (see above, page 117). This author argues that ‘books are read only by the few who understand them, whereas paintings reach all classes of people in a universal way’. Painting is thus more eloquent than rhetoric in expressing the beauty of Creation: ‘and in this view we do not confine ourselves to the books of the historians, rhetoricians, poets or others, because painting … disseminates its greatness in every subject, and imparts its message … in all places and to all people, and thus well nigh imitates divine nature and excellence’.
Here painting joins in a paragone debate between rhetoric on the one hand and philosophy on the other, in which the arguments in support of rhetoric are also deemed applicable to art. With its ‘open palm’, so the argument goes, rhetoric reaches a wider audience than the ‘closed fist’ of philosophy. In this respect painting actually surpasses rhetoric; the ‘mute poetry’ of painting is more rhetorical than rhetoric itself. This is why in the final analysis the Book of Nature is perhaps more easily read than Scripture. Paleotti believes that ‘with a single glance at a painting we understand far more things than we do from the prolonged reading of all manner of books’.²⁰³ As we have already seen, Van Hoogstraten took the view that only unbelievers refused to recognize the omnipotence of the Creator in his Creation, ‘for they call into question what is preached by the birds of the air, the unreasoning animals and the insensate things’.²⁰⁴

According to this thinking, the affective and rhetorical powers of the painted landscape fit into Van Hoogstraten’s more general theory about painting as ‘universal knowledge’ of the visible world and painting as contemplative attention to the ‘Book of Nature’. But we must add the observation that the deceptive qualities of the colours in the painted landscape also refer as *pars pro toto* to the deceptive nature of the visible world in general. According to this reasoning, colour has a mentally salubrious, restorative effect in more than a superficial sense: the ‘silent rhetoric’ of the visible world can also foster the ultimate salvation of the soul by persuading the viewer of the transience of earthly things.

On the one hand, the magnificent colours of the visible world are described in Dutch art theory as something that effectively seduces the senses; on the other, they are deemed to generate nothing more than an illusion, based on chance and deceit. These views are bound up with the prevailing early modern ideas about the confrontation between man and nature. The natural environment may lead to an awareness of the impermanence of human existence; thus Bredero says that nature teaches the lesson of mortality, for example because flowers wither and die.²⁰⁵ In Hooft’s Arcadian prose, which is quoted in the *Inleyding*, the beauty of nature is contrasted to that of architecture because nature is constantly changing, whereas architecture does not (and will eventually become wearisome).²⁰⁶ A very explicit definition of the ephemeral nature of the beauty of landscape can be found in De la Serre’s book, from which Van Hoogstraten quotes when he writes about depicting ugliness. In De la Serre’s view, the beauty of nature is essentially blighted by its deceptive and transitory character.

‘Nothing pleases me [in the landscape], everything dissatisfies me. ... The sky has no beauty that does not make itself dreadful in an instant: for in the blink of an eye it covers its face with lightning, and thunderstorms. ... The Flowers flatter the sight: but do not please the spirit, because they bloom but for one morning. ... The Trees have some semblance of beauty but it is as brittle as the leaves from which they are composed.’

De la Serre ends this passage by remarking that art will never succeed in depicting nature satisfactorily.²⁰⁷ Using the same tropes, the poet Josua Stegmann associates the different aspects of the landscape, such as rainbows, snow, flowers, mist and so forth, with the vanity of earthly things:
‘What, then, is our life
but only trouble and vanity: ...
Snow that vanishes in Spring ...
a rainbow that is gone so soon
a mist driven away by the sun
a red sky that lasts as long as dawn ...
a leaf, turned over by the wind.’

While the contemplation of landscape would probably automatically evoke these vanitas connotations in the seventeenth-century viewer without the necessity of iconographic cues, the landscape could also act as an iconographic reinforcement of narrative compositions with vanity as their subject. This is apparently the case in pictures of Narcissus or Mary Magdalen that allude to the transience of both physical beauty and the elaborate rural setting. This can be put across even more forcefully by adding a skull or a mirror (fig. 97).

The transient and deceptive qualities of landscape lead us to a consideration of the ambiguity contained in the phrase ‘mirror of nature’ in the seventeenth century. Creation itself is the ‘mirror of nature’ if the genitive in the term is understood as a subjective genitive: nature mirrors the Creator. The Creator as Deus pictor can hence be recognized in the visible world. This is a theme that appears explicitly in the art theories of authors as different as De Holanda, Junius and Von Sandart, and is quite common in the Dutch literature of the seventeenth century. Castiglione uses the commonplace to point up the worth of painting, and Reyer Anslo writes in his Schilderkroon (Crown of Painting, first printed in 1713) that a painter’s efforts can be compared to God’s creative powers:

‘[Art] creates with paint, on canvas and panels,
all visible things ...
as did God, when he first created
this great universe from nothing ...
How he acquitted himself in the landscape, ...
thus we have the supreme power,
as if in a painting, before our eyes.”

As we have seen, in *De Schoole der wereld* Frans van Hoogstraten ranks worldly beauty as inferior to that of life after death. The author comes to the conclusion that the sole function of the beauty we see around us is to point toward the beauty of heaven, in other words the ‘invisible world’:

‘But yet there is, although one here
sees nature’s forms in all their glory,
a prospect that pleases us more ...
I mean Heaven, that one sees,
above the pleasing vista here.
No prospect on which our eye may dwell,
but it is defined in this.’

According to the poet, the beauty of the whole of the visible world is as nothing compared with the contemplation of a fraction of life after death:

‘The whole aspect of the earthly globe
– how many wonders it ever contained –
has, if one judges it on its worth,
less beauty than a palm’s breadth
of Heaven’s glittering canopy ...
Oh say, my soul, how little is
the worth of the world’s most beauteous land
when you have once reflected on
the beauty of the Heavenly Throne!’

The notion that nature reflects God can obviously lead directly to thoughts of *vanitas* – what is important, it seems, is the invisible, not the visible world. Frans van Hoogstraten similarly wants to appreciate ‘the manifold essence around us’ only inasmuch as it focuses his attention on the Creator: contemplation of the visible only has a function when it moves the beholder ‘with his mind on high’ to ‘praise God ... with a thankful soul’. The next chapter will discuss how these ideas on religious contemplation are not necessarily confined to the landscape, but can extend to include the whole visible world; suffice it here to refer again to Paleotti’s words on the mute rhetoric of painting as the ‘book of the illiterate’. He argues that:

‘with regard to profane paintings ... we are well aware that one can derive something useful from many things that appear trivial ... for anyone gifted with intellect and judgement can distil great wisdom even from birds, fish, flowers ... and stones; it is actually for precisely this reason that all the created things in this world are shown to
us, so that by way of visible things we acquire knowledge of and a desire for the eternal, invisible things.”

Paleotti concludes that ‘villas, fountains and palaces’ are not painted solely to please the eye: ‘the eye of a good Christian must penetrate through them’ (l’occhio del cristiano deve penetrare più oltre) so that pleasure may be combined with benefit.

Colour, which enables the painter to depict a multitude of contingencies, has proved to constitute an important topic in Van Hoogstraten’s ideas on the representation of the visible world. The theory of the persuasiveness of the image is of key significance here. Unlike drawing, colour is deemed to have a direct impact on the ‘sensitive’ part of the soul and hence on the emotions that are in direct relation to the body. It can thus contribute significantly to the suggestion of being transported into a virtual reality. This chapter has explored how several notions derived from rhetoric can legitimize not only pictorial exercises in the ‘rough manner’ but also a genre such as the painted landscape. In terms of rhetorical theory it is specifically the handeling, the brushwork, with which the painter is deemed able to transform paint into a virtual reality, and which is therefore of fundamental importance in procuring an affective response. Various formal and thematic elements have been examined in the light of the concepts of ornatus and color, varietas and veranderlijkheid. We have seen that the fundamentally deceptive and vain character of painting is a factor in all these concepts.

More general notions like persuasion, brevity and performativity recur in the debate about rough and fine painting. We have seen how the ‘rough’ manner makes it possible to look at a painting in two ways: first with a view to being immersed in the illusion and second by getting close to the surface of the paint so that traces of the artist’s hand are revealed. The two perspectives work together in the delightful deception of painting. The ‘dual perspective’ combined in this technique is explored more fully in the next chapter, which argues that there is more at stake than a showing-off of pictorial artifice; the play with two perspectives reflects a popular intellectual theme in the seventeenth century that was used to bring to light various inherent contradictions in the prevailing world view.

Van Hoogstraten includes a passage about landscape painting in his chapter on colour as the obvious place for the painter’s ‘license to experiment’. His views on landscape are an elaboration of the traditional view that condemns Netherlanders for their excessive attention to detail; it is precisely the universal scope of painting, which focuses on all the contingencies of the ‘entire visible world’, that is at the heart of his theory. A talent for the landscape is consequently an essential attribute of a painter who wants to develop as ‘universal master’; in this field an artist like Rembrandt could measure himself against greats like Titian and Rubens.

Colour’s power to depict the diversity and ‘changeability’ of the visible world has been related to the artist’s choice of picturesque subjects. The concept of schilderachtig thematizes the idea that painting which concentrates on the ‘entire visible world’ also depicts ugly things. The depiction of ugliness is not an explicit goal in Van Hoogstraten’s treatise; ugly subjects are, however, of necessity among the contingencies that painting portrays. Unlike Bellori and
Vondel, he does not appear to condemn modern painters who are compared with philosophers who hold this ‘atomistic’ view of the value of chance.

Although the painter focuses merely on the ‘outside’ of reality, his art is not condemned to remain superficial: the mute rhetoric of painting, which observes the ever-changing particulars of the visible world, can act to involve the viewer all the more closely in the everlasting, invisible world. Thus, landscape painting is deemed to have not just a physically healing effect; it can also contribute to the salvation of the beholder. The next chapter will proceed to probe further into the dichotomy of inside and outside, or semblance and reality: the fundamental division of reality into ‘visible’ and ‘invisible’ worlds.
Chapter VI

PAINTING AS A MIRROR OF NATURE
Fig. 98 – Sebastiaan Vranckx, *Harbour with the Children of Mercury*. Musée Massey, Tarbes.
Chapter VI

Painting as a Mirror of Nature

Angelo: Nay, women are frail too.
Isabella: Ay, as the glasses where they view themselves,
Which are as easy broke as they make forms.
... Nay, call us ten times frail,
For we are soft as our complexions are,
And credulous to false prints.
Shakespeare, Measure for Measure

Mercury is the master of eloquence and the inventor of the lie.
Marsilio Ficino, De vita libri tres

Van Hoogstraten’s comparison of a painting to ‘a mirror of Nature, which makes things seem to be that are not’, is probably the best-known quotation from the Inleyding. He holds that art ‘reflects the whole of nature’, calls it a ‘sister of reflexive Philosophy’ and describes the general tasks of painters in terms of ‘infinite reflections’. This mirror metaphor is not as simple as it may appear: it relates to the deceptive quality of the image produced by the painter. The positive appreciation of deception that sounds in the metaphor was developed primarily in the classical theory of rhetoric. Indeed, rhetoric derives its success ultimately not from a conclusive demonstration of proof but from its persuasiveness. In pursuit of persuasion, orators are even permitted to tell lies; Ficino clarifies this duplicity by noting that Mercury is the inventor of eloquence and of the lie. In the seventeenth century, artists and orators alike were presented as deceivers, for instance in a painting by Sebastiaan Vrancx of the Children of Mercury: a group including merchants, a quack, actors, a painter and a sculptor. Goltzius’s print of the same subject depicts, besides the painter, sculptor and quack, a preaching cleric and a theatre in the background, while the foreground shows two orators debating (figs. 98 and 99).

In the context of the mirror metaphor, we shall discuss the problematic relationship between the pictorial image and reality. Just as Van Mander writes that mirrors display ‘only the appearance of true essence, but not truth itself’, seventeenth-century art theory posits the vanity of all knowledge provided by ‘the mirror of nature’. The fundamental duplicity of ‘seeming’
as opposed to ‘being’, which follows from Van Hoogstraten’s view that painting ‘makes things appear to be that are not’, besides being a topic in art theory, also turns up as a theme in works of art. This kind of playing with painterly illusion may be a pleasing diversion for the honnête homme, but it is not lacking in a serious undertone. Artistic illusion is ultimately unmasked in an ethical framework predicated on the vanity of sensory knowledge and of earthly existence as such. We shall explore the way in which the art-theoretical debate on the dualism of seeming as opposed to being springs from the dualism of a philosophical stance contrasting visible and invisible worlds.

After tracing the origins of the comparison of painting to a mirror, the discussion will move to Van Hoogstraten’s comments on the deceptiveness of art in the context of rhetorical theory and courtiers’ treatises, and elaborate his views on the vanity of painting on the basis of several texts invoked in the Inleyding, by authors such as Agrippa, Michelangelo and De Mor-
nay. Their assumptions about the fundamental ambivalence of art, and of visual reality itself, will then be looked at in relation to the philosophical significance of the art of painting as a contemplative focus on the visible. Finally, the relationship between art theory and painting practice will be discussed on the basis of two case studies.

**PAINTINGS AS MIRRORS**

The comparison of a painting to a mirror of nature is a recurrent theme in the tradition of art theory. From the beginning of this tradition in the fifteenth century onwards, however, there was another metaphor that possessed more conceptual weight: the Albertian label of a painting as a window on nature. When paintings were first compared to mirrors in the Italian tradition, the overtones were pejorative: the emphasis was on the ephemeral and intangible qualities of painting, as compared to sculpture. Thus, Benvenuto Cellini writes, in 1564: ‘the art of painting is no different from a tree or person or something else being reflected in a stream. The difference between sculpture and painting is as great as that between a shadow and whatever is casting the shadow’.

Similarly, Paolo Pino states that a painting merely presents us with a reflection, and is wholly inferior to nature itself.

In the course of the sixteenth century, the mirror metaphor came to be used in a positive sense. This is first evident in the writings of Lucas de Heere, whose eulogy to the Adoration of the Lamb (1432) by the brothers Van Eyck praises the triptych’s panels in these words: ‘They are mirrors, mirrors are they; no, they are not Pictures.’ In the seventeenth century, this positive connotation is echoed in Italy, with Marco Boschini observing that the art of painting is ‘most certainly a mirror of nature’. In the Netherlands, Van Hoogstraten was not the only theorist to emphasize the comparison: De Lairesse writes that the merits of painting may be represented by a personification of Nature to whom a mirror is held up.

It will be argued here that the changing appreciation in art theory of the phrase ‘mirror of nature’ relates to an evolution of the view that the art of painting is concerned with nothing more or less than the aspects of things capable of being mirrored – that is, their outward appearance – and does not penetrate to their inner ‘essence’. In the tradition of art theory, Benedetto Varchi, for instance, discusses this distinction in terms of dentro and fuori (inside and outside): ‘poets chiefly imitate what is inside (il di dentro), that is, thoughts and the passions of the mind ... while painters chiefly imitate what is outside (il di fuori), that is, bodies and the rendering of the texture of all things’. In his comparison of sculpture and painting, Varchi distinguishes sostanza and accidenti: while sculpture supposedly focuses on ‘substance’, the subject of the art of painting is what he calls ‘accidental qualities’. Van Hoogstraten too, elaborating on Zuccari’s views on disegno interno and disegno esterno, notes that painting focuses on external appearances; we may recall his comment that ‘In [the] exploration of nature, painters ‘need consider only her visible aspect’. Their ‘reflections’ thus focus on the outward qualities of things: ‘just as wine, enclosed in a flask, takes on the appearance of a goblet, the shape of the bottle becomes the object that a Painter reflects.’

Goeree elaborates the inside-outside discussion systematically in relation to the mirror metaphor, basing himself on Descartes’s distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ mental images. He distinguishes categorically between mental images and sensory impressions, and
emphasizes that while the former can easily lead to misconceptions, sensory impressions leave little room for doubt. ‘Internal’ mental images ‘display to the Soul certain innate Ideas … and Thoughts of eternal Truths’. External images, on the other hand, ‘come from the objects of the visible World, through or by the Mediation of the external Senses … just as these Mental images are displayed in the Mind like the things in a Mirror, but are by no means actually made by it’ (italics mine).16 Goeree apparently compares the intellect to a mirror that displays the ideas produced by the senses, a rendering of only the outside of things, exactly as these are presented by the visible world.

It is this focus on the outside that supposedly underlies the deceptive nature of both mirrors and paintings. This is emphasized by authors such as Agrippa and De Brune, both of whom Van Hoogstraten invokes. De Brune compares pictures to mirrors on account of their supposedly deceptive character.17 Analyzing the phenomenon of hypocrisy (Gheveynstheyd), he posits: ‘The mirror lies, appearances are deceptive’.18 This focus on the deceptive quality of mirrors increased from the sixteenth century onwards, as an essential part of the intellectual culture of curiosity.19

The negative connotations of superficiality and deceptiveness accompanying the mirror metaphor may be offset by the alleged capacity of mirrors to produce images of all the objects in the visible world. Art theory therefore compares the mirror to the human power of imagination, echoing a comparison expressed most concisely by Bacon who writes that God ‘[has] framed the mind of man as a mirror or glass capable of the image of the universal world’.20 This same universal capability is the basis for Leonardo’s comparison of the painter’s spirit to a mirror ‘that constantly changes into the colour of whatever is before it, and fills itself with as many likenesses as there are things confronting it’.21 Leonardo’s train of thought leads Zuccari to define art as ‘a mirror of rich nature’ that extends as far and wide as the human power of imagination. In his view, art is ‘a faithful rendering of all mental images (concetti) that one may imagine, through the power of light and dark on a surface covered with paint, which displays all manner of shapes and depth without bodily substance (senza sostanza di corpo)’.22 Van Hoogstraten’s definition of art as capable of rendering all the ‘mental images’ that ‘the entire visible world can provide’ and which thus makes things ‘appear to be’, is close to Zuccari’s.23 His mirror comparison resembles metaphors used in Dutch writings in reference to the painter’s supposed ‘reflection’ and ‘mirroring’ (speculeren and bespiegelen) of nature.24 Goeree, for instance, compares the activity of a painter to that of ‘reflecting on natural things’, while Van Hoogstraten refers to painting as a sister of ‘reflective philosophy’.25 Thus, within seventeenth-century art theory, the mirror metaphor is linked initially not to self-reflection, but to the universal range of art to comprehend everything that is visible or even conceivable.26

The tendency to identify mirrors with the art of painting and with the imagination is ultimately based on the visual character, as posited in Aristotelian psychology, of both the power of imagination and the memory, as we have discussed above (see pages 134-136). In this context, Van Mander compares Goltzius’s memory to a mirror.27 De Lairesse uses the mirror comparison to indicate that a person’s nature is determined in large measure by his surroundings, which are ‘imprinted’ on his mind: ‘while our brains are as a glass ball suspended in the middle of a room, which is touched by, and retains an impression of, all the objects that appear there’. From this he infers that the most convincing painter is he who confines himself to ‘de-
picting what he sees every day’. Junius too uses the mirror metaphor to clarify that a painter must base his inventions solely on images presented to him by the visible world.

This short historical overview suggests that when Van Hoogstraten compares a painting to a mirror, he is emphasizing the deceptiveness of art and the fact that it is geared solely towards the ‘accidental’ aspects of things and not towards their substance. This conclusion is at odds with the Albertian comparison of painting as a ‘window on the world’ and with the classical theory that a painting, like an orator’s speech, conjures up a virtual reality. On the one hand, the mirror metaphor suggests that a painting cannot represent ‘the things themselves’ and shows only the outside. On the other hand, the ‘reflective’ aspects of art as geared towards contingencies of the visible world determine an important positive quality of painting: its universal scope, capable of depicting ‘all ideas, or mental images, that the entire visible world can provide’. The focus below will be on the connotations of superficiality and deceptiveness that are linked to the mirror metaphor. How should Van Hoogstraten’s views regarding the deceptive nature of art be construed in relation to his positive observations about the art of painting, as ‘universal knowledge’ and as a ‘sister of philosophy’?

**Deceiving the Eye**

Immediately following the mirror metaphor in the *Inleyding* comes Van Hoogstraten’s famous definition of the art of painting as a form of deception: ‘a mirror of Nature, making things appear to be that are not, and deceiving in a permissible, delightful and commendable way’. Like the mirror metaphor, Van Hoogstraten’s central conviction that a painting serves ‘to deceive the eye’ can be construed in more than one way. It may be traced back all the way to Plato’s banishment of painters, along with poets and orators, from his ideal state, because they focus their efforts not on truth but on deceptive appearances and have the effect of confusing that section of the population that is ‘too susceptible to agitations of the mind’, to quote Van Mander.

It is striking that Van Hoogstraten and many of his contemporaries emphasize this deceptive nature of painting without echoing Plato’s censure. In his description of the different parts of painting, Van Hoogstraten repeatedly uses the words ‘appearance’, ‘seeming’, ‘deception’ and ‘deceptive’. In this respect he follows in his predecessors’ footsteps: Angel speaks of the ‘seeming without being’ that the painter presents to our eyes, the ‘real-seeming guise’ or ‘sham-real power’ of painting. Van Mander compares painting to ‘a shadow of the true thing, and a sham of being’, and Huygens notes in relation to the art of painting that similitude and truth are incompatible variables. He repeats Tacitus’s words that art is close to deception (*patebre breve confinum artis et falsi*). The seventeenth-century literature of art abounds with this emphasis on deception, one example of which will suffice: the engraver Richard Haydocke’s observation (1598) that ‘[t]he skill of the workman consisteth in shewing False and deceitfull sights insteade of the true’.

Especially in the sixteenth century, this emphasis on the deceptive quality of paintings became the subject of debate. Several versions of the paragone-comparisons between painting and sculpture and between drawing and colour emphasize that precisely because painting focuses on contingencies and ephemeral elements of the visible world, it risks becoming mere
illusion, a surface, and empty allure. Vasari believes, for instance, that ‘sculpture is as superior to painting as truth is to lies’, while Cellini points out that the empty allure of paintings beguiles viewers into taking them for the truth. The traditional debate is summarized in Goeree’s comment that paintings are regarded as ‘misleading in appearance or as in a dream’ (toonschijnig or waanschijnig) because ‘the things in a painted Picture only seem to be, but in truth they are not’: by contrast, the things represented in a sculpture are ‘true to life, in three dimensions, capable of being grasped and touched’. It is striking that comparisons between poetry and painting also berate the latter for its mendacity. ‘How far is truth from a Lie? / As far as Ears are from Eyes’ writes Huygens.

In these comparisons, the main feature of paintings to be cited in their favour is the delight that springs from successful imitation. Speroni writes that the delight of imitation is common to all the visual arts: imitation ‘makes things seem real and that leads us to the syllogism hoc est hoc’. Art evidently consists of a procedure in which the viewer is led to conclude from a number of ‘arguments’ that are presented to him that one thing (the work of art) is the same as the other (the visible world). Now it might be said that sculpture provides an additional argument in this respect compared to painting, namely that of its three-dimensionality. But Speroni writes that mere ‘identity’ is less challenging than similarity: while the latter exists by virtue of a difference in ‘substance’, simple identity asks for no artistic skill. In this respect, he compares the art of painting to that of rhetoric: both activities are geared solely towards the surface of things (la estrema superficie) and deceive the people. Following this topical approach, Galileo, inspired by his belief that the less the mode of imitation corresponds to what is imitated, the greater will be the effect of delight (see above, page 240), prefers painting to sculpture with the argument that sculptors ‘imitate things as they are, and painters as they appear’, similar views are expressed by Angel and De Brune in the Netherlands.

Another paragone-debate is inclined to favour the art of painting: traditional comparisons of painting and rhetoric emphasize the great persuasive power of the image. Since it partakes directly of the physical world, the visual image is expected to ‘affect’ the viewer’s imagination far more directly than rhetoric or poetry. The ‘deceit’ of painting is therefore deemed greater than that of oratory. Junius writes in this context of ‘the sweet allurements of Picture, and how we suffer our hearts wittingly and willingly to be seduced and beguiled … to be so possessed with things that are not, as if they were’. He describes this deceptive effect not as the result of a skilful application of perspective or other trompe-l’œil techniques, but of the painter’s ability to manipulate his public’s passions. He compares poetry and painting because ‘both doe wind themselves by an unsensible delight of admiration so closely into our hearts … in such an astonishment of wonder’ that viewers are involved in what is depicted and believe that they have been transported to another reality: ‘to stare upon the Imitation of things naturall, as if we saw the true things themselves’. He emphasizes that this affective impact does not have any damaging side-effects; paintings are ‘nothing else in it selfe but a delusion of our eyes’, and consequently we can view them, in the words of Philostratus, ‘without suffering any hurt by them’, ‘as it is pleasant, so doth [painting] not deserve the least reproach’.

Seventeenth-century Dutch literature frequently discusses the deception of the senses in conjunction with the affective impact of paintings. De Brune’s Wetsteen contains countless descriptions of false temptations of the senses, with the moral that ‘because of this deceptive-
ness, it is wise prudently to restrain one’s eyes’. He points out that ‘the heart follows the eye’, and that it is ‘the eyes, which belong to the same body as the heart, [that] so grievously deceive that most important organ’. The eyes are pre-eminently the sense through which human beings are deceived and seduced: ‘The eyes move the inner senses with far greater strength and emphasis than the ears ... the ears move the membranes of the brain, but the eyes touch the brain itself, and pierce the membrane of the heart’. On the basis of this assumption, artistic illusion is presented in the context of sexual temptation: it is the lover’s eyes that are deemed to exert the greatest attraction. When they respond to the viewer’s gaze, a powerful emotional ‘chemistry’ is born. De Brune notes that Spenser’s poetry describes the effect of the gaze of the lover’s eyes as ‘sweete illusion of her lookes delight’.

Goeree discusses the idea that ‘a Magical Power is radiated by the eyes’ and the power of the eyes to arouse love ‘which is at once soaked up by the Eyes; And stealing through those open Windows, pierces the innermost realm of our Hearts’. In line with this view, Shakespeare ascribes a rhetorical power of persuasion to the lover’s eyes; one of his sonnets asks: ‘Did not the heavenly rhetoric of thine eye, / ’Gainst whom the world cannot hold argument, / Persuade my heart to this false perjury?51

The supposed affective influence of art clearly has amorous connotations. The Inleyding discusses this aspect in relation to the Muses, each of whom personifies different aspects of painting. One of the introductory poems compares them to seductive sirens and ‘Sorceresses’; Van Hoogstraten himself raises the subject of the ‘seductive power’ of the Muse Euterpe, who encourages young men to train as painters; he calls her a ‘flattering Siren’ and ‘temptress to art’. The resemblance between love of art and amorous love is discussed in the context of the very origins of art: painting is said to have been invented when a girl drew the shadow of her lover’s profile, so that she would possess an image of him while he was away.53 A more prosaic variant of this is found in Junius, who writes that pornography, that is, ‘the provocations of vices ... to engrave wanton lusts’, contributed significantly to the development of the visual arts in antiquity.54

In this context, De Brune analyses at length the way in which Michelangelo’s poetry forges relationships between sculpture and ‘the art of love’, while De Bie urges painters not to marry young since this will invoke the jealousy of Pictura, whom he calls ‘a lover with many lovers’. Popular associations between a woman’s charms, the temptation of the senses, reflection and painterly illusion have been studied at length by Eric Jan Sluijter. He pointed out that in the iconography of work by artists such as Goltzius, the seductive nature of painting in general is highlighted in scenes with an erotic undertone, in which form and content are thus attuned to one another.57

The powerful temptations of painting are linked not only to feminine charms, but also to magic. Junius speaks about painting’s power ‘to enchant (beguychelen) the spectators’; artworks ‘doe hold the raines of our hearts, leading and guiding our Passions by that beguiling power they have, whithersoever they list’. He calls painterly illusion ‘an invocation of seemingly breathing spectres’. While Angel speaks in similar terms of painting’s ‘magical power’, Van Hoogstraten states that art instills in ‘the ignorant ... the intimation of a supernatural power’. Certain painters, too, are praised for their magical powers – Dou, for instance, wielded his brush like a magic wand, according to ‘Traudenus’. The height of praise for a painting is the exclamation that a work is ‘not a painting but magic’, in the words of Boschini, who compares
the illusionist power of the ‘rough manner’, in particular, to witchcraft (strigarie).63

These phrases about the supposedly magical properties of painting are of more than anecdotal significance. They are related to rhetorical theory from antiquity, which ascribes to the orator’s *vis verborum* a literally magical influence. Quintilian, for instance, emphasizes that visual impressions can exercise an even stronger seductive force than rhetoric, and he contrasts the eloquence of the orator Hyperides with the beauty of Phryne, Praxiteles’ model and lover:

‘Many other things have the power of persuasion … even some sight unsupported by language … according to general opinion Phryne was saved not by the eloquence of Hyperides, admirable as it was, but by the sight of her exquisite body, which she further revealed by drawing aside her tunic.’64

The early modern assumption that the mind thinks in images or *phantasmata*, and the premise of a direct relationship between sight, the power of imagination, and the emotions, endowed the visual arts with a supposed ‘action at a distance’ which could bring about a permanent physical and mental transformation. Young painters needed to be protected from precisely these seductions of sight, for instance by reading and observing the Stoic rules of conduct as laid down in the *Inleyding*.

**Painter and sophist**

In parallel to Plato’s condemnation of paintings as deceptions, a positive interpretation of the illusory nature of art also developed in antiquity. Its origins lay in the Sophists’ mistrust of reason, as expressed by Gorgias (in other words, in the first generation of Sophists, in which the key figures are Gorgias and Protagoras, in contrast to the later, second generation – the Second Sophistic). Plato defines the Sophist, in his dialogue of the same name, on the basis of a comparison with the painter, and we shall therefore analyse how the Sophists’ appreciation of semblance and deception is cited in the seventeenth-century theory of art.65 De Lairesse gives a concise summary of the Sophists’ doctrine, saying that they deemed wisdom to be ‘foolish, shameful, and dishonourable’.66

Junius discusses Gorgias’s appreciation of the deceptive qualities of the performative arts. It becomes clear that these include the art of painting. Junius repeats Gorgias’s views concerning Greek tragedy, that only the person who is deceived is ethically purified: ‘a kinde of deceit, by which ... the deceived ... is wiser than he that is not deceived’.67 His analysis is elaborated by De Brune, who states that painting’s deception is innocuous and enjoyable, because we ‘hear the artificial weeping with singular delight’; what is more, dramatic catharsis can have a wholesome effect.68 Hence, De Brune repeats approvesly the notion that ‘Painting is Sophistic, that is, illusory and not true to life: for the things that appear in a Painting do not exist in reality’.69

De Lairesse’s comment on sophistry is made in relation to a *vanitas* scene, in which he invokes the argument of the ‘foolishness of wisdom’ to demonstrate the vanity of scholarly research. The scene shows, besides a woman admiring herself in the mirror and children amusing themselves with soap-bubbles, a bearded scholar contemplating a large celestial globe (fig.
This leads to the conclusion that ‘all is vanity’, which De Lairesse deems to be the essence of the scene. Similar views on the futility of the arts are expressed by authors as different as Cardinal Paleotti, who compares painters to sophists when they focus on deception rather than truth, and the academician Noel Coypel, who writes, in an address to the French Académie Royale of 1697:

‘A painter who does not seek to convey the truth of nature is like a philosopher who devotes all his studies to devising modes of reasoning to prove that being is nothing and that the body is but a shadow, and to formulating arguments to dazzle the minds of the ignorant with false appearances.’

The positive appreciation of outward appearances, deception and lies, as expressed by art theorists like Zuccari and Van Hoogstraten, should be placed first and foremost in the context of rhetorical theory, in which the sophists’ views live on in the early modern period. For instance, in his treatise on rhetoric, David van Hoogstraten discusses Plato’s observation that sophists and orators alike practise only the arts of ‘cosmetics, flattery and magic’ (Blanket-vlei-en toverkunst). He contrasts this with his assumption of the civilizing function of rhetoric, which is believed capable of winning over even ‘rough and untutored listeners, of which entire states are composed’. Apparently, this explains the time-honoured description of rhetoric as ‘Mover of souls’ or Zielroerster. Given these beneficial powers of deceptive speech, the mendacious nature of rhetoric is a positive, indeed essential quality: Quintilian goes so far as to say that an orator may tell lies if it enhances the persuasive thrust of his argument. Seventeenth-century art theorists who wish to stress the positive side of painting’s deceptive qualities borrow from these rhetorical notions. In The Elements of Architecture (1672), for instance, Henry Wotton writes as follows about the use of colour to suggest depth: ‘as in the art of perswasion, one of the most Fundamental Precepts is the Concealment of Art; So here likewise, the Sight must be sweetly deceived by an insensible passage, from brighter colours to dimmer’.  

Fig. 100 – Vanitas, image from Gerard De Lairesse, Groot Schilderboek, Haarlem 1740, facing page 108.
Seventeenth-century art theorists sometimes explicitly call in to question the concept of truth, contrasting it to probability. At one moment, Van Hoogstraten appears not to mind whether the painter depicts ‘truth, or probability’ (waarheyt, of waerschijnelijkheyt; the Dutch word for probability could be translated hyper-literally as ‘true-seemingness’). The distinction between ‘truth’ and ‘probability’ (il verisimile) is discussed more systematically by a number of earlier Italian authors, whose comments help to clarify Van Hoogstraten’s position. Paleotti writes that painting which contradicts the truth is ‘false’ or ‘untrue’, but not necessarily improbable. Improbable paintings clash with what is generally accepted as being true. To his mind, probability, unlike truth, revolves around the persuasiveness of artworks (le rendre persuabili) and ‘reassures in particular the common man’. In this context, probability in painting can also be clarified by comparison with rhetoric. The Milanese Cardinal and art lover Carlo Borromeo, for instance, considers persuasiveness to be more important than truth in his treatise Instructiones fabricae et supellectilis eslesiasticae (1577): a painter can make use of subjects that only have the appearance of truth, just like the orator, who does not flinch from probability arguments – that is to say, arguments whose validity has not been fully established. It follows that ‘seemingly true’ subjects make demands on one’s powers of persuasion.

We may conclude with an observation by Boschini that a painter must not show how things are, but how they seem (Non s’ha da dessegnar come in efeto / el mostra el natural, ma come el par). While sculpture must present everything in consistent proportions, for painting all that matters is appearance (solo se val de l’aparenza). De Piles’s Cours de peinture par principes (1708) summarizes the matter by saying that ‘beautiful probability ... often seems more true than truth itself.

**Dissimulation and the ‘bonnête homme’**

Van Hoogstraten’s treatise has some ingenious adaptations of evergreen anecdotes about painterly deception, many of which originate from Pliny’s Naturalis historia and were repeated throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Italian tradition is rich in such anecdotes; they often appear in the work of Vasari and Zuccari for instance, and in Lomazzo’s Libro dei sogni (1564). As the success of the deception is measured by the social rank of the person deceived, those mentioned are often courtiers or dignitaries; in this context, Houbraken attaches much importance to the tale that Emperor Ferdinand III was once deceived by a trompe-l’œil made by Van Hoogstraten.

There is nothing coincidental about the fact that these anecdotes of deception are frequently given a courtly setting. The theory of deceptive appearances was discussed more explicitly in courtiers’ manuals than in art theory. Deceptive behaviour was accorded a significant role at court, where new social structures were developed and where appearances and self-presentation were paramount. Indeed, deception and ambiguity were the subject of many forms of entertainment intended to expose and curb hypocrisy. Gracián’s Arte de prudencia (The Art of Prudence), for instance, focuses in this context on the theme of dissimulation, in which appearance (Spanish parecer) is a key factor. Gracián holds that ‘things do not pass for what they are, but for what they seem to be ... what cannot be seen is as if it did not exist. ... Those who are deceived are far more numerous than those with insight; deception has the upper hand,
and things are judged from the outside ... A beautiful exterior is the best recommendation of inner perfection." Van Hoogstraten applies this courtly emphasis on appearances to the life of Dutch burghers in his *Eerlyken jongeling*: "It is not enough to be worthy; one must present one’s worthiness such that it is appreciated."

Van Hoogstraten’s description of painting as a form of ‘delightful deception’ is related to courtly views on the merits of simulation and dissimulation. In this context, it is worth mentioning the study of courtiers’ handbooks by Manfred Hinz, which developed the concept of the ‘artistic lie’ or *Kunstlüge*: the concealment of one’s true nature and the simulation of qualities one lacks are seen in courtly literature as a function of wit (*ingenium*), which, through intellectual acuteness (*argutezza*), elicits admiration from the public. Deception, the metaphorical use of language, irony and humour are all key themes elaborated in this literature.

A central text on such courtly forms of entertainment is Emmanuele Tesauro’s *Cannocchiale aristotelico*, printed in Venice in 1655, before Van Hoogstraten returned from his ‘Grand Tour’. Tesauro’s discussion ranges from art and architecture, literature and drama, to dancing, chess and card games, festive gatherings and meals. In the Netherlands, the main equivalent to this multi-faceted artistic approach is to be found in De Brune’s *Wetsteen der vernuften*, although the *Inleyding*, too, describes festivities, for instance, within the framework of an artistic theory. Tesauro takes a special interest in optical phenomena such as anamorphosis, deliberately deformed images that are seen in their right proportions only from one specific viewpoint. This particularly invites comparison of his theory with Van Hoogstraten’s, who also experimented with this kind of visual artifice.

Tesauro discusses at length the anecdote of how the ancient artist Parrhasios deceived Zeuxis with his painting of a curtain (also cited by Van Hoogstraten; see above, pages 152-153), stressing the enjoyable nature of this deception as ‘a secret, innate delight of the human intellect in discovering that it has been pleasantly deceived’. Basing himself on Aristotle’s didactics, he calls the ‘transition from being deceived to no-longer-being-deceived’ as an unexpected, pleasing and educational moment of insight. De Brune’s *Wetsteen* (‘whetstone’) also presents a series of anecdotes about illusions, the seduction of feminine charms, the deceptive quality of make-up colours and so forth which are intended, as the title indicates, to sharpen the wit. The reader is expected to gradually learn how to see through false appearances and deception, developing the political acumen (Gracián’s *prudencia*, or what Hinz called *politische Klugheit*) needed to appraise people’s conduct and social situations. As De Brune makes clear, this faculty of prudence, of judging appearances, can only be acquired through experience and is not subject to the rules of art.

In this context, artistic deception is valued as a game aimed at education as well as recreation; Ripa writes that art functions ‘through deception that, though strange, is also delightful and sweet’. Van Hoogstraten’s comments on painting as an art that pleases by deceiving the eye can be studied further in the context of this courtly emphasis on deception, with which he may have become familiar during his stay at the Viennese court in particular. Houbraken notes that when Ferdinand III was deceived by a *trompe-l’œil* made by Van Hoogstraten, he exclaimed that this was ‘the first painter ever’ to have thus ‘deceived him’. With this enthusiasm the emperor demonstrated his sophisticated appreciation of *disimulatio*. Van Hoogstraten’s *trompe-l’œils* may conceivably have functioned in the context of the popular games in which
courtiers practised their ability to see through lies and deception. The proposition that ‘painting is a game of imitation’ can be found in the writings of Gregorio Comanini, the theorist who is frequently associated with the playful experiments of painters at the Habsburg court (such as Giuseppe Arcimboldo’s portraits that look like collections of fruit and vegetables). But Tesaurio too places great emphasis on art as a game and observes that it is the success of the imitation that determines the worth of a painting, rather than the choice of subject matter. In his view, ugly, vulgar subjects may be perfect objects for the recreation of the mind: ‘After all, one will look on any repugnant and hideous subject without abhorrence if it is depicted remarkably. For though what is depicted may give umbrage, the means by which it is depicted imparts delight’.

**Caravaggio’s reputation**

The complex of rhetorical conviction, sophistic tradition, probabilism and *prudentia* is essential in arriving at a complete appreciation of Van Hoogstraten’s views on the deceptive function of art. When all these views are taken into consideration, it becomes clear that statements like Van Mander’s well-known description of the painter Pieter Aertsen as a ‘deceiver’ and a ‘liar’ may be construed in a positive light. But it is Caravaggio’s reputation that is most enlightening in this context of a positive evaluation of the art of appearances. For instance, the terms in which one of Zucari’s pupils, Vicente Carducho, discusses his work reflect an appreciation of certain qualities in his work as well as criticism. Carducho calls Caravaggio’s work deceptive, false and ephemeral (*si engañosas, falsas, y sin verdad, ni permanencia*), and he refers to the affectation and superficial character of his imitation (*su afectada y exterior imitación*). He goes on to say, however, that these qualities enabled the painter to persuade a wide and diverse public.

These judgements about Caravaggio’s art are echoed in Van Hoogstraten’s book. He derives from Van Mander the following account:

‘Michelangelo Caravaggio said that all works of art that were not painted from life were child’s play and trifles (*Bagatelli*), whoever the artist might be, since there can be nothing better, nothing good, except for following nature alone. For this reason he never painted a stroke other than from life’.

Strikingly, Van Hoogstraten then departs from his predecessor’s view. He omits Van Mander’s next statement that painters should not be misled by Caravaggio’s example: Van Mander discourages them from depicting nature without possessing the skill to ‘discern and select the most beautiful from the beautiful elements of life’. By contrast, Van Hoogstraten adds the following remarks to the quotation: ‘The subject of Painting is, as already discussed, to depict everything: its object is thus the whole of visible nature, none of which reveals itself to our eyes without its specific form and shape.** In the *Inleyding*, Caravaggio thus becomes the epitome of a painter who preferred visual reality to idealized beauty. Van Hoogstraten was not the only writer who expressed this appreciation. His positive words are similar to the views of Scanelli, who discusses this Italian master as the ‘foremost among naturalists (*naturalisti*)’ and ‘a unique example of naturalness
chapter VI

(naturalezza), who is driven by his own natural instinct to imitate what is true’. Like Van Hoogstraten, Scanelli links art to seduction and deception. Caravaggio’s gift for ‘naturalism’ relates to his ability to deceive: this painter ‘confused his viewers with astonishing deception, by which means he gladdened and ravished the human sense of sight’.106

Directly echoing this sentiment, when Van Hoogstraten enumerates the painters who excel in a particular ‘virtue’ (listing Rembrandt as a specialist in depicting the passions), he calls Caravaggio the paragon of ‘naturalness’ (nattuerlijkheyt).107 His appreciation of Caravaggio’s focus on all elements of the visible world, without regard for the beauty of his subjects, is akin to Bellori’s comment that was discussed in chapter V: this author compares the ‘naturalists’ (the followers of Caravaggio) with the atomist philosophers who pay no heed to ideal forms (see above, page 256). What merits our attention, moreover, is that Van Hoogstraten’s view of Caravaggio’s focus on nattuerlijkheyt is repeated by Houbraken, who concludes that the Italian master and Rembrandt have an identical vision of art.108 Van Hoogstraten’s views of Caravaggio as a ‘naturalist’ illuminate his ideas about the importance of the depiction of the visible world.

This analysis of artists as courtly deceivers may be concluded with an observation by Roger de Piles, whose opinion that Rembrandt deceived the sense of sight by his rendering of human passions has already been mentioned.109 He also writes that the work of Rubens is based on deceptive cosmetic colouring and pretence: ‘it is true that it is only cosmetics; but one would wish that all these paintings that are made nowadays had been similarly fake’, which he clarifies by noting that painting is essentially based on deception.110 De Piles’s comments, that should be construed in the context of French courtly culture, are supplemented by a characteristic quotation from La Rochefoucauld, writing in 1659: ‘Some counterfeits reproduce the truth so well that it would be a flaw of judgment not to be deceived by them.’111 To this we might add a quip by Algarotti: ‘Lies are even more beautiful than truth’.112

‘MAKING THINGS APPEAR TO BE THAT ARE NOT’: PAINTING AS METAPHOR

In asserting that paintings ‘make things appear to be that are not’, Van Hoogstraten identifies a dualism inherent to painting. Pictorial illusion originates from the contrast between inner essence and façade, ‘being’ and ‘not being’. Deception exists by virtue of duplicity: the viewer is confronted with something presenting itself as something else. Many art theorists have made much the same point: Cennini, for instance, states that art makes ‘that exist which is not’ (quello che non è, sia), which may perhaps be a reference to older views imputing magical powers to the artist.113 The wording adopted by Van Hoogstraten deviates somewhat from this older formula in that, to his mind, the artist does not make things exist that were not there, but makes things seem to be that are not there in reality. Pino too bends Cennini’s view in the direction of mere semblance: ‘paintings ... make things appear that are not there’.114 Paleotti emphasizes the unreal nature of a work of art by noting that ‘every painting ... is false, since it shows what is not, while in truth it is a panel with markings on it’.115 Similarly, Goeree concludes that drawings ‘show us the truth of the things that are, through untruth and a disguised appearance’ and ‘make us believe that we see what we do not see’.116

Van Hoogstraten calls attention to the ambivalent nature of the work of art, which is on
Fig. 101 – Rembrandt, *Portrait of Agatha Bas*, 1641, canvas, 105 x 85 cm.
The Royal Collection, Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II.
the one hand a virtual reality, and on the other hand no more than paint on a panel or a piece of canvas. In a discussion of the potential abuse of art by worshippers of images, he repeats a question posed by Calvin, in *Institutes* 14-15: ‘For what is a Painting? A wise man says, a shape stained with diverse paints.’ This unmasking of the painting as no more than a panel with smudges is popular with seventeenth-century authors who seek to emphasize the vanity of painting. Typical comments include Camphuysen’s definition of painting as ‘a work that in itself is but lines and shadows’ or a ‘piece of canvas or panel smeared with paint’, and his analogous remark that painted figures consist ‘not of flesh and blood, but of resin and clay’. This devout Church minister notes that painted portraits are essentially nothing but stripes and patches. He calls paintings ‘sham beauties’ and notes the consummate vanity of the wish to recognize a relative in a portrait, ‘this paint, this lifeless thing, that is nothing but a shadow’.

For similar views, Van Hoogstraten could consult De la Serre’s *Op d’ydelden van de werelt*. De la Serre emphasizes that statues are nothing more than pieces of stone and cast metal (and indeed that those who worship them are themselves only dust), and dwells on the vanity of ‘canvas with paint on it’. He observes that an image of a king fashioned by a sculptor is ‘nothing but pieces of wood glued together’. Camphuysen and De la Serre apparently reject this most popular of commonplaces in seventeenth-century art literature, the statement that an image appears to be alive. Yet their criticism is inspired precisely by the assumption that pictures are capable of transporting their viewers to a virtual reality: Camphuysen regrets the fact that images can function as ‘dumb rhetoricians’, referring to the orator’s alleged power to influence his listeners’ ethos and, indeed, inspire false religious views.

In relation to the ‘rough manner’, it was noted in chapter V that artists from the Renaissance onwards drew attention to the fundamentally dualistic nature of a painting, as on the one hand a two-dimensional tangible object and on the other hand a living and three-dimensional illusion (see above, pages 237-240). In the context of what he called *Illusionsbrechung*, the puncturing of illusion, Klaus Krüger cited several seventeenth-century examples, some from Rembrandt’s circle: a typical one being the portrait of Agatha Bas. In this painting, a fan extends over a suggested frame, and the sitter herself grasps the frame (fig. 101). This painting seems to be a direct application of Junius’s statement, quoted verbatim by De Lairesse, that ‘we notice that Artists … apply their shadows thus … that the figures come forward with more power, and seem to meet the spectator’s eyes outside the picture plane’.

A *trompe-l’oeil* of a painted drawing and a genre painting recently attributed to Van Hoogstraten is a carefully thought-out exercise in this realm of illusion and its deliberate ‘puncturing’ (fig. 102). The painting displays three interwoven ‘layers of fiction’: the painted tavern scene is exposed as illusory in two ways. It is suggested that the upper left corner of the painted canvas has come loose from the panel to which it was attached, and at the same time, a drawing of the same figures that are depicted in the tavern scene is tacked to this panel.

A detailed discussion of the problematic nature of pictorial resemblance can be found in Tesuuro, who accords crucial importance to the term ‘metaphor’: he writes that ‘metaphor is a miraculous way of seeing one thing by means of another’. This author discusses painting and sculpture as metaphors (he is supported by Aretino and De Brune, who use the same trope). Tesuuro notes that one of the most fundamental elements of metaphor is its falseness. He speaks, for instance, of the ‘metaphor of deception’ (*metafora di decettione*), a comparison in
which two objects, preferably as different as possible in terms of the materials used, are linked such that one is taken for the other.\textsuperscript{131}

Tesauro continues that the ‘metaphor of similarity’ (\textit{metafora di simiglianza}) underlies the view that the painting is not a work of art but a virtual reality. This metaphor inspires topical observations such as: ‘this is not a painting of Alexander, but Alexander himself’ or ‘this is not fiction but truth’.\textsuperscript{132} Painting, in this regard, is based on the \textit{tertium comparationis} of colour: through colour, dead matter is interpreted as a living figure. This metaphor is so important that even literary theory uses the terminology of light and colour to denote figures of speech.\textsuperscript{133} Tesauro refers to Quintilian’s view of rhetorical ornament in relation to \textit{lumina orationis}, by which means the orator succeeds in approaching the clarity of life itself.\textsuperscript{134} Here, the ‘colours of Rhetorike’ are the vehicle of performativity: only by embellishing his language – in other words by speaking figuratively instead of literally – can the orator succeed in transforming his speech into an experience of an alternative reality. The paradox of the metaphor thematicizes the view, discussed in relation to ‘rough’ brushwork, that it is only by abandoning a literal mode of speech that one may evoke a greater suggestion of reality; the more the audience forgets it is listening to an address, the more successful is the orator in his purpose. Similarly, the more the viewer’s mind is activated in summoning up a virtual reality, the more successfully the painter will achieve his goal.

\textbf{Fig. 102 – Attributed to Samuel van Hoogstraten,}\n
\textit{Trompe-l’œil Still Life with a Drawing and a Genre Painting, 65 x 50 cm.}

Presently with art dealer Kunsthaus Lempertz, Cologne.
Tesauro concludes that the metaphorical nature of painting enables it to refer not only to things from three-dimensional reality, but also to ‘invisible’ things. On the one hand, he devotes ample attention to medium-specific components of similarity, and describes how metaphors can bridge the gap between two artistic media, such as word and image. On the other hand, he also notes that similarity can exist on a different level of reality, when instead of two objects from the visible world being compared, invisible things are expressed by reference to visible ones. Tesauro describes this by repeating a well-known anecdote about Apelles (a trope that was applied in the Netherlands to Pieter Bruegel, for instance). While Zeuxis and Parrhasios were still engaged in painting things ‘that can be painted’, Apelles supposedly proved himself the more ingenious of the two when he painted things ‘that cannot be painted’, that is to say, invisible things: ‘he was the first to display invisible things by means of visible images’. These ‘invisible things’ are abstract concepts, for instance, which can be denoted by iconographic details. The dichotomy between the visible and the invisible, and the power of the metaphor of painting to reveal the invisible through the visible, are recurrent themes in the _Cannocchiale_.

The theory of the fundamentally ambivalent nature of painting is a way of explaining how painterly resemblance and optical illusion operate at the interface of ‘being’ and ‘seeming’. At the same time, it clarifies the way in which painting can express the ‘invisible’ by means of the ‘visible’: to speak in the language of mediaeval philosophy, painting depicts _spiritualia sub metaphoris corporalium_ – concepts in the guise of material things. We shall now examine in more detail how Van Hoogstraten’s art theory elaborates on this same distinction between inside and outside, between the visible world and the invisible.

**ILLUSION AND VANITY**

In the seventeenth-century discourse on art, the statement that painting is a lie or a mere semblance, as presented above, is often interpreted in a more general sense, culminating in the view that the pre-eminently deceptive qualities of the art of painting are a metaphor for the vanity of the visible world itself. In this case, the opposition between seeming and being was extrapolated to the duality of visibility and invisibility. Following this line of thought, paintings might be invested with two connotations: 1) art is a vain pastime; 2) our sense of sight deceives us, and any knowledge based on it is vanity.

The supposed vanity and deceptiveness of painting are frequent theme in seventeenth-century art itself and in the literature of art in the widest sense of the term. By virtue of its epideictic line of argument, the _Inleyding_ naturally adopts a positive and affirmative attitude to not only painting but also to the visible world itself, with little of the emphasis on the vanity of human affairs that was so popular in seventeenth-century Dutch Protestant and Stoic culture. Still, Van Hoogstraten does emphasize the deceptive and ‘mirror-like’ qualities of paintings, and in this connection it is worth briefly considering the view that paintings produce nothing but illusory images. At first sight, this view seems hard to reconcile with Van Hoogstraten’s belief that art is a ‘sister of philosophy’ leading to a better understanding of God, and that it can ultimately be construed as a form of devotion (see above, pages 93, 111-113). We will examine the way in which these opposing ideas, about the deceptiveness of paintings on the one hand,
and about the philosophical significance of art on the other, can and do in fact coexist in certain seventeenth-century views of art.

Although the *Inleyding* does not explicitly discuss the supposedly paradoxical nature of painting, as an activity that is both misleading and admirable, it is nonetheless interesting to study Van Hoogstraten’s mirror metaphor in this context. Van Hoogstraten’s line of argument seeks to link painting to numerous, possibly contradictory commonplaces: according to this observation, it would be best not to speak of a paradox in his views about reality and illusion, or of an opposition that needs to be ‘resolved’, but rather of a structural ambiguity that is inherent to seventeenth-century views of art. While Van Hoogstraten’s theory of art expresses a positive view of painting as a profound absorption in the ‘miraculous works’ of the Creator, in the background we also hear a negative train of thought from the seventeenth-century discourse on *vanitas*, which propagates the vanity not just of art, but of the visible world itself.

Before elaborating further on this structural ambiguity, we should note that the doctrine of the transience of all earthly things was one of the central themes among the philosophically minded circle that gathered around the Van Hoogstraten brothers from 1656 onwards. The members read and circulated plenty of ‘*vanitas* literature’ by authors like Agrippa, De la Serre and Jan Luyken. Oudaen single-handedly translated into Dutch Agrippa’s *De vanitate scientiarum* (c. 1530), and Dullaert did the same for De la Serre’s *L’Entretien des bons esprits sur les vanités du monde* (1631). In Frans van Hoogstraten’s translation of Diego de Estella’s *De contemnendis mundi vanitatibus* (1585), he poses the following question to his readers, whom he addresses as ‘those with contempt for the world’: ‘Of what else could we say that it can never be learned enough than contempt for the vanities of the world?’ We shall see that the *vanitas* doctrine may mean that the essential transience of the visible world, where the art of painting is concerned, focuses the viewer’s attention even more strongly on the Creator’s omnipotence.
Narcissus and the vanity of painting

In his definition of the art of painting, Van Hoogstraten writes that it was invented by Narcissus, whose love of his own reflection sealed his fate:

‘[Painting] was of old, and still is, the flower of all Arts: For this reason, our Poets deem it to have originated with Narcissus, who was changed into a flower. For what corresponds more nearly to the beautiful figure of this youth, reflected in the crystal-clear source, than a splendidly, artfully painted image resembling nature? That is why others also refer to it as the beautiful daughter of shadow’.  

Van Hoogstraten’s mention in this passage of ‘our Poets’ is primarily a reference to Ovid’s Metamorphoses. Indirectly, he alludes to a number of theorists who attribute the invention of painting to Narcissus, including Alberti, Leonardo, and most notably Van Mander, from whom the above passage is largely derived. Images of Narcissus, such as were probably also made by Van Hoogstraten, may contain self-reflexive references to the impermanence of painting, which was indeed emphasized by the metaphor ‘flower of the arts’ (compare fig. 103). Narcissus admiring his own reflection is depicted in the frontispiece to a text by the artist Adriaen van de Venne, Zeevscbe mey-clacht, ofte schyn-kycker (May-Lamentation of Zeeland, or the Looker at Semblance, 1623), a poem in which a walk in the countryside prompts a discussion of the temptations of the sense of sight and the art of painting (fig. 104). The mythological youth occurs in Van Mander in an admonition on the transience of youthful beauty; as daf-
fodils fade, so too will ‘those who only love themselves, when they die ... no longer enjoy the sensual pleasures that they filled their lives with’. To seventeenth-century readers, the myth would have been seen as clearly related to the unreality of painting, an unreality which may be associated in turn with the emptiness of earthly existence. Thus, De Bie, for instance, calls painting an ‘ephemeral shadow’, vain as the reflection of which Narcissus became so fatefully enamoured, and compares it to a flower, in the conviction that ‘our lives are no more than frail wildflowers or fading shadows’.

In this context, the Narcissus figure personifies the extraordinary vanity of painting, an art that entices viewers to imagine themselves in a counterfeit reality. De la Serre writes that these viewers, like ‘present-day Narcissuses ... see things that are not there’, discerning ‘attractions, sweetnesses, enticements and graces that are invisible, and that do not exist other than in their own delusions’. Invoking the Narcissus myth, De Estella counsels his readers to avert...
their gaze from the visible: ‘That the bweetie of thy soule is more to be set by, then the bweetie of thy bodie’.

As Eric Jan Sluijter noted, the iconography of the mirror is closely linked to the vanitas theme in seventeenth-century painting. It is most notably relevant to self-portraits, which, by focusing attention on the mirror that the painter used for the image, underscore the vanity of the painter’s profession and the fact that it concerns itself with ephemeral, worldly outward appearances. The same theme recurs in still lifes in which the painter incorporates his own image into reflecting surfaces: this device calls attention to the transient, superficial nature of the objects in the painting, objects that may frequently be interpreted as earthly pleasures and possessions. One highly explicit example is Vaenius’s drawing of a self-portrait in a mirror that is about to crash to the ground, with the caption ‘Live each day entrusted to you as if it were your last’ (fig. 105).

Mirrors and skulls are frequently combined in vanitas scenes. In Laux Furtenagel’s portrait of Hans Burgkmair and his wife (1527), the couple appear in a convex mirror, and skulls have replaced their faces (fig. 106). A vanitas still life by Jacob de Gheyn II from 1603 contains a skull and a glass ball reflecting the interior of the painter’s studio, with the inscription ‘Humana Vana’, all human affairs are vanity (fig. 107). In Antonie van Steenwinkel’s self-portrait, too, the painter depicts himself in a mirror beside a skull (fig. 108).

The literature of art also discusses the fundamental vanity of painting. Paleotti indeed asserts that to speak of a ‘vain painting’ is a tautology; after all, ‘every painting can be called
vain in a sense, since it is as a shadow and image of the truth’. Similarly, Comanini’s treatise on painting *Il Figino* (1591) recalls the Platonic view of the inveracity of the entire visible world: ‘we see so many things in this wide theatre of the world that are all ... images and shadows ... that do not endure’. The vanity or impermanence of paintings is a common theme in poems on portraits. Thus, the playwright Gerard Brandt emphasizes that all that one can find in paintings is ‘the semblance of being’. He regards the portrait of his late wife as ‘merely canvas and paint’: ‘One who lacks the true substance will divert himself with its appearance’. Camphuysen too avails himself of these theoretical commonplaces, not only to emphasize the vanity of painting, but also to draw attention to the fact that the sense of sight focuses on ephemera. ‘The eye seeks to be deceived by painting’, he writes, calling the art of painting a flattering deception of the eye and ‘the art of appearance’ (*schaijn-konst*). Camphuysen uses the same topoi that occur in Van Hoogstraten’s theory of the power of a painting in relation to the visible surface: magic, deception, and rhetorical persuasiveness. However, he links them to exclusively negative connotations; holding that painting obscures ‘the true essence’ of things, he concludes that it is the epitome of vanity: ‘Painting is the Mad Mother of all Vanities’.

Agrippa discusses the same matter in his *De vanitate* (a book that was discussed on pages 202, 221, 232 above), in a chapter on sculpture, an art which he rejects entirely, concluding that ‘human vanity ... is what dams our lives’. The frontispiece to the Dutch translation of this text, which contains an engraving by Herman Saftleven, shows the ‘mask of vanity’ being torn off and displays attributes of the diverse arts. Occupying a prominent, central position is a palette with paintbrushes that refers to a passage about painting in the text (fig. 109). Agrippa says that the vanity of painting arises from its mendacity: ‘Painting is a vile art, but highly accurate
in the imitation of natural things, consisting of the sketching of outlines and the appropriate mixture of colours’.\textsuperscript{161} He quotes a number of arguments from the paragone-tradition to describe painting as a wholly vain, useless occupation. One example is its power to depict ephemeral things like reflections, smoke and fog; unlike poetry and sculpture, painting deceives our eyes, making ‘things that do not exist as if they did, and things that are not such in kind, to seem so’.\textsuperscript{162} Agrippa’s wording places the commonplace view that painting ‘makes things appear to be that are not’ in a negative light. By introducing shifts of meaning into his adaptation of traditional commonplaces, he evaluates them in a way directly contradictory to the views in Van Hoogstraten’s treatise. For example, according to Agrippa, Parrhasios painted his curtain (see above, pages 152-153) so convincingly that it ‘belies the truth’ (\textit{veritatem mentiens}) such as to get the better of his opponent; indeed, painting is a paradox: the most convincing painting is also the greatest lie.\textsuperscript{163}

In paintings, poems inspired by paintings, and the literature of art, an emphasis on the transience of painting can be traced that may lead to the view that in paintings, diverse ‘levels’ of vanity are entwined. For it is not just that the work of art provides a semblance of the visible world; the visible world itself is unmasked as mere appearance. This is asserted, for instance, in a poem written in praise of Dullaart’s translation of De la Serre’s \textit{Ydelbeid}, in which the visible world in general is branded an empty exterior and for this reason compared to a painting: ‘What are all the World’s doings? Vanity, a nought, / other than they appear ... ’tis but a Painting, / a superficial layer of paint, no more’.\textsuperscript{164} The poet Jodocus van Lodenstein describes a painting as ‘no more than paint and but a copy / of the vain principal’.\textsuperscript{165} The term \textit{principaal} is used in art theory to denote an original painting, by the master’s own hand, which is the exam-
ple for pupils to copy. Here it is argued that the ultimate original, the visible world, is itself a vain thing: art evidently stands in the same relationship to the visible world as the visible world to the immutable, true reality.

These examples show that the Dutch literature of art exhibits a paradoxical dilemma: the reality on which the painter bases his ‘mirroring’ image is itself no more than semblance. As one art historian noted, the mirror metaphor ‘suggests a ... profoundly philosophical dilemma: painting can exist both as a form of truth and as a form of deception’.

In the context of the *Inleyding*, there is no need to emphasize the philosophical complications of this contrast, given the rhetorical aim of Van Hoogstraten’s treatise in which there is no problem in combining logically inconsistent notions. Views on the vanity of art, such as those expressed by Agrippa and Camphuysen, may be seen as the inevitable complement of the mirror metaphor, and of the positive commonplaces about painting’s power to deceive that have been discussed above. The same arguments that Van Hoogstraten applies ‘in praise of painting’ can evidently also be used to criticize the visual arts.

Indeed, Van Hoogstraten himself discusses this inherent ambivalence in the last chapter of the *Inleyding*. Already in the frontispiece, the vanity of painting and of the visible world in general is addressed (fig. 30). This complex print depicts the completion of the appren-
The Muse Urania is presented in the adjacent poem as the one who apportions the painter’s rewards. These rewards are described within a structure resembling that of Petrarch’s *Triumphs*, in which death is conquered by fame, fame by time, and time by eternity.

The title page alludes to life after death through the ‘picture-within-a-picture’ device (albeit that we are dealing with a print here), which invests the image as a whole with added significance (fig. 110). It depicts Urania holding a painted scene that represents a smoking lamp, a skull and bones, and a mirror: three objects that epitomize *vanitas* symbolism. The three-part division of smoke (the lamp), mortality (the skull) and illusion (the mirror) recur, for instance, in the inscription that Lipsius wrote for his own grave, which emphasizes that ‘all human affairs are smoke, shadow, vanity and scenes on a stage’. The three objects place the painter’s earthly ambitions, which are depicted in the frontispiece in the form of an artist who is being knighted, in the context of the Stoic doctrine of the ultimate vanity of the existence of the *vir proficiens*, the man who seeks wisdom. Closer scrutiny reveals that the picture-within-the-picture rests on a gravestone from beneath which a serpent is emerging, possibly the Biblical serpent from the Garden of Eden, and thus an allusion to the state of sin in earthly existence, which only death can end.

Van Hoogstraten discusses the iconography of this print only at the end of the chapter, when he quotes a sonnet by Michelangelo that revolves around the fundamental division between fleeting and enduring aspects of reality. In effect, many of Michelangelo’s poems relate his sculpture to his religious views, which are heavily infused with notions of mortality; Jan de Brune accordingly quotes from them at length when broaching the *vanitas* doctrine. A number of Michelangelo’s poems broach the theme of mortality in the form of oppositions, such as earthly versus heavenly love, or God providing redemption from the earthly vale of tears. The well-known sonnet of which Van Hoogstraten provides a Dutch translation, the opening line of which is ‘Giunto è già il corso di mia vita’ (‘My Life’s Travels Have Now Come
to an End’), is characteristic of Michelangelo’s preoccupation with sin and mortality.

The translation (or, more accurately, adaptation), probably made by Van Hoogstraten himself, begins with the statement that the author’s ramshackle ‘Ship of Life’ is approaching its final destination, where he will be judged for his deeds. The author expresses the realization that the visual arts, his profession, are based wholly on vanity, and that the secular rewards he enjoys as an artist are trivial in comparison with what awaits him in the life to come. He asks himself:

‘What is it all, what I achieved on earth,
if yet I undergo a double death?
One is certain, the other looms ahead.’

The author fears extinction in the life to come, a double death, not only of the body, but also of the soul. He expresses his wish, having ‘painted and toiled’ so much, to be redeemed by Christ. Van Hoogstraten’s translation here follows Michelangelo’s original in speaking of ‘two deaths’ (duo morte), a phrase repeated in several of the sculptor’s poems. This dualism largely echoes the seventeenth-century notion of vanitas that emphasizes the essential ambiguity of the visible world: as images do no more than provoke the question as to what true reality is, just so does life ultimately refer only to death.

The division of reality into realms of mortality and immortality is elaborated in detail by Jan de Brune, who states that it is analogous to the fundamental duplicity of painting as discussed in seventeenth-century art theory. He contrasts the ephemeral ‘exterior’ of things, the realm of the painter’s work, with the ‘inner’ immortal soul:

‘Man is composed of two parts, soul and body: but these differ as greatly as do eternity and mortality. The one, being immortal, rises to heaven, while the other is covered with earth and consumed by worms. The one is not represented, other than in moral conduct; the other is depicted on a panel by painters.’

The beauty of the invisible world is evidently beyond all comparison to that of the visible world, which offers no more than the exterior of the mortal flesh: ‘The one conceals all its beauty within; the other possesses it on the outer surface, which, if stripped off, reveals slimy and bloody flesh, which is indeed the sheath of unclean matter [i.e. of the bodily fluids].’

As the frontispiece to Van Hoogstraten’s eighth chapter makes clear, there is a positive facet to the vanitas doctrine which follows from the phrase non omnis moriar, ‘I will not die entirely’: the immortal soul will endure in the life hereafter. It is this conviction that enables Van Hoogstraten to resign himself to his own approaching end, in the realization of the mortality of the flesh; he expresses the hope ‘that God will use his soul for something better after this time’ and expects that ‘the best part of him, not fearful of death, will soar to the Heavens’. Van Hoogstraten contrasts his physical body and the fame of his works of art on earth with the ‘best’ part, which liberates itself from the visible world. The same distinction is made in one of his plays, which identifies the invisible world directly with life after death.

The emphasis on the vanity of human affairs in the title illustration to the Inleyding’s
last chapter and in Michelangelo’s poem can be interpreted first and foremost as a rhetorical
device with which Van Hoogstraten takes the sting out of any condemnation of the deceptive,
superficial and futile aspects of his profession, precisely by incorporating the criticism into his
theory. Motivated by this same argument, Van Mander’s biographies of painters end with a
pointed comment on the vanity and transience of earthly fame, and Angel’s Lof too concludes
with a reference to human mortality. But there is more at stake than just a rhetorical ploy, as
is apparent most explicitly in certain comments in De Bie’s Cabinet. De Bie exhorts painters to
render account for their sensory bias towards the visible world: ‘since at the end of their brief
lives they must account for themselves, they should not fix their desires so firmly on the beauti-
ful and vain pleasures of this deceptive world’. He argues that not only is painting a ‘seeming
without being’, but the visible world itself is just as misleading: ‘The world is a trickster and
a fraud, for she deceives everyone, she enchants: ... All the world ... is but vanity, and must
fade like smoke’. Here he invokes Quintilian’s words on the correlation between the vanity
of painting and the vanity of earthly existence, concluding that we should set our eyes on the
life hereafter:

‘No one should be amazed that such great Art has sprung from a shadow (which in
itself is Nothing), since we all spring from the slime of the earth ... that is why we have
good reason to love the things of Heaven rather than to strain after the vanity of the
world.’

De Bie’s remarks show that the emphasis on the evanescence of the visible world is not just a
persuasive device in an argument in which ‘the end justifies the means’. The concept of the
vanity of all things visible may be an automatic, complementary connotation in a theory that
revolves around the deceptiveness of painting. Thus, the literature of art repeats the same
complementary ideas concerning painting and the visible world as the many vanitas still lifes
and self-portraits that allude to the mirror-like nature of painting. The vanity of painting is
expected to remind the viewer of the vanity of the senses and of the visible in general, and it is
seen as an aid to focus his mind, through this via negativa, on the afterlife. As we shall see, this
vanitas concept is essential to the positive religious function that Van Hoogstraten ascribes to
painting.

‘THROUGH A GLASS, DARKLY’: VISIBLE AND INVISIBLE WORLDS

It is time to explore the significance for the interpretation of seventeenth-century painting of
the connotations attached to the definition of a painting as ‘a mirror of nature’ that have been
traced in this chapter. It has become clearer that the Dutch discourse on visual reality world is
based on an ideology that includes a moment of embracing the things of this world, as well as
a moment of renouncing them. What can be added to the conclusion reached earlier that the
visible world is worthy of contemplation as the ‘Book of Nature’ (see above, pages 108-113)?
Again, we may wish to address the seventeenth-century division of reality into spheres of vis-
ibility and invisibility: we shall look at religious views regarding the relationship between the
visible and invisible worlds, as these determined Van Hoogstraten’s division of reality into a
visible and an invisible domain.
The distinction made in Plato’s *Timaeus* between *mundus intelligibilis* and *mundus sensibilis* is repeated by Christian authors like De Mornay, who refers to the theory of the ‘Platonists’ that ‘there are two worlds, one that we understand with the senses, the one in which we live; and the other, that is only understood with the mind’. This dualism possessed a biblical basis in St Paul’s assertion that ‘by [God] were all things created, that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible’. The fundamentally dual nature of reality as consisting of both visible and invisible components was eventually codified in the Confession of Nicea, which glorified God as the maker of *visibilium omnium et invisibilium*, or, as this formula was repeated by Calvinist orthodoxy at the Synod of Dordrecht: ‘Creator of heaven and earth and of all things, visible and invisible’.

Calvinist authors in general stressed the impossibility of rational thinking to understand the truths of the invisible world. To proceed *per visibilia ad invisibilia*, something else was needed, related more to sensual experience and emotional response than to speculation on doctrine (hence, they stressed the importance of sacred rhetoric above scholastic studies). Here, they followed the systematic elaboration of the twofold division in Augustine’s view concerning a struggle between the *civitas Dei* and the earthly city, in which everything in the latter is susceptible to mortality while living with the constant awareness of the ‘life to come’ after the end of time. Augustine emphasizes that it is essentially only God’s grace that can bring redemption.

Norman Bryson studied the visibility/invisibility division in relation to still-life painting in his *Looking at the Overlooked* (1990). He analysed the strong tendency in Calvinist doctrine to question the power of the sense of sight to penetrate to the transcendent: ‘Where Catholic painting opens effortlessly on to sacred scenes and celestial spaces, the Northern *vanitas* has exactly no route [sic] towards the transcendent that vision may directly take.’ It is precisely the impossibility of discovering the essence of things through the eye, wrote Bryson, that leads artists to concentrate on outward appearances: ‘The transcendent can be sensed only in the inability to reach it.’

This paradoxical position can be clarified with the aid of texts from Van Hoogstraten’s library. De Mornay, for instance, asserts that God’s greatness is hidden from human insight, such that the only way in which he reveals himself is precisely through his concealment:

‘Since our eyes cannot bear the brightness of such intense [Divine] light, let it suffice for us to behold this light in its shadows. The world, which we comprehend with our senses, and in which we live, is the shadow of that world, which can only be beheld through the mind, which world of the mind the followers of Plato’s doctrine understand as God.’

De Mornay’s central proposition that God can be known through his Creation has been discussed above (see pages 116-117). In his view, our relationship to God can be construed as a paradox: we know only that we know nothing, and can describe God only by saying nothing. This echoes an essential point of Calvinist doctrine, namely that the most universal and immediate approach to God takes place at an affective, non-rational level. Calvin emphasizes that this capacity for affective comprehension is the most quintessentially human quality.
view, contemplating the Creation is a path leading to God, even though the ensuing insight stems from a paradox: the ever-changing multiplicity of visible things focuses the human mind on the perfection of the immutable God from whom they spring.

De Mornay explains in detail that only the ephemeral qualities of the visible world can unlock our human understanding of the eternity of God. He contrasts the multiplicity of the natural world with God, who is one, and yet has his hand in all the diverse things of the world: ‘Just as appearances, colours, and visible things are all distinct from one another, and the light of the Sun brings forth diverse effects, so too does God’s presence manifest itself differently in different things, while remaining immutable’. This paradox results from the fact that we only comprehend the unity and immutability of God through the ephemeral and manifold nature of the visible world: ‘We [shall] behold God ... in the imperfections to be seen in all things, such as [the fact that they are] changeable, impotent, weighed down by matter etc., and must realize that these things differ from God far more greatly than one can grasp with one’s intellect.’

From this paradoxical insight we may understand how it is precisely the painter’s ability to depict contingencies such as reflections, surface textures and the play of light – De Mornay refers explicitly to the ‘diverse effects’ of the play of light – that is furnished with religious connotations. The realization that visual reality is a world of fleeting appearances may give rise to a moment of profound contemplation on the foundations of reality. It is this moment, when sensory experience prompts contemplation, that determines the philosophical value of an art which is by its very nature deceptive. When the work of art itself actually alludes to its own medium, and to its illusory properties, it is drawing attention to a far more essential distinction, namely that between appearance and reality. Painting that makes the viewer realize that the visible world is illusion without true essence may ultimately focus his mind on the Creator’s intentions.

The answer to the question of how it is possible that the ‘deceptive’ senses can lead to ‘true’ knowledge lies in the notion that painting stands in the same relationship to nature as nature to its Creator. As we have seen, the phrase ‘mirror of nature’, construed as a genitivus subjectivus, is used to indicate that nature itself is a mirror of its Creator. A perfect example of this is an assertion by the twelfth-century poet Alan de Lille that the world is ‘like a book, a painting, a mirror’, an indirect way of coming to know the Creator. Willem van Blijenberg, the philosopher in Van Hoogstraten’s circle of friends, similarly infers the existence of God from the abundance of nature:

‘abundant material from his radiant glory is provided to us on all sides ... wherever you turn your eyes, everywhere you see bright mirrors showing God’s power and majesty, bright paintings expressing God’s essence and power as if they had been painted.’

What is of particular interest to Van Hoogstraten’s ideas on the visible and the invisible in relation to painting, is the view that God does not reveal himself directly but ‘as in a mirror’, in reflections. Calvin himself stresses the fundamental incomprehensibility of God, stating that the created world ‘stands before us as if it were a mirror, in which we can behold God, who himself is invisible.’
Frans van Hoogstraten uses the example of a pair of spectacles in an emblem in his *Schoole der wereld*, to indicate that we look at the invisible world ‘through the spectacles’ of the visible world. He compares spectacles to mirrors; both objects, it seems, are suitable for this ‘optical’ metaphor:

‘Many mirrors can our soul survey,  
in nature they help it find its way:  
Its eye absorbs what Creation’s glass records,  
God’s wisdom and His might, who from nought made all;  
in the Book of our Salvation it beholds the wondrous sight  
of our redemption; and when the Sky’s beauties are at their height  
it beholds His glory, pledged as our inheritance,  
through the glass of God’s beneficence.’

Frans calls nature the ‘Book of our salvation’ and distinguishes between the mirror of Creation and that of the Bible. He often uses the phrase ‘visible world’ in this text, which suggests that his writings and those of his brother were not unrelated. On the one hand he sees this world as an expression of God’s might, and on the other hand he calls it ephemeral and contrasts it with the greater truth of the afterlife.

These observations about the vanity of the visible world are linked directly to the art of painting by another author of pietistic writings, Jan Luyken. Many of this poet-engraver’s ideas did not mature until after Van Hoogstraten’s death. Even so, they probably illustrate the prevailing views in the circle surrounding Samuel and Frans in Rotterdam, where they may have been introduced in the 1670s by Johannes Antonides van der Goes, a friend and kindred spirit of Luyken’s. An interesting book in this context is *Leerzaam huisraad* (Instructive Household Objects, 1711), a late text that illustrates Luyken’s habit of investing everyday objects from the ephemeral visible world with moral significance – a device that in this respect is comparable to Frans van Hoogstraten’s *Schoole der wereld*. Both these texts bear witness to the notion that not only organic nature, but also man-made objects are judged as part of the visible world that reflects divine omnipotence. Luyken defines the human condition as abandoned to ‘the presence of visible life ... and surrounded by the ephemeral’; but human beings are expected to find their bearings by consulting ‘the great book of things’. One example is the mirror, which Luyken furnishes with the caption ‘Know Thyself!’; musing on this object, he condemns human vanity and urges the need for intellectual reflection.

Luyken produced an emblem that links the art of painting directly to a cogent concept of *vanitas*, which contrasts the visible and invisible worlds. The emblem bears the laconic title: ‘Het lykt war’ (‘It Seems [to be] Something’). The image of two figures debating in front of two paintings (a still life with fruit and a double portrait) contains a caption from Paul’s Second Epistle to the Corinthians (fig. 111): ‘While we look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen: for the things which are seen are temporal; but the things which are not seen are eternal’ (II Corinthians 4:18). Luyken’s own caption reads:
‘A Painting is mere appearance
of things that are in essence:
from its Fruit you cannot Eat,
with its Mouth it cannot teach.
Thus is the entire visible world,
with all pleasures of this age,
and all its affairs and riches:
just shadows of dead images.’

Luyken observes that just as paintings are only a semblance of the visible world, the visible world itself is only a semblance of true reality. He follows the same line of argument in an emblem representing ‘The Painter’, which reads: ‘Everything the eye sees is not the original’ (the word ‘original’ is rendered in Dutch principaal, the term that artists used for a work that was being copied). The author explains: ‘Art shows us a mere semblance / of what is in essence; / just so is the great Painting / of the All of visible things’ (fig. 112). The identification of ‘all the visible world’ with the realm of the transient follows from the method, adopted in Luyken’s book, of using the most inconsequential of objects as a starting-point for a contemplative discourse expressing disdain for worldly matters. This idea returns in his poem ‘Een ding is nodig’ (‘One Thing is Needful’), a title that refers to Christ’s meeting with Mary and Martha that, as early as in the sixteenth century, had come to symbolize man’s choice of the contemplative
rather than the active life (Luke 10:41-42). The poem begins and ends with the lines *alles wat men ziet / is mijn beminde niet* (‘all that can be seen / is not beloved by me’).

The poet heaves ‘many a sigh / in God, that expanse of sky’ and wonders when he will be shuffling off his mortal coil for life in heaven, replacing ‘all-that-can-be-seen’ with its converse:

‘The eternal Nought,
existing above all senses,
an All, whence everything came,
what as a principle once began,
‘tis that, so good and sweet, that has our love.’

Although Luyken, like Camphuysen for instance, defines painting as mere appearance, he does not reach a wholly negative conclusion about its pre-eminently ephemeral qualities. He sees the visible world, including ‘instructive household objects’, as an important instrument that focuses the viewer’s attention on the ‘invisible world’. This double perspective on the visible world can be summarized by another exhortation from Paul’s Epistles to the Corinthians, a text to which Van Hoogstraten refers elsewhere:212 ‘For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face: now I know in part; but then shall I know even as also I am known’ (I Corinthians 13:12).213
Van Hoogstraten was probably not an enthusiastic devotee of the pietistic religious attitude propagated by Luyken; this attitude has no place in the epideictic argument of the *Inleyding*, which is aimed at affirming the importance of visual reality. However, it is evident that Luyken’s view of the vanity of ‘all-that-can-be-seen’ is immediately complementary to, and the converse of, Van Hoogstraten’s focus on the visible world. It is an inference that, although not expressed overtly in the *Inleyding*’s text ‘in praise of painting’, must have been an obvious truism in seventeenth-century views of the visible world.

The currency of this ambivalent attitude towards ‘all-that-can-be-seen’ can be illustrated by referring to the work of various older art historians, who studied the possible symbolism contained in still-life painting; they concluded, notably in relation to *vanitas* scenes, that while some seventeenth-century viewers will have interpreted all images moralistically, many symbolic elements are open to different interpretations. In this connection and in relation to works of art dating from the late sixteenth century onwards, these scholars highlighted the structural ambiguity underlying the decision to depict specific insignificant and ephemeral objects. On the one hand, the minute attention to detail in otherwise inconspicuous objects may be interpreted as proof of the artist’s power to give permanence to items that are in themselves ephemeral. On the other hand, these still lifes impress on viewers that the visible world is deceptive and transient through iconographic references. In paintings that combine meticulous attention to the details of fleeting visual reality, in rendering reflections and surface textures, with an explicit *vanitas* symbolism, form and content are thus attuned to one another. This same ambivalence recurs, for instance, in self-portraits of painters that contain iconographical allusions to the vanity of the painter’s profession, while at the same time flaunting the painter’s skill in rendering a wealth of transitory components of the visible world.

Van Hoogstraten’s observations on the deceptiveness of art clearly emphasize the praiseworthy aspects of this deception. He uses commonplaces on this subject as positive threads of his epideictic line of argument. His definition of painting as deceit, for instance, while very similar to Agrippa’s bitter criticism, is cast in a wholly positive light. Even so, seventeenth-century viewers were able, armed with the topoi of a treatise such as the *Inleyding*, to adopt a pietistic view of works of art, valuing them solely as instruments that reveal the human tendency to succumb to illusion and sin. The plethora of anecdotes from the literature of art describing viewers who try to touch painted food, who cannot avert their eyes from a painted goddess or suppress their desire to speak to a portrait, according to this pietistic view, are so many examples of human folly. The art historian Reindert Falkenburg thus linked Pieter Aertsen’s still lifes, which display the artist’s skill in representing a variety of objects and textures to the rhetorical device of the ‘paradoxical encomium’, the elaborate praise of inconsequential things that is intended to lead to greater insight into the human condition:

‘The glowing terms used to praise something that is generally deemed worthless ... serve to lure the reader, who is swept away by the skill of the speaker/writer, into involuntarily endorsing the praise – only to subsequently expose the suspect nature of this endorsement and his own tendency to err into folly and sin.’

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Although Aertsen’s paintings are specific in their explicit juxtaposition of the display of profane objects with a religious narrative, the same train of thought concerning a fundamental ambiguity in the appreciation of visible things lives on later in the seventeenth century. This is not surprising, since, as Ernst Gombrich remarked, ‘every painted still life has the vanitas motif “built in” as it were …. The more cunning the illusion the more impressive, in a way, is this sermon on semblance and reality’. More specifically in relation to Netherlandish painting, Celeste Brusati wrote ‘there seems little question that both ... impulses [of moral education and preservation of the ephemeral] feed into Dutch still-life painting and register the audience’s ambivalence towards possessions and worldly attachments that are both desired and feared’. That the same ambiguity also holds good for other genres was suggested by Eric Jan Sluijter, who remarked that self-portraits often ‘reflected the painter’s professional pride as well as his awareness of the singular relationship between the art of painting, transience and vanity’. Our present analysis of the connotations of the metaphor ‘mirror of nature’ in seventeenth-century texts suggests that this fundamental ambivalence in thinking about certain works of art may be extrapolated to every representation of the visible world. In the context of this combination of an affirmative attitude towards the visible with a total renunciation of it, it is noteworthy that Frans van Hoogstraten’s pietistic views regarding the visible world are almost diametrically opposed to those of his brother, although both use the same terminology to discuss this concept.

The structural ambivalence inherent in seventeenth-century ideas about painting is rooted in the thinking in terms of similitudo, which, as we have seen, pervades Van Hoogstraten’s treatise. In this mode of thinking, not only is each element of the visible world supposed to be correlated to a specific concept in the higher, celestial sphere, but the entire visible world or civitas Mundi can be construed as an imperfect reflection of the invisible world or civitas Dei. Thus, paintings representing ‘all-that-can-be-seen’ do not need to take a specific allegory as a point of departure in order to construe visibilia as references to invisibilia. One might even argue that to some seventeenth-century viewers, the ‘Book of Nature’ doctrine itself encompasses a vanitas concept, namely one in which the visible world is valuable only as a Second Bible, as a path to the Kingdom of God that should be the final destination of all earthly endeavours.

These observations about painting’s religious significance as a ‘mirror of nature’ may supplement older art-historical ideas about the iconographic framework of paintings in which the artist draws attention to ephemeral visual details. One example is Albert Blankert’s belief that Vermeer’s work may be interpreted in the light of a ‘transcendental’ appreciation of the visible world. In a 1995 exhibition essay Blankert first posited that Vermeer ‘saw the beauty and richness of earthly reality as transcendental and wanted even the tiniest details of his paintings to bear witness to it’, a view that he contrasts to the traditional belief that the painting Woman Holding a Balance (c. 1664), for instance, is a vanitas scene (fig. 113). The arguments set forth in this chapter have shown that it is precisely the ‘colours and visible things’ studied attentively by the painter, such as ‘the light of the Sun [that] brings forth diverse works’, in the words of Du Mornay – the ‘changeable’ details of the visible world – that ultimately expose the vanity of the visible world. (To vary on Blankert’s theme: these details encouraged viewers to focus on the transcendental aspects of reality, which meant most notably, in seventeenth-
The views about sensory perception and speculations about the foundations of the visible world outlined here are thematized in various ways in paintings themselves. This will be illustrated by two works of art that reflect an ambivalent attitude towards the visible world in two care-
fully elaborated but very different ways. The first is Van Hoogstraten’s ‘peepshow’ or perspective box now at the National Gallery, London, which depicts allegorically the main rewards to be reaped by the painter. The second is Rembrandt’s self-portrait at Kenwood House, London, in which he presents himself with brushes and palette, and which has frequently been linked to art theory and the artist’s self-image. Comparison with Van Hoogstraten’s self-portrait in the *Inleyding* invites a fresh interpretation.

**Van Hoogstraten’s Perspective Box: The Bifocal Gaze as ‘Memento Mori’**

A number of paintings by (or attributed to) Van Hoogstraten take as their theme the mirror-like quality of painterly likeness and the notion that a painting conjures up a deceiving semblance. In this context, we may refer back to the process, analysed by Klaus Krüger, by which elements aimed at the deliberate puncturing of illusion are added to paintings, a process that was popular in the seventeenth-century Netherlands. Examples include painted frames or other elements through which a painting focuses attention on its own medium: paintings-within-paintings, painted mirrors, and views through doorways or window panes that frame selected elements of the visible world, just like paintings. While most of the paintings in which such devices are used cannot be explicitly linked to a theoretical statement, Van Hoogstraten’s perspective boxes and his emphasis on anamorphosis – deliberately deformed imagery – can be regarded as practical experiments that problematize painterly likeness as such.

Only six seventeenth-century perspective boxes have been preserved. Besides the famous one in London’s National Gallery, a peepshow in Detroit is also attributed to Van Hoogstraten (fig. 114). The London one contains a number of scenes on the sides and top, representing the rewards reaped by the artist. Three *putti* and a painter, on the sides, depict the three-part division that is articulated in the *Inleyding*: financial gain, fame and love of art. The top of the box contains an anamorphic view: an image of Venus and Cupid, figures that may refer, in the light of the amorous connotations of painting discussed above, to the sensual nature of painting and its seductive power. The figures do not lose their distorted appearance until the viewer adopts a specific vantage point in the lower left-hand corner, roughly at the height of the picture plane itself, ‘at Venus’s feet’ (fig. 115). What is more, depicted on one of the box’s sides is a painter studying an object that Celeste Brusati identified as an anamorphically distorted eye. Anamorphosis is an express reminder of painting’s essence as an optical deception. It reverses the normal order of events: the viewer is initially confronted with ‘a shape stained with diverse paints’, in Van Hoogstraten’s words, and only when looked at from one specific viewpoint does the illusion take effect. The process of anamorphic representation is repeated in the perspective box. This device is effectively composed of a number of anamorphic images, placed at different angles and at different distances from the viewer, and painted such that when viewed from one precisely determined vantage point, together they produce a single perspectival illusion. But the effect of the perspective box is not complete unless one is also able to adopt some other vantage point, and thus to discover the degree to which the actual work of art is distinct from the image that is conjured up. In the case of the perspective box,
Fig. 114 – Attributed to Samuel van Hoogstraten, *Perspective Box with Views of a Vaulted Vestibule*, 1663, wood, glass, mirror, 42 x 35 x 29 cm. Detroit Institute of Arts.
one side is open, or can be opened, to make this possible. Tesauro’s description of the delight afforded by metaphor alludes to the insight bred by this pictorial experiment: the greater the distinction between the image and the thing to which it is compared, the more admiration it will command (see above, page 240).

While Van Hoogstraten does not broach the subject of anamorphosis in the *Inleyding*, Tesauro’s *Cannocchiale* contains a noteworthy discussion of this subject. The frontispiece displays an anamorphosis being painted by a personification of Pictura, holding her palette and brush. Most unusually, a conical mirror is needed to undo the distortion and make the figures recognizable (figs. 116 and 116a). The mirroring surface reveals that the distorted inscription on the anamorphosis reads ‘omnis in unum’. The print’s maker is clearly referring here to the theory of metaphor, which is central to Tesauro’s text. It describes metaphor as a vehicle for ‘bringing together different concepts within a single term, showing these things in a miracu-
lous way, such that one appears by means of the other’. Tesauro concludes: ‘This magnifies the
delight, such that it is more astonishing and enjoyable to view objects through a perspectival
distortion than when you see the original things with your own eyes’. 229

Anamorphosis reveals the crucial significance of the beholder’s viewpoint to the assess-
ment of a work of art. Its problematization of pictorial likeness is seized on in seventeenth-cen-
tury philosophy as an illustration of the subjectivity of representations in general. Leibniz, for in-
stance, describes ‘the inventions of perspective, in which certain beautiful drawings appear utter
confusion until viewed from the right vantage point’. He compares the chaos presented by the
painted surface to the chaos of everyday life, and equates the organization of this chaos, which is
dependent on the view from the right distance, with the harmony of the macrocosm. 230

**Appearance and reality**

Anamorphosis is an explicit way of drawing attention to the dualism between appearance and
reality that is inherent in pictorial representation. In chapter V, discussing the problematic
nature of ‘rough’ brushwork, the term ‘complementarity’ was used to describe the relationship
between the two vantage points needed to adequately judge painting’s ‘delightful deceit’: one
from which the image appears distorted, and another from which it creates an illusion of reality
(see above, pages 237-240). Anamorphoses and perspective boxes also derive their effect from
this ‘bifocal’ structure.

The discussion of the rough manner in the previous chapter dwelt on the paradoxical
seventeenth-century belief that greater dissimilarity sometimes leads to greater likeness; fur-
thermore, when the representation is most dissimilar to the thing represented, the admiration
evoked by the painter’s power to deceive is greatest (see above, page 240). Félibien writes, for in-
stance, that the recognizability of portraits is often based not on precise painterly likeness
but on a single detail that stimulates the imagination. 231 There is a most illuminating passage
about this ‘similarity through dissimilarity’ in Descartes’s treatise on optics. Van Hoogstraten
apparently owned this work in a Dutch translation, *Verregezichtkunde* (1659), as part of the
collected works of Descartes in his library; he refers to Descartes’s optical theories in the
*Inleyding*. 232 Descartes explains the principle of similarity through dissimilarity referring to engravi-
gings that show perspectival foreshortening:

‘One sees that the prints, cut in either copper or wood, and transferred to paper with
a little ink here and there, show us woods, towns, people – indeed, even battles and
storms, although the multiplicity of diverse properties that they conjure up for us in
these objects, consists [in reality] of nothing more than [linear] shape alone, from
which the likeness derives. And this is a most imperfect likeness, since they seem to
present us, on a completely flat surface, objects that are convex and concave in various
degrees; since indeed, according to the principles of Perspective, they should often
depict circles by showing ellipses rather than circles, and squares by showing oblique
lozenges rather than squares, and similarly with all other shapes: since in order to be
more successful images, and to better represent an object, they should frequently not
bear a likeness to it.’ 233
Fig. 116 – Title page to Annibale Tesauro, *Cannocchiale aristotelico*, Venice 1670.

Fig. 116a – Detail of Fig. 116.
Van Hoogstraten may well have been inspired by a similar observation on the theme of ‘similarity through dissimilarity’ when he noted that rulers and compasses, and geometry in general, are of little use to painters in suggesting the precise shapes of things. He believes that someone who has obtained that ‘certainty’ that comes with ‘a sure hand’, ‘will not be asked about ‘a body’s proportions: For the eyes, being prepared by art, themselves become a Measure, and the hand follows the art with unwavering confidence’. (He adds, however, that this method is to be commended to none but the accomplished painter; in the hands of the untutored, a disregard for geometry is doomed to fail.) Strikingly, Van Hoogstraten’s fundamental appreciation of ‘practical reason’, of practice above theory, leads him to describe the eyes positively as a reliable source of knowledge, in contrast to the traditional distrust of these pre-eminently deceptive sensory organs. The ‘truth’ about the dimensions of things obtained with a ruler and a pair of compasses is deemed to be subordinate to the phenomenal appearance of things to our sight. This insight is thematized in perspective boxes and anamorphoses: successful likeness is achieved by virtue of a fundamental dissimilarity.

The perspective box and the ‘two vantage points’

By placing an anamorphically distorted image of Venus on the London perspective box, Van Hoogstraten links anamorphosis with the enticements of physical beauty, of sensory temptation, and of painting in general. The perspective box in Detroit explores this same theme, as noted by Arthur Wheelock in a cogent iconographical analysis. The interior painted here provides an important clue to our understanding of the artist’s wish to emphasize the dualism inherent in pictorial likeness: the inscription ‘memento mori’ (fig. 117). In Wheelock’s words, the box shows that ‘just as the perceived reality created by the artist is but an illusion, so is the world of the senses transient and without lasting significance.’ Wheelock observed that the interpretation of painting on this general level is not confined to the perspective box, but is one of the possible connotations in paintings in which striking optical effects are combined with a vanitas symbolism. In this context, he referred to Gerard Houckgeest’s trompe-l’oeil of a painted church interior behind a curtain, noting that the graves depicted in the church in this painting link the evanescence of painted images to the transience of earthly existence. Wheelock also mentioned a painting by Cornelis Norbertus Gijsbrechts, dated 1668, which contains interwoven ‘layers of fiction’ similar to those in Van Hoogstraten’s own trompe-l’oeil of a genre
painting which playfully thematizes the issue of painterly likeness (fig. 118). Gijsbrechts’s work is a **trompe-l’œil** of a still-life painting attached to the wall, surrounded by portrait miniatures and painters’ attributes. The still-life refers, by means of a skull and soap bubbles, to the fact that not just the painting but the rest of the world perceptible to the senses too is nothing but fleeting outward appearance and vanity.

In Wheelock’s view, the interplay between being and seeming addressed in these paintings alludes to the fundamental dualism of reality. The visible world is a passing semblance, whereas true reality does not appear until after death. This statement may be illustrated by citing a seventeenth-century source text: a passage from one of John Donne’s sermons; as noted above, this author’s sacred rhetoric was well known to Dutchmen like Huygens (see page 232). Donne distinguishes explicitly between the two worlds of appearance and reality, of ‘now’, the present day, and ‘then’, in the hereafter:

> ‘These two terms in our Text, *Nunc* and *Tunc*, Now and Then ... one designes the whole Age of this world from the Creation, to the dissolution thereof (for, all that is comprehended in this world, Now). And the other designes the everlastingness of the next world, (for that incomprehensibleness is comprehended in the other world, Then). ... For our sight of God here, our Theatre, the place where we sit and see him, is the whole world, the whole house and frame of nature, and our medium, our glasse, is the Booke of Creatures.’

What is particularly interesting about this wording for the theme of the perspective box is the fact that Donne refers literally to two possible perspectives in relation to a single subject. From the vantage point of the visible, we see God only through the indirect, mediated gaze of the Book of Nature. Only from the perspective of the invisible world can we gain an intimation of God in his true form: ‘But for our sight of God in heaven, our place, our Spheare is heaven it selfe’. During our lives on earth, we see God ‘through the mirror of nature’; only in the hereafter will we behold God directly. Donne continues: ‘all the world is but Speculum, a glasse, in which we see God; ... faith itself, is but aenigma, a dark representation of God to us, till we come to that state, to see God face to face, and to know as also we are known.’

In relation to our analysis of the Dutch Calvinists’ ideas about the visible world, it is interesting that Donne links his remarks on the two ‘worlds’ to the idea that the Creator can be known from his Creation. He even uses the metaphor of the mirror. Donne’s text forges an explicit link between the alleged dualism of all human knowledge on the one hand and the notion that the Creation functions as a ‘Second Bible’ on the other.

The inscription *memento mori* that accompanies Van Hoogstraten’s experiments relative to the status of pictorial likeness draws attention to the fundamental religious principle that subordinates ‘Now’ to ‘Then’. Other members of Van Hoogstraten’s circle also relate the awareness of the possibility of viewing reality from two different perspectives to the art of painting: for instance, in the poem praising Dullaart cited above. The author defines the visible world as ‘other than it seems, to those who look at it in the right way’. In this sense, the visible world may be compared to a painting: ‘Mere outward paint the World-Child delights to see / Only in practising virtue is eternity’.
The two viewpoints needed for a proper appreciation of anamorphosis and the perspective box can thus refer to the duality evoked by every successful painterly likeness. Painting achieves its full effect only when the viewer becomes aware of the fact that he has been deceived and identifies the work as ‘a shape stained with diverse paints’.

The more profound the effect of a virtual reality created by a work of art, the more strongly it reveals its own vanity when viewed from the ‘two perspectives’. According to seventeenth-century pietistic beliefs, this revelation automatically exposes the vanity of sensory knowledge while at the same time focusing the beholder’s thoughts on the afterlife. Thus, the Detroit perspective box is an effective aid for *ars moriendi* or the pious ‘art of dying well’, the preparation for the hereafter that is the aim of texts such as Frans van Hoogstraten’s *Schoole der wereld* and Luyken’s *Leerzaam huisraad*.

Fig. 118 – Cornelis Norbertus Gijsbrechts, *Vanitas*, 1668. Statens Museum for Kunst, Kopenhagen.
THE PAINTER AND THE VISIBLE WORLD:
SELF-PORTRAITS BY VAN HOOGSTRATEN AND REMBRANDT

Van Hoogstraten produced an image expressing one of the themes central to his theory of art – the distinction between the visible and the invisible worlds – in the portrait etching in the Inleyding (figs. 32 and 119). In the left background, two circles can be seen, one hoisted by a sculpted Atlas, the other shrouded in mist. Inscriptions identify the circles as the visible and invisible worlds, though these inscriptions are not legible in all versions of the print. The following paragraphs will trace an iconographic motif: the two circles or spheres, possibly in combination with a portrait, depicting the division of reality into a mundus visibilis and a mundus intelligibilis, as expressed by Erasmus’s statement that ‘there are two worlds, one accessible to insight, the other to sight.’

Mediaeval cosmology often presupposes a spherical universe, in which the earth is the centre and the outer ‘shell’ is formed by the coelum stellatum, the fixed stars. Between this outer layer and the sublunary world are the spheres of the heavenly bodies. Many mediaeval manuscripts visualize this structure in terms of two-dimensional concentric circles rather than three-dimensional spheres. A well-known representation of the firmament and the planetary spheres in the form of flat circles appears in a set of prints known as the Tarocchi, which some have attributed to Mantegna. Among the figures depicted in these prints are the nine Muses, each of which is linked to a planet: each Muse is endowed with a large, empty circle. The foundation of the cosmos, the primo mobile, is also depicted as a figure standing on a sphere (the macrocosm), who sets in motion the earth’s sphere (the microcosm) (figs. 120 and 121). Van Hoogstraten may have been thinking of these images when he chose his frontispieces featuring the Muses, associated with planets and in the case of Urania with a globe (fig. 30); this division is similar to Kircher’s identification of the Muses with the different heavenly spheres mentioned earlier (see above, page 63; fig. 24). Other allegorical figures also occur in the Tarocchi prints, furnished with circles, some of them studded with stars representing the canopy of heaven.

Fig. 119 – Detail of Fig. 32, Samuel van Hoogstraten, engraved self-portrait in the Inleyding tot de hooge schoole der schilderkonst, Rotterdam 1678.
In the sixteenth century we find the first images that represent the cosmos as a three-dimensional sphere. A striking illustration of the transition from a two-dimensional to a three-dimensional rendering of the cosmos is an image of Atlas by Francesco di Giorgio Martini, in which the world held up by the Titan is shaped like a flat disc, rendered with perspectival foreshortening (fig. 122).

The later history of art contains numerous examples of the cosmos depicted as a globe, sometimes containing inside it a smaller globe, representing the earth. The globe may symbolize either the visible or the invisible world, or both simultaneously. Atlas’s spherical burden, for instance, represents not just the earth but the heavens as well, in other words the entire cosmos. For this reason he is ranked among the oldest philosophers, the first to provide human beings with knowledge of the heavenly spheres: he features alongside Moses and Hermes Trismegistus in a series of paintings by Dosso Dossi, now in Ferrara (fig. 123).

A figure with a globe alluded in general to a claim to universality; thus, Siena Cathedral has a floor mosaic depicting a personification of Justice with a large globe. The Atlas in Van Hoogstraten’s self-portrait in the *Inleyding* probably alludes to the universal power of an art that embraces ‘the entire visible world’ and possibly to the intellectual pretensions in which Van Hoogstraten dresses his profession as ‘the sister of philosophy’.

Although, in the course of the seventeenth century, the neo-Platonic cosmology of the heavenly spheres gradually lost ground to a growing awareness of an infinite universe, this infinity was still visualized in the shape of a globe. Pascal wrote, for instance, that ‘nature is an infinite sphere of which the centre is everywhere and the circumference nowhere’.

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**Fig. 120** – Attributed to Mantegna, ‘Primo Mobile’, card from the so-called *Tarocchi*.

**Fig. 121** – Attributed to Mantegna, ‘Urania’, card from the so-called *Tarocchi*. 
Hoogstraten shows his familiarity with this equation of a sphere with infinity when he states that ‘a globe or ball exhibits a bounded circle and a single horizon to our eye, although with our hands and minds we comprehend its infinity’.  

Coexisting with the iconographic tradition of a single sphere representing the universe, there is another tradition within which two spheres are distinguished, representing the earth and the heavens. When Goltzius designed a frontispiece for the text *The Creation of Heaven and Earth*, he took two spheres that were being pulled apart by two male figures, to show how the initial unity of the Creation had been ruptured into the duality of the visible and invisible worlds (fig. 124). On one of the spheres, the continents are suggested with sketchy lines. The other one has double lines, apparently referring to the zodiac or to planetary orbits. A similar representation of two spheres appears in William Marshall’s title print to a 1640 edition of Bacon’s *Of the Advancement and Proficience of Learning* (fig. 125). On the sphere to the left are depicted the continents that were known at that time, as well as the equator. The right-hand sphere bears a number of vague, sketchy lines. The inscription *mundus visibilis* appears above

the left-hand sphere and mundus intellectualis above the one on the right. Beside each sphere is a mass of clouds from which a hand protrudes; the two hands reach out to one another. The same engraver made a frontispiece for Owen Feltham’s Resolves, a Duple Century (1636), showing a globe with the inscription per visibilia invisibilem, ‘through the visible to the invisible’ (fig. 126). The two spheres refer to the universal claims of Bacon’s philosophical project to lay the foundations for scientific research. Similarly, an all-encompassing reach is depicted by two spheres in Ripa’s personification of cosmography (fig. 127). Furnished with the same earthly and celestial spheres, the universal application of rhetoric is depicted in the frontispiece of a treatise by Balthasar Kindermann, Teutscher Wolredner (1680, fig. 128).

These claims to universality seem inherent to Van Hoogstraten’s concept of painting as a ‘universal knowledge’ that reflects the ‘entire visible world’. Seventeenth-century art theory presents its most direct equivalent to the iconographical tradition in an illustration in Carducho’s Diálogos de la pintura (1633) depicting Pictura amid the liberal arts. She is flanked by the earthly and celestial spheres (fig. 129). Comparable to this is a drawing by Carducho’s teacher, Federico Zuccari: it shows Pictura standing beside the Muses and the other arts, flanked by Geometria ‘who is handling the earth’s globe’ and Astrologia, who is leaning on a celestial sphere (fig. 130).
In seventeenth-century emblem books, the two complementary spheres are used in illustrations recalling the vanity of earthly things and the importance of the afterlife. Several emblems show the two spheres being weighed on a balance, which obviously tips towards the side of the invisible world (fig. 131). An engraving by Luyken actually renders it as ‘invisible’: the scale that is being pulled downward appears empty, since the sphere on that side is not part of the reality that is perceptible to the senses (fig. 132).

Finally, the combination of the two spheres with the universal scope of cosmography, rhetoric or painting can be linked to the way in which the earthly and celestial spheres are incorporated into portraits of scholars. A print produced in the latter half of the sixteenth century, after a painting by Vasari, shows six Florentine poets and philosophers with two globes, clearly identifiable as the earthly and celestial spheres, on a table in front of them (fig. 133). The two spheres were found in cabinets of curiosities, evidently conveying the same connotations of universality, as in a painting by Jan van der Heijden in Budapest. This work depicts naturalia and artificialia alongside the earthly and celestial spheres, which on the one hand were apparently standard items in collections of curiosities, and on the other hand referred to the universal range of humanist scholarship (fig. 134). The inventory of Rembrandt’s kunstkamer likewise lists ‘two globes’.

We may conclude that the two spheres in Van Hoogstraten’s self-portrait in the Inleyding fit seamlessly into the iconographic tradition in which a set of two similar globes alludes to universal knowledge; these globes may stand for the earth and the heavens, or for the visible and the invisible world – in other words, the vanity of earthly existence juxtaposed with the eternal afterlife. But a second pictorial tradition is also relevant to an interpretation of this...
self-portrait: that of images depicting a painter together with a globe or a map. The globe may be combined with objects denoting a *vanitas* symbolism, as in a picture of an artist’s studio by Gerard Dou. Jan Miense Molenaer painted a studio with a large map hanging on the wall containing two large circles, possibly representing the eastern and western hemispheres; Vermeer’s famous *Allegory of Painting*, now in Vienna, also shows an artist’s studio with a large map. Rembrandt, too, probably depicted himself standing in front of a map in his unfinished *Self-portrait* at Kenwood House (fig. 135).

Rembrandt’s self-portrait has been interpreted in a variety of ways, differences generally revolving around the interpretation of the circles in the background (explanations of which ranged from ‘Aristotle’s Wheel’ to the Cabbala). In contrast to a number of interpretations based on the literature of antiquity, the art historians Van de Waal, Bauch, Chapman and Brown all argued, more plausibly, that the circles represent a topographical map. Still, it is striking that they are not identified as such in the painting. The frontispiece to Bacon’s *Advancement*, for instance, does include such identification, since the meridians and the contours of the continents are clearly visible within the globe’s outlines. Van Hoogstraten’s self-portrait in the *Inleyding* could be seen in this regard as similar to Rembrandt’s portrait at Kenwood House: Atlas is represented shouldering a sphere that is not specified by any markings on its surface.
Opinions also vary as to the possible iconographical significance that might be attached to a map painted by Rembrandt. Let us start by noting three non-contentious points: 1) The circle is the most common symbol of perfection and universality; 2) Rembrandt’s self-portrait contains two circles; and 3) Rembrandt has depicted himself while engaged in painting.

If Rembrandt had sought merely to invoke the symbol of mathematical or theoretical perfection, a single circle would have sufficed. The fact that his painting depicts two circles may be linked to the fact that Rembrandt has depicted himself holding the tools of a painter. If that is correct, the two circles, like the spheres in Van Hoogstraten’s self-portrait or those in the print in Carducho’s Diálogos, may be interpreted as the painter’s supposed universal powers, as references to the conviction that there is ‘scarcely a single art or science of which it is fitting for a Painter to remain ignorant’, in Van Hoogstraten’s words.

As we have seen, Van Hoogstraten’s treatise draws a distinction in relation to these universal powers. He emphasizes that the subject of painting is the ‘visible world’, the exterior of things, that is, the domain of visible disegno esterno in contrast to invisible disegno interno, the duality we have discussed in this chapter. As we have seen, he also notes that the painting of the visible world may have the effect of concentrating the viewer’s mind on the ‘invisible’ foundations of that world. If we are in fact to believe that Van Hoogstraten’s self-image in his treatise is in any way an elaboration of ideas to which he was introduced in his formative period with Rembrandt, it is a fair suggestion that Rembrandt has depicted himself here standing in front of the visible and invisible worlds, as Van Hoogstraten did in his own self-portrait. It is possible that in relation to the division of reality into visible and invisible aspects, Rembrandt subscribed to the older view that by painting the outside of things, the painter actually penetrates to their inner essence, and hence proceeds per visibilia ad invisibilia. Perhaps Rembrandt was even alluding to his capacity to represent ‘inner’ emotional states, which would correspond to the self-image of pathopoios or ‘painter of the passions’.
Alternatively, Rembrandt may have been closer to Van Hoogstraten’s views, believing that the painter remains confined to the visible aspect (*alleen haer zichtbaer deel*) of things and is incapable of acquiring knowledge of the invisible world, of the ‘true nature’ of things. In this case, his symbolic reference to the invisible world would introduce a *vanitas* concept, recalling that the representation of the visible world is nothing but vanity, serving no other function than to direct the viewer’s thoughts at the invisible world. If this is the underlying conviction, the message conveyed by the portrait at Kenwood House would be identical to that of the perspective box in Detroit. Like the perspective box and the deliberate puncturing of illusion in *trompe-l’œil*, a painting focusing on the surface of the visible world may almost automatically refer to the vanity of sensory knowledge in general.

That Rembrandt’s self-portrait does in fact express a *vanitas* idea can be argued from the fact that it is painted in a demonstrably ‘rough’ manner and was possibly left unfinished. The painting might thus deliberately have focused attention on the possibility of ‘two viewpoints’, on the notion of complementarity that also proved important to the interpretation of the rough brushstroke (see above, pages 237-240). Like the perspective box, the two differing but complementary viewpoints may be intended to expose the contrast between ‘Now’ and ‘Then’, everyday life and the hereafter. In calling attention to its own medium, effectively ‘a shape covered with paint’, the painting would thus expose the deceptiveness of the sense of sight. The two circles in Rembrandt’s self-portrait may be a further elaboration of this *vanitas* idea. The connotations of all-inclusiveness or infinity suggest that the circle symbolism may well allude to the afterlife.

*Fig. 130 – Federico Zuccari, The temples of virtue with Apollo, the Muses, and the Arts.*

The Morgan Library and Museum, New York.
In this connection too, an iconographic tradition can be identified. In a drawing by Federico Zuccari of *Time with Allegorical Figures*, an earthly sphere and an openwork celestial sphere are depicted in the background (fig. 136). A skeleton is leaning on the earthly sphere. The figures may represent the successive ages of man: child, young man, old man and death. In this interpretation, the celestial globe refers to eternity, which awaits human beings only in the afterlife.

Additional literary sources exist for the use of the globe as part of a vanitas symbolism. De la Serre concludes from the fact that the world is an unbounded sphere that wherever you go, you can never arrive anywhere that is essentially different from where you started: thus, man is always moving towards his end.

A poem by Heinrich Mühlpforth, published in 1698, expresses a vanitas idea based on the same line of argument:

‘What is it, that we call Life?
A circle suffused with suffering borne
a Dream and a deceptive gleam;
an uncertain dawn.’
The visible world – in Luyken’s words, ‘all-that-can-be-seen’ – is of value, in the view of the seventeenth-century pietistic authors studied in this chapter, only to the extent that it refers to the invisible world. The universalist aspirations of painters to depict the ‘entire Visible World’ are ideally suited, precisely because of their ambition to comprehend ‘everything under the sun’, to reminding viewers of the ephemeral nature of essentially all things earthly.

The possible vanitas connotations of the geographical or cosmographical circles in Rembrandt’s self-portrait may be linked to the iconographical tradition in which painters furnish their self-portraits with a vanitas symbolism; Rembrandt’s Self-Portrait as Zeuxis (c. 1662), for instance, may also allude to human vanity in general: it represents the legendary artist laughing at his model, an old and ugly woman (fig. 88). In Michelangelo’s poetry, the artist’s gaze in the mirror is linked to the notion of mortality; he sighs that he is ‘betrayed’ by the gaze in the mirror, which confronts him with his own advancing years. This train of thought can be connected to artists’ portraits. A lost fresco by Daniele da Volterra depicted Michelangelo looking at himself in the mirror, with the inscription ‘Know Thyself’ (fig. 137).

Goeree links this phrase, gnothi seauton in Greek, to the painter’s knowledge of the human passions and to his ethical conduct. That this connotation was more than an isolated notion is suggested by a seventeenth-century mirror which is inscribed with precisely these words (fig. 138). Van Hoogstraten’s exhortation to painters to use a mirror to study their own passions can be construed as a literal interpretation of this precept. Indeed, his remark is based on an ancient commonplace: Socrates is said to have advised his students to look in the mirror frequently to learn more about themselves.
Fig. 135 – Rembrandt, *Self-portrait*, ca. 1660, canvas, 114 x 94 cm.
The Iveagh Bequest, Kenwood House, London.
Gazing in the mirror can evidently be invested with connotations of self-scrutiny and insight into human vanity; thus, Calvin writes that in Mosaic law, ‘we behold, first, our impotence; then, in consequence of it, our iniquity’ in the manner of ‘a mirror [in which] we discover any stains upon our face’. According to Van Hoogstraten’s theory of physiognomy, the painter’s gaze in the mirror can reveal not only his past but also his future, and most notably the moment of his death, as discussed above (see page 177). Michelangelo remarks in a sonnet that, looking in the mirror, he becomes ‘the enemy of himself, uselessly shedding tears and heaving sighs that no loss is as great as the loss of time’. A similar lament appears in one of Vaenius’s emblems: ‘To look in the mirror / and see your once smooth cheeks / all wrinkled and your skin quite aged, / Is to learn that ... Nothing ... can resist its fate.’

In this interpretation, Rembrandt’s self-portrait, like that of Van Hoogstraten in the Inleyding, is a conscious and intricate representation of the artist’s self-image. The painting thus emphasizes that painting is not a ‘cobbler’s trade’ but an art with cosmographical aspirations, encompassing the ‘entire visible world’. At the same time, the admonition ‘Know thyself’ means that the painter should realize that his works are no more than streaks of paint on a canvas, and that his activity – like the other arts and sciences – is a vain occupation.

When Van Hoogstraten’s definition of painting as a ‘mirror of nature’ is studied in the light of its historical connotations, it becomes clear that the metaphor draws attention to the fact that painting depicts only the surface, the outward appearances, of things. The deceptive and mendacious nature of art is nonetheless charged with positive appreciation arising from the rhetorical value attached to persuasiveness and courtly dissimulation.
The theory of the metaphorical nature of art, elaborated most explicitly by Tesauro, focuses on the dichotomy underlying the phenomenon of painterly illusion which links two incompatible domains. Seventeenth-century Dutch literature describes this contrast not only in terms of the distinction between the lifeless panel or canvas versus the living virtuality of the image, but also in terms of inside versus outside, or appearance versus reality. This fundamental artistic contrast is also expressed in art itself, as is demonstrated by examples such as Van Hoogstraten’s experiments with interwoven layers of fiction and optical devices such as the perspective box. Such sophisticated modes of courtly entertainment prove to have a serious undertone. As the dichotomy between the ‘Now’ of earthly existence and the ‘Then’ of the afterlife, this serious message recurs at the end of the programme set forth in Van Hoogstraten’s *Inleyding*, the last chapter of which confronts the ambitious young painter with his own mortality. Rembrandt, too, may have been familiar with the pictorial tradition depicting the ‘two worlds’ theme in the form of two circles. If he did indeed paint himself flanked by
these two worlds, he was expressing the intricate train of thought associated with the formula that painting is a ‘mirror of nature’, a train of thought in which corporalia and spiritualia stand in a complex relationship of similitude to one another that calls attention to the vanity of the visible world.

Opinions regarding the ‘Book of Nature’ in the latter half of the seventeenth century are distinct from the older views on this topic in the sense that they regard nature as a highly flawed and indirect path to the divine: a sceptical attitude towards the sense of sight as a source of knowledge suggests that in the visible world, including everyday objects, we see ‘through a glass, darkly’. Painting, which, as a ‘mirror of nature’ doubles the ephemeral quality of the visible world, can thus be construed in moral terms: through his skill in representing fleeting details, the painter emphasizes the very vanity, not only of art itself, but also of the visible world in general. In cases in which a work of art itself refers to its own medium, it questions the aims and limitations of an art focused on illusion while at the same time challenging the epistemological status of the visible world itself. Besides defusing Reformational criticism of images, this art of painting also plays a positive role in the pre-eminently religious ars moriendi in focusing the viewer’s mind on the falseness of the visible world.

The comparison of a painting to a mirror can be linked to an ambivalent attitude to the intellectual and religious value of art. The epideictic argument of the Inleyding is essentially positive in tone; the emphasis on the deceptiveness of art is combined unproblematically with an appreciation of its powers as the ‘sister of philosophy’. In the work of authors such as Frans van Hoogstraten or Jan Luyken, on the other hand, the ambivalence in seventeenth-century thinking about the visible world leads to a shift in emphasis, focusing on the deceptiveness of the visible world itself. This does not deprive art of its religious or moralistic function; on the contrary, by revealing the vanity and ephemeral nature of the visible world, a painting can lead the viewer to focus on the everlasting, invisible world.
The words pronounced by the Synod of Dordrecht, that God has revealed himself in two ways, may be furnished with a significant qualification: namely that the second way, through the Book of Nature, ultimately provides no more than an imperfect reflection. The various connotations of the mirror metaphor, of the deceptiveness of the sense of sight, and of the deceptiveness of painting, thus modify the view that the assiduous study of nature can ultimately lead to a true understanding of God – on the one hand, nuancing its powers to contribute to any empirical knowledge of reality, on the other shielding it from the criticism of sceptics who doubt the validity of sensory knowledge. As the last part of this book will argue, in this sense the metaphor links up with the ‘new philosophy’ that was gaining ground in the seventeenth century.
EXCURSUS

PAINTING AS A SISTER OF PHILOSOPHY
**Excursus**

Painting as a ‘Sister of Philosophy’

_He who denies God, to give finer colour_
_To his denial, driven most unreasonably,_
_Knows no Godhead but the heavens, earth and sea,_
_And what he sees on low and high, and from near to far._

Joost van den Vondel, *Bespiegelingen van Godt en godtsdienst*

Thus far we have looked at Van Hoogstraten’s ideological underpinning of an art that reflects and contemplates the visible world primarily from the perspective of ancient philosophy, in particular Stoicism and Aristotelianism. This chapter will examine the ideological context of his ideas from another perspective: instead of looking at the classical tradition, it endeavours to determine the influence of a contemporary philosophical debate that Van Hoogstraten was introduced to by his friend Willem van Blijenberg.

Although his theory is manifestly determined by concepts from antiquity, it nonetheless contains a clearly discernable shift away from the ideas of predecessors like Van Mander. While Van Hoogstraten occasionally refers to the Neoplatonic cosmology that is the main ideological basis of Van Mander’s didactic poem, this cosmology is in no way a connecting thread in the theory set out in the *Inleyding.* To clarify this shift, we can examine it in the light of the ‘new philosophy’ which, aside from a few passing references to Descartes, we have not yet discussed. Van Hoogstraten became directly embroiled in the debates sparked by the onset of Cartesianism in the Dutch Republic in the second half of the seventeenth century. Our discussion will have the nature of an excursus because of its speculative conclusions, which are at odds with the wish for factual completeness proper to the practice of art history. Van Hoogstraten’s own intellectual leanings and his learned milieu, however, allow for an exploration of the key role of the concept of the visible world in the *Inleyding* by placing it against the background of the author’s interest in the ‘new philosophy’. The distinction between ‘visible’ and ‘invisible’ aspects of reality was radicalized in this philosophy. We will see how the visible world loses significance on one front, but gains it in a remarkable manner on another.

In many respects the ideas of the ‘new philosophy’ of the seventeenth century meant a break with the older world view, determined primarily by Aristotelian and Platonic hypotheses. The response theory of ekphrasis developed in the Second Sophistic, for instance, was weak-
ened by Descartes's optical insights. We shall see that Van Hoogstraten's epideictic argument effortlessly combines an unmistakable interest in modern optics with the ancient theory that images transport the viewer into a virtual reality. This is in no way to suggest that the paradigms of the new science have replaced the older ones in his treatise; it may be said, though, that the argument in the Inleyding can be analysed with a view to both traditional and modernizing forms of intellectual authority.

THE VISIBLE AND THE INVISIBLE

The visible-invisible dichotomy, discussed in particular in the previous chapter, is a commonplace of art literature (see above, pages 285, 295-298, 302). It is seized upon by Camphuysen, for instance, to reprimand painters: ‘You seek the outer husk, your judgement is pitiful: / The opposite of our God: who cares only for the inward.’ Zuccari had asserted that painting only imitates the ‘external superficial accidents’ of things (it concentrates on nature ‘almeno quanto all’esterno nella superficie accidentale’), and Houbraken proclaimed the view that ‘the world reveals the exterior of things, but conceals the interior’. This dichotomy is made a central point of contention in the ‘new philosophy’, in particular in Cartesianism and its critics.

The philosophical division of reality into two ‘worlds’, an invisible and a visible one, is obviously related to the internal-external dichotomy. An important question for art theory is just how these two worlds are related to one another. We have seen that Calvinist authors share the Stoic conviction that it is reprehensible to try to depict ‘invisible’ things (see above, pages 110, 116, 117). A treatise on drawing by Cornelis Biens believes that it is ‘naturally (but pervertedly)’ the case ‘that man always depicts something visible in order to express the invisible’, which the author regards as conflicting with the commandment not to ‘depict infinite, almighty and unfathomable God by means of any visible things’, thus setting his face against devotional works. We have also discussed the alternative put forward in the Inleyding, expressed most clearly by Frans van Hoogstraten, that precisely by painting the visible world, artists could praise ‘invisible’ God.

One of the characteristics of the ‘new philosophy’, particularly Cartesianism with its strong synthesizing tendency, is that a multiplicity of related conceptual antitheses such as those between mind and body, between invisible and visible aspects of reality, or in many cases simply between an inside and an outside are subsumed into a fundamental dichotomy. Descartes divides reality into cogito, ‘I think’, the only domain about which certain information can be obtained, and the world ‘outside myself’, which I am compelled to doubt. The separation he introduced between res cogitans and res extensa – thought and ‘extension’, or the physical world – largely deprived visible nature of the spiritual value it was allotted in earlier natural philosophy. Cartesian mechanistic philosophy saw nature not as an allotted in earlier natural philosophy. Cartesian mechanistic philosophy saw nature not as an animated principle, but as no more than a mechanism that satisfies the laws of particle physics.

It is primarily as a consequence of this central Cartesian dualism that the division between mind and matter is so often formalized in the second half of the seventeenth century. Hans-Jörg Czech suggested that Van Hoogstraten’s division of his writings into areas of ‘visibility’ and ‘invisibility’ was inspired by these conceptions in the ‘new philosophy’. The painter’s reading of the work of the philosopher and scientist Kenelm Digby may have moved
him to devote a two-volume publication to the fundamental subject of ‘the visible versus the invisible world’. Digby’s book likewise comprises two volumes: it is titled *Two Treatises; in the One of Which, the Nature of Bodies; in the Other, the Nature of Mans Soul, Is Looked Into: In Way of Discovery, of the Immortality of Reasonable Soules* (1644). The division into ‘bodies’ and ‘souls’ corresponds to the Cartesian division *res extensa*, matter extended in space, and *res cogitans*, thought. In effect, the title of the third volume of the Dutch edition of Descartes’s *Principles of Philosophy* is literally ‘de Zichtbare Werrelt’, ‘The Visible World’ (in Latin it is *Mundus aspectabilis*). Van Hoogstraten owned this book, and its title is the most directly comparable source for the *Inleyding*’s subtitle in Dutch literature of the second half of the seventeenth century.

In the last decades of the seventeenth century, art theory was undoubtedly influenced by the terminology involved in the division of reality into two spheres. We see how Goeree, whose art-theoretical work draws more explicitly than Van Hoogstraten’s on Cartesianism and Spinozism, also makes extensive use of the ‘visible’ and ‘invisible’ dichotomy and expressly associates it with *res extensa* and *res cogitans*. The author makes a distinction between the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ impressions that the human mind can experience: ‘which impressions on the Mind can also be of two kinds; for they are either internal or they come from outside’; the ‘internal’ impressions are the ideas that the mind itself generates. The ‘external’ impressions come from visual reality: ‘The externals come from the objects of the visible World’.

Descartes’s rigorous dualism of visible and invisible worlds represents a break with the philosophical tradition that assumes that the natural world consists of animated objects that affect each other ‘at a distance’ and express some hidden or explicit meaning, symbolic references to ideological issues. His idea that visible nature is a mechanism of colliding particles denies the possibility that elements of the visible world are seen as *spiritualia sub metaphoris corporalium* (concepts in the guise of material things), thus putting paid to the option of ascending from *visibilia* in God’s Creation to *invisibilia*. We now have to ask what implications this vision has for the idea voiced by older authors like Bacon and De Mornay – an idea that also occurs in the *Inleyding*: the belief that the visible world, as the ‘Second Bible’, has transcendental significance (see above, pages 108-117).

Our analysis of how Van Hoogstraten’s views on the visible and the invisible world relate to contemporary philosophy starts with an examination of some aspects of the seventeenth-century theory of optics. We will then deal in a more general sense with discussions about Cartesianism and the role of Spinozist metaphysics, as they were known to Van Hoogstraten and his correspondents. Spinozism presents a philosophical system in which the relationship between *res extensa* and *res cogitans* is interpreted such that the visible world regains something of the transcendency it lost in Cartesianism. It may even acquire a philosophical significance in a more complete sense than before. We shall see that an ‘optical paradigm’ plays a central part in this thinking.

**FROM QUALITIES TO PARTICLES: THEORIES ABOUT OPTICS**

Celeste Brusati has pointed to the connection between Van Hoogstraten’s views of art and the experimental natural sciences that were flourishing in the seventeenth century. The painter’s trip to London, for instance, may have been prompted by the establishment of the Royal So-
Ciety in 1660; he visited this society, which was the institutional home for the ideas of the ‘new philosophy’, and had contact with its members. Brusati explained Van Hoogstraten’s preoccupation with trompe l’oeils and his interest in perspective boxes and the camera obscura in part as a response to the current scientific climate, which attracted him as ‘an experimental investigator of nature’. The painter may have been inspired to seek out this scientific environment by Cartesianism’s popularity in the intellectual climate of Dordrecht, as personified by a number of prominent figures associated with the city, such as Isaak Beekman. This philosopher was principal of the Latin school from 1627 and a friend of the physician Johan van Beverwijck, for whose work Van Hoogstraten provided illustrations. Beekman corresponded at length with Descartes and with members of the Royal Society too.

In the Inleyding Van Hoogstraten discusses the optical theories of contemporary thinkers like Descartes, Bacon and Digby, and adds his own comments. The scientists with whom he was in touch had a particular interest in optics: most notable was the Dordrecht mechanic and optician Caspar Calthoff, whose portrait Van Hoogstraten probably painted in 1650 (fig. 139). Calthoff worked with important physicists like Christiaan Huygens; when he and his brother Constantijn decided to make their own lenses for their microscopes, it was Calthoff who supplied the grinding discs. In 1655 Huygens observed that no one could rival this mechanic’s work when it came to optical instruments. When Calthoff departed for England, where Van Hoogstraten went to see him again, the Huygens brothers called on Spinoza’s skill in grinding lenses and discussed optical problems with the philosopher.

In his painting treatise, Van Hoogstraten discusses modern experimental science and describes his experiences with the camera obscura. He had seen the device when he visited the Jesuits in Vienna and again in London, as we learn from a remark in the Inleyding. Through his contacts with Van Beverwijck, whose Schat der ongesontheyt (Treasury of Ill-Health, 1664) contains an illustration of a camera obscura, the painter may already have become familiar with the workings of the apparatus in Dordrecht (fig. 140). Interestingly, Van Hoogstraten believes that the image produced by a camera obscura shows what colour qualities ‘a truly natural Painting’ should possess, and compares it with a mirror. In effect, the camera obscura provided an attractive experiment that was repeatedly referred to by seventeenth-century philosophers (like Locke and Leibniz) concerned with the sense of sight and the cognitive faculty in general, exploring the comparison of the eye with the camera obscura. In the context of art theory, it is Goeree who gives an analysis of sight based on similar philosophical ideas. He describes ‘Bodies in a dark Room [that] were painted on Canvas or Paper by the opening of a tiny hole’. His Menschtkunde contains an illustration showing how perspective works, how the image is projected ‘into the eye’ by way of moving particles, and how eventually, when these particles collide with ‘nerves’, the image reaches the brain. Goeree’s ideas show a close affinity with the Verregezichtkunde, the 1659 Dutch translation of Descartes’s Optics.

Goeree refers to the epistemological insight that an analysis of the workings of the camera obscura brings with it. It means that we understand that we always observe things from a specific viewpoint, which severely limits our apprehension. The camera obscura produces an image that reveals ‘to which side or Point an object that is formed in our Eyes, and is seen by us, is turned, or which position it is in’. In Goeree’s view, when we see things there is no question of an ‘action at a distance’: he explicitly rejects Aristotelian theory, which holds that sight
involves a ‘phantasm’ that ‘impresses itself on the mind’. Seeing, he asserts, is a function of particles colliding with the optic nerves: ‘To be sure, one must not think that [perception] occurs as a result of an Action or Image that comes from the Seen object, but only as a result of the position of the particles of the Brain from which the Nerves derive their origin.’ Goeree may have borrowed this idea, too, from Descartes, who warns the readers of his *Verregezichtkunde*:

‘One must not suppose that the soul, in sense experience, has to contemplate images that are sent from objects into the brain, as our [Aristotelian] Philosophers commonly do ... [who], seeing that our mind can easily be stimulated by a painting to receive the object that is painted on it, believed that our mind is in the same way stimulated to comprehend the objects of sense experience by means of minute images which are formed in our head.’

Descartes rejects the Aristotelian idea that observation occurs when minuscule images ‘become present’ in the imagination. He posits that when reflecting particles of light collide with tiny globes in the brain, the position of these globes dictates which part of the object is actually seen. Goeree consequently compares seeing with the way a blind man observes, using a stick to feel the shape of objects: in the same way, the eye ‘feels’ the outside of objects in the visible world by means of a connected string of minute colliding particles in the air. Later in the book Goeree clarifies his views by citing the example of the mirror, ‘whose Nature is to present a thing to the Viewer’s Eye, as it has received it’.

The workings of the camera obscura contributed to the undermining of the earlier
scientific notion that, according to their specific ‘qualities’, things emit ‘spirits’ (as the eyes themselves can shoot spiritual qualities like ‘arrows’, cf. fig. 56), which set in motion various events in the affects and in the imagination (the ‘sensible’ level of the soul) that ultimately lead to perception and knowledge. The device demonstrated the realization that sight is no more than the projection of particles, and that the image we see is the result of the angle of incidence and refraction: in other words, of the position of the light source and the position of the viewer. In opposition to the ancient commonplace that painting makes ‘the absent present’, the comparison of the eye with the camera obscura posits a different conception: the image produced by the sense of sight is a reflection, in other words it does not have an independent presence in the imagination. Huygens contrasts these conflicting ideas in his Oogentroost: ‘Here our eyes are [seen as] bows, / And shoot out rays: there it’s [deemed] a gross lie, / There it’s naught but mirror-glass that takes things in.’

The insight bred by Cartesian optics robs the popular notion of the ‘living image’ of the epistemological basis it was accorded in antiquity. Like the mirror, the camera obscura only shows the surface of things. In this it is like the art of painting which, in Van Hoogstraten’s words, in the ‘exploration of nature ... [has] only to consider her visible aspect’, and studies things ‘not as they are described by the [Aristotelian] natural philosophers, but only as they determine the outward shape, like the shell around the egg’. Early experiments with the camera obscura led to the awareness of a paradox. On the one hand it was possible, using this device, to provide an example for a ‘perfect painting’ that seemed to overlap almost entirely with life itself. On the other, the camera obscura demonstrated the contingent character of both the visible world and the gaze of the painter who captures it. Painting with the aid of a camera obscura did not, after all, require the ability to distil an inner essence from things or discover their ‘true nature’: the camera obscura presents no more than a moment in time and illustrates the view that the projected image’s relation to reality is based on no more than chance.

Van Hoogstraten’s interest in the camera obscura reveals how new and old scientific
ideas are interwoven in the epideictic argument of the Inleyding, and how the response theory of the Second Sophistic is given a place alongside more modern optical experiments. It is consequently impossible to attribute an unequivocal scientific preference to his treatise; for an outline of the context of his theory, an analysis of the classical roots of his arguments may be supplemented by an examination of the contemporary scientific developments in which he was interested.

**Colour theory**

Van Hoogstraten's interest in the camera obscura is not the only aspect of his work to show an affinity with the modern scientific ideas of the seventeenth century; his colour theory, too, was influenced by them. Aristotelian theory holds that things have colour by virtue of their formal cause: colours are inherent ‘qualities’ of things; this is a view that we still find in Bacon. In this line of reasoning, colours are supposed to procure specific affective responses that correspond directly to the formal cause of things: each thing is allocated a specific colour and sympathetic quality. Van Mander presents this view when he asserts that all things were given their specific colours at the Creation ‘by this most Ingenious Sculptor and Painter’. Light, in this thinking, was also seen as a quality in the Aristotelian sense, a spiritual element that acts on the mind ‘at a distance’.

There is a great deal of theorizing about colour in the ‘new philosophy’. Van Hoogstraten's view of the optical theories of his contemporaries is not clear. By and large, he criticizes the philosophers he mentions; he does not, for instance, agree with Descartes's description of the spectrum, and reports that he has made different observations ‘from life’. Whereas Bacon's colour theory clings to old-fashioned views revolving around alchemy and elementary ‘qualities’, Descartes and Robert Boyle worked out a mechanistic theory in which colour, too, is seen as a function of colliding particles. Boyle was a prominent member of the Royal Society, and Van Hoogstraten may well have been acquainted with his *Experiments and Considerations Touching Colours* (1664) since it was published shortly after the painter’s arrival in London. Boyle describes the view – dated in his opinion – that ‘Colours are Inherent and Real Qualities, which the Light doth but Disclose, and not concur to Produce’; in other words, older authors did not recognize that colours are a function of light. Boyle says that the ‘chymists’ regarded colours as alchemical ‘qualities’ and attributed their origin and effect to substances such as sulphur or salt. The Cartesians, on the other hand, were the first to argue that this concept of ‘qualities’ has no validity, and that in the judgement of colours, too, only the ‘extension’ – the form and position of things in space and time – is essential. Boyle describes the views of light as a function of particles:

‘As for the Cartesians I need not tell you, that they, supposing the Sensation of Light to bee produc’d by the Impulse made upon the Organs of Sight, by certaine extremely Minute and Solid Globules ... endeavour to derive the Varieties of Colours from the Various Proportion of the Direct Progress or Motion of these Globules ... by which Varying Proportion they are by this Hypothesis suppos’d qualify’d to strike the Optick Nerve after several Distinct manners, so to produce the perception of Differing Colours. ’
In his *Optics*, Descartes describes how colours are the result of reflections on bodies with a distinct surface texture: he thinks that they come about because particles bounce against the optic nerves in a particular way.\(^{11}\)

In the *Inleyding* we can detect both the old and the modern conceptions of colour. On the one hand Van Hoogstraten urges artists to discover the ‘local colour’ of things: the colour that things were given ‘at the Creation’, which is, he postulates, permanently bound to the ‘ideal forms’ of which things on earth are the shadows. He states ‘that the colour of each thing must be diligently found out’ and encourages his fellow artists to imitate the ‘colours that things have in themselves’ – to give ‘each thing its own natural colour’.\(^{32}\) There is no detailed analysis of light as a function of particles in the *Inleyding*; Van Hoogstraten says: ‘We shall pass over what the philosophers say about *lux* (light) and *lumen* (shine), and treat only light and lighting, in so far as they concern our art.’\(^{33}\) At the same time, however, he is well aware that colour is a function of light: ‘The colours can be changed by different lighting.’\(^{34}\) He also observes in regard to reflected light that things are coloured ‘according to the colour of that by which they are lit’ and that things give off their colour by reflection to surrounding objects.\(^{35}\) Furthermore, he describes the use of lenses and mirrors to determine the extent to which our judgement of colours is governed by the distance between us and an object.\(^{36}\) These are by no means entirely new observations: Van Mander talks about reflected light in similar terms.\(^{37}\)

Van Hoogstraten differs from his predecessor inasmuch as he uses a specific term to explain that local colours can be contaminated by various factors. He states in this regard that the colours a painter depicts do not follow from the immanent formal cause of the things he paints. On the contrary, they are governed by the colours the painter has on his palette and by his own ‘judgement’, which searches within the constraints of the range on the palette for colours that correspond with what he sees – colours as they are affected by the position of things relative to the viewer. In other words colour becomes, in the modern art-historical term, ‘relative’: it is dependent on the position of objects in space. Van Hoogstraten uses the word *houding* (similar to the modern Dutch *verhouding*, which means ‘relation’) to explain this: an artist determines his colours and tonal values not by attributing specific local colours to the objects he paints, but relative to the colours he already has on his canvas and to the spatial effects he wants to convey. He writes in the *Inleyding*: ‘it is chiefly for the *Houding* that one compares different shades and illuminated things with one another’.\(^{38}\)

Digby, mentioned earlier in connection with the titles of the two volumes of Van Hoogstraten’s book, uses the observation that painters ‘will make objects appeare neerer and further of, merely by their mixtion of their colours’ as his point of departure in explaining that colours are a function of the reflection of light, and not Aristotelian qualities.\(^{39}\) He explicitly rejects the notion that light partakes of a spiritual nature: in his view, light belongs to the domain of ‘bodies’ (and not to that of ‘souls’, which he treats in the second part of his discourse).\(^{40}\) Like Descartes, Digby compares the movement of light particles with those of a bouncing ball, and he thinks that the way they rebound determines the appearance of things on the viewer’s retina.\(^{41}\) Colour is clearly a function of these collisions, ‘for those who are cunning in Optikes; will, by refractons and reflexions make all sortes of colours out of pure light’. The different colours consequently exist only on our retina, and are not properties of things: ‘the very same object must appeare of different colours, whensoever it happeneth that it reflecteth light differently to us’.\(^{42}\)
Van Hoogstraten, who apparently had an inkling of the ideas formulated by Digby, concludes: ‘thus a finished Painting already lies on your palette’. The colours to be painted, first mulled over in the painter’s mind, are constrained by the limits of the range of pigments at his disposal; what appears on the canvas is obviously a function of the artist’s ‘eye and judgement’ relative to the possibilities of his palette and the spatial effects he has in mind. In Van Hoogstraten’s theory there is certainly no question of a complete shift in the perception of colour as something that is solely a function of the reflection of light. Again, the *Inleyding* contains a combination of older and new conceptions: although Van Hoogstraten recognizes the relativity of colour in respect of the incidence of the light and the position of the viewer, he does not describe it explicitly in terms of moving particles.

He might have been attracted to another example from painting practice presented by Digby – depicting *changeant* or shot fabrics. The philosopher describes how artists go so far as to use complementary colours to paint one and the same fabric, which illustrates the importance of the incidence of the light. In this connection, he observes on the effect of a prism: ‘the considering of which, will confirm our doctrine, that even the colours of bodies, are but various mixtures of light and shadowes, diversely reflected to our eyes’. It is not inconceivable that Van Hoogstraten debated these questions with opticians like Calthoff or others when he visited the Royal Society. Painters who specialized in depicting reflecting fabrics could make precisely this optical problem the *pièce de résistance* of their work, appealing to the public’s intellectual awareness that colour is a function of light.

Another consequence of the optical concepts of light and colour outlined here is the realization that representations of visible reality (such as figurative art) do not have any real correspondence with their subject. Mechanistic optics no longer assumes that the artist makes things ‘present’ in the mind or to a degree ‘recreates’ them, as the Aristotelian concept of sight postulated. The image on the retina is no more than a snapshot of a mixture of particles; we do not know whether this image really corresponds with the things themselves. As Descartes put it, ‘there are no images that are the same in every respect as the objects they represent ... indeed, their perfection often consists in this, that they do not resemble them as closely as they might’. In the previous chapter we saw the comparison he made with works by artists who use foreshortening, often depicting circles by means of ellipses, and employing similar devices for other shapes, since for ‘more successful images’ the representations should ‘frequently not bear a likeness’ to the objects depicted (see above, page 307). It can thus be argued that any likeness to the actual object is based on chance (or, in the prevailing seventeenth-century thinking, on God’s will). Descartes’s remarks about foreshortening are reminiscent of the art-theoretical commonplace that a painter must hold ‘a compass in his eye, not his hand’, an aphorism that Van Hoogstraten repeats: after all, a painter works not with elementary geometrical figures, but with the way these figures appear to the eye. Boschini refers in similar terms to foreshortening when he argues that it is this very deformation that guarantees the successful optical illusion: ‘it is precisely by means of deformation that the eye must be deceived, and perfection must appear by means of imperfection’. He gives the example of a foreshortened arm, and concludes rather cryptically: ‘without form – indeed even with deformed form – the painter gives form to the seemingly real formality’. Boschini’s paradox of ‘giving form without form’ illustrates the fundamental impossibility of objective visual representation: the painter always produces an image from his own point of view.
These optical insights emphasize the art-theoretical concept that likeness in a painting is no more than a deceptive feat of artifice. Digby, for instance, who believes that it is a misconception to confuse the ‘pictures we make of them in our owne thoughts’ with the things themselves, concludes that likeness in a painting always encompasses an element of imperfection and unlikeness: ‘What is likenesse, but an imperfect unity betwene a thing, and that which it is said to be like unto?’, and he repeats the topical comparison of a drawing done in black lines on white paper: the suggestion of a likeness exists in it even without colour. In other words, in Descartes’s and Digby’s conceptions a painting loses its performative nature. It is not automatically an alternative ‘window on reality’: the painting can be regarded as a fundamental unreality, a ‘mirror’ of nature, a reflective surface.

So what significance do these scientific views about the nature of seeing have for Van Hoogstraten’s ideological motivation in regard to the depiction of the visible world? To answer this question we must examine a debate about the ‘new philosophy’ that he encountered in the 1660s and 1670s, in which old philosophical traditions are combined with new knowledge – and in which, as we will see, an ‘optical paradigm’ plays a central role.

**Van Hoogstraten and Van Blijenberg Discuss Body and Soul**

At at least one moment in his career Van Hoogstraten was caught up in a philosophical debate. This emerges from his correspondence with Willem van Blijenberg in the 1660s, when the philosopher became embroiled in a controversy with Spinoza that acquired a degree of notoriety in the seventeenth century. On the evidence of Van Hoogstraten’s friendship with Van Blijenberg, art historians have argued that the painter made a portrait of Spinoza, which is now catalogued as such in the Jewish Museum in New York (fig. 141). Notwithstanding the fact that the identification of the sitter is disputed, it is by no means impossible that Van Hoogstraten painted Spinoza’s portrait. As we shall see, the painter and the philosopher certainly did not inhabit separate worlds. Around 1670, when this portrait is dated, both men lived in The Hague. In the circle of scholars surrounding the Van Hoogstratens in Rotterdam, Spinoza’s ideas met with both positive and negative reactions. Although Van Hoogstraten expressed his contacts with the ‘new philosophy’ only fragmentarily, we shall explore how the discussions that led to Spinoza’s thinking might be relevant to a contextualization of the theory in the *Inleyding*. After all, Spinozism was the most debated philosophical movement in the twenty years prior to its publication.

There are two key questions here that may have reached Van Hoogstraten in the form of topical discussions. The first is how his comparison of painting with philosophy can be related to the Cartesian dualism of visible and invisible worlds, and to his conviction that painting’s subject is ‘only the visible aspect’ of reality. A second point that arises is the ‘hierarchy of the Creation’: the ‘new philosophy’ attacks the division of the Creation into more material and more spiritual components, and hence calls into question the assumptions about the existence of order in nature and of visible beauty itself. What implications does this have for painting?
A key figure in answering these questions was Van Blijenberg, who wrote several philosophical works but was known in his age – and still is today – primarily because of his correspondence with Spinoza. Van Blijenberg is an interesting figure in a discussion of the appearance of the ‘radical’ ideas in the second half of the seventeenth century because he was initially taken with the ‘new philosophy’; however, when he realized its implications more clearly, he retreated to an orthodox religious position and eventually published a number of treatises attacking Spinoza. Van Blijenberg’s surviving correspondence with Van Hoogstraten demonstrates that he discussed similar issues with the painter on many occasions. Their main subject appears in essence to be the relation between body and soul, a topical point of philosophical speculation set in train by Descartes’s division of reality into the two spheres of res extensa and res cogitans. In the second half of the seventeenth century the strictness of this dualism started to provoke resistance. Henricus Regius, who can be called the first Dutch Cartesian, arrived at a strong materialistic interpretation; he also allotted a material character to thought, much to Descartes’ annoyance. The ‘radical’ philosophy making the rounds in the vernacular from the mid-1660s onwards came up with a solution for the distinction between extension and thought that is as simple as it is effective, stating that body and soul occur separately only in the human imagination and are in essence two aspects of the same reality.
This radical idea, propagated by Spinoza in particular, inevitably caused a considerable stir because it could lead to far-reaching conclusions about metaphysics and religion. It acted as a catalyst in the more general move towards denouncing belief in supernatural phenomena and taking the Bible literally, and in a more general sense condemning the various superstitions that the analogical world view entailed. As Jonathan Israel pointed out, these ideas rapidly took hold across a broad spectrum of the population of the Republic. The 1660s and 1670s were clearly an experimental phase. By the 1690s, however, Spinoza’s thinking had whipped up such a storm of criticism that few people were prepared to champion it in public, even though it had been more widely disseminated and was more generally known than the work of any other modern philosopher.

In his earliest surviving letter to Van Hoogstraten, dated 10 January 1661, Van Blijenberg is evidently much exercised about the idea that soul and body might not be separate. He alludes to the possibility that the loss of this fundamental distinction would lead to the reduction of the whole of reality to matter, and lists a great many arguments and personal observations to demonstrate that a separate domain of the soul exists. In his letter, in which he writes that he has often spoken of this problem with Van Hoogstraten in the past, he wants ‘to show clearly and simply ... that there is something else in us besides body, which is not only not body, but is an individual and separate substance, and this is evident because when I examine a body closely I find nothing there but matter and extension’. Arguing that the body is a substance separate from the soul, he states that whereas all matter contains extension, thoughts have no spatial dimension: ‘allow your thoughts to dwell on everything that is in created nature, you will find a body and an extension in all of it, but then allow your thoughts to dwell on your thoughts, you will find neither body nor extension in them’; Van Blijenberg determines that ‘thought is [as distinct] from body as light is from darkness’. Here he is rejecting the views of the ‘radicals’ that thought or substantia cogitans can also relate to the domain of matter.57

Spinoza’s ideas were developed around 1661–62, and in 1661 he finished his response to Descartes and Bacon, the Tractatus de intellectus emendatione, a text that may, like other parts of his work, have circulated in manuscript form. In 1663 the Principia philosophiae cartesianae appeared,58 and Van Blijenberg published a work in which he may have incorporated his initial opinions of Spinozism. In a letter dated September 1663, Van Hoogstraten refers to a philosophical work Van Blijenberg had sent him. This was probably his De kennisse Gods en godsdienst, beweert tegen d’uytvluchten der atheisten (The Knowledge of God and Religion, Argued Against the Atheists’ Excuses); Van Hoogstraten reports that he has ‘reread [it] not once but often’.59 The first edition of this work, and hence Van Blijenberg’s earliest reaction to Spinozism, has not survived.60 The fundamental ideas in this work are, however, known from a later edition published in 1677.

In one sense the Kennisse is a not very original specimen of the adversus bereticos genre, in which God’s omnipotence is adduced from God’s Creation. At the same time, however, one of its central themes is the subject on which the author had corresponded with Van Hoogstraten — ‘that our soul is different from the body’, as the beginning of the book states: ‘We set ourselves the end or goal of proving that there is a God, and that he rules the world, that our soul is distinct from the body and that it is immortal’.61 Van Blijenberg tries, in reply to the ‘atheists’, to prove the existence of a Creator by using the Creation.
‘Come here, oh Atheists, and be taught that God is not far from any among us, that he can be felt with our minds and touched with our hands, and that we have as many arguments and as many things to persuade us that there is a God as there are things in the world.’

The relationships between body and soul and between nature and God are central to the Kennisse. In this work Van Blijenberg raises an important question: if the Creation is seen as an expression of God, how can the perfection and infinitude of God be reconciled with the imperfections and finiteness of nature? The prevailing medieval cosmology assumed a hierarchical chain of links between microcosm and macrocosm through which the ‘imperfect’ visible world and the ‘perfect’ world of ideas were related. The fact that Van Blijenberg is now wrestling with this problem can be seen as symptomatic of the mechanistic world view, a view in which thinking in terms of colliding particles calls into question assumed analogical relationships between things.

Spinozism’s original attraction for Van Blijenberg can largely be explained by the position Spinoza adopted in the debate about the relationship between mind and matter, and his comparable position on the relationship between nature and God. By seeing matter and mind as two sides of the same coin, and conceiving the visible world as one of the attributes of God, Spinoza resolves the paradox between God’s perfection and infinitude on the one hand and the innumerable insignificant elements of the Creation on the other.

Van Blijenberg did not go along with a Spinozist solution in the Kennisse, although he was evidently intrigued by it, for in 1664 he enthusiastically entered into correspondence with Spinoza. In 1665 he visited the philosopher in Voorburg because specific problems could not be adequately addressed in letters. He reported that he was initially greatly impressed by ‘the very great solidity’ of Spinoza’s arguments and describes ‘the satisfaction it gave [him]’.

The discussion between the two philosophers was detailed and technical. Summing up a debate that touched on such topics as original sin, the cause of evil and the salvation of heathens, we can say that Van Blijenberg was particularly concerned about the notion, which he distilled from Spinoza’s ideas, that body and soul were not separate entities. It is clear from his letters that Van Hoogstraten’s friend was having difficulty accepting this. In 1674 he consequently wrote a response to Spinoza’s Tractatus theologico-politicus, which was published that year: De waerbeyt van de christelijke godtsdienst (The Truth of Christian Religion). He was thus one of the earliest and most fervent of Spinoza’s critics; time and again in his detailed critique he stresses Spinoza’s ingenuity – his way of pointing to the dangers concealed in this doctrine.

In 1682 Van Blijenberg published another rebuttal, the Wederlegging van de Ethica of zedekunst van Benedictus de Spinosa (Refutation of Spinoza’s Ethics), in which he does, admittedly, accept that nothing in nature occurs accidentally, in rerum natura nullum datur contingens, but is not prepared to link total determinism in respect of the soul to this.

In 1644, when Van Blijenberg debated with Spinoza, Van Hoogstraten read his friend’s treatise. In so far as the painter’s reactions to the controversy in which Van Blijenberg wanted to involve him have survived, it appears that he remained very noncommittal and tried to find a ‘happy medium’ between entrenched beliefs and the radical new ideas. We do not have Van Hoogstraten’s reply to the letter of 1661. His earliest surviving letter to the philosopher is
dated 2 August 1662, when the artist was in London. The philosophical discussions had been going on for some time, as Van Hoogstraten writes that ‘the good grounds of our friendship’ have been ‘thoroughly dug over by all kinds of speculations [that have] passed between [us]’. In this letter he refuses to adopt an unequivocal position and expresses his wish to abide by the views accepted by the church: ‘I once tried ... to argue high secrets with you, but I have as great a fear of straying from the common path in establishing something new through my own audacity as I have a revulsion against those who ... renounce to imitate anything.’ Like Van Blijenberg himself, Van Hoogstraten was apparently initially interested in the ‘high secrets’ of the ‘new philosophy’, but he refused to take a position on it.

Van Hoogstraten and Van Blijenberg were in frequent contact until the former’s death; Houbraken tells us that Van Hoogstraten loved the philosopher ‘for his knowledge’. Another obvious way in which he may have encountered early Spinozism is through his literary network in Rotterdam, where the ‘new philosophy’ was being discussed even before the publication of the *Opera postuma* in 1677. One of the key figures in the circle was Joachim Oudaen; he was deeply involved in the debates about Spinozism, which initially he did not reject. According to Zijlmans’s study of the circle, Oudaen found much with which he could agree in Spinoza’s earliest writings, which in the 1660-1663 period circulated in his environment (the Rijnsburg Collegiants) even before they were published. Oudaen may therefore have acted as a conduit for the philosophical writings, channelling them to the group that met in Frans’s bookshop; one of its principal activities, after all, was to popularize philosophical ideas. It seems that Jacob Ostens, a member of the group, became personally acquainted with Spinoza in 1664-1665. In 1668, however, when the first ‘radical’ thinkers were sentenced and even imprisoned, the group’s original enthusiasm cooled. In the 1680s Oudaen published a satirical poem aimed at Spinoza and his *Ethics*; but another member of the group, Antoni van Dale, eventually followed the path of the ‘new philosophy’.

In a poem on his portrait in the *Inleyding*, Oudaen says that Van Hoogstraten’s art is based ‘on grounds of pure reason’ – a clear reference to his friend’s intellectual calibre, with which he had become familiar during these discussions.

The intricate cultural network to which such diverse figures as Spinoza, Van Blijenberg, Calthoff and Van Hoogstraten belonged had a geographical focus: the shared interest in new optical phenomena and experiments was an important element of the intellectual climate in and around Delft, Rotterdam and Dordrecht. Isaak Beekman, whose name has cropped up before, was the pivotal figure in this network of like-minded thinkers. This is not the place to examine the assertion that the work of artists like Fabritius, Vermeer and Van Hoogstraten himself was intimately connected with this more general interest in optics; suffice it to say that Van Hoogstraten’s acquaintance with the ‘new philosophy’ should not be seen as an isolated phenomenon.

These observations in regard to the relevance of Spinozism arouse curiosity as to Spinoza’s solution to the philosophical problem flagged by Van Blijenberg: how can the multiplicity of the visible world be combined with divine perfection? It is unlikely that Van Hoogstraten’s philosophical *Onzichtbare Wereld* would not have explored this highly topical theme in the philosophy of the 1660s and 1670s. Since no pronouncements by Van Hoogstraten on Spinozism
have survived, however, we cannot look to specific borrowings from Spinoza to identify the relationship between Van Hoogstraten’s ideas about art and the radical thinking of the time; it is, again, a matter of outlining an intellectual context for his ideas.

**THE PHILOSOPHICAL STATUS OF THE VISIBLE WORLD**

What is at stake in radical philosophy that makes it interesting to relate it to contemporary art theory? Spinoza’s ideas can be explained on the basis of his magnum opus, the *Ethics* published posthumously in 1677, to which Van Blijenberg responded at length in 1682. In a letter written as early as 1665, Spinoza reported that part of the work was finished. The *Ethics* contains the key points of his philosophical system and a number of propositions that are relevant to the theory of painting. That these soon filtered through to a wider public outside the universities is demonstrated by Willem Goeree’s reference to Spinoza’s ideas in his treatises on painting, and concise enumeration of them in a book on church history that appeared in 1705.

The ideas propounded in the *Ethics* were as influential as they were, not so much because of their novelty as because Spinoza had, for the first time, combined various older bodies of ideas in a very systematic form – particularly ancient atomism and Stoicism. He reclaimed the Stoic identification of God and nature; in Junius’s words: ‘what is Nature else ... but God and a divine power infused into the whole world and every part of the world?’ Spinoza’s relationship to Stoicism is the subject of considerable debate of a quite technical nature, which we will not go into here. (We must not, though, assume too direct a relationship, which the philosopher himself certainly did not emphasize.) Contemporaries placed him in the tradition of classical Stoicism; Goeree, for instance, expressed the opinion that ‘Spinoza agrees in many things with Aristotle, Epicurus and other Ancient Philosophers from among the Stoics’. In constructing his philosophy, Spinoza reinterpreted a number of older ideas that we have already discussed in the previous chapters.

Spinoza’s thinking bears in a crucial respect on the world view we examined in chapter II in regard to the depiction of the visible world, which is expressed in De Mornay’s observation that in the Creation God has ‘manifested and depicted [himself] in all things’. At first sight, the world view in which nature is conceived as the ‘Second Bible’ appears to conflict with one concrete consequence of Spinoza’s ideas, namely that elements of the visible world are stripped of their supernatural meanings. He rejects a Creation in which, via a chain of ‘similitudes’, intellectual analogies are anchored, to such an extent that he even questions the authority of the Bible. In his view, nature does not answer to any teleology; all final causes are just human fictions. Followers of Spinoza were consequently referred to by contemporaries as ‘materialists’ or ‘naturalists’, a description comparable to Bellori’s term *naturalisti* for philosophers who espouse atomism (as well as for painters who depict everyday reality, as discussed above, see page 256). It is striking, though, that Spinozism does not regard the visible world as wholly devoid of meaning or content for philosophical reflection. The philosopher attributes an important philosophical significance to the visible world as a whole and to its observation by the human faculty of sight.

Goeree provides a concise overview of Spinoza’s ideas, explaining how he divides reality (or substance) into its various ‘attributes’ or perspectives from which it can be seen: the only
attributes known to the human understanding are extension and thought. Individual things are described as ‘modes’, ways of being, of the single substance: from the perspective of extension, they appear as visible things; from the perspective of thought, they appear as thoughts. Our analysis will paraphrase two of the characteristics in Goeree’s list: the conclusion that the concepts of beauty and ugliness are useless, and the supposed overlap of visible and invisible worlds.

**The uselessness of the concepts of beauty and ugliness**

Spinoza arrives at a fusion of classical atomism and ideas about the mechanistic foundations of nature which leads him to assume that everything is predetermined. Every part of reality must be understood as an expression of God. Everything that is sensory is necessarily willed to be so by God; there is consequently no room for free will. Proposition 29 of the *Ethics* reads: ‘Nothing in the world of things is contingent, but all things are determined to exist and operate in a particular manner by the necessity of the divine nature.’

Spinoza posits that it is solely human imagination that regards things either as contingent or as wholly predetermined. Reason, however, which assumes that reality can be deduced from God, will conclude that everything is necessary: ‘Every individual thing … cannot exist or be caused to act, unless it is caused to exist and act by another thing.’ From this it follows that all the elements of the Creation are perfect in equal measure:

‘that things have been brought into being by God in the highest perfection, because they have necessarily followed from a certain most perfect nature, and this does not in any way charge God with any imperfection, for his perfection compels us to affirm this … that things could not have been created by him other than they are, or in a different order … that it depends solely on God’s decree and will that each thing is what it is.’

It would be pointless to apply the concepts of beauty and ugliness to objects in nature; after all, they are all dependent on God in the same way. Spinoza bases his argument on modern optical insights, asserting that it is a common misconception to take a subjective ideal of beauty as normative: ‘For instance, when the motion the nerves receive from objects, pictured by our eyes, is pleasing, the objects by which this is brought about [are called] beautiful, but those which create the opposite motion [are called] ugly (misshapen)’. He then deals with the problem raised by Van Blijenberg: ‘If everything follows from the necessity of the supreme nature of God, from where, then, do so many imperfections in Nature come? From where comes this decay, to the point of rot, this misshapenness that causes revulsion …?’ The answer, says the philosopher, is obvious: ugliness, like beauty, is not a given anchored in the Creation that follows from a hierarchy of being, but a projection of human needs.

Goeree repeats Spinoza’s views in his *Mensbzkunde* and specifically applies them to painting. He refers to ‘some new Philosophers’ who express the opinion ‘that Beauty is not so much a function or perfection of the Object one sees as a product or action caused by it in the one who sees it’. He notes that the old hierarchy of being has been stripped of its value by modern optical discoveries: ‘The most Beautiful hand seen through a magnifying glass will ap-
pear hideous. Consequently things considered as themselves, or in regard to God, are neither Beautiful nor Ugly."

Ultimately, Spinoza concludes that all things, as so many ‘modes’ of a single substance, express God’s power: ‘Everything that exists expresses God’s nature or essence in a fixed and determined manner: everything that exists reveals God’s power, which is the cause of all things, in a fixed and determined manner’. In his conception of nature, there is a very direct relationship between nature and God; everything stands in a direct – that is to say equal – relationship to God. He thus arrives at a very ‘horizontal’ metaphysics. It is not the case that the Divine attributes (like extension and thought), from which the modes then emanate (like concrete visible things and individual thoughts), derive from substance (‘from high to low’): substance is nothing other than its attributes, which are expressed in the multiplicity of modes.

Spinoza asserts that extrapolating subjective ideas to universal truths has produced not only illusory ideas about beauty, but also misconceptions like the existence of a ‘harmony of the spheres’. The idea of an ‘order in nature’, in which every part is judged according to the place it is allotted in a cosmological hierarchy, is replaced by Spinoza’s assumption that everything is perfect. He states: ‘By reality and perfection I mean the same thing. For we are accustomed to place all the individual things in Nature in one category, which we regard as the most universal, namely in the category of Being, which applies without exception to all individuals in Nature.’ The philosopher broaches the same issue in a letter to Henry Oldenburg: ‘[I should] like to point out that I attribute neither beauty nor ugliness, order nor confusion to nature. For things cannot be called beautiful or ugly, ordered or confused, except in regard to our imagination.’

These quotations exemplify how Spinoza’s views about beauty are in stark contrast to the ideas of early art theory, where beauty is conceived of as a quality anchored in the Creation, as one of the higher elements in the ‘great chain of being’ linking material objects to spiritual truths. Broadly speaking, the philosophical devaluation of concepts like beauty and natural order can be related to Van Hoogstraten’s urgings to take note of even insignificant elements of nature, as we saw in previous chapters, and in his insistence that in his training an artist should focus on the ‘least of objects’ and maintain an ethos of ‘naturalness’, as may be summed up by his statement ‘that the ugly can yet be beautiful if it is true to nature’.

**Overlap of visible and invisible worlds**

These general remarks bring us to the question: what are the implications of Spinoza’s ideas for the philosophical meaning of the ‘visible world’ that is Van Hoogstraten’s central concept?

It is clear that the notion that Creation functions as a ‘Second Bible’ takes on a new meaning in Spinoza. He observes: ‘The eternal and infinite Being … that we call God or Nature acts by the same necessity as that whereby it exists … The reason or cause why God or Nature exists, and the reason why he acts, are one and the same.’ In Spinoza’s view nature has, as it were, a performative character. Just as in early modern art theory a painter was deemed to a certain extent to ‘be’ his work, so God ‘is’ his Creation.

We have seen how the division of reality into a visible and an invisible domain recurs in the tradition of art theory. Spinoza produces an exceptional variation on the theme, in the...
sense that he sees a highly systematic, completely parallel relationship between the mental and material aspects of reality. To summarize his views, mental components of all visible things exist as ‘thoughts’ in God; thus the human mind is nothing other than the body that is conscious of itself and ‘thinks’ itself, while this thinking is nothing other than a ‘mode’ of divine thinking. Spinoza observes:

‘that whatever can be perceived by the infinite intellect as constituting the essence of a substance belongs only to one substance, and that consequently the thinking substance and the extended substance are one and the same substance, comprehended now through one attribute, now through the other. Likewise, a mode of Extension [i.e. matter] and the mental representation of that mode [i.e. mind] are one and the same thing, only expressed in two ways.’

He gives the concrete example of an existing (visible) circle and the (invisible) mental image of a circle, which in his view are two sides of one and the same object, regarded from two perspectives: ‘For instance, a circle existing in nature and the idea of that existing circle, which is also in God, are one and the same thing displayed through two different attributes.’

In Spinoza’s philosophy there is as it were an overlap of material and mental domains, of visible and invisible worlds. The one substance – God or Nature – of which mind and matter are the attributes can in turn be viewed from two points of view – on the one hand that of natura naturata or the product of God, and on the other that of the corresponding natura naturalis that underlies it, or God himself. Spinoza consequently believes that ‘individual things [are] nothing but modifications of God’s attributes, or modes by which God’s attributes are expressed in a fixed and definite manner’. He defines the distinction between ‘creating nature’ and ‘created nature’ as follows:

‘by natura naturans [we] should understand that which exists in itself and is conceived through itself, or those attributes of substance which express an eternal and infinite essence, in other words God, in so far as he is considered as a free cause. By natura naturata, on the other hand, I understand everything that follows from the necessity of God’s nature, or of any of God’s attributes, that is to say all the modes of God’s attributes, in so far as they are considered as things which are in God, and which without God cannot exist or be conceived.’

The distinction between natura naturata and natura naturalis loses much of its earlier significance in Spinoza’s hands (see above, pages 102-104). Rather than a division into two ‘spheres’ of Creation or into a microcosm and macrocosm, he posits that there is a single nature that is identical to God, which can be viewed from two perspectives. ‘Creating’ and ‘created’ nature are thus not separate worlds, but essentially overlapping concepts that are only regarded as separate in our limited human imagination. Spinoza concludes: ‘Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an extended thing.’ In other words, God is the visible world. It should be concluded from this not that all things have a ‘divine’ character, but that the visible world as a whole is one of the divine attributes, and that all individual things, which are its modes, are ‘in God’.
This overlap of *natura naturata* and *natura naturans* can, of course, have profound implications for a theory of art centred on the imitation of nature. In this thinking it is not necessary to interpret the central proposition *ars imitatur naturam* — art imitates nature — as an encouragement to work from an idealized nature or to discover the ‘true’ nature of things. *Natura naturata* is not just the only visible manifestation of nature but also its most direct manifestation, caused directly by God, and the infinite number of ways in which the modes differ from one another is the correlate of God’s infinity. We may repeat how Goeree gives his explicit inversion of Platonic thinking, basing the significance of the depiction of nature not in the study of ideal beauty, but precisely in the fact that nature is ‘unfathomably rich in bringing forth multitudes of every species ... which, although they are of one stock, are not, however, exactly the same form as one another’.101

Goeree demonstrates his knowledge of Spinoza’s equation of the visible with the invisible. In his *Mensbkunde* he writes: ‘Benedictus de Spinoza, who in all probability states that the Universe is God, states ... that the body and the Soul are one and the same thing, which is conceived now under the attribute of movement and then under the attribute of thinking.’102 It is not just substance that can be regarded from these two perspectives: man, too, viewed from the perspective of visibility (erroneously, Goeree refers not to the attribute of extension but to ‘movement’), is a body; from the perspective of the invisible, a soul.

We may resume that, viewed from the perspective of everyday experience, visible reality should merit religious contemplation and study as the most direct manifestation of the Divine; from the perspective of eternity — *sub specie aeternitatis* — the visible world shows its other face: it is nothing but sham and vanity. A modern term applied to this sort of distinction between two points of view that augment each other is ‘complementarity’; we have already discussed this concept in relation to seventeenth-century thinking about bifocal perspective in art (see above, pages 237-240, 304-311). Goeree describes the existence of these complementary viewpoints as follows: ‘We have two different views of ourselves, namely one [in which we comprehend ourselves as] a thinking Mind, and the other [when we comprehend] an extended Body’.103 However, the author’s *Mensbkunde* makes it clear that he has no desire to link this to Spinoza’s idea that mind and body are two sides of the same coin: ‘we are concerned about flying so high with that reckless Icarus that in this Life we should see the incomprehensible Majesty of God from so close by, and beyond what has been revealed of him’.104

To explain the importance attached to the visible world in Spinoza’s thoughts we may refer to Wim Klever’s recent observation that optics and the practical activity of grinding lenses were very important to Spinoza and that they had a real bearing on his philosophy.105 Spinoza wrote a treatise about optics in response to Descartes’s theory on this subject.106 In many respects seventeenth-century philosophy in the Netherlands assumed an ‘optical paradigm’; optical instruments like the microscope and telescope were crucial in the development of the new sciences. By positing that ‘extension’ is the most fundamental category for speaking about sense experience, Descartes automatically placed considerable emphasis on the sense of sight. Form and location of things are the most essential, followed immediately by movement and the position in time.107 Spinoza pushes this ‘optical paradigm’ to an extreme position. Here he parts company with Descartes, who leaves room for a sphere of reality that withdraws from the optical armentarium in the form of the immortal soul. Spinoza links the spheres of mind
and matter so intimately that in his view an imagined image of a circle is essentially indistinguishable from a drawn, visible circle. In an exemplary way, this optical paradigm is expressed in the metaphor comparing the mind to a mirror. Spinoza, in a reaction to the older theories about knowledge formulated by Bacon, compares human nature ‘with a regular or flat mirror that reflects all the rays in the universe without distorting them’. Spinoza’s conception of the visible world holds that man forms an illusory and arbitrary image of the universe, in other words his impressions are determined solely by a subjective viewpoint; but this, so optics teaches us, is also the only adequate image of reality that we have, an image that is directly caused by the reality around us. Here again, we can only point out in general terms that, according to the metaphor that compares paintings to mirrors, the optical paradigm so essential to the Dutch ‘new philosophy’ can also be called a ‘painterly paradigm’ (thus we see that Spinoza himself sometimes uses painterly metaphors, for instance when he compares mental images to ‘mute paintings on a panel’).

We should end by endeavouring to answer the question as to how Spinoza’s views fit into the philosophical tradition we have studied in chapter II in relation to the ‘significance of the depiction of the visible world’. The most far-reaching implication of his doctrine for the views of an art theorist like Van Hoogstraten is that it casts substantial doubt on the Neoplatonic cosmology in which ‘everything relates to everything else’ and in which, according to the hierarchical ordering of the cosmos, ‘lower’ elements of Creation automatically refer to more spiritual ones. In other words, the work of radical thinkers from the second half of the seventeenth century undermines the ontological foundations of the endeavour to base a multi-layered iconography on an everyday reality that, although it appears self-evident and ‘realistic’, contains ‘hidden’ meaning. An iconography based on thinking in terms of analogy, where intellectual concepts appear sub metaphoris corporaliun, can no longer derive legitimacy from the notion that Creation itself is put together in the same way. It is no longer possible to ascend from the material to the more spiritualized aspects of Creation and in this way of moving per visibilia ad invisibilia – through the visible to the invisible. In Spinoza’s thought, the visible world as a whole is dependent in a very direct way on God: the visible world as a whole, including the elements of it that man is inclined to regard as more or less perfect, is one of God’s attributes.

It is evident that various concepts in the early modern world view come to grief in this seventeenth-century philosophy, whereas the fundamental principle, seeing nature as the expression of God, remains intact and is even promoted to a key position. And ‘nature’ here should not be conceived as the landscape or the ‘created’ reality as opposed to the reality made by man. As res extensa, nature contains all the elements of the visible world, and the concept of ‘extension’ places the emphasis on the spatial and strongly visual character of this aspect of reality. Spinoza’s thinking underpins the idea that an art of painting that focuses on the ‘visible world’ in the most literal sense is a ‘sister of reflective philosophy’.

To conclude this train of thought, we may return to Plutarch’s conviction that the contemplation of Creation by philosophers and artists is an inherently virtuous activity. Spinoza’s Ethicus reaches a comparable conclusion: he points out that freedom does not consist in a possibility of withdrawing oneself from the necessity of the natural world in which everything is predetermined, but in the acceptance of reality in all its aspects, as as many modes of God.
Freedom is the realization that every form of human behaviour is determined by the passions, and that the power of reason is limited. Spinoza provides a modification of the old Stoic view in which ‘following nature’ is taken to extremes when he says: ‘It is inconceivable that man should not be a part of Nature and should not follow her general order.’ The idea that the sum-mum bonum can only be found in nature, comes closest to what can be described as ‘Spinoza’s aesthetics’: looking at a work of art that has been made ‘according to nature’ makes man contemplate his determined position, leading to the insight that:

‘we [shall] bear with equanimity all that happens to us in conflict with the claims of our own advantage, so long as we are only conscious that ... the power which we possess does not extend so far as to enable us to avoid this blow; and that we are a part of universal Nature, whose order we must follow.’

This contemplative determination by nature is healthy for body and soul. When man recognizes that his passions are wholly determined, he will no longer allow his peace of mind to be disturbed by them. This closely follows the Neostoic elements of Van Hoogstraten’s theory; we may repeat his statement that ‘Politics and Morality, which treat of good morals’, are learned more from ‘the great Book of this world than from Aristotle or Descartes’. Insight into the natural order of things and the corresponding code of conduct arise, to his mind, from ‘that which is preached by the birds of the air, the simple animals and the insensate things’. The visible world thus puts the beholder on the trail of a moral doctrine comprising ‘all the teachings of Philosophy, of how one should live’. This ethical conviction explains how Van Hoogstraten arrives at the conclusion that painting, as a form of philosophy, gives peace of mind to artist and beholder alike, summed up in the Inleyding in the admonishment to ‘virtuously (zeedichlijk) imitate the properties of simple nature’.

How can we answer the question raised by the disputed portrait in the Jewish Museum – the question of the relationship between Van Hoogstraten and Spinoza? Spinoza’s phrase natura sive Deus means in the first place a radicalization of the idea that painting which concentrates purely on the ‘outside’ of phenomena and on schilderachtig contingencies nonetheless acquires religious significance; in his view the visible world is a direct means of expression of the invisible. His doctrine is thus a contemporary philosophy that ties in with the theory surrounding the central concept of the ‘visible world’ set out in the Inleyding, and the ethical and philosophical value of ‘mirroring’ it.

Let us return for a moment to the discussion with which this book opened: the debate between the adherents of ‘seeming realism’ and ‘hidden symbolism’ on the one hand and those who supported an ‘art of describing’ on the other. It can be argued on the basis of a conception of art determined by Spinozism that it is not necessary to assume an antithesis between a supposedly old-fashioned world view, based on cosmological analogies, and a secular art focused on inventorying the visible world. In Spinoza’s world view the possibilities of using a multilayered iconography are stripped of their ‘ontological foundations’: the argument that
the Creation works in the same way as art, that is to say as a complex of cross-references in which ‘everything is related to everything else’, loses its validity. This brings about more than a loss of significance for old-fashioned iconography. ‘Hidden symbolism’ is rendered no longer necessary at all: whereas Cartesianism robbed the domain of the visible world of all spiritual significance, Spinoza restores it in its entirety.

A sketch of the philosophical context of Van Hoogstraten’s ideas thus produces a contribution to the discussion about ‘realism’: even insignificant or ugly objects merit contemplative attention. According to the phrase *natura sive Deus*, visible and invisible world are overlapping concepts. The fact that he believes that it is legitimate to give the concept of the visible world such a central role in his treatise can be clarified by studying not just the art-theoretical tradition, but also the contents of his bookcase. Given Van Hoogstraten’s interest in the discussion surrounding his philosophy, Descartes’s title ‘Van de Zichtbare Werelt’ (‘Of the Visible World’) may have caught his eye and could well have been a textual source for the subtitle of his own treatise.

We cannot conclude that Van Hoogstraten read the passages quoted from Spinoza’s *Ethics* himself, and still less that he consciously tailored his theory of art to it, although there is no doubt that the artist came into contact with Spinozism through his scholarly network. Since we do not have the Onzichtbare Werelt, we are left with Goeree’s remarks on the subject to reconstruct how Spinozism can be incorporated in a theory of painting. Nor can we say that Van Hoogstraten shared Spinoza’s idea of regarding nature as identical to God; it is clear from the correspondence with Van Blijenberg that he baulked at such radical views. We should also note that Van Hoogstraten did not need Spinoza to arrive at his eventual formulation.

The epideictic thinking underlying the *Inleyding*, however, combining contradictory forms of ancient and modern intellectual authority, means that it is not impossible that the Spinozist solution to the problems that Cartesianism had raised was one of the elements in Van Hoogstraten’s frame of reference that determined his eventual wording. After all, in the last decades of the seventeenth century, Spinoza’s views were widely known in the Republic: in 1686 the philosopher Balthasar Bekker remarked ‘that Spinoza’s ideas have spread and taken root all too far and too much through all places and classes of people; that they have won over the courts of the highest, and ruined some of the best minds; that the members of a very civil walk of life, godly men, have been dragged along to ungodliness by them.’ Towards the end of the century, a minister wrote: ‘I do not think that there can be anybody who does not know who Spinoza was and what heresy he pursued. His writings are to be found everywhere, and are, because of their novelty, sold in almost all bookshops.’

In conclusion, we may sum up by saying that the findings in this excursus have confirmed the observations made earlier in this book in which we saw that Van Hoogstraten’s concept of nature differs from Van Mander’s. Thinking in terms of internal Aristotelian qualities and ideal forms, underlying phenomena are faced with the new concept of nature, in which the visible world as *res extensa* obeys the laws of mechanistic physics. When light and colour prove to be a function of colliding particles, the Aristotelian assumption that a painting ‘makes things present’ in the imagination loses significance. Spinozism assumes an ‘optical paradigm’ and can thus, even without there having been any direct borrowing, have entered into the intellectual and artistic discourse about the visible world.
We have seen that Spinozism’s attraction lay in the solution it provided to a paradox that is inherent in the doctrine of the ‘Book of Nature’ versus the ‘Book of Scripture’. When confronted with the question of how to reconcile the imperfection of the multiplicity of contingencies of the visible world with divine perfection and unity, Spinoza argues that in a performative way God ‘is’ what he ‘does’: Creation and Creator are overlapping concepts.

Spinoza’s view of reality is relevant to the notion of the ‘two perspectives’ that was so essential to seventeenth-century experiments of perception, as we have examined in chapters V and VI. He applies the notion of the complementarity of different viewpoints to reality in its entirety, which, from the vantage point of the transient, appears as the visible world; from the vantage point of eternity, it appears as the invisible God. His observation that *natura naturata* and *natura naturans* are two sides of the same coin may serve as the point of departure for an art theorist to state that the painter should not look down on the ‘slavish’ copying of the visible world, and does not have to concentrate on the ideal forms that lie behind (or beyond) the world of phenomena. *Natura naturata* as a whole merits contemplative attention, and none of its elements is ‘imperfect’; or to put it another way, all contingencies are worthy of the artist’s attention. The Spinozist outlook thus corroborates Van Hoogstraten’s statement that painting which encompasses all aspects of the visible world is a ‘sister of philosophy’.
INLEYDING TOT DE HOOGE SCHOOLE DER SCHILDERKONST:

ANDERS DE ZICHTBAERE WERELT.

Verdeels in negen Leerwinkels, yder beelters
door een der ZANGGODINNEN.

Ten hoogsten noodzakelijk, tot onderwijs, voor alle die deeze
deelen, yvve, en hooge Konst oefenen, of met yver zoek-
ren te leeren, of anders eenezins beminnen.

Beschreven door
SAMUEL VAN HOOGSTRAETEN.

Rotterdam
By Franck van Hooistraet, Boekverkooper,
M. DC. LXXVIII.
Conclusion

Was there such a thing as a theory of the art of the baroque? What conclusions can be drawn from the multiplicity of material that has been discussed in this study, in which the issue of investing seventeenth-century painting with theoretical legitimacy has served as a heuristic guideline? This study of the *Inleyding tot de hooge schoole der schilderkonst* has proved, one may hope, that the barrenness of Hoogewerff’s ‘arctic expanse’ was an ill-chosen metaphor for the climate of art theory in the Netherlands. Contrary to Julius von Schlosser’s view of Van Hoogstraten as an uninspired exponent of official theory, a study of his treatise yields an abundance of viewpoints and theoretical themes. These arise from the wide scope of Van Hoogstraten’s own project of elevating the status of painting, and from the way in which he selects material from the tradition of art theory and applies it in a new chapter structure, at the heart of which he places the concept of the ‘visible world’. Although his treatise, following established tradition in rhetoric, says almost nothing about living masters, Van Hoogstraten presents numerous views that are relevant to the art of his century, which in his opinion had evolved into ‘a revived Greece’; he takes the *fijnschilders*, in particular, as an extreme against which to contrast his own views, while praising his master Rembrandt in terms borrowed from the theory of rhetoric.

How may we summarize the historiographical debates about the supposed ‘Dutchness’ of Dutch painting and the related art theory, and the role of ambiguous iconography and a postulated ‘realism’? For one thing, it is clear that the intractable nature of the debate reflects what were indeed inherent contradictions in seventeenth-century culture, contradictions that determined both the form and content of Van Hoogstraten’s treatise.

On the one hand, the text contains countless expressions of mediaeval cosmology. It discusses the supposed ‘action at a distance’ effectuated by the planets, precious stones and works of art, as well as the predictive value of physiognomy. On the other hand, Van Hoogstraten, not one to be deterred by religious condemnation of scholarly curiosity, immersed himself in new scientific developments and the debates that ensued from the ‘new philosophy’. His interest in optics, in particular, placed its stamp on the *Inleyding*. This study has clarified the way in which seventeenth-century views on art theory were embedded in a larger whole, in which literary, psychological and philosophical views were all enmeshed.

The *Inleyding* was probably based on a collection of quotations on which Van Hoogstraten had been working throughout his life. The way in which authority is vested in *quantity* of arguments displays parallels to many texts quoted by Van Hoogstraten, by authors such as Huarte, De la Serre and De Mornay. To borrow a metaphor from Grotius, the *Inleyding* is a mosaic exhibiting a wealth of individual details that blend together in the larger whole to form a satisfactory theory of painting, employing a line of argument appropriate to the rhetorical genre of eulogy. Van Hoogstraten deals cursorily with diverse traditions and views: ancient rhetorical theory; the humanist tradition of discussing painting not as a craft but as one of the
liberal arts; the goals of the Reformation; texts by Bacon and Descartes; and contemporary views on the role of drama and the passions.

The study has discussed the way in which Van Hoogstraten’s views are embedded in a ‘rhetorical culture’. While this culture held fast to the old analogy-based world view that assumed the existence of a ‘chain of being’ linking all the elements of Creation in a hierarchical order, the development of the modern natural sciences led at the same time to a sceptical attitude to knowledge passed on by theological tradition. The simultaneous occurrence of highly diverse scientific and ideological views in seventeenth-century thought led to the formulation of oppositions such as ‘Ancients’ versus ‘Moderns’ or rationalism versus empiricism. And although many of these distinctions, as antithetical categories, are primarily the products of later historiography, they make it clearer why the literary historian Gerard Knuvelder said that the Dutch Golden Age was unparalleled as ‘a bundle of contradictions, a wilderness full of enigmas and incongruities’.

This book has set out in particular to study the *Inleyding* in the context of the humanism of the seventeenth-century republic of letters, and not to discuss it in isolation from contemporary philosophical and intellectual trends. This approach reveals more clearly that Van Hoogstraten’s theory does not suggest any explicit contrast between a religious concept of painting on the one hand and a ‘modern’ concept of a secular, merely ‘descriptive’ art on the other. The logical inconsistencies in his theory should not be seen as problematic; they are not discrepancies that have to be ‘resolved’, but combinations of concepts belonging to a rhetorical theory governed not by the laws of systematic aesthetics but by those of epideictic argument, in which the key aim is to provide intellectual legitimacy. Most probably it is precisely the argument of the *Inleyding*, which seeks to elevate the status of painting through an abundance of detail and viewpoints, that the modern reader finds so daunting and that led Von Schlosser to condemn it so harshly. The value of Van Hoogstraten’s voluminous and at times highly lucid and relevant treatise becomes clear when this abundance is not viewed as an obstacle and not explained in terms of the author’s lack of originality or logical consistency, but when it is placed in the context of a rationality that attaches the greatest meaning to intellectual authority and to quantity of arguments.

Van Hoogstraten’s emphasis on the depiction of the visible world is explored in a variety of ways, drawing on commonplaces from older art-theoretical tradition as well as on the philosophical and theological views of his age. In the *Inleyding*, he compares painting to theatre, rhetoric and philosophy. The author’s encyclopaedic interest, which is apparent from his desire to accumulate an abundance of views, is reflected in his opinion that painting itself is a form of knowledge that brings together the other arts and sciences. In representing the ‘visible world’, painting encompasses a multiplicity of contingencies, from subjects such as the surrounding landscape to light reflected in inconsequential objects and variations in human appearance.

In not linking Van Hoogstraten’s treatise to any particular scholarly or philosophical school of thought, but instead viewing it in the light of a ‘rhetorical culture’, this study would not deny that specific philosophical ideas in his age may have influenced his views. It has set out to judge his observations following an analysis combining the painting of his contemporaries, texts of diverse origin, and the rhetorical tradition that provides the basis for much of traditional art theory. For seventeenth-century authors, rhetoric provided a conceptual framework
for discussing a relatively new subject such as painting, and familiarity with rhetoric proves a valuable tool for modern readers wishing to study this theory. Besides facilitating a meaningful discussion of art, rhetoric supplies a theory of communication and action that is ultimately geared towards the ethos of bonnêteté; in the context of rhetoric, the Inleyding is placed on ethical foundations, the key concept of which is the seventeenth-century ideal of the *vir bonus dicendi peritus*, the ‘good man who is skilled in speech’.

The application of rhetorical theory to art theory went beyond the classification of terminology and the analysis of the various ‘parts of painting’. A number of terms can be distinguished here, such as *beweeglijkheid* (movement), which is a translation of Junius’s term *energia*, ornament, invention and imitation, all of which, in Van Hoogstraten’s theory, relate to means of transporting the public to a virtual reality. But there are other terms too, which modern readers would be less inclined to relate to rhetoric, as they may be connected to very specific aspects of painting practice, such as *ordinnantie* (composition of figures) and houding (composition of colours and tones), that also fulfil functions in the wider context of a theory of persuasiveness.

Taking the international nature of the art-theoretical tradition as its point of departure, this book has examined Van Hoogstraten’s observations in the context of his southern European predecessors. The Inleyding is presented expressly as a contribution to that tradition; it is more than the idiosyncratic reflection of Van Hoogstraten’s social aspirations and his own painting practice. As far as this tradition itself is concerned, the written sources probably reflect oral debates by painters and art lovers that were conducted in studios all over Europe. Art theory contains exemplary commonplaces and a lexical structure for the ‘civil conversation’ in the studio, which could be used to justify the activities of painters and art lovers alike.

It has repeatedly been noted that Van Hoogstraten’s primary aim was not to develop a ‘rationalist’ aesthetic system but to write a didactic treatise. The ultimate goal is not so much to teach students how to paint – which can really only be learnt in the studio, as Van Hoogstraten himself emphasizes – or even how to speak about it, but *eudaimonia*, the effort to lead a virtuous life. This ethical objective is the crowning element of his various efforts to elevate painting’s intellectual status, and an ideal destination to which the aspiring painter progresses one step at a time under the guidance of the Muses, passing on the way the diverse sensory temptations that are part and parcel of his profession. The rhetorical views concerning the ability of an orator – or in this case a painter – to transport his public into his own reality, the ultimate goal being to achieve an actual change of character, are crucial to this ethical function. Van Hoogstraten deals more explicitly still with the inherent virtuousness of the contemplative activity of painting itself. A painting that is made with close attention to the visible world focuses the viewer’s mind on nature, God’s Creation. With the realization that the spectator’s own passions, too, are part of nature, the work of art can produce a tranquillity of mind that, besides being a seventeenth-century equivalent to an aesthetic experience, is also in an ethical sense the *summum bonum*.

The most explicit answers to the issue of ‘Dutch realism’, the question of the significance of depicting the visible world, are given at the beginning and end of this book. A chapter devoted to Van Hoogstraten’s emphasis on the depiction of the visible world began by placing this concept in the context of the tradition of art theory, in which the ancient doctrine of Stoï-
cism proved to be essential. The discussion also dwelt briefly on the writer-painter’s Calvinist background. In the final excursus, the focus shifted to Van Hoogstraten’s striking interest in the new philosophy of his day, which suggested that his emphasis on the visible world may also be studied from the perspective of contemporary developments in philosophy.

These discussions involved an outline of different seventeenth-century views of nature. The topos of honouring God through nature, as a ‘Second Bible’, can be found in the Italian literature of art, in which it is closely bound up with the assumption that microcosm and macrocosm are linked by a web of analogical relationships. This assumption would also explain the artist’s power to penetrate, through the visible world, to the world that exists behind it. In the course of the seventeenth century, this cosmology was challenged by a more fragmented view of nature, which provided a clearer theoretical justification for representing the superficial, ‘chance’ features of the visible world. Vondel discusses the link between the philosophical and painterly views forged by this realization in a comparison with ancient atomism. Painters who focus on contingent elements of Creation, he suggests, are comparable to modern philosophers who deny the existence of a hierarchically ordered structure in the cosmos.

Van Hoogstraten’s emphasis on painting as providing ‘universal knowledge’ and his comparison of it to philosophy are rooted in traditional views on the scope of the imagination. His views correspond most closely to those of Zuccari, who sought to contribute to the theoretical emancipation of draughtsmanship by positing that all the other arts, including philosophy, depend on this fundamental activity. Zuccari’s proposition appears in modified form in Van Hoogstraten’s assertion that painting is capable of ‘depicting all ideas, or mental images, that the entire visible world can provide’. In Van Hoogstraten’s view, the painter’s prime concern should not be with proportions or ideal beauty; the aesthetic focus, he holds, is not on universals but on the ‘eternal difference’ between things. The primary importance of the imagination, he posits, is in the painter’s comprehensive capacity to depict all contingencies of the visible world, ‘as in a mirror’.

In discussing the problems bound up with the concept of imitation, this study linked Van Hoogstraten’s didactic views to what are ultimately ethical ideals, embedded in classical Stoic doctrine, which revolves around ‘living by following nature’. Living in accordance with the natural order provides guidelines not only in the scientific or artistic quest for ‘right reason’ (recta ratio), but also in the general sphere of human endeavour. ‘Following nature’ is a thread that runs through Van Hoogstraten’s views on painterly imitation. As a guideline, it makes itself felt in the diverse aspects of the depiction of the visible world and the use of examples from tradition.

As an activity geared towards imitating nature, painting occupies a justified and possibly even exemplary position among the other arts, which are all mimetic in origin. What is more, painting is pre-eminently capable of evoking a virtual reality, which is a key objective in the theory of rhetoric. The artist must follow both his own nature and ‘nature’ in the sense of visual or virtual reality, with style and artistic skill becoming invisible. It is this ethos of dual ‘naturalness’ that ultimately gives the painting its quality of persuasiveness.

In general, Van Hoogstraten is very positive about the painting of his fellow-countrymen and contemporaries, which he describes as having entered into ‘a new Greece’. This comparison is more than a general compliment: he believes that only the uncorrupted and
unembellished representation of nature can lead to an art of painting approaching that of the ancients. This kind of ‘realism’ is hence the perfect imitation, both of nature and of the most admirable examples.

This study has sought to demonstrate that within Stoic thought, a ‘knowledge of nature’ also leads to an understanding of human behaviour and a personal code of conduct. It has explored the way in which Van Hoogstraten’s views about the passions are partly anchored in a cosmology in which planets, elementary qualities and works of art exert a physical ‘action at a distance’. That visual art can provide insight into the inner life is another argument for emphasizing its intellectual status: in the theory of painting as virtual reality, in which it has the function of influencing the viewer’s ethos, the passions are of fundamental importance. The artist must be a master not only of simulating emotion, but also of deceiving his public. This deception makes it possible for a painting, like a tragedy on the stage, to lead its public to greater spiritual health. The painter’s qualities as pathopoios, or designer of the passions, are subordinated to his task as ethopoios – that is, as one who can alter a viewer’s character.

Both the theory of classical tragedy and that of rhetoric emphasise the effect of lifeliness, which in this theory is related primarily to the concept of enargeia. A brief but vehement affective impression is deemed to transport a viewer completely to a virtual reality. In painting, this can be achieved by capturing a highly illusionist ‘snapshot’ of the visible world, which Van Hoogstraten describes as oogenblikkige beweeging (instantaneous movement). His experience with the passions makes the painter a good judge of human nature, of the variety in character of those whom he must try to win over to his own ethos. Recognition of the familiar provides the best assurance of persuasiveness, together with the viewer’s related sense of sharing the painter’s knowledge of nature and the human soul. This ethical effect applies not just to images of human figures, which encourage emulation in the manner of Archimedes’s mirror, but also to depictions of contingencies in the visible world. The painter can seize the mute eloquence of his natural surroundings to make an image that itself produces a powerful rhetorical effect, a rendering of visual reality that not only has a healing power, physically as well as mentally, but also confronts the viewer with the ‘greatest good’ encapsulated in following the natural order.

According to the theory of the persuasiveness of images, a painting’s stylistic qualities as well as its subject-matter are important. Colouring, in particular, is believed to possess an affective influence. Besides clarifying certain peculiarities of the ‘rough manner’, rhetorical theory is also relevant to views regarding landscape painting, for instance, traditionally regarded as a Netherlandish genre par excellence. This is linked to an ambivalent attitude to the ephemeral, superficial and seductive aspects of art. The colouring of landscapes can not only foster physical health, the ‘mute rhetoric’ of the visible world can also lead the viewer’s thought to the greater rhetoric of the Creator, who proclaims his omnipotence in his Creation.

Van Hoogstraten’s views regarding dissimulation, artistic semblance and deception, are rooted in a rhetorical theory that is less close to Alberti’s seminal treatise of 1435 – or even to that of his direct predecessor, Van Mander – than it is to the copious writings of Marco Boschini, published from 1660 to 1674, which focus on subjects such as deception, false appearances, visible brushstrokes, affective response, the intangible quality of ‘grace’, and the practical application of theory. In the debate on ‘rough’ versus ‘smooth’ painting, the Dutch situation pays particular attention to the idea that the ‘rough’ manner makes it possible to
adopt two perspectives, of a virtual reality on the one hand and technical details on the other, which complement each other in the pleasing deception wrought by painting.

The theory of metaphor, a stylistic device that links two incompatible variables, can be applied to the art of painting as Van Hoogstraten describes it. This theory thematizes the contrast underlying the essence of painterly illusion: paint versus virtual reality, two opposites that coincide in the performative act of painting. In the seventeenth-century literature of art, this metaphorical contrast between the lifeless panel or canvas versus the ‘living’ image is also compared to the distinction between appearance and inner truth, or illusion and reality. This fundamental artistic contrast is expressed in art itself when diverse ‘layers of fiction’ are intertwined, or in optical tricks such as anamorphosis. This sophisticated, courtly form of entertainment turns out to possess a serious undertone, where a ‘bifocal’ perspective is used to highlight the contrast between the ‘Now’ of earthly existence and the ‘Then’ of the afterlife. In a pietistic seventeenth-century interpretation, Van Hoogstraten’s comparison of the painting to a mirror can be linked to an ambivalent appreciation combining both the acceptance as well as the renunciation of the things of this world. By emphasizing the vanity and impermanence of the visible world, the work of art can lead the viewer to contemplate the eternal, invisible world.

Starting out from this premise regarding the religious function that can be fulfilled by depictions of the visible world, the book analysed philosophical debates that were topical when the *Inleyding* appeared, which posit an extremely close relationship between God and nature. We noted the ways in which Van Hoogstraten was connected, through his immediate intellectual circle, with the controversies raised by the new ‘radical’ school of thought. The solution for the problems caused by the Cartesian distinction between ‘visible’ and ‘invisible’ aspects of reality, as put forward by Spinozist thinkers in the latter half of the century, may have contributed to his decision to propose the visible world as a legitimate concept to place at the heart of his treatise. These philosophical views regarding beauty and the order of Creation can be linked to the discourse about painting.

An excursus looked at a series of questions: what does the proposition that God reveals himself through his Creation actually mean? How can imperfection and the multiplicity of contingencies in the visible world be reconciled with divine unity and perfection? Spinoza’s solution to the problem that God, in a performative sense, ‘is’ what he ‘does’ places the Stoic foundations of the doctrine of ‘following nature’ in a new light. The philosopher applies seventeenth-century views on the complementarity of opposing viewpoints to the whole of reality, which from the vantage point of the ephemeral and earthly life can be construed as visible nature and from the vantage point of eternity as the invisible God. His observation that *natura naturata* and *natura naturans* are overlapping concepts may lead to the conclusion, in art theory, that painters should not look down on the ‘slavish’ copying of the visible world, and should not direct their endeavours to the ideal forms that lie behind (or beyond) the world of appearances. *Natura naturata* as a whole is worthy of contemplation, and none of its elements, in Spinoza’s view, is chance or ‘imperfect’; in other words, all the contingencies of the visible world are worthy of the painter’s attention.

It has emerged from this study that Van Hoogstraten’s *Inleyding* gives us no reason to posit the existence of two clashing, rival views, a realism that is ‘devoid of content’ and a ‘seeming realism’ based on the existence of disguised symbolism. By historicizing the question
of the relationship between world view and painting, and by seeing how Van Hoogstraten’s views on art can be linked to a variety of contemporary ideas, it has become clear that to posit an explicit contrast between a religious concept of art and a ‘modern’ view of *l’art pour l’art* is ill-conceived. On the one hand, Van Hoogstraten makes no effort to justify the representation of insignificant elements of the visible world through poly-interpretable iconography; nor does he believe that the painter should seek to penetrate to the ‘true nature’ that lies behind the world of appearances. The aesthetic focus he describes revolves not around universals but around an ‘eternal difference’, the details that make one thing dissimilar to another. On the other hand, his effort to elevate the art of painting above the level of a craft is certainly geared towards elevating it to the level of an intellectual and pre-eminently virtuous activity, which is full of religious significance.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ABBREVIATIONS

Angel, Lof

Barocchi, Scritti

Barocchi, Trattati

De Bie, Cabinet
Cornelis de Bie, *Het gulden cabinet van de edel vry schilderconst*, Antwerpen 1661.

De Lairesse, GS

EJ
Samuel van Hoogstraten, *Den eerlyken jongeling, of de edele kunst, van zich by groote en kleyne te doen eeren en beminnen*, Dordrecht 1657.

Goeree, MK

Goeree, SK

Goeree, TK

Huygens, Fragment
Constantijn Huygens, *Fragment eener autobiografie*, ed. A. Worp, s.l., s.a. (originally written in the years 1629-1631).

Inl.
Samuel van Hoogstraten, *Inleyding tot de booge schoole der schilderkonst; anders de zichtbaere werelt*, Rotterdam 1678.

Junius, TPA

Junius, SKDO
Franciscus Junius, *De schilderkonst der oude, begrepen in drie boecken*, Middelburg 1641.

Van Mander, Grondt

Van Mander, Leven

Van Mander, Wtlegginge
INTRODUCTION

1 Białostocki 1977.
2 Hoogewerff 1939, p. 98.
5 A study of exemplary significance to the iconographical approach is De Jongh 1967; see also Alpers 1983. For this debate, see also Bruyn 1986, Hecht 1986, Sluijter 1997 and the compilation of recent positions in Franits 1997.
6 Van Mander, Grondt, see Miedema 1973; Angel, Lof, see Sluijter 2000c; Goeree, TK, SK, MK, on the Teyckenkonst, see Kwakkelstein 1998.
8 Brusati studied the Inleyding, as part of her monograph on Van Hoogstraten’s life and work, as a ‘self-legitimizing enterprise’, a project designed to boost the painter’s social status. In Czech’s work, which is structured explicitly with a view to filling a gap in existing research and gathering factual material, the compelling authority of the tradition in which the Inleyding is situated is neglected; see Czech’s comments on his vantage point in Czech 2002, vol. I, p. 385, and my discussion of this work in Weststeijn 2004.
9 Michael Baxandall laid the foundations of his pioneering research in a philological method that sets out to ascertain the painter’s conceptual apparatus. His work covers the literature of art written in the early Italian Renaissance; Baxandall 1971, see also the more recent Baxandall 2004. For the sixteenth century, see Summers 1981; Summers 1987, and Sohm 2001.
10 Pauw-de Veen 1969; Van de Wetering 1991, Taylor 1992, Van de Wetering 1996, Sluijter 2000c. Other indications can be found in Miedema’s commentary on Van Mander’s Grondt, which is not comparable in structure, however, to the thematic study embarked on here, see Miedema 1973. The same applies to Nativel’s commentary on the first volume of Junius’s Latin version of De Pictura Veterum, in which she focuses on rhetorical aspects, see Nativel 1996.
12 On this issue, see most recently Bakker 2004.
14 Two studies including exemplary discussions of the way in which the biographical material concerning contemporary artists included in theoretical texts is determined to a large extent by topoi from the literary tradition are McKim-Smith 1988, pp. 1-33, and Kris and Kurz 1932.
15 Emmens 1979, p. 98.

CHAPTER I

1 Von Schlosser 1924, p. 559.
2 ‘Het oeffenen van de Poëzie, of ten minsten het lezen der zelve, is de Schilderkonst zoo
Van Mander trained under Lucas de Heere, whose pursuits included literature as well as the visual arts. Many seventeenth-century painters belonged to Haarlem’s chamber of rhetoric, including Frans and Dirk Hals, Salomon de Koninck, Esaias van de Velde, Jan Wynants and Adriaen Brouwer. A key figure was Adriaen van de Venne, who was active in both arts and who refers to painting in his literary work. Other painters with literary pursuits were Pieter Codde and Hendrik Bloemaert. Graphic artists who also wrote works of literature include Coornhert, Boetius Bolswert, Philips Galle and Jan Luiken. Bredero and Dullaert both trained as painters, but later concerned themselves exclusively with poetry. Sixteenth-century masters who wrote poetry include Lambert Lombard, Jan van Scorel, Pieter Balten and Cornelis Ketel. Since the fragmentary study by Brom 1957 (see esp. p. 57, p. 161), no overview research has been done on the literary pursuits of Dutch painters.


Sellin 1976.

Emmens accorded only a minor role to the text in his research on the art theory relevant to Rembrandt, Emmens 1979, p. 98.


Thissen 1994, p. 56, with select bibliography.

Golahny 2004, p. 54; cf. also Levy 1984, pp. 20-27.


Thissen 1994, p. 171.

Van Hoogstraten quotes Cartari in Italian in the *Inleyding*, refers to Dante’s *Divina commedia*, of which no Dutch edition existed at the time (Inl. p. 9 and p. 210), and may have actually translated Michelangelo’s sonnets himself.


Such as Ficino’s *De vita libri tres*, Alberti’s *De pictura and Architectura* and Del Monte’s *Perspectivae libri sex*. He also repeats several passages in Latin in the *Inleyding* (on pp. 252 and 280). In many cases, Van Hoogstraten adopts verbatim passages from Junius’s – often quite free – translation from the Latin (cf. the paraphrase from Longinus, Junius, SKDO p. 233, Inl. p. 179).


Goeree stated that it was ‘seer voordeelig’ for painters to be ‘in eenig vreemde Taal, als Latijn, Frans en Italiaans ervaren te wesen … om beter eenige Schrijvers, die noch niet in onse Moederspraak overgeset zijn, te konnen verstaan’, Goeree, SK p. 42.

EJ p. 28.


Vossius was headmaster of the Latin school until 1615; see Rademaker 1981, pp. 60-87. In accordance with educational reforms implemented from 1625 onwards, boys studied a consistent curriculum of humanist texts, the main authors being Erasmus, Scaliger and Vossius. On Vossius’s rhetoric, see Rademaker 1981, pp. 177-81.

Vossius 1690.

Vossius married Junius’s half-sister Elisabeth after the death of his first wife Elisabeth Corput, who was her cousin. Junius and Vossius belonged to the same humanist ‘dynasty’, which was partly rooted in Dordrecht, and to which Jan de Brune the Younger, a cousin of Junius’s, also belonged; cf. Nativel 1996, p. 30.

Nativel 1996, p. 60. While Junius wrote an introduction to Vossius’s treatise on painting, Vossius in turn referred to Junius, in this same text, as a major author on the theory of art.

Van Hoogstraten refers to Vossius’s views, Inl. p. 43, p. 69, p. 280.

The Inl. refers to Cicero’s *Pro Archia, De oratore, Orator, Tusculanae disputations*, *De officiis*, and the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* that is attributed to Cicero.
31 De Bie, Cabinet p. 65.
36 The physician Van Beverwijck, for whose work Van Hoogstraten produced a number of engravings, attended the Latin school under Vossius, then studied at the University of Leiden and went on a *grand tour*; he corresponded with Heinsius and Vossius.
37 Spies 2002.
38 Van Hoogstraten 1725. For Dirk van Hoogstraten see Brusati 1995, pp. 16-24, and Thissen 1994, chapter II.
39 Van Hoogstraten stayed at Rembrandt’s studio from 1642/3 to 1646/7, at the same time as Carel Fabritius (probably autumn 1641-April 1643), Bernhard Keil (1642-44), and Jurriaen Ovens. See the survey of pupils in Liedtke 2004, p. 68. This makes Van Hoogstraten one of the pupils who stayed the longest in Rembrandt’s studio; most remained there for one to three years: cf. Flinck, one year (c. 1635-6), Eckhout (1635-1638/9), Drost (1648-1650/52), De Gelder (two years in the 1660s). De Gelder and Drost may have been taught in Van Hoogstraten’s own studio in ‘the style of Rembrandt’, as Liedtke calls it, which would explain their great affinity with Rembrandt, even in their later work; see Liedtke 1995-6.
40 Scriverius owned two paintings by Rembrandt; Buchelius visited him in Leiden. These suggestions are made by Wetering 2001a, pp. 27-32, esp. p. 29.
41 Lastman owned about 150 books; Lastman and Swansen burg both came from educated families. In Rembrandt’s adaptations of classical sources, in which he did wish to go to the source, examining the traditional representation in the light of the original text, he probably relied on a well-read acquaintance, Golahny 2004, p. 54 and chapter IV.
42 According to Orlers’s description of the city, Rembrandt had also studied at this university, where he enrolled on 20 May 1620, cf. Schnackenburg 2004.
43 In his autobiography, Huygens characterizes Rembrandt’s style of painting using a number of terms that derive from rhetoric; these recur in Rembrandt’s correspondence with Huygens (see Weststeijn 2005). Van Hoogstraten was in contact with Rembrandt’s pupil, Heiman Dullaert, who soon abandoned his career as a painter to devote himself entirely to poetry, according to Van Hoogstraten 1983, p. 7. Dullaert probably stayed at Rembrandt’s studio from 1651 to 1653.
44 Spies 2002. Vossius, as rector and first professor of the new Athenaeum Illustre, also determined the intellectual climate in Amsterdam to a large extent.
45 Cats lived in Dordrecht from 1623 to 1636.
46 For this city’s literary life, see Spies 1998.
48 Federico Zuccari was a member of the Accademia degli Insensati and the Accademia degli Innominati; Gian Paolo Lomazzo was a member of the Accademia della Val di Bregna.
49 Other women in this circle were Agneta Colvia, Anna van Blockland, Catharina van Muywijk, Cornelia Blanckenburg, Maria de Witt, Catharina and Wilhelmina Oem, Anna van Beverwijck and Maria Magaretha van Akerlaeck. For a list of publications, see Thissen 1994, pp. 249-268.
50 Zijlmans 1999, p. 172 observes that the group’s activities revolved around the exchange of ideas, and loaning and borrowing topical literature.
53 Bok 2001, p. 193, n. 25, notes that he knows
of no uneducated painters; see also Levy 1984.

56 Van Mander, *Leven* fol. 259r.

57 For Merula, see Van Regteren Altena & Van Thiel 1964, p. 163.


59 For the *grand tour* and the ideal of *prudentia*, see Frank-Van Westrienen 1983.


61 Cf. Oudaen’s caption to Van Hoogstraten’s self-portrait, Inl., unpaginated.

62 ‘It is known that great expectations are harboured of artists who have attended foreign schools of art for some time, and that as a result, what they have learned there is much appreciated by art lovers’, Goeree, SK p. 107, see also p. 106: ‘that travelling and seeing other countries, and great empires, may be of benefit to young painters and can help to give them a degree of fame’.

63 DaCosta Kaufmann 1982.

64 Duindam 2003.

65 ‘Now follows a thunderous rumour and piece of news. It is said that Germany’s greatest painter, Sandrart, is to come here’, letter from Vienna, 9 August 1651, see Roscam Abbing 1993, p. 43. Sandrart praises Van Hoogstraten’s work in the *Teutsche Academie*, cf. Roscam Abbing 1993, pp. 43-44.

66 Brusati 1995, p. 75.

67 The travel account may be found on pages 201-204 of the Inl.

68 Hoogewerff 1950, p. 109. For a reconstruction of Van Hoogstraten’s Italian journey, based on Van den Bos’s *Wegwijzer*, see Czech 2002, vol. II, p. 288, fig. 43. It is unclear, however, whether the painter saw everything he enumerates in this eulogy with his own eyes; his description stays quite close to that of Van den Bos, who probably did not follow exactly the same route.


70 The reference is to De Bisschop’s *Korte Aanteekeningen aangaande de Naamen, manieren van Werken en levens-tijd der Italiaanse Schilders, Beeldhouwers en Architecten*, written in the late 1640s and early 1650s, two manuscripts of which have been handed down, the oldest one in the Fondation Custodia, Paris, and a more recent one in the Rijksmuseum; see Van Gelder 1971.


72 ‘There are references to the association with the Vauxhall Society on p. 207 of the Inl., to the Royal Society on p. 188; cf. Thissen 1994, pp. 91-92; Brusati 1995, pp. 91-94.

73 Schull 1833, p. 29.


75 These novels were influenced by a variety of literary elements: English, French and Spanish novels, which were ultimately based on novels from the Hellenistic period, see Spies 2002.

76 Johan van Heemskerck had published a *Batavische Arkadia* (1637) inspired by San-nazarro’s *Arcadia*, and Lambert van den Bos had written a *Dordrechtse Arcadia* (1662).

77 ‘The brush would succeed better than my pen in depicting the specific beauty of each Nymph’, Van Hoogstraten 1669, p. 183.

78 ‘De groote Poëet die sijn Morge-sangen den gantschen dagh schaafden, bleef niet onbesserpt, hoe sou ik, die den gantschen dagh een ander Godinne gedient hebbende, in’t ontkleeden, eerst om Roselijn docht, vry zijn?’ *Schoone Roselijn*, unpaginated, p. *4 verso*.

79 ‘Want ik begin te twijfelen of my ook al dit schryven ergens toe dient, daer ik aan een andre Konstgodinne, die hare Dienaers beter als de Poezy beloont, verbonden ben’; Van Hoogstraten 1669, p. 270.

80 He will ‘wel haest veel vremder en ongehoorder dingen vertellen’; Van Hoogstraten 1669, p. 336.

81 This is argued by Van Mander on the grounds that painters ‘must eschew Rhetoric, the art of poetry, with its lovely ways, desirable and charming though it may be’, because it will not earn them any money, Van Mander, *Grondt* I, 47, f. 5.

82 ‘[T]rotse Zangheldinnen, die in moedertaal gelijckerhand aanspannen’, Van Hoogstraten 1669, unpaginated.

83 Bidloo 1720, p. 68.

84 Schull 1833, p. 70. This play creates the impression that it was meant to be read rather than performed. Schull suggests that Van Hoogstraten may have written this play in collaboration with Willem van Blijenberg, Schull 1833, p. 68.

85 Tadema 2004.

86 De Vries 1998.


88 Van Blijenberg’s poem in praise of the *Roomsche Paulina* refers to ‘paintings that speak’, and J. Teerlinck calls plays ‘levende tafreelen’, see Van Hoogstraten 1650, unpaginated.

89 ‘[W]aar door hy by-na tot den hoogsten trap der wel-sprakentheyt gerocht is, en levendigb alle verstanden der menschen, driften, gebreken, en middelen om die te beteren
heeft kunnen aanwijzen'; Van Hoogstraten 1650, unpaginated, fol. no. *4, verso.
90 Quoted in Roscam Abbing 1993, p. 21.
91 '[I]n ernst van onzichtbare dingen te handelen spaaren wy voor onze Onzichtbare Wereld', Inl. p. 86.
92 That the Onzichtbare Wereld was a philosophical work is suggested as a plausible possibility by Czech 2002, pp. 74-78; Horn 2000 shares this opinion, p. 412.
93 '[M]ijn voornemen is niet van de Schilders, maer van de Schilderkonst, te handelen; een ander, die beter tijd heeft, mag haere leevens beschrijven, en Karel Vermander vervolgen', Inl. p. 257.
95 A second edition appeared in Rotterdam as early as 1675: Justus Lipsius van de stantvastigheid, by't samenspraeke verdeelt in twee boeken, waar in byzonderlijk over d'algemeene tijdelijke zwarigheden gehandeld word. Nieuwelijks uit het Latijn vertaelt door F.v.H.
96 On the importance of epideictic rhetoric, which was dominant in the early modern period, see Vickers 1989, pp. 53-54, p. 61.
97 Of his nine chapters he says: 'dat is, dat wy de leerlingen als met der hand in de Schoole geleiden, die wy in negen Leerwinkels verdeelt hebben, en wy wijzen hen dan aen ...
98 'Zoo komt dan ook onze Inleiding zeer wel te pas voor alle liefhebbers van de Schilderkonst, schoon zy in de zelve onervae zijn, om in't koopen van Konststukken niet bedrogen te worden, want zy zullen die waarderen nae de maete der deugden, die in de zelve zijn waergenomen', Inl., 'Aen den Lezer', unpaginated.
101 Comparisons are drawn between Van Hoogstraten and Van Mander in several pangenries by Pieter Godewijck (from 1652) to Hoogstraten's Goude schalmei, Brusati 1995, p. 78. In the Inl. (p. 22), Van Hoogstraten quotes from Van Mander as his great inspiration (he explains that he is quoting from his work because of 'de loflijcke gedachtenis van onzen Vermander, wiens voorgang ons tot dit werk heeft aengeporte'). For Vermeyen's list of theorists, see Czech 2002, p. 123.

116 ‘Niet dat ik zeggen wil, dat deeze mijne Inleiding allen Liehebebers de oogen zoo zal openen, dat sy zelfs strax van de kunst zullen kunnen oordelen: dat sy verre; maer sy zullen uit ons werk gemakkelijk kun-
nen begrijpen, waer van dat men oordelen moet, en dan zullen sy, met behulp van een ervaren Schilder, de deugden en feilen, die in eenig werk zijn, klaer en onderscheidelijk kunnen naspeuren’, Inl., ‘Aen den Lezer’, unpaginated.


118 ‘Mai è stato alcuno tra gli antichi o moderni, ch’abbia scritto o trattato di quest’arte lodevolmente, che non sia stato anco eccel-
ente in esercitarla’, Lomazzo, Idea, cap. IV; ed. Barocchi, Scritti p. 34.

119 ‘[E] quelli, che non possono, che ne sia la ragione, attualmente la pittura esercitare, non lascino almeno, come cosa bellissima l’amara, e con l’amo (il che ciascuno poter di fare) pittori immortali divengano’, Borghi-
ni 1584, p. 444; cf. Junius: ‘dat Plinius en an-
dere oude authoreun den naam konstenaer niet alleen den genen toeschrijven die de hand selver aen’t werk slaen, maer dat sy onder dien naam ook sodaeinghe Konst-
lievende mannen vervatten die met een seldsame en wel-gheoeffende verbeeldens kracht d’uytnemende wercken van groote Meesters beschouwen, en met een onbe-

120 Miedema has described Van Mander’s Grondt as a text that can be read on three levels, each appealing to a different readership; cf. Miedema 1993.

121 Varchi wrote on both painting and poetry, as did Vossius; Lodovico Dolce wrote not only a dialogue on the art of painting, but also a handbook for courtiers; Junius, Goeree, Gauricus and Alberti wrote on a wide range of other social and scientific subjects.


123 This relates to texts as diverse as Gauricus’ De sculptura, De Holanda’s Dialogus em Roma, Carducho’s Dialogos de la Pintura, Dolce’s Artino, De Ville’s T’samen-speekinghe and De Lairesse’s Teekenkonst.

124 Goeree 1697, p. 65; Lairesse 1701, p. 21; Houbraken 1718-1721, II p. 122; Weyer-

125 Czech has researched the degree to which the Inleiding actually reached its intended readership by looking at the edition, price and sales points, as well as listings in archives and other texts; see Czech 2002, pp. 111-22. Although the Inleiding appears in six cata-
logs of bookshops in the Dutch Republic, the only probate inventories in which it is listed are those of Cornelis Dusart (1660-
1704) and Jacob Molaert (1649-1727), see Czech 2002, pp. 119-21. This information tells us little or nothing about the degree to which painters were familiar with the book; there is not a single reference to the texts of Angel or Goeree, for instance, Junius is mentioned only four times, and it is ques-
tionable whether the artists’ inventories that have been handed down accurately reflect the dissemination of these books.


127 For the relationship between the Inleiding and Rembrandt’s studio, see Van de Weter-

128 Inl. p. 2.

129 In 1649 a Latin De pictura was published in Amsterdam, in Johannes de Laet’s edition of Vitruvius’ De Architectura, with commen-
tary by Philander, Barbaro, Salmacus, Wot-


131 On Vos, see Weber 1991; cf. the eulo-
gies of Thomas Asselijn, Broederschap van de Schilderkunst (1654); Adriaen van de Venne, Zeerische mey-dacht. ofte schyn-kycker (1623); Werner van der Valckert, Lof-dicht ter eeren Sint Lucas (1618).

132 For a survey of the non-theoretical or bio-
graphical literature on the art of painting, see Porteman 1984; specifically on poems inspired by paintings, see Emmens 1981.

133 The largest (though not exhaustive) survey...
of the Dutch literature of art is to be found in De Pauw-De Veen 1969, pp. XVII–XXIII.

134 On Angel, see Sluiter 2000c and Miedema 1973-1975; on De Bie, see Schuckman 1984 and Buitendijk 1942, on De Lairesse, see Dolders 1985 and most recently De Vries 1998 and 2002.

135 Taylor 2000, p. 146.

136 De Ville adopts a point of view opposing the Caravaggeschi; see Emmens 1979, pp. 78-79.

137 Junius 1638, ‘epistyle dedicatory’.

138 See Ellenius 1960, p. 42.

139 The 1651 edition of Da Vinci’s Trattato contains a long list of art theorists, including Junius and Van Mander.

140 Van Mander has ‘meerder kracht om den geest op te trekken, dan te onderwijzen’, Inl. p. 2.


144 Jansen 1995, p. 22.

145 Rhetoric, poetics and art theory have scarcely been studied in their mutual relationships; cf. the compilation Renaissance-rhetorik, Plett 1993; also Konst 1995, Spies 1993, Nativel 1991 and Kibedi Varga 1987.

146 It was Della Fonte’s De poesie (c.1492).

147 Spies 1993, p. 13. A real treatise on poetics is Rodenburgh’s Eglientier poeten bust-wering (1619), which is based on Sidney’s Apology for Poetry (ed. 1595) and Thomas Wilson’s Arte of Rhetorique (1st ed 1553). Vossius wrote a number of texts on poetics, the best known of which is De artis poeticae natura ac constitutione liber (1647). Vondel’s Aenleidinge ter Nederduitsche dichtkunst (1650) should also be mentioned.

148 Von Sandrart lived in Rome from 1629 to approximately 1634, working for the Caravaggio collector Giustiniand and the art connoisseur Michel LeBlon; he also worked for the Genoan dealers who purchased work by artists including Rubens and Van Dyck. From 1637 to 1645, Von Sandrart lived in Amsterdam. Van Hoogstraten attended lessons in Rembrandt’s studio in 1642 or 1643.

149 E.g. Alberti’s De pictura, Gauricus’s De sculp- tum, Junius’s De pictura veterum, Vossius’s ‘De graphic’ and Du Fresnoy’s De arte graphica. Von Sandrart also published his Academia iudaeus in Latin, and De Lairesse’s Groot schilderboek was also translated into Latin; see De Lairesse, De Lairesse & Schenk 1702.

150 Lampsonius 2001, p. 20. Lampsonius writes that he has at his disposal Pliny, Vitruvius, Vasari, Dürer, Vesalius, Varchi, Philander’s comments on Vitruvius, Cousin, Alberti and Gauricus, idem p. 60. Furthermore, in the last sentence of his Vita, Lampsonius refers to Pamphiliius, Alberti, Dürer and Gauricus.

151 Ridolfi is mentioned twice in the list of names drawn up by De Bisschop (n.d.) and the anonymous Twederley Naem-Lyct der Italiaensche Constenauers, Schilders, Beeld-bouwers, Bouw-meesters, Plaestsnyders en anderen, 1671. Ridolfi devotes the first volume of his Maraviglie dell’arte (1648) to the Dutch collectors Johan and Gerard Rijnst. This text alludes to a multiplicity of other sources, such as Lomazzo, Dolce, Vasari, Borghini, Baglione and Zuccari; cf. Ridolfi 1648, e.g. p. 348.


155 ‘Italien in Vrankrijk verplaatst schijnt’, Inl. p. 330; according to Goeree, France was a more popular destination than Rome in his day, Goeree, SK pp. 106-7.

156 A single volume was published in Amsterdam in 1722 containing C.A. du Fresnoy, De schilderkonst; idem, Konstwoorden of spreek-wyzen van de schilderkonst, and Roger de Piles, Zamenspraak over ’t coloriet, all translated by J. Verboek.


158 See Van Son 1993. De Piles was held as a political prisoner in the Dutch Republic from 1696 to 1697, and wrote his Abrégé de la vie des peintres (Paris 1699) during his time in captivity.

159 Vasari and Guicciardini commend Dutch painters for travelling to Italy. Guicciardini writes: ‘I quali dipintori, architettori, e scultori mentionati sono stati quasi tutti in


161 ‘Want schoon zy de konst by avontuuren in’t geheel beter verstaen mochten, dan wy, zoo zal’t henliden juist niet gelust hebben, de zelve zoodanig in leeden te verdeelen, dat zy ze bequaemelijk aen een ander kunnen over-leeren’; ‘Aen de Lezer’, unpaginated.

162 This author links Euterpe to Correggio, for instance, and the other Muses to different artists; see Sohm 2001, p. 139.


165 Inl. p. 278.

166 Inl. p. 345; see below, pp. 91-95.

167 Van Hoogstraten shares this aim of dividing up his treatise according to a hierarchy of material for didactic reasons with Willem Goeree, who states in his *Schilderkeuze*, besides which he mentions anatomy, colouring, rendering of textures and brushwork, Angel, *Lof der kunst, of de proportie en schaduwen lijck is waergenem [sic]; of de kolorijten en hangende regulen, niet teffens overvallen, maar allenghskens bemachtight mochten worden’, Goeree, SK p. 84. Angel distinguishes between the following virtutes: ‘een ghesont Oordeel: Een seecere en ghewisse werck; of de proportie ook zuiver-\(\LaTeX\)e; ‘Aen de Lezer’, unpaginated.

168 His wording here clearly reflects traditional concepts: ‘let eerst wel, of er beminness waerdige deugden (\(\text{virtutes}\)) in zijn; of de zaek, die verbeelt wort, wel zoo waerdighen inhouht (\(\text{inventio}\)) begrijpt, als van Clio vereyst wort; of de proportie (\(\text{propor}tio\)) ook zuiverlijck is waergenomen [sic]; of de kolorijten en schaduwen (\(\text{coloro}\)) met de lessen van Terpsichore en Melpomene overeenkomen: of de doeningen en lijdingen (\(\text{actiones et passiones}\)) ook haere rechte rol speelen? of de omstandicheden eygen (\(\text{de ductus}\)) zijn? of de schicking (\(\text{dispositio}\)) geestig is; en eyndelijk, of al deze deugden deur de gratiën (\(\text{gratia}\)) verbonden zijn?’, Inl. p. 319.

169 The parts referred to most frequently are *inventio*, *dispositio*, *disegno* and *colorito*, cf. Ellenius 1960, pp. 60-70, 147-196.


171 Vossius 1690, § 24, pp. 71-72.

172 Czech provided a different classification, roughly as follows: 1 proemium/exhortatio; 2-4 inventio; 5 dispositio; 6-7 elocutio; 8 ethos; see Czech 2002, p. 224.

173 As Lomazzo writes, ‘ne l’istesso modo, et ordine, con che sono state da essa natura prodotte’; Lomazzo 1584, p. 13. Van Hoogstraten too describes this, in his passage on the ‘Origins, rise and fall’ of painting; he suggests, for instance, that working with broken colours was Apollodorus’s ‘invention’, Inl. p. 223.

174 De Geest 1702.

175 Inl. p. 335.


177 Wright 1984, p. 69.

178 Inl. p 245; Pliny, *Naturalis Historia* xxv,v,16. Light and shade were discovered after this (Van Hoogstraten notes that the Greeks initially made monochrome paintings, Inl. p. 247) and introduced colour later, cf. Wright 1984, p. 65.

179 Possevino writes: ‘as Aristotle says, first, the contours of things are indicated with lines, then the things acquire colour, softness and hardness, in accordance with the painter’s task, which corresponds to nature’s own task of creation and preservation’, *Tractatio de Poési et Pictura* (Rome 1593), ed. Barocchi, *Scritti* p. 42.


181 Goeree, SK p. 20; ‘de konst is in de natur ingenoodt, als gy die daer uit zult getrokken hebben, zult gy veele dwaelingen in uw werk

182 ‘[D]e dingen, eeven alsze zijn, nae te boot-sen’, Inl. p. 36.
184 Quintilian, Inst.orat. 1, 1, 21-22.
185 Alberti’s classification, which ends with the statement that painters must cultivate good morals, follows Quintilian; see Wright 1984, pp. 56, 57, 59.
186 Quintilian, Inst.orat. 12, 10, 4-6.
187 Inl. p. 75.
188 Barasch 1985, p. 341.
190 Inl. p. 247, 255.
191 Aristotle, Metaphysica 980a-981b; cf. Wright 1984, p. 70.
192 On the figure of Hermathena, see DaCosta Kaufmann 1982 and Lee 1996.
195 ‘[N]egen meestressen, die zelf van outs over al de planeten, starren hemel, en der zelven maetgangen gestelt zijn’, Inl. p. 5.
197 King 1988.
198 Inl., unpaginated.
202 It shows ‘wat weg men zal inslaen, om’t einde der loophaene, daer zoo vele ten halven wege langs struikelen, en verdoolt loopen, te geraeken’, Inl. p. 2.
204 ‘[D]at den selvighen wegh [voor de begin- ner] slecht [d.i. eenvoudig] ende recht sy ... datter eenen sekeren goed ene bequa- men wegh is, waer de Nature selver van selfs vele dinghen sonder leerlinghe moet ver- richten’, Junius, SKDO p. 9; TPA p. 11.
207 The important point here being not to un- dermine the dignity of art: ‘De Konst klimt tot hoogen prijs en achting, door de onder- linge heusheit der oeffenaers en kenders’, Inl. p. 318, marginal note.
208 Inl. pp. 201-6.
210 Inl. p. 345.
211 ‘Siccome avessi a studiare in teologia o filosofia’, Cennini 1943, p. 34.
213 He refers to ‘de oeffening der zedige deugt’ as ‘d’oprechte en waere uitspanning des Schildergeests’, Inl. p. 213, and admonishes the painter to ‘voor eerst zijn goede for- tuine in zijn eygen verdiensten, dat is, in de deugt en in d’aengenaemheyt van zijn werk zoeken’, Inl. p. 310.
214 ‘Gy zult ook, ô Schilderjeugt, de werken uws leermeesters behoorlijk in waerden houden ... En zegt met Alexander: Mijn vader gaf my het leven, maer van dezen heb ik het wel leven door Godts genade geleert’, Inl. p. 319.
216 See below, chapter II, pp. 95-99.
217 While Lomazzo’s temple has seven pillars, Van Hoogstraten distinguishes nine ‘steps’ or ‘rooms of learning’ in a hierarchical ar- rangement. Lomazzo bases himself in turn
Van Hoogstraten's erudition and the fact that his knowledge of the classics was not simply copied from Junius is clear *inter alia* from his correspondence with Oudaen; see Roscam Abbing 1993, pp. 78-80.

For the relationship between painting and dialectics, see Baxandall 2004, pp. 69-82, Hundemer 1997, pp. 117-121 and Mack 1992; for dialectics and early modern rationalism in general, see Mack 1993.

Emmens 1979, *passim*.


On Camillo's *Idea del teatro*, which has seven entrances; Ackerman 1964, p. 79, p. 193.

In a letter dated 31 May 1638 from Grotius to Vossius that was first printed in the Dutch edition of the *Schilderkonst*: ‘plane simile mihi videtur opus tuum illis imaginibus quae ex lapillis diversicolorum compaginatis hunte ... Delectat varietas, multoque magis ex ista varietate consurgens pulchra species’, see Aldrich 1991, p. lii.; Nativel 1996, p. 108.

Van Mander too 'Daar is niets in deeze laetste eeuw dat goederen te eeren', Van Hoogstraten 1650, unpaginated, no. 4. Bato is the mythical forefather of the Batavians – the Dutch.

Van Mander too 'Ik hebbe mijne meyning met oude en nieuwe schrijvers vermengt, en't geen ik te Hoof zelfs verstaen hebbbe daer in geschikt, en soo ik een yegelijk het sijne zouden weederom geven, soo moet ik bekennen, dat het mijne daer soo onder gewart is, dat ik het nocht uyt maltanderen zoude haspelen of spinnen kunnen. Het waer ook verlooren arbeydte, en datmen geloooven zoude dat ik yetts uyt my selfs hadt uyt gevonden, acht ik soo weynig, dat eer ik die moeylijke vraeg wil beantwoorde, ik veel liever bekenne, dat de goede dingen die in dit stukije worden gevonden gestoelen zijn, de middelmatige uyt goederen originalek qualië gekopieert, en de slechtige die meest al de blaren vullen uyt mijn eygen hoofd voort komen', EJ, p. 89. Inl. p. 346.


'Schiltz Sangh-heldinne! die Hollandt in Latium herstelt ... span gelijker hant aan, en laat Batoos Landt-volk haar egen Taal-gehoorden: en recht geheet-merken of spinnen konnen. Het waer ook verlooren arbeydte, en datmen geloooven zoude dat ik yetts uyt my selfs hadt uyt gevonden, acht ik soo weynig, dat eer ik die moeylijke vraeg wil beantwoorde, ik veel liever bekenne, dat de goede dingen die in dit stukije worden gevonden gestoelen zijn, de middelmatige uyt goederen originalek qualië gekopieert, en de slechtige die meest al de blaren vullen uyt mijn eygen hoofd voort komen', EJ, p. 89. Inl. p. 346.

For the relationship between painting and dialectics, see Baxandall 2004, pp. 69-82, Hundemer 1997, pp. 117-121 and Mack 1992; for dialectics and early modern rationalism in general, see Mack 1993.

Emmens 1979, *passim*.

'Che la pittura sia arte, si pruova de la defizione de issa arte, la quale in somma non è altro d'una ragione retta e regolata de le cose che si hanno da fare. Si pruova anco perché tutte le cose naturali sono la regola e la misura de la maggior parte de le scienze et arti del mondo, essendo che sono fatte da Dio con somma sapienza ... onde ne seguirà chiara mente che la pittura è arte, perché piglia per sua regola esse cose naturali; et è imitatrice e come a dire simia de l'istessa natura', Lomazzo, *Trattato* (1584), ed. Barocchi, Scritti p. 957 (italics mine). Thus, Leonardo describes the existence of ‘rules of art’, which are based on experience, as follows: ‘Queste regole fanno che tu possiedi uno libero e bono giudizio inperochè ’l bono giudizio nasce dal bene intêdere, e ’le be intêdere derria da ragion tratta da bone regole e le bone regole sono figlie del bono spirîtia: comne madre di tutte le scïette e arti’, Leonardo, *Trattato*, ed. Richter 1949, I, par. 18.


‘[M]en bevind somtijts twee menschen zeer schoon en fraey, van de welke d’eene met d’andere niets gemeen heeft ... Want de konst is in de natur ingedoopt, als gy die daer uit zult getrokken hebben, zult gy vele

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dwaelingen in uw werk vermijden’, Inl. p. 50.
236 Van Eck & Zwijnenberg 1996, p. 31; for an overview of classical views, see Vickers 1898, pp. 1-82.
237 Seventeenth-century manuals of rhetoric are therefore primarily didactic; this genre was very widely disseminated and Van Hoogstraten will undoubtedly have been familiar with it. Cf., besides Vossius 1678, De spreek-kunst van Artistoteles aan Alexander de Grote, Leiden 1677, and ‘Van het lachen’ en ‘van’t onthouden’ uit Fabius Quintilianus van de spreekkunstelijke onderwijsing, Leiden 1677.
241 ‘Een T onge over-eynde gehouden met een handt, beteyckent welsprekentheyt: om dat welspreken een daet is, en dat de handt tot-ter daet bequaem is, en oock macht bewijst’, Van Mander 1604, Van de uitbeeldingen der figueren, f. 132v.
244 ‘De leeringhe diemen uyt de regulen haef-ten moet, valt langh ende verdrietigh; ’t onderwijs daerenteghen ’t welck men uyt d’exempelen treckt is kort en krachtigh, De Gheslachten der Hoofdt-zaaken zijn dry: Betooghend, Beraadend, en Recht-spreekelijk. Betooghend is, waar door men looft oft lastert ... oft van een Persoon, oft van een daadt, oft van een zaak ... alsozo men de welspreekdheit oft het landtbouwen looft: oft veracht de ondueghdt van een on-dankbaar ghemoedt’, Vossius 1648, p. 2, cf. p. 31.
245 ‘De leeringhe diemen uyt de regulen haef-ten moet, valt langh ende verdrietigh; ’t onderwijs daerenteghen ’t welck men uyt d’exempelen treckt is kort en krachtigh, Junius, SKDO, p. 86. Here Junius has translated the rhetorical belief ‘longum iter est per praecepta, breve et efficax per exempla’, and Nativel concludes that in Junius’s theory, ‘precepts are subordinate to practice’, Nativel 1996, p. 59, p. 442.
246 ‘De Natuerlijke gave van een bequamen

260 Goeree, SK p. 39; cf. 'gelijk de weelige akkers niet en verergerd, datmen ze nu met het eene, en dan wederom met het andere zaad bezaije', p. 41. On this theme, see Horowitz 1998. Goeree quotes Cicero in this connection: 'Het is het geraadsaamste, zegt Cicero, dat wy de leidinge onser eigene nature volgen, en dat wy de betragting der Konsten t’eenemaal na den regel der nature richten ... Want dan konnen de Konsten eerst volkomen worden uitgewrocht, wan-neerze met alle haren regelen een bequame natuur onttomen', Goeree, SK p. 38 (italics mine).

261 '[D]e wetenschappen ... teelen onder een ander een zaet der wijsheyt, zoo dat door de menigthe zoo veeler exempelen, in het voorvallen eener zaek den regel opblikt, en her verstant machtigh wort van een zake wel te oordeelen', EJ pp. 24-25.

262 'Gy meesters zult ook in uwe onderwijzingen de natuur en uwer Discipelen te gemoet komen', Inl. p. 21, cf. p. 23, p. 73.

263 'De onderrichtingen dienen alleen tot leyts-... man, en volbrengen van zich selfs niets', EJ p. 5.

264 He states that 'niemand volkomen verstant uit dit geschrift zal trekken, ten zy hy de leerlinge dezer Konst tot zweetens toe arbeide', Inl. p. 3.

265 '[D]e Schilderkonst is het vertoonen eygen-... dan het spreken', Inl. p. 312; art 'bestaat in wel te doen, en niet in wel te zeggen', Inl. p. 22; cf. 'Pictura ... houd meerder van doen, dan van zeggen', p. 230.

266 '[M]eesters in de mont', Inl. p. 18, Inl. p. 3.

267 Artistic reflections should not be disturbed by meaningless babbling ('a inutíl conversação dos ociosos'), according to De Holanda 1984, p. 27.

268 '[E]en kostlijke schat ... waer van de bewe-... rijn, dat se niet zonder merklijk gevaer geschieten', EJ p. 63.

269 'Poëten mogen door denken, maar Schilders moeten door doen, Meesters worden. Wy zullen iemant niet hulpe der negen Zuster-... en wel van de konst leeren spreken, maar

van niemand met dit onderwijs een Schilder maeken, ten zy hy de hand vlijtich aen’t werk sla', Inl. p. 321.


271 'De gewoonte van opletten maekt het oor-... Ze zal het oog met’er tijd een passer verstrekken, Want ik bevind dat de regels en gronden der konst, een vernuftich liethelber voorgeschreven, hem wel verstandich maken, om van deselve te spreken; maer dat hy door ongewoonte van doen, groote misslagen begaet, en door een ongeleerde, die door groote oeffening den passer in ’t oog verkregen heeft, overtrof-... word. … Die zich vlijtich aenwent met goede opletting veel na’t leven te teikenen, zal michmael een grootmeester beschamen, ende natuurlijke eygenschappen der dingen nader komen, dan zijn verstand, noch in lan-... zal, kunnen begrijpen', Inl. p. 35.

272 '[E]en schilderachtig oog, vaerdiger tot uit-... beelden, als tot uitspreeken', Inl. p. 46.

273 'Want bijna ieder deel der Natuer is be-quaem genoeg om deze opletting te voeden, en de scherpte des oogs te weten', Inl. p. 35-36.

274 '[W]elschapentheyt [kan] veelerley ... zijn, en de zelve in de natuer verborgen, ontstelt gemeenelijk onze oordeelen … want men bevind somtijts twee menschen zeer schoon en fraey, van de welke d’eene met d’andere niets gemeen heeft … de konst is in de natuer ingedoopt, als gy die daer uit zult getrokken hebben, zult gy veele dwaelingen in uw werk vermijden', Inl. p. 50. 'Ziet dat gy deze dingen, ô Schilderjeugt! in de levende natuer waerneemt, en op een aerdige en als onge-... se, en de zelve in de natuer verborgen, ontstelt gemeenelijk onze oordeelen … want men bevind somtijts twee menschen zeer schoon en fraey, van de welke d’eene met d’andere niets gemeen heeft … de konst is in de natuer ingedoopt, als gy die daer uit zult getrokken hebben, zult gy veele dwaelingen in uw werk vermijden', Inl. p. 50. 'Ziet dat gy deze dingen, ô Schilderjeugt! in de levende natuer waerneemt, en op een aerdige en als onge-... se, en de zelve in de natuer verborgen, ontstelt gemeenelijk onze oordeelen … want men bevind somtijts twee menschen zeer schoon en fraey, van de welke d’eene met d’andere niets gemeen heeft … de konst is in de natuer ingedoopt, als gy die daer uit zult getrokken hebben, zult gy veele dwaelingen in uw werk vermijden', Inl. p. 50. 'Ziet dat gy deze dingen, ô Schilderjeugt! in de levende natuer waerneemt, en op een aerdige en als onge-... se, en de zelve in de natuer verborgen, ontstelt gemeenelijk onze oordeelen … want men bevind somtijts twee menschen zeer schoon en fraey, van de welke d’eene met d’andere niets gemeen heeft … de konst is in de natuer ingedoopt, als gy die daer uit zult getrokken hebben, zult gy veele dwaelingen in uw werk vermijden', Inl. p. 50. 'Ziet dat gy deze dingen, ô Schilderjeugt! in de levende natuer waerneemt, en op een aerdige en als onge-... se, en de zelve in de natuer verborgen, ontstelt gemeenelijk onze oordeelen … want men bevind somtijts twee menschen zeer schoon en fraey, van de welke d’eene met d’andere niets gemeen heeft … de konst is in de natuer ingedoopt, als gy die daer uit zult getrokken hebben, zult gy veele dwaelingen in uw werk vermijden', Inl. p. 50. 'Ziet dat gy deze dingen, ô Schilderjeugt! in de levende natuer waerneemt, en op een aerdige en als onge-... se, en de zelve in de natuer verborgen, ontstelt gemeenlijk onze oordeelen … want men bevind somtijts twee menschen zeer schoon en fraey, van de welke d’eene met d’andere niets gemeen heeft … de konst is in de natuer ingedoopt, als gy die daer uit zult getrokken hebben, zult gy veele dwaelingen in uw werk vermijden', Inl. p. 50. 'Ziet dat gy deze dingen, ô Schilderjeugt! in de levende natuer waerneemt, en op een aerdige en als onge-... se, en de zelve in de natuer verborgen, ontstelt gemeenlijk onze oordeelen … want men bevind somtijts twee menschen zeer schoon en fraey, van de welke d’eene met d’andere niets gemeen heeft … de konst is in de natuer ingedoopt, als gy die daer uit zult getrokken hebben, zult gy veele dwaelingen in uw werk vermijden', Inl. p. 50. 'Ziet dat gy deze dingen, ô Schilderjeugt! in de levende natuer waerneemt, en op een aerdige en als onge-... se, en de zelve in de natuer verborgen, ontstelt gemeenlijk onze oordeelen … want men bevind somtijts twee menschen zeer schoon en fraey, van de welke d’eene met d’andere niets gemeen heeft … de konst is in de natuer ingedoopt, als gy die daer uit zult getrokken hebben, zult gy veele dwaelingen in uw werk vermijden', Inl. p. 50. 'Ziet dat gy deze dingen, ô Schilderjeugt! in de levende natuer waerneemt, en op een aerdige en als onge-... se, en de zelve in de natuer verborgen, ontstelt gemeenlijk onze oordeelen … want men bevind somtijts twee menschen zeer schoon en fraey, van de welke d’eene met d’andere niets gemeen heeft … de konst is in de natu...
zoo spreektze nochtans overvloedich, op een Hieroglyphische wijze', Inl. p. 346.

282


283

E.g. his assertion, 'Dewijl ook de Poëzy met de Schilderkonst in veel dingen gelijk loopt, zoo zal 't onze Schilderjeugt geoorloft zijn, met het stomme peneel, de spreekende penne der dichters te volgen', Inl. p. 192, cf. 'Overeenkomende met Horatius, den leermeester der Poëzy ... de Schilders, die de stomme Poëzy oefffenen', p. 297.

284

'[D]icemo che, sì ogni libro ordinariamente ha per fine di fare capace colui che legge e persuaderlo a qualche cosa, così si può dire che le pittrice vadano anch'elie all’istesso fine con quelli che le mirano', Paleotti 1960, p. 144 ff. On the rhetorical significance of the formula ut pictura poesis, see 'Tramiti 1973, esp. p. 3, note 4.

285

'Hy maekt zijn toehoorderen verdrietich, zo oft als het met de wel sprekenheydt wel gingh; dat de Notturst ihres Beruffs efordert daß sie unserer Herzen behagen sollen', Von Sandrart 1675-1679, L1, p. 78.

286

't Beeldt is een redenaar, (eylaas!) al sì come le parole, quasi messagiere, por tano per le orecchie i concetti nostri ad altri, così la pitura rappresenta per gli occhi le cose da noi significate alla mente altrui; per lo che da' Greci il medesimo nome è attribuito comunemente allo scrittore et al pittore [i.e. graphice]; Paleotti, Discorso alle imagini sacre e profane (Bologna 1582), ed. Barocchi, Scritti p. 337.

287

Poësis is ‘Rhetorica met haer Soet-Rijm ghedichte’, De Bie, Cabinet, p. 5, 25.

288

Dolce 1557, p. 17r.

289

Quintilian, Inst. orat. 6, 1, 32-33.

290

Junius, TPA 104; ‘Want dese Konsten zijn eens met malckanderen ... ’t Wordt met ver-wonderingh aenghemerckt, dat de Schilderkonst ’t hooft heeft opgehouden, soo lange als het met de welsprekenheyd wel gingh; dat dese daerentregh onder de voet gheareackt is, soo haest als het met de welsprekenheyd ghedaan was’, Junius, SKDO pp. 96-97; cf. Goeree, SK p. 12.

291

A.S. Piccolomini, Opera (Basel 1571), p. 646, quoted in Panafochy 1970, p.16, note 1. Van Hoogstraten's comments on the rise and fall of painting – he refers to the 'renewal of the ages' (p. 291) and retrieving architecture from its 'grave' (p. 126) – belong in the same rhetorical framework.

292

‘Prope autem cum Graphice comparatum est, sicut cum Oratoria facultate', Vossius 1690, § 24, pp. 71-72.

293

Aristotle, De anima III, 3, 431a, 16.

294

Vossius derives the title of his text, De graphice, from this term; cf. Vossius 1690, §50, p. 84: ‘Ubi scribere dixit pro pingere, more Graeco, quibus graphein utrumque notat; unde pingendi ars iis graphice vocatur’. Cf. Gauricus: 'painting and poetry hold graphein in common', Gauricus 1969, p. 43; Michels 1988, p. 74.

295

Zucacci states that making and speech are similar activities, since both are informed by an intellectual disegno or design: 'parlare, e operare tutte le cose, le quali sono però al-lumate, e guidate dal concetto del Disegno Intelletivo, forma singolare dell’ anima, e virtù che la fà discorrere, e intendere compitamente', Zucacci 1607 I, XIII, p. 36.

296

'[Drawing] is a Voedster aller Consten goedich./ ... Iae oock d’edel Grammatica bevroedich./ Is door haer geheooght en ghwassen spoedich,/ Leerend’ haer letters en caracen halen’, Van Mander, Grondt II,2, fol. 8v.

297

'Sj come le parole, quasi messagiere, portano per le orecchie i concetti nostri ad altri, così la pitura rappresenta per gli occhi le cose da noi significate alla mente altrui; per lo che da’ Greci il medesimo nome è attribuito comunemente allo scrittore et al pittore [i.e. graphice]', Paleotti, Discorso alle imagini sacre e profane (Bologna 1582), ed. Barocchi, Scritti p. 337.

298


299

Inl. p. 219; ‘d’Egypaenaer, Chinezen, Japonders en Mexikanen, hebben hare boeken met Zinnebeelden, in plaets van letteren, geschreven; en deeze wijze van uitbeelden is met de schilderkonst ook tot ons gekomen’, Inl. p. 90.

300


301

‘t Beeldt is een redenaar, (cylaas!) al t’enbespraackt’, Camphuysen 1638, p. 190, p. 115.

302

Junius, TPA p. 50; cf. ‘hy is den alder-besten Schrijver die sjine vertellinghen met een ziel-roerende kracht der wel sprekendheydt soo weetet te bekleeden, dat ons de gantsche gheleghenheydt der saecke als in een
Chi vuol veder quello che può il fine

They made rhetoric ‘een koningin der menschen, wanneer ze haer den naam gaven van “Zielroerster”, Van Hoogstraten 1725, pp. 2-3.

Ché sì come il dipintore et il poeta, due artefici all’oratore sembianti, per dilettò di noi fanno versi et imaginì di diverse maniere: quali orribili, quoi piacevoli, quoi dolenti e quoi lieti; così il buono oratore non solamente con le facezie, con gli ornamenti e co’numeri, ad amore, ma ad ira, ad odio et invidia movendo, suol dilettar gli ascoltanti’, Sperone Speroni, Dialogo della Retorica (Venezia 1596), quoted in Barocchi, Scritti, pp. 261-62.

[L]a pittura ... depingendo le azioni de’buoni, ci rappresenta talora anco le opere dei cattivi; così ci fa cognoscere quelle che sono degne di laude et di premio, e così ... fa ‘l uomo savia, prudente et virtuoso’, Zuccari, L’idea (Torino 1607), quoted in Barocchi, Scritti p. 1046.


Such speakers are ‘zedig et beleef ... en als men met hem om gaat, zoo blinkt in haer gemoet soo veel aenmoedigheyt, in haer herte soo veel vroomheyt ... dat een ygelijck zich geluikrijk acht welk sijn gansche leven in haer geselschappen mag door brengen’, EJ p. 68.

Menschkunde niet alleen tot de Teyken en Schilderkunde van Groot belang is, maar datszich ook uytstreek, tot de Welvoegsame Samenleving en dienst der Menschelijke behandelinge ... Ja is die Kennis ook niet noodig in de Dagelykse Ommegang met ons Even-Mensch?’ Goeree, MK unpaginated, fol. *5 verso.


‘Sed cupio pictorem ... in primis esse virum et bonum, et doctum bonarum artium. ... Proxime non ab re erit, si poëtis et aliorum artibus liberalibus ... Proxime non ab re erit, si poëtis et aliorum artibus liberalibus. ... Quodam magnum vel opus, si vehemens ... rhetorici deductabantur. Nam hi quidem multa, cum pictore, habent ornamenta communia’; Alberti 1550, p. 100-101. Cf.: ‘als dan mag men wel op zijn konst vertrouwen, nochtans nedrig van herten, en gemeen-saam van ommeag wen ... soo moetmen tragen sig selven over-al in de gunst der Menschen in te dringen’, Goeree, SK p. 109.

‘Finalmente il vero pittore dovrebbe essere tuttò filosofo per poter ben penetrare la natura delle cose ... E verebbe egli altra ciò ad esser modesto, umano et circonspezzo
in tutte le sue azioni, cosa che anco dalla filosofia s’impara, si come sono stati il saggio Leonardo, il ginosofista Buonarotto, il matematico Mantegna, i due filosofi Rafael-lo e Gaudenzi, et il gran druvido Durero. I quali non tanto acquistarono lode et fama per l’eccellenza dell’arte, quanto per l’umanità et dolcezza dei costumi’, Lomazzo 1974, p. 97.

318 ‘Die met zijn constich werck, soetelijck pranghen/ Can d’ooghen der Menschen, dat uyt de wonste/ Desherten haer ghemoedt die behoorde oock elcx vrientschap bevanghen/ Met vroom en eerbaer zijn, welck is een Conste/ Boven alle Consten, om goede jonste,/ Ghenade en vriendschap, nae herten wenschen,/ Vercrijghen by Gode end’ alle Menschen./ Onder al die Schilder-const name voeren,/ Behoorde sonderlinghe te regeren/ Die edel beleeftheyt, die self der Boeren/ Herten dickwils can beweghen, beroeren,/ Met haer redelijcke soete manieren:/ Summa, alle gheschickte, goedertieren’, Van Mander, Grondt I,30, f. 3v.

319 Van Mander, Grondt I,34, f. 4r; for Titian’s ‘noble and pleasant manner’ (‘edel soete manier van omgangh’), see Het Leven der moderne, oft dees-tijtsche doorluchtighe Italiaen-sche schilders, in Van Mander 1604, f. 177v.

320 ‘[D]ese Const bestaet in dry qualiteyten van Edeldom, dat is politicq, naturelijck, ende gheestelijck’, De Bie, Cabinet p. 270.

321 Cf. the lemma ‘ars’ in Sloane 2001, pp. 52-56.

322 This problem is addressed in Baxandall 2004, p. 1.

CHAPTER II


2 Junius proposes a similar thesis: ‘So is het dan blijkelijk dat onder’t ghetal van soo vele ende verscheyden door de welcke eenen grooten naam ende een onsterruffelike beroemtheyt verworven wordt, dese Konste gheen van de geringhste en is, dewelcke daer af-beeldet alles watmen onder’t wijde uyt-spansel des Hemels be-deckt niet’, Juni, SKDO p. 5.

3 ‘Dat ik het [boek] ook de Zichtbare Werelt noeme, is, omdat de Schilderkonst al wat zichtbaer is, vertoont’, Inl. p. 4.

4 The globe is also an attribute of Urania, who, according to Ripa’s rules, should be depicted with a globe. In the emblem literature, the globe is a customary symbol for the world; thus Ripa’s personification of cosmography has two globes, one terrestrial and one celestial; Ripa 1644, p. 64, p. 599.

5 ‘De schilderkonst is een wetenschaap, om alle ideen, ofte denkbeeldhen, die de gansche zichtbaere natuur kan geven, te verbeelden: en met omtrek en verwe het oog te bedrie-gen ... Want een volmaakte Schildery is als een spiegel van de Natuer, die de dingen, die niet en zijn, doet schijnen te zijn, en op een geoorlofde vermakelijke en prijijslije wijze bedriegt’, Inl. pp. 24-25.

6 ‘It is so that those who practise art as no more than a Cobbler’s craft understand nothing beyond their last; but those who understand what they make will also become aware that all other things are also understood by that same mind’, Inl. p. 70, with a marginal note on p. 71: ‘One should become a universal or general master’ (‘Men behoort universeel of algemeen meester te zijn”).


8 Decartes 1992, p. 4.

9 See Harrison 2000, p. 274, and Brusati 1995, p. 219. Brusati says she is focusing on the ‘idiosyncrasies’ of the treatise, and she sees an ‘overarching concern with the illusionistic and imitative aspects of pictorial representation’ (p. 222), see further the quotations on pp. 226-227, with the comment that evidently ‘it is not the art of antiquity that provides the rule [of art], but the eye itself, trained to observe and represent the variety of nature’s visible riches’.

10 ‘Leer voor eerst de rijke natuur volgen, en wat’er in is, naebootes. De Hemel, d’aerde, de zee, t’ gedierte, en goede en booze menschen, dienen tot onze oeffening; De vlakke velden, heuvelen, beeken en geboomten, verschaffen werz genoeg. De steeden, de marten, de Kerken, en duizent rijkdommen
in de Natuer, roepen ons, en zeggen: kom leergierige, beschouw ons, en volg ons nae. Gy zult in't vaderlant zoo veel aerdicheit, zoo veel zoetichheid, en zoo veel waerdicheit vinden, dat, als gy 't eens wel gesmaekt had, gy uw leeven tot kort zoud keuren, om alles uit te beelden. En in deze minste voorwerpen kan men al de grontregels leeren in't werk te stellen, die tot de alderheerlijkste dingen behooren', Inl. p. 18.

11 'Het mach zijn dat de geen, die de konst

12 'I will gladly allow that in large works a mas-

13 '[Erasmus'] landtsluiden niettemin scheppen

14 'It is not unamusing to see the things that

15 'Zoo zeggen wy met

16 '

17 '[Z]oo zjn [sic] daer en teegen veel andere,

18 '

19 'Het mach zijn dat de geen, die de konst

20 'De derde Les is, nae den aert van't leven./ Een yder ding zijn eygenschap te geven./ In't handelen: men wen zich geen manier./ Als die zich strekt tot aller dingen zwijer', Inl. p. 30.

21 'Want men moet zijn handeling nae den aert
der dingen somtijts veranderen', Inl. p. 30.

22 'Want daer behoort een andere lossicheit
den behoort een andere profijtelijkheyt, aengebracht

23 Van de Wetering 1991, Van de Wetering

24 'Men moet de eygenschappen der simpele

25 '[D]at hy op de ziele der konst als verslingert

26 'Want men moet zijn handeling nae den aert

27 Junius, SKDO p. 65.

28 For this box see Brusati 1995, pp. 213-217.

29 Junius, TPA p. 21; ’deser Konste ... de wel-

30 Van Mander, Leven f. 276r.

31 'Waarachtige werkingen van deugt en
Elsewhere, too, Van Hoogstraten expresses the view that painting is a virtuous occupation, in which the painter confines himself, in Stoic fashion, to a passive role; "schilders [dienen] haer met geen Staetzaken te be-
moeyen", and he gives examples of artists who concern themselves solely with making money, as one 
Schilders in 't oeffenen dezer bevallijke wijsgeerte, hebben toe-

See Valla 1998. Valla observed that the visual art 'which are so close to the liberal arts, flourish simultaneously with rhetoric', p. 143. Lorch says that Valla 'thought of rhet-
oric as the highest human art, encompassing all that man produces ... Rhetoric for Valla is a science that comprehends all forms of the study of the human language. It com-
prehends all other disciplines and cultural expressions', Lorch 1988, p. 334, p. 338.

'Sì come degli oratori è stato scritto che, per riuscire grandi et eccelenti, debbono essere versati in ogni facoltà e scienza, poi che di tutte le cose può occorrere loro di dover ragionare e persuadere il popolo; così pareva si potesse dire della pittura, la qual essen-
do, come un libro popolare, capace di ogni materia, sia di cielo o di terra, di animali o di piante, o d’azione umane di qualunque sorte, richiedesse insieme che il pittore, al quale appartiene il rappresentare di queste cose, fosse di ciascuna, se non compitamente erudito, almeno mediocremente instrutto e non afatto imperito', Paleotti 1960, p. 120.

'Een schilder, die de rechte maniere van “Imiteeren”, ofte naevolgen, maer eens ge-

Cf. EJ, ‘Van de dicht- en schilder-kunst, en kennis der landen en spraken’, and Castigli-
one’s Corteggiano: ‘another thing … which, being in my opinion of great importance, I believe our Courtiers must in no way ne-
glect: and this is to be able to draw, and to understand the art of painting …[from] this art, besides that it is very noble and worthy, one [can] derive much that is useful … and particularly in warfare, to depict and draw terrrain, rivers, lakes, rocks and strongholds, and other such things’, Van den Bos 1662, pp. 112-113.

Vossius 1690, § 21.


Van Mander, Grondt, II,3, fol. 8v; Goeree, TK p. 83.

Williams 1997.


‘Wy noemen [de schilderkunst] algemeen om datze waarlijk algemeen is, en dat soo wel ten opzigt van haar vernomen, als ten aan- sien van haar algemene nuttigheid ontrent het gantsche Menschdom ... wy bemeren dat de Letter-making van de Schilderkonst ontleend is’, Goeree, SK p. 25.

‘On einde velden in de Teykenkonst te doorwandelten’; ‘ontrent alles, wat de natuer voortbrengt’; ‘de dingen, even alsze zijn, nae te bootsen’, Goeree, TK p. 3.

‘Wy zullen de wakkere geesten aenmoe- den om algemeen te worden; dat is, zoo veel gedaentens der dingen nae te beelden, als er zouden mogen voorkomen; dewijl alle te zamen, en elk in’t byzonder, door eenzel ve beleyt nagevolgt, en in het verstant eens Konstenaers begrepen worden ... [de]
The ‘universality’ of the artist had already been advanced as an argument in Boccaccio’s opinion of Giotto in Deameron III 5, cf. Panofsky 1970, p. 13. Cf. Dürer’s definition of painting: ‘Item Malen ist das, was Einer von allen sichtigen Dingen eins, welches er will, wiss auf een eben Ding zu machen, sie seien wie sie wollen’, see Dürer, ‘Von der molerei’, London manuscript f. 301, quoted from Tatarckiewicz 1979, p. 258. Goeree makes a comparison between theological and painting: ‘There are no sciences nor practices given to man that have a greater relevance to everything than theology and painting’ (‘Datter geen Wetenschappen noch Offeningen aan de Mensen gegeven zijn, die een grooter Uytstrekking tot alles hebben, dan de Godgeleerdheyd en de Schilderkunst’), MK introduction, unpaged.

The initial origin of art appears to have been the strength of our innate imagination (de kracht onzer ingeboore verbeelding), which paints absent things as if in the mind, and by means of some characteristic endeavours to display them to the sense of sight, or seeks some designs that in some way correspond to the mental images (denkbeelden) that we have of real things’, Inl. pp. 244-245.


Vasari speaks of a ‘giudizio universale’ ‘simile a una forma, o vero Idea di tutte le cose della natura, la quale è singolarissima nelle sue misure; di qui è, che non solo ne i corpi humani, e degli’animali; ma nelle piante ancora, e nelle fabbriche, e sculture, e pitture conosce la proporzione’, Vasari 1568, I, 43.

‘[L]e cose, le quali conosce naturalmente, e dirrettamente l’intelletto nostro sono le nature delle cose materiali, … le quali nature non si trovano separate da suoi individui, come vogliono alcuni, che tenesse Platone il divino in quelle sue positioni dell’Idee; mà sono in realtà solamente in questi suppositi singolari; perchè non è l’humanità se non in questi, e in quelli singolari, e non è la natura del Leone se non in questi, e quelli Leon; e così dell’alternative’, Zuccari 1607, I,30.

For the distinction between ante rem and post rem in art-theoretical tradition, cf. Paleotti 1960, p. 134.

‘[M]a dico bene, e so che dico il vero, che l’arte della Pittura … non piglia i suoi principi, ne ha necessità alcuna di ricorrere alle Mathematiche scienze, ad imparare regole, e modi alcuni per l’arte sua, se anco per poterne ragionare in speculazione: pero non è di lei figliuoa, ma bene si della Natura, e del Disegno’, Zuccari 1607, II, 29-30.


‘He techne mimetai ten fuin’, Aristotle, Physics, ii.2.194a.

Plato, Republica, X. 596d-e. In Ripa’s Iconologia, for instance, the personification of ‘Imitazione’ or ‘Naevolginge’ is accompanied by a monkey; Ripa 1644, p. 350.

Bialostocki 1988a, pp. 64-68.


Cf. ‘Est autem Deus universalis causa omnium quae naturaliter funt; unde et quidam Ipsum nominant naturam naturantem’,
these examples are related to the ‘observation of the properties of natural things’, Angel, Lof p. 40; cf. Sluijter 2000c, pp. 244-246.

Angel describes a perfect painter ‘die het leven soo na-quam, dat men moste be-sluyten, dat het selve soo eyghentlick en niet min veranderlick was’, that people ‘sulcke naby-kominghe nae't leven gehoornt en had’, Angel, Lof p. 54.

‘Nu mochte vele oordeelen dese eyghentlickheyt veel moeilicker te zijn om na te volghen, dan anders; maer aenghesien wy na-bootsters van ‘t leven zijn, zoo en moet-men om wat meerder moeyten (almen de natuerlicke dingen daer mede nader by komt) niet achter laten’, Angel, Lof p. 41.


Inl. p. 86.

‘Maer op dat wy tot het geene alreede gezeyd is, noch yts mosten toevoegen, dat tot een verstandelijke grotacht van de Schilderkonst kon dienen, moesten aanmerken datse een volstrekte navolger is van de volmaakte natuur, aan welke sy soo seer is vast geschakeld, datze van den anderen niet mag gescheiden worden. ... De natuur is onnaspeurlik rijk in menigerley van yder soort voort te brengen, waar van wy een Exempel hebben aan soo veel duizend Menschen, Dieren, en Gewassen: die, alhoewel sy van een geslachte zijn, echter malkander niet juist gelijktallig zijn; hier in kan de konst gezeid worden deselve volmaaktheid te besitten, voor so veel sy in ‘t navolgen soo menigerley form als ze wil, voortbrengen’, Goeree, SK, pp. 20-21.

‘Twee droppen zijn niet eens, twee eyren, twee peeren./ Twee aangesichten min./ De trotze mogenheid/ Van d’eerste Schepper blijkt in ‘t eeuwig onderscheid/ Van al dat was en is, en worden sal na desen’, Goeree, SK p. 22.

Broekman 2004.


‘Questa ancora è debolissima, perché, se bene dice in parte la sua sostanza, cioè imitatrice della natura, è però manchevole,


101 Junius, TPA 12; ‘Dese bestaet de natuyre uyt te drucken, nae’t vermengen van verwen afmalende allerely ghelijckenissen der sienelicker lichamen; dus maeken sy menschen, onredele schepselen, boomen, velt-slagen, stroom-vlietende bloedt-stortinghen, Koninghen, ghemeyne menschen; sy maeken een Princelicke staet-stoel, den Prince sittende, den Barbarischen vyandt onder sijne voeten neder-ghestort, het scherp geslepen spits der spiessen, loopende rivieren, vermaeckelijke beemden: in’t korte sy bereyden de beschouwers een seer aengenaeme lustbaerheyt in’t kunstigh afbeelden van Alderhande sichtbare dinghen’, Junius, SKDO p. 4.


105 Samuel van Hoogstraten, *S. v. Hoogstratens goudeschalmey, klinkende van heilige gezangen; op de toonen Salomons en stemmen der heiligen* (Dordrecht 1652).

106 ‘Samuel van Hoogstraten to Willem van Blijenberg’, 2 August 1662; published in Roscam Abbing 1993, pp. 59-60, no. 71.

107 ‘Ik en ben niet zoo superstitieus, zegt Calvijn, dat ik zoude achten ganschelijk geene beelden lijdelijk te zijn: maer dewijl het snijden ofte graeven, en maelen of schilderen Gods gaven zijn, zoo eysche ik het oprecht en zuiver gebruik daer van: op dat het geene ons van de Heere tot zijn eere en ons nut gegeven is, door het misbruik niet ontreynigt worde, noch tot ons verderf verkeere’, Inl. p. 359.

eenen ghebaenden wegh om tot de kennis dese heerlicken Scheppers te beter te ghe-
raecken, ons door dit middel te verstaen ge-
geven word", Junius, SKDO p. 67.

119 Junius also voices this opinion at the begin-
ing of his treatise: ‘Anaxagoras ghevaarckt
sijnde tot wat eynde hy voordt-ghebracht
was, heeft gheantwoort. Tot beschouwinge
de de Sonne, Maene ende den Hemel, ende
in der waerheydt, wat is doch den mensche
anders als “een schepsel ’t welck”, nae’t seg-
ghen van Quintilianus, “naest by Godt comt,
ghestelt in de Wereldt tot op-merckinghe
al ’t ghene de Wereldt in sijnen schoot
ver-vat”", Junius, SKDO p. 4. See Curtius
1973 for a comparable theme in Spanish art
theory; Horn points to Gracian as Houbrak-
en’s source for an identical line of reasoning
(but also to a parallel with Ignatius), Horn
2000, p. 167; for Castiglione on this topos

120 H. Peacham, *The Compleat Gentleman* (1634,
ed. Oxford 1906, p. 125), quoted in Ellenius
1960, pp. 228-29.

121 ‘Noch minder zou’t pinseel verslensen./
Zoo nu de zinlijkheid der menschen,/ Daer-
ze als verzet staat en verwondert/ Op zulk
een konst de keur uit hondert/ Uit dit
gemaal na zichtbre dingen/ d’Onzichtbre
Godheid lof ging zingen,/ En haeren Schep-
gemael na zichtbre dingen/ d’Onzichtbre
en’s heerlicken Scheppers te beter te ghe-
zelijcke die deughdelijck volmaeckt en
Of die hem schoon zoo rijke gaven./ Dat hy
met zijnen geest de haven/ Der konst be-
zeilde, en wist te treffen/ Al ’t zichtbre op
doen vlak en effen’, Inl., no pagination
[translation Michael Hoyle].

122 Cf. the way Alberti expresses this idea: ‘lodo
... coloro, e’ quali dicono l’uomo cre-
ato per riconoscere un primo e vero prin-
cipio alle cose, ove si vegga tanta varietà,
tanta dissimitudine, bellezza e multitudine
d’animali, di loro forme, stature, vestimenti
ed colori, per ancora lodare Iddio insieme
costante e in ciascuno animante

123 Bakker 2004, p. 20.
125 Jorink 2003.
126 ‘E nel vero qual homo libero, o Prencipe
sara nel mondo, che non prende diletto
d’imitare col pennello Iddio, e la natura
in quanto puo?’, Bisagni 1642, p. 5-6.

127 Junius, TPA p. 85; ‘wat is doch de nature
anders ... als God en een Goddelicke kracht
inde gantsche wereld ende in haere ghe-
edeelten verspreydt?’, Junius, SKDO p. 77.

128 ‘De werelt is een school, waer in God seifs
comt leeren./ Ja sonder spreken hoe dat
wy hem sullen eeren./ Oft eenen wenteltrap,
die ons op cliimen doet./ … / De werelt is
een boeck, daer in men Godes werken/ Seer
lichtelijcken can in groote lettern merken./
Elck stuk werk is een bladt, ende elcx doen
ongelaect/ Een boeck staef is seer schoon,
in haer gestalt volmaeckt’, Du Bartas, *La
sepmatina ou la creation du monde; eerste dagh
der eerster weken* (1578, translated by Zach-
arias Heyns, 1610); quoted in Brinkkemper &
Soepnel 1989, p. 98. Van Hoogstraten
refers to Goulart, a Dutch translator of Du
Bartas, on pp. 39-40 of the Inl.

129 See Kraye 1988, p. 1288, p. 1311 n. 72.
130 Hall 1623.
131 This standpoint is propounded by Mied-
dema, who writes of Spiegel’s ‘diatribes
against allegorical poetry, in which objects
are referred to obliquely rather than by their
proper name’, with reference to Spiegel’s
*Hertsiepiegel* (Amsterdam 1594), p. 4, l. 133;
see Miedema 1977, p. 208.
132 ‘Schilders haer met geen Staetzaken [heb-
ben] te bemoeyen’; Van Hoogstraten con-
cludes: ‘wy begeeren dat den Konstenaer
ben’ te bemoeyen’; Van Hoogstraten con-
cludes: ‘wy begeeren dat den Konstenaer
en’ te bemoeyen’; Van Hoogstraten con-
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en’ te bemoeyen’; Van Hoogstraten con-
cludes: ‘wy begeeren dat den Konstenaer
en’ te bemoeyen’. Inl., no pagination
[translation Michael Hoyle].

133 Kraye 1988, p. 369.
134 ‘[D]aer [Plutarchus] handelt vande sonde
en’s heerlichen Scheppers te beter te ghe-
zelijcke die deughdelijck volmaeckt en
Onberis[bp]baer sijn, en ... dat daer mede
bloedich innemen van Rome; beyde, of hen

135 See Kraye 1988, p. 348; for this see below, pp. 93, 111.
136 Cicero, *De natura deorum* 2, 37; cf. Junius:
‘Deus optimus maximus creavit hominem,
qui ueluti paruus quidam est mundus, ad
matorius mundi contemplationem imita-

tionemque’, Junius quotes the passage from
Cicero at the end of the first paragraph, see
*Nativel* 1996, 1, 1.

137 Junius, TPA p. 12; ‘wat is doch den mensche
anders als een schepsel ’t welck ... naest by
Godt comt, ghestelt in de Wereldt tot op-
mercinghe van al ’t ghene de Wereldt in sijn schoot ver-vat?", Junius, SKDO p. 4.

138 ‘He who sees in God’s handiwork the world about us, the guide to righteous living, the life according to Nature, is the only happy man’, Saunders 1995, p. 85. Lipsius writes on the importance of the contemplation of nature: ‘The mind is oppressed, as if shut up in a jail, unless and until contemplation has been added, which bids the mind take fresh courage by contemplating the universe, and turns the mind from earthly matters to things divine’, Lipsius, Physiologia stoïcorum, referring to Seneca, letter 65; quoted in Saunders 1955, pp. 120-22.


140 Saunders 1955, pp. 69 ff.


143 Castiglione repeats the Stoic line that nature should be regarded as God’s creation, and that this constitutes the value of painting; Van den Bos 1662, pp. 112-114.

144 ‘Stoicism, for the humanist, was sometimes a fairly particular set of beliefs, but it was also the particular form in which the pervasive and common assumptions of Hellenistic paganism presented themselves most attractively and forcefully to the Renaissance’, Bouwsma 1975, p. 7. For the significance of Neostoicism in the Republic see Israel 1995, pp. 566-69; for the specific situation in an environment of artists see Morford 1991, passim.

145 Miedema 1975, p. 9. In this connection cf. also Becker’s analysis of the simplicity and purity of ‘Atticism’ as a style concept for Dutch painters, see Becker 1991.

146 Saunders refers to an Augustinian classification into three kinds of theology – mythic/poetic, natural philosophical and civil – in which the Stoics would certainly favour the natural philosophical approach; Saunders 1955, p. 122.

147 For Lipsius’s influence on Bacon see e.g. Saunders 1955, p. 66.


149 On Stoicism and vanitas symbolism, see Heeze-Stoll 1979.

150 Saunders 1955, p. 83.


152 ‘[D]e goddeloosheyt zoo uyt komt te weyen, dat sy ’t gene de vogelen onder den Hemel, de onvernuftige dieren, en de ongevoelige dingen verkondigen ... in twijfel trekken ... De vreeze Godts is den aenvang der waerachtige wijsheydt, welke alle onderrichtingen der Philosophie, van hoe men behoort te leven in sich begrijpt’, EJ, ‘Van de religie’, chap. VIII, pp. 29-30.


154 ‘Datte eenen Godt sy, wiens aensichte ghy siet schynen oock in der minste dinghen’, De Mornay 1646, fol. 7 r.


157 ‘[God] heeft, na zyne onmeteliche goetheydt allenthalven zich soo geopenbaert, ende in alle dinghen afgemacht ... dat al wat men van hem soude kunnen bedencken, uyt spreecchen, schryven veel donckerder is, dan al wat wy inde Werelt aenschouwen ... Daerom seyde een van d’ouste filosofen ... als in Aristotele of Discartes deser wereld, als in Aristotele of Discartes deser wereld, als in Aristotele of Discartes deser wereld, als in Aristotele of Discartes deser wereld, als in Aristoteleonderzoekers wel dat men Goed met menschen vernuift niet en konde doorgroonden, maer wel met handen tasten ... [en dat wij] eenighsins God begrypen [vóór] alle ghebruyck des verstandts, niet door eenighe kennis, maar door een seckerere aenrakinghe, die veel ghewisser is dan alle kennis’ ... zo[dat] de zinnen selve, uyt de welcke d’eerste kennis des menschen onspringt, van eenen Godt betuyghen’, De Mornay 1646, fol. 1 rv, fol. 2 r.

158 With his metaphor of the mirror, Junius stresses that the painter should not paint fantastical compositions; he says that the
artist's mind 'gelijck sy eenen onvervuylden helderen Spiegel ... [die] een onvervalscht schijn-beelt vertoont over een komende met de ghedaente die daer in ontfanghen wordt. Oversulcks mach men't ghene tot noch toe gheseyt is niet verstaen van allerhande ydele inbeeldingen, hoedaenigh de selvige oock mochten sijn, maer alleen van fantasijen die op de nature der dingen sijn gegrondet', Juniús, SKDO p. 33.

Saunders 1955, p. 179. Saunders refers to the 'epistemological rejection, by the Stoics, of Platonic Ideas as real entities. The early Stoics regarded sensation as the only source of all representations. The soul is a blank page, sensation is the hand that fills it with writing', Saunders 1955, p. 172, n. 14.

'Doch dese bestryden ende vernielen met voorbedachten wille alle leeringhen, oock die in een onwedersprekelijck vertoogh bestaen, ende, zy twijfelen van't gene zy met ooghen sien, ende met handen tasten', De Mornay 1646, fol. 6v.

'Dat wy van Gods wegen dit alleenlijk weten, dat wy niets en weten ... gelijkerwijs wy God niet en konnen begrypen met den verstande, dat wy hem alzoo oock na behooren niet noezen geen deel in de materia en maniere van imitatie; want

C H A P T E R  I I I

For the theoretical merging, in the Renais-
sance, of mimesis, as the imitation of nature, and the imitation/emulation of examples, see the entry on 'Mimesis/Nachahmung' in Baerck 2000, vol. III, pp. 86-91.
sy hebben alle beyde ’t selvighe oogen-merck’, Junius, SKDO pp. 41-42.

17 Vossius 1690, § 3: ‘Ars pingendi initia sua habet a natura. Nam insitum est nobis imitari: ac magnam ex imitatione capimus voluptatem; cui ars incrementa sua debet. Hic Philostratus lib. II de vita Apollonii cap. X ait: … ’nos natura habere imitandi facultatem’. Ac postea … ’Ambo consentimus, imitandi facultatem a natura hominibus adstitutam’. Perscrutanti autem ipsius artis ortum, imitatio utique tia dixerint’, with note: ‘Mundus Latinis, Mundum a perfecta absolutaque elegantia nomine appelaverint, Latini uero sensu quoque Gentium suadente, fecit hunc mundum, ut eum Graeci, con-

19 ‘Optimus maximus Universi fabricator talem [I]lla facultas imitatrix animis humanis pen-

18 Junius, SKDO p. 92. ‘Ik vreeze zelf[s] dat gy, ter plaetse [i.e. in Rome] … van ons onderwijs, in ’t naevolgen number erroneously printed as 176).


20 Junius, TPA p. 15; ‘t gantsche beleydt onses levens bestaet daer in, dat wy altijck vaerdiglijck naetrachten, ’t ghene wy in andere hoogh achten’, Junius, SKDO pp. 7-8.


22 Inl. p. 21; cf. ‘De Thebaensche wetten verey schten dat eck Konstenaer ende Schilder- ghelijkenissen soo wel als’t immers moghe lich was soude uytducken; die anders dede, was ghouden een sekere boete te betaelen’, Junius, SKDO p. 7.

23 Junius, SKDO p. 97.

24 ‘Gelijk Vitruvius zegt, dat de verdore ge woonde het daertoe gebracht hadde, datmen in de grotissen veel eer gedrochten en monsters, dan eenige waerachtige dingen tro toonde: tegen de gewoonde der ouden, die haer kamers, gaenderyen en etzaelen, met konstige naebootssingen van’t geene natuur lijk was, oppronktten. Wy wil dat een schip een schip, een beelt een mensch, of een beest, of een bekent, of immers natuurlijk gedierte zal gelijken’, Inl. p. 184.

25 Note in Junius: Vitruvius, Lib. VII. Cap. 5.

26 Junius, TPA p. 41; ‘Laet de Schilderye een Beeldt wesen, seght [Vitruvius], van sulcken dingh, als is, of ten minsten kan zijn … soo moet oock den Lief-hebber deser Konsten een recht ende slecht werck het welck met de eenvoudighyedt der nature over een komt hooger achter dan eenighe vremele op ghesochte beelden uyt verscheyden li chaemen van bysondere ghediertten by een gheraep’t’. Junius, SKDO, p. 33. Vergelijk Van Hoogstraten, ‘zoo moeten zich vast aen de waerhetyt, of waerschijnlijckhetyt houden, en niets ander uytbeelden, als dat is, of ten minsten zijn kan’, Inl. p. 93.

27 For this formulation, see e.g. Nativel 1996, p. 441, Morford 1991, p. 192, Saunders 1955, p. 69.


31 ‘Ik vreeze zelf[s] dat gy, ter plaetse [i.e. in Rome] … van ons onderwijs, in ’t naevolgen


33 Hier hy sal ook eindeling een verstandig Konst-oeffenaar moeten weten, dat hy hem boven de studie van alle de voorgemelde dingen, seer neerstig bezig houd over het beschouwen van het natuurlijck leven, en dat in alle voorvallen, daart’ mogelijk is, gebruiken … want het natuurlijk leven is in alles soo rijk, overvloedig, konstig en geleerd, dat onse geheugnis op verr’na niet magtig is die geheel te bevatten, veel min te behouden’, Goeree, SK p. 63.

34 ‘d’Alleroutste en beste Poëten zijn de natuur lijkstekte en eenvoudigste. De nakomelingen, om hen voorby te rennen, vielen uit
eerzucht of aen het snorcken en poffen, of vernissen en blanketten’; Vondel 1650, p. 74.


36 ‘Molte altre cose si potrebbono dire del sog- getto de l’historia, che il prudente pittore per sé stesso potrà considerare, avertendo però sopra ogni cosa di farlo semplice e puro, perché mescolarlo col poetico e finto altro non è che un deformare il vero et il bello, e farlo falso e mostruoso’, Gilio, Dialogo nel quale si ragiona degli errori e degli abusi de’pittori circa l’istorie (Camerino 1564), ed. Barocchi, Trattati II, p. 38 (italics mine) .

37 ‘[N]on monta questo, che la figura sia strana o difforme e poco in se stessa graziosa, ma si attende l’artifizio senza più; il quale, se è fatto avvenente e con senno, si commenda grandemente e molto si apprezza’, Frances- co Bocchi, Ragionamento sopra l’eccelenza del San Giorgio di Donatello (Florence 1584), ed. Barocchi, Trattati III, pp. 179-80.

38 ‘[D]at het geen minder konst is, een boertig als een ernstige zaak, een Landman als een Hoveling, en een Ezel als een Paardt te ver- beelden; dewyl tot het een zo wel, als tot het ander, goede kennis vereischt word, om het wel te treffen’, De Lairesse GS I, p. 182.


40 Junius, TPA p. 71; ‘so ghebeur[t] het oock menighmael dat de levende ghelijckenisse van leeliecke ende afsichtighe dinghen niet min vermaeckelick bevonden wordt als de gelijkenisse van d’aller schoonste lichamen. ... d’imitatie van schoone of leeliecke dinghen word ... zonder eenigh onderscheid gepre- sen’, Junius, SKDO p. 15.


42 ‘Sempere il pittore deve cercar la prontitu- dine ne gl’atti naturali fatti dagl’huomini all’improviso ... e di quelli far brevi ricordi ne’suoi libretti, e poi a suoi propositi adop- erarli’, Da Vinci 1651, cap. L VII, p. 14; cf. cap. XCV , p. 27.


44 Cf.: ‘de genegentheid voor deeze of geenen Meester in zyne voorwerpen, coloriet, of andere dingen is zoo groot, dat zy zich niet eens willen verwaardigen noch ontleed- gen om hunne gedachten over het werk en de konstoeffening van een anders braven Meester te laten gaan’, De Lairesse, GS II, p. 41.
tar, can also draw all kinds of useful things from the examples of others', Inl. p. 195. Cf. a passage about the way in which a painter should practise the making of compositions: 'Om d'aendacht en geheuchenis, in't zien/ Van konststuk of natuurwerk, te gebien,/ Al d'aerdicheên als schatten te vergaeren./ Zoo gaert een bie den honich uit veel blaeren', Inl. p. 175.


59 '[I]'huomo dotto deve haver buon giudicio nel l'elegger le cose buone, & regittar le cat-

60 '[W]ant der is een groot onderscheyt in de konst, ten spijt van Minerva, te treffen. Ze-


62 '[M]en moet de geesten aenleyden tot hun natuurlijke drift', Inl. pp. 5-6, marginal note.

63 '[Z]ulk een man, die zich zoo geheelijk had overgegeven, om de naturer, met penseel en verwen, besitptelijk nae te volgen'; Inl. p. 235. Elsewhere in the Inleyding, Van Hoogstraten uses the terms opletting [at-

64 Cf. Inl. pp. 234-235.

65 Junius, TPA pp. 36-37; 'wy [zullen] ons selven nauwelikens konnen begeven tot d'imitatie van sulcken uyttnemenheydt, sonder eerst onse eyghene krachten t'overweghen … Yeder een heeft in zijn eygen borst een seke Wet der nature, die hy sonder mer-


67 'Hierom moet yder een zich zelven onder-

68 Understanding this individual 'law of nature' is a recurrent element in Van Hoogstraten's art theory; e.g. 'Het is ons geraetsaemst … de leydingen onzer eigene natuere te volgen, en onze betrachtingen daer nae te richten: want te vergeefs zouden de zelve tegenstreeven in het bejaegen van 't geene wy onmachtich zijn: gelijk'er gezegd wort, dat het onmogelijk is de bevallijkheyt in de konst, ten spijt van Minerva, te treffen. Ze- kere de Schilders staen hier wederom met de Poeten, gelijk die van Horatius deeze ver-

69 'Hierom moet yder een zich zelven onder-

70 '[M]en moet de geesten aenleyden tot hun natuurlijke drift', Inl. pp. 5-6, marginal note.

71 Van Hoogstraten contrasts attentive and lethargic [wakker/slaperig] temperaments: '[W]ant der is een groot onderscheeyt in de geesten; zoo dat des eens begrijp aen wast, des anders, terwijl het beezych is, in slaep valt', Inl. p. 240; De Bie explicitly links temperaments and styles: De Bie, Cabinet p. 65. While history painters like to be surround-

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incline towards solitude; ‘melancoly soeckt rust in stillicheyt altijd’, p. 50. Lomazzo writes that since the work of painters is related to philosophy, they are easily swayed by their humours: ‘il piu dei pittores sono fantastichi et agitati spesso dall’umore’, Lomazzo 1974, p. 97.

72 ‘Imitazione ha da conformarsi alla attitudine naturale’; ‘Essendo adunque di tanto momento che l’pititore e qualunque altro artefice conosca il suo genio, e dove piu l’inclinu l’attitudine e disposizion sua d’operar piu facilmente e felicemente per un modo che per un altro, ha da porre ognuno in ciò somma diligentia, e, conosciutolo, deve darsi ad imitar la maniera di quelli che se gli conformano, guardandosi con molta cautela di non inciampare nelle contrarie’, Lomazzo 1974, p. 35.

73 ‘[H]oevel deze Konstenaeren in haere werken elkanderen zeer ongelyk bevonden wierden, zoo was daer evenwel geen reden, waerom men wenschten zoude, dat yder niet by zijn eygen handelinge gebleven was … het geene dat in de kost, door een eenich vernuft, onmooglijk schijnt uitgevoert te kunnen worden, wort doort inslaen van veel verschillende wegen, die elk nae zijn ingebore lust en zinlijkheyt verkiest, door de menichte der Edele geesten te weede gebracht’, Inl. p. 74.

74 ‘[D]at naemelijk die dingen de weleke in d’uyt nemendste Konstenaers voor de beste worden ghekeurt, bynau on-nae-volghelick zijn … ende wy begrijpen d’over-groote kracht haerer deughden voornaemlich daer uyt, dat het ons onmogelick is de selvighe nae te volgen’, Junius, SKDO p. 27, with a reference to Quintilian, Inst. orat. x, 2.

75 ‘[D]e manier van handeling onnavolgelijk, en uw werk de natuer in de deelen der kunst aen deelt worden’, Inl. p. 234.

76 ‘Michiel Agnolo Caravaggio zeyde, dat alle Schildery Bagatelli … was … die niet na’t leven geschildert was. Vermits’er niets beter, niets goet, als alleen de natuer te volgen zijn kan’, Inl. p. 217.


78 ‘[In]t leven zijn des Schilders rechte boeken/ Waer in de Text der waerheit is te zoeken’, Inl. p. 32; cf. Van Mander, Grondt II, 13-14, f. 9rv. Van Mander makes this observation after a brief practical account of teaching, which discusses drawing after prints and sculptures; see Miedema 1973, p. 435. The section of the Inleiding that deals with the training of painters is not structured systematically and hierarchically, as in Goeree; at the beginning of his treatise Van Hoogstraten urges apprentice painters to spend a good deal of their time drawing from life (Inl. e.g. p. 35).

79 ‘Want byna ieder deel der Natuer is bequem genoeg om deeze opletting te voeden, en de scherpte des oogs te wetten’, Inl. p. 35-36.

80 ‘En dit had Lysippus, die eerst maer een gering kopersmit was, van Eupompos onthouden, die, gevraegt zijnde, wat meesters handeling men most trachten te volgen? op de mart, die vol volx was, geweezen had: en met eenen gezegt, datmen de natuer als een groot meester behoorde te volgen’, Inl. p. 219; cf. Van Mander, Grondt VI, 73, f. 28v-29r; also in Goeree, SK p. 87-88.


82 ‘Maer dat niemant zich inbeelde, dat hy die volkome kracht der Konst, die in de origineelen of oorspronkelijke werken der treflike Meesters is, in de kopyen zal vinden. Want zulx is onmogelijk, ten waere eenich Godt den naevolger met den selven geest des eersten meesters begenadigde’, Inl. p. 197.

83 Junius, TPA p. 35; ‘[slechte navolgers, die] de deughden van de groote Meesters niet wel doorgronden hebbende [gaan] op t eerste gesicht te werck, meynende dat hun d’ Imitatie wonderlick wel gheluckt is als sy d’uytgelesen wercken der ouder Konstenaeren eenigheer wijse in’t nae-trekken van Livien en ’t opmeeven van Coleuren hebben afgebeeld, daer sy nochtans verde van de rechte kracht der selvigher verscheyden zijn’ (italics mine), Junius, SKDO pp. 27-28.

84 Junius, TPA p. 38; ‘dat wy … de kracht der

85 ‘Daer is altijts een bevallike lusticheit in d’origineeleen ... die in de kopyen ontbreekt: want hoe wel datze zijn nagevolgt, zoo wij-zenze nochtans hier en daer iets uit, dat niet uit de natura, maer uit een pijnlijken arbeyt schijnt voort te komen’, Inl. p. 197.

86 Grace is an ‘onnavolglijken … schijn’ that bestaet in de ontmoeting van al Goodengaeven, die niet dan door een origineelen ... die in de kopyen ontbreekt: Junius, TPA p. 292; Junius, SKDO p. 325.

87 ‘Een T eykening, schoon zonder verwen, al-"nus, SKDO p. 30. maer dat wy meest van allen d’inwendighe

88 ‘Een onuytsprekelicke, onnaedoenelicke, Grace is an ‘onnavolglijken … schijn’ that bestaet in de ontmoeting van al Goodengaeven, die niet dan door een origineelen ... die in de kopyen ontbreekt: Junius, TPA p. 292; Junius, SKDO p. 325.


90 The Inleyding contains twelve references to Philostratus the Younger and fifteen to Lucian; see Czech 2002, II, 125, 117-118. One striking example is the adoption of an ekphrasis from Lucian describing an image of centaurs, Inl. p. 298. Vossius and Junius corresponded about an edition they planned to publish of Philostratus’ Imagines, which did not materialize, however.

91 ‘Een Teykening, schoon zonder verwen, al-"nus, SKDO p. 30. maer dat wy meest van allen d’inwendighe

92 These aspects of art theory, which also played a fundamental role in the Netherlands, are discussed in Emmens 1981b and Weber 1991, cf. also Guépin 1991, p. 474 ff.

93 ‘S]i vede alcun’hominii, che con tanta bona grazia ... narrano una cosa che sia loro in-"nus, SKDO p. 30. tervenuta, ... che coi gesti e con le parole ha mettonon inanzi agli occhi e quasi la fan toec-car con mano; e questa forse, per non ci aver altro vocabolo, si potria chiamar “festività” o vero “urbanità”, Castiglione, Cortegiano XIV, quoted in Hinz 1992, p. 199.

94 Aristotle, De Anima iii, 3, 429 a1 and iii, 3, 431a, 16. It is the ability to represent in images that makes the higher intellectual faculties possible; this is why ‘the capacity for thought presents its forms in terms of mental images’, De anima 427b 18-22; 432 a 17, 431b 2; cf. Yates 1974, p. 32 ff.

95 ‘[D]e gansche Schilderkonst uit de innerlijke verbeelding des Konstenaers gebaert wort, als een andere Pallas uit de hersenen van Jupiter ... dewijl een verstandich meester niet alleen de schets, maer zelfs een volmaekt begrijp van ’t geen hij voorheeft in zijn ver-"nus, SKDO p. 30. "nt voor af maet’, Inl. p. 46. Van Hoogstraten uses the term kracht van inbeelding (‘power of imagination’), Inl. p. 212, but he frequently uses the terms verstand and ver-"nus, SKDO p. 30. naeft (wit and ingenuity) in a similar meaning, Inl. p. 286. Junius refers to the power of imagination as ‘d’inbeeldens kracht (die ghemeynlck d’imaginatie ofte fantasye genaemt wordt)’, and ‘fantasije ofte ver-"nus, SKDO p. 30. beeldens kracht ... een stercke imaginatie’, SKDO p. 52.


98 For the term ‘kracht van inbeelding’ see Inl. p. 212.

99 ‘S]i vede alcun’hominii, che con tanta bona grazia ... narrano una cosa che sia loro in-"nus, SKDO p. 30. tervenuta, ... che coi gesti e con le parole ha mettonon inanzi agli occhi e quasi la fan toec-car con mano; e questa forse, per non ci aver altro vocabolo, si potria chiamar “festività” o vero “urbanità”, Castiglione, Cortegiano XIV, quoted in Hinz 1992, p. 199.


101 Angel observes, on the other hand, that the added value of paintings, as compared to poetry, is precisely that they are not dependent on the viewer’s imagination. See Sluijter 2000c, p. 222-23.
The painter has ‘gestaedigh de fantasien van de sichtelijcke werkhen in’t hoofd ... hier door verkrijght hij veel sorge en swaeremoedigheyt’, ’t welck daer nae eene aen-brandinge [i.e. the spirit that ‘burns up’] veroorsaeckt, gelijk de Medicijns verhaelen, waer uyt dat nutrylijcker wijsie in den Menschen, ... dese besondere [aanloening] voortkomt’, Ripa 1644, p. 452. Cf.: ‘li pittori divengono malencolici, perché, volendo loro imitare, bisogna che ritenghi107 li fantasmi fissi nell’intelletto, aciò dipo108 li esprimeno in quel modo che prima li avean visti in presenzia: e questo non solo una volta, ma continuamente, essendo questo il loro esercizio; per il che talmente tengono la mente astratta e separata della materia, che conseguentemente ne vien la mellen-colia’, R. Alberti, Trattato della nobiltà della pittura, quoted in Barocchi, Trattati III, p. 209.


[105] Cicero, De oratore, II, lxxvii, 357. For similar utterances by Horace and Erasmus, see Sluijter 2000d, p. 160.


[108] Elsewhere, Van Hoogstraten also uses the term inventie, Inl. p. 179. In the literature of art theory, the term ‘invention’ is used in two different senses, linking up with two common meanings in rhetorical tradition: on the one hand as part of the process of making a speech, and on the other hand as a fundamentally creative activity on the part of the orator. In his theory of art, Junius ascribes fundamental significance to ‘Inventie’ and devotes an entire chapter to it. He discusses invention, inspiration and imagination as closely related faculties; see Junius, SKDO vol. 3, chap. 1, pp. 206-43. For the philosophical significance of the ars invenciendi in the early modern period, see Van Peursen 1993, pp. 16-69.


[110] ‘Leer zoo van tijt tot tijt uwen geest met schoone stoffen verrijken, om op uw beurte ook uwe vindingen te baren’, Inl. p. 27. Junius states that it is inventio that distinguishes the artist from the craftsman; Junius, SKDO p. 216-17.


[112] Van Hoogstraten refers to de Redenkonst of Dialectica’, Inl. p. 346. Little research has been done to date on the significance of dialectics to the question of artistic inventio; cf. Van Peursen 1993.


[115] Junius, TPA p. 58; ‘Er is ‘onderscheydt ... tusschen de verbeeldens kracht die de Poeten gaende maeckt, en d’andere die de Schilders te werk stelt. De Poetische fantasije en heeft ander gheen ooghen-merck, als een onsinnigheydt der verwonderinghe te verwecken; de Konstenaers daer en teghen zijn maer alleen op de uytdruckelickheydt uyt. Soo soecken ’t oock de Poeten alsoo te maecken ... dat haere gedichten fabelachtigh en de waerheydt onghelijck souden schijnen te sijn; ’t fraeyste daer en teghen ’t welck in de fantasi der Schilders aen ghemerckt moet worden, bestaet daer in, dat haere verbeeldingen krachtigh sijn en met de waerheydt over-een komen’, Junius, SKDO p. 49-50.

[116] ‘[D]e Teikeningen, Schetsen en Printen, moetmen in’t sien met het verstand, en niet met hand en ooge gebruiken, om daar stukken en brokken uyt te stelen, veel min om die geheel na te apen, en ... geduriglijk door de bril van een ander [te blijven] kijken. Maar neen, men moet alleen de deugden ... door het besien, hersien, bedenken, overleggen en herkauwen, trachten in sijn gemoeid te drukken, en daar in, met dikwils daar aan te denken, bewaren; invoegen sy door het toedoen van uwen Geest, niet meer
eenes anderen, maar in uw eigen vindingen veranderd worden’, Goeree, SK p. 49.
119 Junius, TPA p. 60; ‘daer [wordt] een sonderlinge verbeeldens kracht vereyscht ... in die ghene de welcke de wercken der Schilder-Konste recht wel meynen te besichtighen’, Junius, SKDO p. 52.

For a study of the relationship between literary ekphrasis and seventeenth-century Dutch painting, see Goedde 1989.
120 For a study of the relationship between literary ekphrasis and seventeenth-century Dutch painting, see Goedde 1989.

121 Junius, TPA 300; ‘dat wy de bysondere figuren, die ons in't werck sijn voorgestelt, niet alleen met onse ooghen haestighlick behooren t'overloopen; maer dat wy de selvighe insghelijcks door den gantschen aendacht onsens Konst-lievenden ghemoeds moeten insien, als of wy met de levendighe teghenwoordighedt der dingen selver, ende niet met haere gekontrefeyte verbeeldinghe te doen hadden’, Junius, SKDO p. 335.


123 Junius, TPA p. 303; ‘Want het den ghenen, die de konstighe wercken met een rijp oordeel soecken t'overweghen, niet ghenoegh en is, datse de rechte verbeeldinghe van 't afgebeelde argument met de Schilder-beelden selver vergelijken, 't en sy saecke datse 't afgebeelde met eenen ook voorstellen als of het voor gheen bloote afbeeldinghe maer voor de saecke selver was te houden’, Junius, SKDO p. 341.

124 ‘Aenghesien het een oprecht Lief-hebber toe-staet de levendighe verbeeldinghen van allerley naturelicke dinghen in sijn gemoedt op te legghen, ten eynde dat hy de selvighe te sijner tijdt met de wercken der Konstenaeren mocht vergelijken; soo is’t klaer dat men sulcks niet en kan te weghe brengen sonder het toe-doen van een sterkke imaginatie’, Junius, SKDO p. 50.

125 Viewers are ‘niet anders ontroert [worden], als of sy de gantsche gelegentheydt deser dinghen voor haere ooghen aenschouwden’; Goeree, MK, p. 285.

126 Junius, TPA p 57; ‘dit alhier't voornaemste, dat men sich recht wel bewogh venide om de verbeeldingen niet anders te vatten, als of het waerachtighe dinghen waeren daer mede wy ons selven besich houden’, Junius, SKDO p. 50.


130 ‘[B]yna meer dan een Natuurlijke Toverye, datmen uyt Doode en Levenloose stof, Mensch-beelden maakt, die sekerlijk stil zijnde, maar nogtans op veelerley wijzen schijnen te bewegen. Datmen de Stomme meend te hooren Spreken ... En die, daarse in ons Gesigt blijven, nochtans in't selve oogenblik, daar snellich schijnen uyt te vlieden’, Goeree, MK, pp. 337-338.


133 For Rubens's imitations of Italian masters in general, see Muller 1982 and Fehl 1987.


135 On Rembrandt's rivalries with Lastman and other masters, see Van de Wetering 2001a, pp. 41-53.

Cf. Van Mander on Spranger and Michelangelo, Leven fol. 274r-v, Van Hoogstraten on Michelangelo, Inl. p. 289, 316, 349; for this theme, see Emmens 1981c.

Rubens wiert van enige zijnher tegenstrubbelaaers gehechelt, dat hy geheele beelden uit d’Italiaenen ontleende: en dat hy, om dit te lichter te doen, teykenaers op zijne kosten in Italien onderhiel[d]; die hem alle fraeyicheden naeteykenden en overzonden: maer deze groote geest dit vernemende, gaf tot antwoort: zy mochten’t hem vryelijk nedaen, indien zy’er voordeel inzaghen. Hier meede te kennen gervende, dat yder een niet bequaem en was zich van dat voordeel te dienen”, Inl. p. 193.

‘Un tableau dont le dessin et les couleurs locales sont médiocres mais qui sont soutenues par l’artifice du clair-obscur, ne laissera pas passer tranquillement son spectateur, il l’appellera, il l’arrêtera du moins quelque temps’, De Piles 1708, p. 301.


It was painted such that ‘haare oogen ieder meelden met de bekende spreuk: “Ik ben aldermeest beezych, als gy my leedigh ziet”, Inl. pp. 194-195.

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Junius, TPA 56; cf. ‘Als Ovidius den roecikelooesen jongelingh, die sijnes Vaders vierighen waeghen verlangt hadde te betreden, nae ’t leven beschrijft, dunkt u dan niet dat hy zelfs mede met Phaeton op den waeghen ghestapt sijnde het selvige ghevaer van’t begin tot het eynde toe uyt ghestaen heeft? want het en hadde hem andersins niet mogehelijk gheweest de minste schaduwe van soo een vreeselick verwerde noods-praeme door ’t verbeelden t’achter haelen, t en waer saecke dat hy sich selven aldaer in maniere van spreken, ver-teghenwoordigheheid hadde om elcke bysondere gheleghenheyd des perijckels aan te mercken,’ Junius, SKDO p. 49.


‘[D]at de geenen, die dagelyks by slecht en ondeugend volk verkeeren, gemeenlyk slecht en ondeugend; en, in tegendeel, die met deftige en deugdzame omgaen, ook deugdaam worden’; De Lairesse, GS I p. 199.

‘[V]erbeeld u zelf die persoon te zyn, de een voor en de ander na, die gy verbeelden moet’, De Lairesse, GS I p. 48.

Junius, TPA p. 60; ‘Want het onmogelyk is ... dat yemant een bequaem oordeel strijcken sal van een geschildert Paerdt ofte beelen’, De Lairesse, GS I p. 174.

‘[D]at de geenen, die dagelyks by slecht en ondeugend volk verkeeren, gemeenlyk slecht en ondeugend; en, in tegendeel, die met deftige en deugdzame omgaen, ook deugdaam worden’; De Lairesse, GS I p. 199.

Junius, TPA 304; ‘Het is ’t eenemael noodigh ... dat yeman[d] die zich in de schriften van desen slagh [i.e. comedies] soude verlusten, een redelick[e] ervaerenheyd hebbe in die dinhgen selver die het schrift voorstelt; so is het mede onmogelyk dat yeman de minste bequaemheyd soude hebben om behoorelicker wisje daer van te oordeelen, het en sy saecke dat hy menighmael met de nachtoopers en rovertende slampampers op de been tijnde altemets omeen moye meydys wilde teghen de vuyst loopt en andere altemets vuystloock te eten geeft [i.e. deliver blows oneself]’, Junius, SKDO p. 52.

Junius, TPA 304; ‘Het is ’t eenemael noodigh ... dat yeman[d] die zich in de schriften van desen slagh [i.e. comedies] soude verlusten, een redelick[e] ervaerenheyd hebbe in die dinhgen selver die het schrift voorstelt; so is het mede onmogelyk dat yeman de minste bequaemheyd soude hebben om behoorelicker wisje daer van te oordeelen, het en sy saecke dat hy menighmael met de nachtoopers en rovertende slampampers op de been tijnde altemets omeen moye meydys wilde teghen de vuyst loopt en andere altemets vuystloock te eten geeft [i.e. deliver blows oneself]’, Junius, SKDO p. 52.

‘[I]n de keelput, onder den hals, zachmen, zoo ’t scheen, de pols speelen’, Inl. p. 239.

[D]at de konst zoo veel te weeg brengt, dat men uit haere rond gefronste neusgaten, uit haere nedergedrukte ooren, en samen gedrongen ledenmaten een gereede begeerte bespeurt om 't aen't loopen te stellen, schoon men weet dat ze onbeweeglijk zijn', Inl. p. 167.

'Dus stelde seker Konstenaer onder een sla-

ing, als hy van Venus by Virgiel deeze woorden leest? Zoo spreekende, gingze heene, blok on haeren roosverwigen nek, het hair gaf een goddelijke locht, als ambro-

sie, van zich, het kleet sleepte na, en haer tret wees wel uit, datze waerachtig een godinne was', Inl. p. 296. The most important study of this 'power of images' is Freedberg 1989, who includes a large number of illustrations with his written sources and makes it clear that the repetition of topoi with this theme does not detract from their validity. The very fact that the 'living' nature of the image is emphasized so frequently demonstrates that this belief was widely held.

'De nacht, die hier nu slaept ... wie denkt

'tat, ... nae den eysch der saeke vaerdigh-

staet, ... nae den eysch der saeke vaerdigh-

/ En zachtjes rust? Of

zouw'er iets ontbreeken?/ Ontwaek'er dan,

wy de lieflijkheid van dit gezichte strax quijt

broken en worde; want zoo doende zouden

digen geest, dat den aenschouwer lust krijgt

den gheschiedenissen, gelijkse uyt veele en vast aen
een gheschaekelde omstandigheden be-
staet, ... nae den eysch der sace vaerdigh-

A variety of sources may be consulted on the practice of hanging paintings behind curtains. To begin with, the practice is displayed in several collections of paintings. Secondly, there are works such as Metsu's Woman Reading a Letter in which someone in the background is drawing a curtain to briefly glance at a painting, and trompe-

'oeils in which a curtain is suggested, such as
Rembrandt's Holy Family. Of a different order are paintings in which the drawn curtain appears to be hanging behind the frame, as in Vermeer's Allegory of Painting (Vienna, Kunsthistorisches Museum) and Girl Reading a Letter at an Open Window (Dresden, Gemäldegalerie). For the Italian tradition, see Cecco del Caravaggio, Trompe-l'oeil with Painting of Cupid at the Fountain (Viti Collection, Rome), illustrated in Nicholson 1979, no. 454. Works by Gerard Dou are known to have been kept in small cabinets or boxes, see Sluijter 2000c, pp. 217-220. For the different methods used by Rembrandt and Dou to depict illusionistic curtains, see Sluijter 2000c, pp. 209-210, 255-258. On the practice of hanging paintings behind curtains, see Kemp 1986, Heuer 1997.

Junius, TPA 303-304. '[W]anneer hy eenen
geweepen krijghs-man ghemaect hobbende, ghelijk de selvighen ghered stond om eenen uytval te doen op de vyanden die 't omringende platte land afliepen, niet goed en vond datmen dese sijne Schilderey te voorschijn soude brengen, sonder eerst eenen Trompetter heymelick by der hand te hebben die zijn Trompette stekende eenen loosen alarm op den selvighen ooghenblick
soude maecken alsmen de gordijne die 't
stuck bedeckt hield beghost te verschuyven',
Junius, SKDO p. 341. The curtain is not

174 'I[n ons zelve de gordijn opschuiven, en
in ons genoed de geschiede daert af-
schilderen', Inl. p. 178.

175 'That the purpose of the curtain was not to
protect the work of art from dirt and dust is
clear from a letter dating from 1648 from
Poussin to Paul Fréart de Chantelou, in
which the painter writes that to achieve the
best possible effect on the viewer, it is best
to display paintings one at a time, in Poussin
1911, p. 384.

176 '[U]t subito terrore perculsum spectatorem
(velari nempe tabella solet) ipsa tamen rei
diritate, quod vivida venustaque, delectet',
Huygens, Fragment p. 73.

177 Białostocki 1963 has pointed out that in
the early Italian history of art, the contem-
plation of architecture was said to have a
soothing effect. Summers 1997 describes
terribilità as a quality that did not have the
customary rhetorical purposes of delighting
and instructing; instead, it moved the viewer
on a 'prepredicative' level.

178 Published by Robortello in 1554; cf. Fu-
maroli 1980, p. 165. Junius refers repeatedly
to Longinus, e.g. SKDO pp. 237-238.

179 In this passage he describes painters who are
so experienced 'that they come to see things
painted in images as if they were present in
them' ('datze met der tijdt de zaken, als ofze
tegenwoordich waren, in denkbeelden ge-
schildert zien'), Inl. p. 178-179.

180 '[D]at is waerlijk groots ... 't welk ons 't elkens
wederom als versch voor d'oogen verschijnt;
't welk ons zwaer, of liever onmogelijk is uit
de zin te stellen; welkerz gedachtenisse ge-
duerich, en als onuitwisselijck, in onze herten
vereert? om niet alleen in haer leeven be-
houden, maar zelf[s] de wankelingen
der tijden te verduuren', Inl. p. 291.

181 Junius, TPA p. 50. On Orlers, see Sluijter
2000d, p. 204, n.18. On the nescio quid of
Italian art theory; see Sohm 2001, p. 194.

182 'Het zweet brak my aen alle kanten uit, zegt
Damascius, doen ik de Venus, die Herodes
Articus gewijt hadde, gezien had; van weegen
den schrooemelijk verwarden zinnemestrijdt
[sic], dien ik in mijn gemoed gewaar wiert.
Mijne innichste gedachten wierden door 't
levendig gevoelen van een onuitspreekelijke
vermakelijckheid zoo gekicht, dat dat het
my byna onmogelijk was t'huize te gaan, en
schoon ik my derwaerts spoede, zoo wierden
mijn oogen nu en dan, door de gedachte-
nisse van zulk een zeltzaemen gezicht, terug
trokken', Inl. p. 290.

183 '[M]y quam een verbaesde bangigheyt over
... als ick my selven de rouwe afschetsels
everm deselvighe met de waerheyd der nature
selver in eenen strijd schenen te treden', Ju-
nius, SKDO p. 295.

184 Vossius 1650, par. 17, p. 69.

185 'De braeve geesten des ouden tijds mocht
het koude zweet van angst ten hoofde
afdruipen, als sy te Rhodus den schoonen
Jalyzus van Protogenes beschouden, daer
Apelles zelf van verstomde, jaer nae uut-
barstte, dat hy een wonder in de kunst zocht:
of andere, als sy aen de bevallijke Venus te
Koos geheylicht geen hand dorsten slaen,
on iets weynichs, dat'er noch aen ontbrak,
to voltooyen. De Beeltsnyders ook, mochten
zich over den Jupiter Olympius ontzetten,
en in't zien van de statue van Doryphorus

186 Weber 1991, 231-242; Roscam Abbing
57 ff., p. 69 ff.

187 '[I]n het eerste opslach geheel tot zich
trekken'; 'machtig genoeg ... om de
konstliefdige geesten tot zich te trekken, uit
d'alderafgelegenste gewesten', Inl. p. 291.

188 'Hier wrocht [Rafael] Urbijn, toen hy ver-
liefd was; Venus deede hem Venus op het
schoonst te toon brengen ... Het geen
ommooglijk schijnt kan de liefde uitvoeren,
want de geesten zijn wakkerst in verliefde
zinnen', Inl. p. 291.

189 Inl. p. 354, 289; Matsys too is said to have
been inspired to become a painter by his
lover's beauty, Inl. p. 10.

190 Van Mander, Leven f. 203v-204r.

191 'Michelangelo beminde de konst als een
Huisvrouw', Inl. p. 349, his images are 'im-
mortal offspring', Inl. p. 289.

192 Paintings make 't gezicht in haere behaeg-
lijkhen ... verlieven'; Inl. p. 302.

193 Inl. p. 290.

194 'Bevalijkheid port aen om te beminne[n]',
Inl. p. 293.

195 Sluijter 2000h, pp. 131-144.

196 Sohm 2001, p. 199.
197 ‘[I]n de aerdicheden der bevallijche natuur uit te beelden, verliefd is ...op de ziele der konst als verslingert is: dat is, de natuur in hare eigenschappen te onderscheiden’, Inl. p. 12.

198 The phrase non so che, which derives ultimately from Augustine’s nescio quid, can be found in Vasari, Lampsonius and Van Mander; see Miedema 1973, p. 440, and Becker 1973, p. 55-56, n. 20; Inl. p. 197.

199 ‘E dacchè il core non ha norme fisse come l’intelletto, quindi la grazia non s’impara, ma si sente, e traei dalla natura: che elle è un non so che, che piace, incanta, e seduce, e l’anima a celeste giocondità dispone’, quoted in Sohm 2001, p. 274 n. 40.

200 ‘[D]ie Gratie of bevalligheydt, de welcke van te gheven ... wy begrijpen alle dese eene, eertelyk te oordienen, eertelyk te zuyn, eertelyk te omtreck der leden levende lichaemen ver-woetheit, onrechtvaerdicheit, en quaede verwoetheit, onrechtvaerdicheit, en quaede der Edele konsten, in stille opmerkende begeerte voorgebracht; daer de oeffeningen der deugden over een alvernielenden Alexander zelf; want hoe Hannibal, een onrustigen Pirrhus, of een Polykleet of Phydias, als een woedenden schapen gemoed was, of hy zou liever wen-chen te zijn zoo konstigen beeldenaer als de Konstenaers ghestaedighlick ver-quickt worden door de kracht des levendigheen roerende gheests die den onverwachten voord-gangh haeres wercks in hun over-vloedighlick uytstort’, SKDO p. 100-101. Cf. Lipisus: ‘The mind is oppressed, as if shut up in a jail, unless and until contemplation has been added, which bids the mind fresh courage by contemplating the universe, and turns the mind away from earthly matters’, Physiologia Stoicorum, quoted in Saunders 1955, p. 120 ff.


202 Junius expresses a certain determinism, with a quotation from John of Damascus: ‘Deus omnium auctor est et omnium quae sunt Ratioes in se et caussas iam ante habet’, Lipisus, Physiologia Stoicorum, quoted in Saunders 1955, p. 120 ff.


204 Junius, TPA p. 85; Junius, SKDO p 77.

205 Junius, TPA p. 85; Junius, SKDO p 77.

206 ‘[I]ngannatone il senso e la vista, ed istupidi-


‘Si negat ars formam, gratia vestra dabit...


Le peintre ne tient que de la nature ...


Many examples of this thinking in terms of *similitudo* may be found in the writings of Filison, with which Van Hoogstraten was certainly familiar, considering that he refers to them in his first chapter: thus lovers take on many of each other’s characteristics; cf. De amore, orat. sept., VIII, ‘Quo pacto amator amato similis efficiatu’.

Cf.: ‘Zoo zal’t verstandt doorgaens scherper, de manier van handeling onnavolgelijk, en uw werk de natuur in de deelen der kunst gelijk worden’, Inl. p. 234.

Junius, TPA p. 35; ‘dat naemelick die dingen de welcke in d’uytnemendste Konstenaers voor de beste worden gehgekeert, bynae onnae-volghelick sijn,’ Junius, SKDO p. 27; ‘ande wy begrijpen d’over-groote kracht haerer deughden voornaemelick daer uyt, dat het ons onmoghelick is de selvighe nae te volghen’; Junius, SKDO p. 27.


‘La véritable peinture doit appeller son spectateur par la force et la grande vérité de son imitation, et ... le spectateur surpris doit aller à elle, comme pour entrer en conversation avec les figures qu’elle représente’, De Piles 1708, p. 4.

See chapter V below, pp. 230-235.

Inl. p. 237.

He was ‘door’t zien schilderen in een Schilder verandert’, Inl. p. 10.

Honig 1995.

gevalle, maer met opset schijne ghetroffen te hebben. ... die Konstenaers spannen, mijnes duneckens, de kroone boven d’andre, de welcke d’oude Konst ontrent een nieuw argument naerschighlick oeffenen, om haere Schilderyen door dit middel met het aenge-
naeme vermaeck van eene ongelijke gelijckhiet behendighlick te vervullen (italics mine), Ju-
nius, SKDO p. 29.

236 Inl. p. 191; on this practice, see Konstam

237 Borghini 1584, p. 444; Junius, SKDO p. 24. 239 Junius, SKDO p. 239.

238 ‘Daer is dan eenen sekeren slag van oogen

dienen met Aelianus “konstighe of Konst-
gheleerden oogen” mag noemen. So en is het
oock niet genoegh dat wy ooghen in ons
hoofd hebben als andere menschen, maer
het is voorder van noode dat wy sulcke ooe-
gen sochten te bekomen die nae de maniere van spreken by Cicero gebruyckt “eruditi
oculi”, dat is, “geleerde ooghen” verdienden
te worden gnenaemt’, Junius, SKDO p. 60,
cf. p. 28.

239 Junius, SKDO p. 239.

240 Junius gives a variant of ‘wie altijd navolgt,
gaat nooit voorbij’, in which he censures the
practice of imitating examples from the
past and praises the art being produced in
his own day: ‘So en is daer oock geen reden
ter wereld dat wy van dese onse tijden
soo quaelick souden ghevoelen, als of het
t’ eene-mael on-moghelick waer dat daer
ieter naer de wetenschappen die al-reede
aen den dagh ghebracht sijn soude werden
togehevoeght, der-halven moeten die ghene
selfs, die welcke nae den hoogsten trap der
volmaecktheyt niet en staen, daer toe liever
arbeiden dat sy aen ’t voor-lopen waeren,
as aent [sic] ’t nae-loopen, want die d’eerste
soekte te sijn, sal misschien de voorste met
der tijd achter-haelen, al-hoe-wel hy de
selvige niet en kan voor-by loopen: Soo
wie daer-en-teghen meynt dat hy maer al-
leen de voet-stappen der ghene die voor-
gaen moet betreden, de selvige kan nimmer-

241 Making ‘inventions’ is ultimately aimed at
increasing the artist’s reputation and is
therefore an important element of rivalry;
Junius, SKDO p. 173.

242 Junius, SKDO p. 33; ’t Waer te wenschen
dat dese arnhertighe Konstenaers met
eenen oock de reden haeres weer-siens
[d.w.z. gerichtheid op het verleden] voor-
stelden; ... jae maer, seggen sy; daer is een
sekere maniere van Schilderen die by d’oude
noyt gehbruuyckt en wiert. ’t Schijnt allhier
vry wat slots (sic) te hebben, dat sy ’t exem-
pel der oudehiet voorwen[den]; maer wat
voor een oudtheydt is het doch daer sy op
aer selven beroepen?’ Junius, SKDO p. 25.

243 [H]y bedriegt zich zelven, die met zulk een
nae-aeping der outheyt onkundigen poogt
to bedriegen; want dus volgende zalmen al-
tijs achterblijven’, Inl. p. 218.

244 ‘Ik zouden ook meesters in de kunst niet on-
raeden, iet goets van een ander, ’t was dan
vanouden of uitlanders, somtijts eens nae te
volgen: want mooglijk kon dit, door de
vernieuwing, de sluimer uit onze oogen drijven;
maer die zich inbeelden meester te worden
met altijs te kopyeeren, zonder oyt zelfs iets
uit eygen vinding te bestaan, acht ik bijster

245 ‘Het is zoo enkel deze drift van naeryver
geweest, die op eenen tijdt jeffens zoo veel
heerlijcke meesters in de kunst heeft voortge-
bracht. En men ziet met verwondering, dat
niet alleen in de tijden, die met de kunst in
den hoogsten graet gepraelt hebben, maer
zelfs in die eeuwen, in welke de konst als
wederom opgedolven wiert, de voornaemste
gesteen meer hebben getracht malkander te
tarten en de kroone af te winnen, als datze
het doelwit, dat de waerachtige konst voor-
stelt, hebben gezocht te treffen’, Inl. p. 216.

246 Van Hooogstraten regrets that the custom
of purchasing old masters has gone out of
fashion: today’s art lovers are ‘Ezels ... die
in d’oude kunst niet dieper zien, dan in een
wetsteen’, Inl. p. 212-213. He writes that
Apelles bought up all the available work by
Protogenes, Inl. p. 213, and Pieter Lely that
of Rubens, ‘Konstoeffenaers ... die zelfs,
door ’t opgaederen van goede kunst, blijk
of Rubens, ‘Konstoeffenaers ... die zelfs,
door ’t opgaederen van goede kunst, blijk
geeven dat ze de goede werken van anderen
ook lief hebben’, Inl. p. 196-197.

247 ‘Dewijl ... het den leergierige geesten nut en
profijtelijk is, somtijts de werken van andere
beroemde baezen nae te volgen, zoo past’er
tijd achterhale, de kroone boven d’andere,
met altijts te kopyeeren, zonder oyt zelfs iets
uit eygen vinding te bestaan, acht ik bijster

248 [V]an de eer en glory der groote Meesters
tot wakkerhiet worp aengeprikkelt, laet u

249 ‘Ik houde my daer van versekert ... dat
eck grootmoedigh herte zich niet alleen
met de huydendaegsche vermaerde mannen
vergelijkt, maer oock met alle deghene
die wel oyt eenen hoogh-loffelicken naem
hebben verworven””, Junius, SKDO p. 95.

250 Junius, TPA p. 102; ‘De deugd is in haeren eyghenen aerd eersuchtigh’, Junius, SKDO p. 94.

251 ‘Een braef geest staet na dat deel, dat in achting is, daer hy zich bevind, en word ook dikwils wakker door eenich tegenstrever in de konst. ‘t Is ons onmoglijk ergens in uit te munten, zegt Chrysostomus, ten zy dat wy met d’alleruitmuntenste om strijt daer nae trachten. En voorwaer het en kan twee loopers tot geen schade gedijen, datze uit Eeryver tegen elkander om strijd rennen. Dees Edele nijd zal braeve geesten ten top voeren. Zoo streed Rafael tegen Angelo, en Angelo tegen Raphael, en Pordenone met den grooten Titiaen’, Inl. p. 73-74.

252 ‘Door naeryver quam Zeuxis tot zoo hoogen graet in de Schilderkonst, dat de vogelen door zijn geschilderde druiven bedrogen wierden. ... Dit zelve vier ontstak Raphaël Urbijn, om den grooten Buonarot de loef af te snijden: En Michel Agnolo om een ongenaekbaere hoogte te beklauteren’, Inl. p. 215.

253 Inl. p. 229, 331, 237-238.


255 Junius, SKDO p. 96.


257 Sikyon is the exemplary city reputed to have been the cradle of art. As early as in Van Mander, we find the view that ‘Pictura nu wel Bataven/ Soo jonstich is, als voortijts Sycionen’, Van Mander, Grondt VII,45, f. 32v.

258 Van Mander writes that ‘classical’ painting is not exclusively that of Roman antiquity; he includes ‘eenie Nh Antijcken, die de Franci oft Duyschden souden hebben ghedaen’, Van Mander, Leven fol. 220r.

259 Inl. p. 170. Van Hoogstraten repeats the well-known anecdotes (from – most notably – Pliny’s Naturalis historia) relating to the illusionist art of painting of Hellenism, such as the horses painted by Amphiparaos that were drenched in sweat and covered in dust, and Pausias’s foreshortened image of a cow, Inl. p. 168-169. In fact Van Hoogstraten illustrates his section on foreshortening with numerous anecdotes from antiquity featuring painters who seem to endow their figures with ‘een levenden geest’ and most importantly imbue them with a suggestion of three-dimensionality (uitheffen), Inl. p. 308.

261 This is one of the central propositions of Brusati 1995, cf. p. 12; for theoretical aspects of trompe-l’oeil art in antiquity, see Robert 1996 and Marin 1985.

262 Inl. p. 291.

CHAPTER IV

1 ‘De Poësie is een suster, ja een lidt, van mijn Godinne Pictura, dieshalven heb ik wel veranderingh in de handelingh, maer niet in’t verstant begaan, overwegende, besinnende, en beschouwende de affecten en passien der menschen’, Van Hoogstraten 1650, unpaginated.


3 Vossius 1690, § 19, p. 70, uses Pathopoios as a synonym for ‘Affectus effingens’: ‘Hinc Graphice Callistrato ... vocatur ethopoios techne, ars mores effingens. Ac poterat si-militer pathopoios (affectus effingens) dicere.’

4 Inl. p. 75.


6 ‘This is the focus of both Coornhert’s Ethic and Descartes’ Passions of the Soul. For the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century view of the passions and their portrayal on stage see Konst 1993. For Italian art theory see Barasch 1967, Michels 1988. For the French see Montagu 1994 and Kirchner 1991.


11 Goeree, MK, pp. 357-376, borrows from Descartes’ Méditations, his Passions de l’âme and La dioptrique.

12 Steenbakkers 2000.

13 LeBrun’s Caractères des passions (1668) was translated into Dutch in the eighteenth cen-
The full title is Redenwoeringen over de hertstochten en hunne vaste kenteeken in 5 men schen wezen.

‘[D]oor byvoegen van verstand uitbeeldende dingen [heeft de schilder] zijn voornemen uitgevoort ... als met de gedaanten harer kleederen, handtuigen, gedieren, en dergelijke’, Inl. p. 111.


‘De eerste en wichtigste hoofd-regel is dat men sijne tochten en bewegingen des gemoedt zouden streven, en doch te vooren niet leerden ons eygen wille te overwinnen ... een wakker mensche ... hoed [zich] van sijne tochten soo lijfeygen te worden, dat hy niet die gene, welkers goede gunst hy hem onrecht waer, heerschen, soo wy de goede wil van andere gemoet zouden streven, en doch te vooren niet leerden ons eygen wille te overwinnen ... een wakker mensche ... hoed (zich) van sijne tochten soo lijfeygen te worden, dat hy se niet die gene, welkers goede gunst hy hem onderwerpen wil, ook onderwerpen kan’, EJ pp. 61-62.

In Miedema’s view, the Grondt contains in a very general sense an admonition to be more careful of the passions (‘beter op d’Afecten te passen’), Van Mander, Grondt VI,70, f. 28v, see also VI,34, fol. 25v; cf. Miedema 1973, p. 493.

Van Mander urges young painters to exhibit the Stoic virtues of temperanta in times of prosperity and patientia in times of hardship, cf. a remark like ‘do not allow your mind to get so broad’ that you make figures that are too large, Grondt V,6, f. 15v. In the Inleyding, these admonitions can be found in the chapter on ‘Uitspanning’ or leisure, where, with a reference to Seneca, young artists are encouraged to practise temperanta, Inl. p. 199, p. 200. In chapter VIII, Van Hoogstraten advises patient forebear-

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV
ance (‘verdraegsaem gedult’) in the face of the opinions of ignorant art lovers, Inl. p. 315, cf. also Inl. p. 317: ‘Maer laat u al deeze opschuimingen eens ontstelden gemoets, ô Schilderjeugt, niet verrukken, maer stel gestadich, nevens een betamelijk gedult, deeze twee middelen in’t werk [i.e., favourable behaviour and respect].’ Elsewhere, too, Van Hoogstraten expresses Stoic views, such as Marcus Aurelius’s advice not to become too occupied with just one thing, Inl. p. 71; a literal reference to the ‘Stoic philosophers’ on p. 90. Cf.: ‘Een bequaem gemoedt is geschikt in alle voorvallen, en schijnt een lust en toeneyging, tot alle zaken die het verricht, te dragen. … Wanneer zoodanigh een mensche, zich by eenen die van rasenden toorn brant bevint, soo zal hij dese geweldige gemoets beweging, waer voor alle dingen schrikken, om ver gewurpen te worden, soo geschikt weten te wijken, dat hy op een ongemerkte wijs, dese wraekgierige hitte af koele’, EJ p. 63. ‘Leer spot, spijt, schimp en geck altijdt verduldich lijden/ Soo sult ghy lichtelijck de sond’ van gramschap mijden’, De Bie, Cabinet p. 543.

36 ‘De Stoiken riepen, dat deeze hartstocht [i.e. sadness] een rechtschaepen man noit en behoorde te beweegen: maer de Schilders en Treurdichters geven aen haere T afe-reelen en T oneelen, door het uibeilen van verscheyde droefheden en jammerklachten, het beste sieraet’, Inl. p. 111.

37 ‘[D]at hy door de Deugd en Reden alle ongetemde harts-togten, en met een goede order sijnen geest … bestieren kan, tot aanleiding aller vrye konsten’, Goeree, SK p. 4.

38 ‘Gelijk ook den Maker gewild heeft, dat … de gesteldheid van’t Gemoed en de Passien, met den yver der Doening in’t Aangesicht des Menschen niet en souden verborgen blijven’, Goeree, MK p. 338.

39 De Lairese, GS II, p. 11.

40 Verberckmoes 1999, with bibliography.

41 The reception of Theophrastus’s Characteres is an intellectual tradition that to a degree runs parallel to physiognomy: whereas in the latter the character of a type of person is represented by physical traits, in the former it is defined by a particular pattern of behaviour.

42 Verberckmoes 1999; specifically on Leonardo see Kwakkelstein 1994; on physiognomy and art theory in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries see Reisser 1997.


44 Inl. p. 107; Zopyrus is also mentioned by Van Mander, see Miedema 1973, p. 501.

45 ‘De kroostkunde nu is een kennis van uit de byzonderheden, die in de aengezichten of tronien der menschen bespeurt worden, haar landaert, geslacht, geest en neygings des gemoets te verklaren’, Inl. p. 40; cf. Gaurus: ‘Physiognomica … est certa quaedam observatio, qua ex iis que corpori in sunt signis, animorum etiam qualitates denotamus’, Gauricus 1969, p. 129; on this passage see Michaels 1988 p. 76.

46 Inl. p. 41. Boccaccio associates the remark about ugliness in contrast to a good character with Giotto, see Panofsky 1970, p. 14, n. 2.

47 Cicero, Tusculanae disputationes IV, xxvii, 80. Van Hoogstraten says that Socrates succeeded in overcoming his ‘hostile nature’, Inl. p. 46.

48 ‘[P]rikkel […] om onze aengebore gebreeken ook te wederstaen’, Inl. p. 113.

49 ‘Maer deze verschillenheit wort men allermeest gewaer in de beweegingen des gemoets: want dan worden de tronien zoo veel meer die dieren gelijk, daer zy naer aeren’; Inl. pp. 41-42. The classical source for this idea is Aristotle, Historia animalium I-III. Inl. p. 112; cf. the hints for depicting a stupid person: ‘Fleshy and bulging muscles on the temples are, according to Scaliger, sure signs of stupidity, ignorance and an abhorrence of the arts’, Inl. p. 42.

50 Goeree, MK p. 197.

51 Inl. p. 41; for the chiromantic and physiognomantic tradition that can be traced back to the Chaldeans in relation to the passions in art see Barasch 1967.

52 ‘[J]a dat nog verder gaet, en van veelen gelooft word, het geluk of ongeluk, dat iemand over’t hooft hangt, te kunnen voorzeggen … Datmen uit het weezen eens menschen iets van zijn toekomende geluk of ongeluk zoude kunnen voorzeggen, is een oud gevoelen’, Inl. p. 40-42.


57 Inl. p. 40; Van Mander, Grondt VI, 4, f. 23r.
59 ‘[L]eevent te maken, dat al die hen toe hooren zich daer aen verlustigen ... op dat men dan twee zinnen te gelijkt door die oogen en ooren bemachtige’, EJ p. 82.
61 ‘Voornamentlijk moet men waer nemen, dat geen valsheydt in onse reden schijne, of dat de oogen de mont doen liegen, en alsoo in een oogenblik onsen arbeydt en bedenking te vergeefs om ver valt’, EJ, pp. 63-64.
62 ‘Ten hoogsten verfoeyt ... van die geen, die des Menschen Lichaam geheel ... met synen Geest, vereenigd heeft’, Goeree, MK p. 109.
63 ‘Een schoon lichaem belooft wel een schoone Ziele; maer het aenghezicht beleeft oock wel het herte’, De Brune 1657, p. 14, par XL VII.
64 Inl. p. 349; see above, p. 145.
65 ‘d’Alleroutste schilders zijn ook al verscheeyde weegen ingeslagen, en de hyzondere driften haers gemoeds zijn altyds in hare werken bekent geworden .... Zoo is’t dan, dat de Konstenaer elck als tot iets eygens gedreven worden, waer door men, als door een hyzonder merk, haere werken kent, gelijk men de zweemingen [i.e. characteristic features] en ’t kroost der ouderen in de kinderen gemeeneelijk gewaer wort. En al hoewel deze hyzonderheden eer afwijkingen, dan volkomenne vastechten der konst kunnen genoemt worden, zoo zijne ... den liefhebbers een bekoorlijke vermaelkijtheyt’, Inl. p. 74.
66 ‘Het gemeen zeggen is, dat de Schilders de gebreken, die sy zelfs in haren persoon hebben, ook veeltijts in haer werk vertoonen. ... De reden zouw zijn, dat onze innerlijke zinnen met onze uiterlijke gedaanten lietelijk overeendragen’, Inl. p. 65. ‘The same observation is found in Leonardo, cf. Borinaski 1965 I, p. 170.
68 ‘[S]i dice che ogni depintore depinge se medesimo [...] depinge se in quanto depintore: id est secondo il suo concepto; e benchè siano diverse fantasie e figure de’ dipintori che dipingono, tamen sono tutte secondo il concetto suo’, Savonarola, Prediche sopra Ezechiel, XXVI, quoted in Tatarckiewicz 1979, p. 78. On this subject see Kemp 1976.
70 Huygens, Fragment pp. 75-76, Huygens 1994, pp. 82-83.
72 ‘Wy noemen manier, een zekere handeling des Schilders, niet alleen van zyn Hand, maar van zyn Gemoed ... Het woord Manier betekent in een Schilder het zelve, dat het woord Stijl betekent in een Auheur; want een schilder is bekent by zyn Manier, gelyk als een Auheur is by zyn Stijl, of een Koopmans Hand is by zyn Schrift’, Weyerman, De Levens-besbyringen der Nederlandsche Konst-Schilders en Konst-Schilderessen (The Hague & Dordrecht 1729-1769, volume I p. 27), quoted from Broos 1990, p. 127.
73 F Baldinucci, Cominciamento, e progresso dell’arte dell’intagliare in rame (1686); for the passage on Rembrandt see Slive 1953, pp. 104-115; on Rembrandt’s ugly and ‘plebeian’ appearance (‘una faccia brutta, e plebea, era accompagnato da un vestire abietto, e fucido’) see p. 113.
74 The traditional topos that the painter and his work correspond (Michelangelo makes difficult work, Raphael, in contrast, makes graceful work, etc.) recurs in Vasari’s lives of the artists; cf. Rubin 1995, p. 331.
75 On this subject see Guépin 1991, p. 468.
77 Junius, TPA 108; ‘dewijl het seker is dat de Konstenaers ghestadeighlick verquickt worden door de kracht des levendighen roerende gheests die den onverwachten voordangh haeres wercks in hun overboelichlickr uytsstort’, Junius, SKDO pp. 100-101.


82 ‘[E]en verwoeden ... met een barsch ende dreystend aengezicht ... veranderde verwe ... de vergramde, hun oogen branden en glinsteren ... hun aengezicht is rood van’t bloed, dat uit het diepste van hun ingewant opwelt; hun lippen beeven, en hun tanden klapperen, hun hairen ryzen te berge, ... hun geheel lichaem siddert en dreyst schrikely, hun gelaat is leelijk gezwollen en verdert zich zelve’, Inl. p. 112.


84 For one example see Inl. p. 42.

85 ‘[D]e affecten oft d’inwendighe crachten’, Van Mander, Grondt VI,10, f. 23v; see further VI,60-61, f. 27v.


87 Konst 1993, p. 22.


89 Motus is a concept dat that Lomazzo, in particular, applies very broadly; see Barasch 1985, pp. 276 ff.

90 For this see most recently Roodenburg 2004.

91 ‘[D]e sprake der handen ... een algemeen sprake aller volkeren des aertbodems’, Inl. p. 118.

92 Cf. the way Félibien renders Poussin’s words: ‘Just as the twenty-four letters of the alphabet are used to form our words and to express the various passions of the soul, so the forms of the human body are used to express the passions of the soul and make visible what is in the mind’, quoted in Barasch 1985, p. 326. See Kapp 1990, on sermo corporis in the context of courtiers’ literature, and also on this question Hess 2000 and Rehm 2002.


94 ‘[L]e figure movano gli animi de’ riguardanti, alcune turbandogli, altre rallestrandogli, altre sospingendogli a pietà, e altre a segno … come aviene parimente al Poeta, all’ Historicco, e all’Oratore’, Dolce 1557, fol. 41r-v.

95 ‘Still I would not for this reason go so far as to approve a practice of which I have read, and which indeed I have occasionally witnessed, of bringing into court a picture of the crime painted on wood or canvas, that the judge might be stirred to fury by the horror of the sight. For the pleader who prefers a voiceless picture to speak for him in place of his own eloquence must be singularly incompetent’, Quintilian 1920-1922, 6.1.32-33.


97 ‘Hy behoort met den hoogen geest der treurspeldichters vermaegschapt te zijn, om alle beweegingen des menschelijken gemoeds niet alleen te kennen, maer ook, als’t pas geeft, de zelve te kunnen uitdrukken; dewijl men noit eenich beelt behoort onder handen te nemen, zonder daer in zeeckere beweeging … te vertoonen’, Inl. p. 88-89.


100 ‘Wilmen nu eer inleggen in dit alleredelste deel der konst, zoo moet men zich zelven geheel in een toneelspeeler hervormen. T en is niet genoeg, dat men flaeuwelijk een Historye kenbaer make, Demosthenes was niet ongelukkiger als anders, toen hem het volk walgelijk den rug toe keerde: maer sedert Satyrus hem Euripides en Sophokles vaerzen met beeter toonen en bevallijker bewegingen had voorgezeyt, en hy hem zelve … geheel den komediant leeren nabootsen hadde, sedert, zeg ik, hoordemen hem als een orakel der welsprekentheit. Dezele baet zalmen ook in’t uitbeelden van diens hartstochten, die gy voorhebt, bevinden,

101 Inl. p. 109. The same anecdote is found in Junius in connection with the concept of energeia, Junius, SKDO p. 50.


103 Horace, Ars poetica, 3.99-102.

104 ‘Moverà l’istoria l’animo quando i huomini dipinti molto porgeranno suo movimento verso desiderio, Alberti 1547, 2.41.

105 ‘Een schilder die oordeel heeft, zal niet meer op een panneel uitbeelden dan ‘er op een plaats en op een zelfde tijdt gebeurt is. Een Spel dat een spreekende schildery vertoont en een plaats en op een zelfde tijdt gebeurt is. Want de Schilders, of die maer alleen duydelick ende uyt-voorgebracht, de welcke de dinaestie van enige ende eenweezich voort.’ Op dat het werk eenstemmich den toezieder, als een anderen omstander verrukke, van een felle daed doe schrikken, en door het zien van iets blygeestich doen verheugen: of dat hy door eenich aengedaen ongelijk met meedelijden bewoogen worde; en in een rechtvaardige daed zich vernoegt bevinde’, Inl. p. 116.

106 Quintilian, Inst. orat. 7, 2, 32: ‘Intersequeitur energeia quae a Cicere illustratio et evidentia nominatur, quae non tam dicere videtur quare ostendere; et adfectus non aliter, quam si rebus ipsis intersimus, sequentur.’ For energeia and energeia see Michels 1988, p. 61, p. 182.

107 Cicero, Orator 23.79, the virtutes dicendi are puritas, perspicuitas, decorum and ornatus.


110 ‘Démonstratio est cum ita verbis res primitur ut qui negotium et res ante oculos esse videatur’, Cicero, Rhetorica ad Herennium, IV,lv,68.


112 ‘Wanneer de zaek, die gy voorhebt, in uw verstand wel begrepen is, zoo neem, nae uw keur, een oogenbliklijke daedt, want de verkiezing eens Schilders is vryer, als die van een History schrijver, zijnde deze verbonden aan de dingen van den grond op te verhandelen, daer een konstenaer plotselijk of in het begin, in het midden, of wel in het eynde der Historie valt, nae zijn lust en goetdunken, Hy verbeelt of het voorgaene, het tegenwoordige, of het toekomende, en is niet verder verbonden, als met ‘t geene in een opslach der oogen tevens gezien kan worden, uit het eeuwich vervolger der zaeken te vertooren’, Inl p. 178.


114 On the concept of ‘eenweezich’ as a design principle in Rembrandt’s studio see also Van de Wetering 1997, p. 253.


116 ‘[T]en is niet genoeg, datmen flaeuwelijk ... een Historye kenbaer make’, Inl. p. 109.


118 De Lairesses explains the meaning of the depiction of the passions in genre painting; see Kemmer 1998.


120 Michels 1988, p. 62.


122 Junius, TPA p. 265; ‘d’uytdruckelickheyd ofte duydelickheyd ... die ons de gantsche saecke soo blijckelick voor d’ooghen stelt, als of wy de naeckt vertooninge der dinghen selver aenschouden’, Junius, SKDO p. 291.

123 Junius, TPA p. 57; ‘[het] blijckt dat dien Konstenaer maer alleen duydelick ende uyt-druckelick wercken kan, de welcke de din-
ghen die hy ter handt treckt als teghenwoor
digh aenschouwt. ‘t Welek meest van allen in
de herts-tochten ofte in de inwendighe be-
weghen onses ghenoedts plaetse heeft’,

124 ‘[D]istaccandosi dalla superficie con tanta
energia, che spira le parole, e parla con chi
gli si fa incontro, e si ferma a riguardarlo’,

125 Inl. p. 292.

126 Junius, TPA p. 53; ‘Gregorius Nyssenus
nae een wijdloopen gyts behendigheid
verhael van Isaacks Offerhande, heeft dit
daar en boven daer by gevoeght. ‘Ick hebbe

127 Cf. Shakespeare, in Hamlet 2.2: ‘For lo, his
sword,/ Which was declining on the milky
head/ Of reverend Priam, seem’d i’th’air
to stick;/ So, as a painted tyrant, Pyrrhus

128 Cf. Sumowski 1979-1992, no. 1155x, p. 2567,
and no. 1195x, p. 2651.

129 Cf. Shakespeare, in Hamlet 2.2: ‘For lo, his
sword,/ Which was declining on the milky
head/ Of reverend Priam, seem’d i’th’air
to stick;/ So, as a painted tyrant, Pyrrhus

130 ‘Als wilde hy hun, met neerstich bestieren/
Medelij dich eenich jammer bedieden,/ Of
yet dat schrickelijck staet te gheschieden,

131 Inl. p. 116.

132 ‘Seneca mede zegt, dat de vervaerlijke
Schilderye van een droevige uitkomst on-
se gemoed ontroert’, Inl. p. 349.

133 ‘[D]e Schilders en Teurichiepen gezien de
haere Taferelen ende Toneelen, door het uit-
beelden van verscheyde droeven ende jam-
merklaet, het beste sieraet’, Inl. p. 111.

134 ‘[O]nde herten [worden] door een stuk
‘t welek ons een rechthandige wraeke
af-beeldet krachtighe beroert’, Junius,
SKDO p. 45.

135 ‘Tu Artifex, quid quaeris amplius? delectan-
tur spectans multitudo, ducitur Pictura, gau-
det, dolot, ridet, miratur, et, Pictura quosuis
affectus inspirante, ad misericordiam aut


137 See Blankert 1976, pp. 41-45. On the Aris-
totelean principle of peripeteia and the art
of Titian see Puttkärken 2003, pp. 16 ff.

138 In the Roomsche Paulina Van Hoogstraten re-
counts how Paulina’s chastity is jeopardized
when greed gets the upper hand over Mun-
dus’s feelings of friendship: ‘Iere friendship
is in distress, fettered to love and affection’,
Van Hoogstraten 1660, last part, p. F3.

139 ‘t Meysje, dit staetich gezicht beschou-
wende, kreeg zulk een schrik en verander-
ing, datse haer omkeerende weer dadelijk
nae huis liep’, Inl. p. 350-351; after Gregory
of Nazianzus, Carmina moralia 1,2,10, 793-
807.

140 Van Mander describes a Paris by Euphranor,
in which judgement and wisdom are coupled
with love and valour; Van Mander, Grondt
VI,40, f. 26r.

141 ‘[F]lauwicheit in’t sterven, de moederlijke
af-beeldet krachtighick beroert’, Junius,
SKDO p. 45.

142 Inl. p. 111.

143 ‘Fa anco il dolore svenire, gridare ... e simili

effetti, come si deue fare nel padre Giacob,
quando gli fu rappresentato dai figliuoli, il
mantine of Gioseppe’, Lomazzo 1584, book
II, cap. 16, fol. 166; for this scene in Rem-
brandt’s circle see Sumowski 1979-1992, no.
1220x, p. 2685.

144 E.g. Sumowski 1979-1992, no. 1160x,
no. 1154x, p. 2565, no. 1192x, p. 2643
(Tobias alarmed by the fish), no. 1230x, p. 2725
(The Resurrection).

145 Von, Alle de gedichten (1726, p. 361), quoted
from Weber 1991, p. 199; Lomazzo 1584,
fol. 168.

146 Cf. Konst 1993, p. 82. Michels uses the
terms, pragma, ethos and pathos, which like-
wise stem from classical rhetoric; pragma
refers here to practical argumentation that
has an effect on the listener’s rational under-
standing; logos and pragma are therefore es-
sentially interchangeable; Michels 1988, p.
54.

147 ‘Bewijsredenen ... Redenen, Zeden en Hart-
stochten, welke by de Ghriecken Logoi, Aes-
thae and Pathae genoemt worden’, Vossius
1648, pp. 29.

148 Junius, TPA p. 297; ‘wie in alle dese din-
ghen overtreft, deselveghie sal voor den aller
grootsten Meester ghehouden worden’, Ju-
nius, SKDO pp. 330-331.


150 ‘Seneca mede zegt, dat de vervaerlijke
Schilderye van een droevige uitkomst on-
se gemoed ontroert’, Inl. p. 349.


152 See Blankert 1976, pp. 41-45. On the Aris-
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1648, pp. 29.

162 Junius, TPA p. 297; ‘wie in alle dese din-
ghen overtreft, deselveghie sal voor den aller
grootsten Meester ghehouden worden’, Ju-
nius, SKDO pp. 330-331.
149 Cap. XXI, ‘Dell’officio e fine del pittore cristiano, a similitudine degli oratori’: ‘Delectare est suavitas, docere necessitatis, flectere victoriae’, with a reference to Augustine, ‘De Doctrina Christ, IV, 12’, Paleotii 1960, pp. 214-216. Speroni believes ‘si come il dipintore et il poeta, due artefici all’oratore sembianti, per diletto di noi fan-no versi et imagini di diverse maniere: quali orribili, qui piacevoli, qui dolenti e quai li-eti; così il buono oratore non solamente con le facczie, con gli ornamenti e co’numeri, ad amore, ma ad ira, ad odio et and invidia movendo, suol diletar gli ascoltanti’, Speroni, Dialogo della rhetorica (Venezia 1596), quoted from Barocchi, Scritti p. 262.


152 ‘De Hoogh-draavende Spreekwijs heeft voorneemlijk plaats in ghroote dingen; als van Ghodt en’t Ghemeenbest; waar om oy inzonderheyt in Heldelijke en truerghe dingen by-ghe-bragt wordt. … Haalt Over-draghten van ghroote dingen, brenght de heftigsthe Ghestalten by: als Uitbarstingen, Persooneeringen, Afwendingen. Zy is be-quaam om de Hartstoghten te ontroeren, … In’t teghende voelt het Nederighe Stijl an slechte dingen, en is vermoehd met de eigh-enschap der woorden, ghewoonlijk Over-draghten; insgelyx met scharpzigheyt en gheestigheydt. … De middelbaare Stijl wordt ghebruikt in middelbaere dingen. En is nederiger als de hoogghdraavende; maar hoogghdraavender als de nederigh, Vossius 1648, p. 29.


156 ‘Maer gelijk ‘er by de Poëten verscheeyde be-quaemhenhen zijn, en deze, door den Geest van onze Thalia ontsteeckhen, niet dan aerd-hidenen hervoor brengt: daer een andere, van Melpomene bezeten, een hooper tael, in krakende brooozen, ten toneelle uitbromt: en een darde door de gunst van Clio met groot-scher heldevaerzen hervoor komt; zoo schoeit de Schildergeest, op dergelijke leesten’, Inl. p. 175.


158 Konst 1993, pp. 188-193.


160 ‘Het wit en ooghmerck der wettige Treur- spelen is de menschen te vernornwen door schrick en mededoogen’, Vondel 1927-1937 V, p. 613, r. 179; the passage occurs in the preface to Lucifer (1654).


162 ‘[L]’occhio […] commove gli animi ad odio, ò all’amore, ò à timore, che tutti gli altri, se-condo le cose vedute, e per ciò essi supplici gravissimi presenti vedendo, e quasi veri […] alle volte li sono cagione per ciò di essere commossi alla vera pietà, e da questa tirati alla devotione, e in ultimo al buon timore, i quali tutti sono rimedi, e mezi ottimi per la loro salute’, Armenini 1586, p. 34.


166 ‘[T]reurige en beklaeglijke [...]

167 ‘[L]’arte sia accompagnata sempre con grazia e...

168 Junius, TPA p. 215; ‘want ghelijck de T ra-

169 ‘Veel zaeken zultge voor het oog verbergen,

170 ‘Maer hoor hoe St. basilius de kracht der...
'Comedy is a mirror of human life', Vossius 1990, p. 52, n.11, See also Borinks 1965, p. 143.

Van Mander, Grondt VI,5 and VI,34-35, f. 23 and 25v; Junius, SKDO pp. 220-1. In line with this traditional criticism of the use of texts in the study of the passions, eventually LeBrun’s codification was contested too, first by Roger de Piles; one passion can after all be depicted in different ways; see Kirchner 1991, p. 54.


‘Affecten uytbeeldinge wort van groote Meesters meer gebruyckt als sy weten’, Van Mander, Grondt VI,71, f. 28v.

‘Want wat d’Affecten moghen bedrijven/ Wijst Natuer al meer dan men kan beschrijven’, Van Mander, Grondt VI,5, f. 23r.

‘De Natuere ... en can niet lieghen’, Van Mander, Grondt VI,31, f. 25r.

‘[O]m op den rechten wech te komen, en zeker te gaan, zoo moet een konstoeffenaer zich tot de leevende natuer keeren, en zien, hoe ver het hem in de beweegingen geoor- derd is te gaan’, Inl. p. 294.

‘[G]een oeffening [is] den Schilder nutter ...

‘De Natuere ... en kan niet lieghen’, Van Mander, Grondt VI,31, f. 25r.

‘Want wat d’Affecten moghen bedrijven/ Wijst Natuer al meer dan men kan beschrijven’, Van Mander, Grondt VI,5, f. 23r.

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‘[G]een oeffening [is] den Schilder nutter ...

Van Hoogstraten refers to Agrippa’s Onzekerheid der wetenschappen in the translation by his friend Joachim Oudaen, Inl. p. 171.


Vossius describes ‘ethos’ as the quality that the speaker wants to engender in his audience: the ‘Aethae’ or ‘Morals’ are appropriate ‘to prompt goodwill; the Passions to move’, Vossius 1648, p. 2; cf. ‘Op dat een Reden zedigh zy, zo moet een Reedener ...

‘[De] regtschapen Konstenaar ... ’t oor-
deel van de gantsche Weereld’, ‘dat men ... zig wijsselijk drage in het aanhoren van alle-mans oordeel, selfs ook van de onkundige’, ‘niemand noemde, maar wees met sijn vinger op het omstaande Volk; te kennen gevende, dat het oordeel van den gemeenen Man, hem voorsigtig had gemaakt, om sijn konst wel aan te leggen’, ‘wanneer als de gantsche menigte van’t Volk, hare Werken op het nauwst ondersoeken’, Goeree, SK pp. 87-88.


216 Jansen 1995, p. 115. The preference for the vernacular is also a theme in the Italian tradition; see Rubin 1995. On the preference for writing in one’s own language that prevailed in the Van Hoogstratens’ circle in Rotterdam see Zijlmans 1999, p. 151.

217 Van Hoogstraten refers to Gregory who ‘Schilderyen, onder den naem van der leeken boeken, in de kerken voorstond, niet om die aen te bidden, maer om den volke met een begrijpelijke maniere te leeren’, inl. p. 251.

218 ‘[O]m de kracht en zuiverheid hunner taal’, ‘Is het niet een groote dwaaling, eenige uitheemsche woorden te willen gebruiken in een taal die van zelve ryk genoeg is?’ De Lairesse, GS I, pp. 194-195.


220 ‘[V]oor hy desselfs natuur, neyging, en hoe wijd sijn verstant strekt, te vooren betracht en overweegt: op dat hy noch te laeg, noch te hoog, maer na de mate des vernufts [of the audience], sijn reden stiere’, EJ pp. 77-78.


223 ‘[D]e beweinghe soo ware, als die in onze hedendaechse Feeste ghevonden werden’, Angel, LoF p. 48.

224 ‘The saying libro degli idioti can be found, for example, in Castelvetro; see Schröder 1985, p. 68.

225 ‘[H]et boek der Leeken ... werkende met een doordringende kracht op het gezicht van allerley menschen’, Inl. p. 25.

226 ‘E não somente el discreto é satisfeito, mas o simples, o vilão, a velha; não ainda estes, mas o estrangeiro sarmata e o índio, e o per- siano (que nunca entenderam os versos de Virgílio, nem de Homero, que lhe são mul- dos) se deleita e entenderá aquela obra com grande gosto e prontezza; e até aquele bár- baro deixa então de ser bárbaro, e entende, por virtude da eloquente pintura, o que lhe nenhuma outra poesia nem números de pês podia ensinar’, De Holanda 1984, p. 47.

227 ‘[T]endo ainda por mor a potência da pintu- tura que da poesia em causar mores efeitos, e ter muito mór força e veemência, assi para comover o espírito e a alma, a alegria e riso, como a tristeza e lágrimas, com mais eficaz eloquência’, De Holanda 1984, p. 97.

228 ‘A pintura de Flandres ... satisfará ... geral- mente a qualquer devoto, mais que nen- huma de Itália, que lhe nunca fará chorar uma só lágrima, e a de Flandres muitas ... A mulheres parecera bem, principalmente às muito velhas, ou às muito moças, e assim mesmo a frades e a freiras, e a alguns fidal- gos desmusícos da verdadeira harmonia’, De Holanda 1984, p. 29.

229 ‘En dewyl dit onderwerpen zijn, die meer dan een dierlijke beweeging in [zich] heb- ben, zoo zijn de konstenaers, die hier toe een rechte beguaenheyt hebben, alderdunst gezaeyt’, Inl. p. 87; cf: ‘In een waerachtich Konstenaer wort ... een grootmoedige natuurve yeszucht ... [en] datmen liever de weelderichet des ongetemden geests in een lustbaere en overvloedige vinding, zelfs tot vergrijpens toe, moet laten speelen, als datmen de wakkerheyt des voortvarenden gemoeds in een al te bekleedende stoffe zoude laeten versterven’, Inl. p. 78-79.


231 Inl. p. 93, p. 200.


235 Junius, TPA p. 57; ‘soo moetmen dan dese
beroerten in alderley manieren uyt de waerheydt der dinghen getrocken worden; ende een rechtsinnigh Konstenaer behoort liever te versoecken al wat daer erghens te versoecken is, dan dat hy de verbeeldingen sijnes vruchtbaeren ghemoedts door een bedwonghen ende koele imitatie soude laten verdwijnen', Junius, SKDO p. 50.

238 Spies 1999, p. 125.
239 'Maer hier is een Poëtische geest van noode, om een ieders ampt zich wel voor te stellen. Die deeze niet en gevoelt, tree vry te rugge; want hy en zal de zaek niet machtich zijn; ten waer hem eenich Godt of Poëet de hulpige hand bood', Inl. p. 110.
240 'Maer wie zouw al de veranderlijke werkingen, die van de menschen, door't zoo zeer verschillende reedewikken, bedreeven worden, kunnen optellen, of in zijn verstand begrijpen? Wat vangt de wil niet al aan? En wat voert de Fortuin niet al uit?', Inl. p. 86.
241 'Een bewooge Geest kan alleen iets groots, dat andere overtreft, voortbrengen, en de gemeene dingen verlaeitende, en door een heylige inblazing verheven, zingt dan eerst iets, dat hooger is, dan't geen dat uit een sterflijke mond kan komen, Ja 't gemoet kan niet, zoo lang het bij zich zelfs is, iets dat hoog en moeilijk om bij te komen is, bereyken. Het moest van zijn gewoone tret afgaen, en opwaerts stijgende, den breydel tusschen de tanden neemen, en den be-stierder wechvoeren, en ter plaets brengen, daer't door zijn eygen beweging niet darde komen', Inl. p. 200.
242 Inl. p. 200. This divine inspiration is explicitly associated with the passions. In the section on the passions, Van Hoogstraten commends Van Dyck for a Mary Magdalen, a painting he said was 'bathed with Divine favour', Inl. p. 115.
243 Junius, TPA p. 56; 'soo en is het hun niet mogheelick de hitte haerder beroerder sin nen langher te bedwinghen, maer sy worden door ick en wete niet wat voor een onwe-derstaenelicke kracht aen ghepoort om haere swanghere herssenen als met den ersten f ontlasten', Junius, SKDO, p. 49.
244 Wine 'beweegt de geest van onderen op', Inl. pp. 200-201.
245 Michels 1988, p. 61.
246 '[D]at men nauilijx machtich was, anders te gelooven, of men zach de levende Schilderye der geesten en zielen zelve', Inl. p. 29.
247 '[U]na pittura rappresentata come dianci diceva con moti al naturale ritratti farà senza dubbio ridere, con chi ride ... maravigliar si con chi si maraviglia, desiderare una bella giovane per moglie vedendone una ignuda, compatire con chi s’affigga, e anco in pigliar di mangiare vedendo chi mangi di pretiosi, e delicati cibi, cader di sono vedendo chi dol cemente dorma [etc.], Lomazzo 1584, lib. 1, cap. 2, p. 105; cf. Scribanius's remark about a Saint Sebastian by Coccie: 'et spectatores vulneris dolorem sentiunt', Scribanius 1610, p. 39.
248 Quintilian, Inst. orat. 3, 1, 21-25.
249 'Wie ook der Italiaensche of Nederland-sche groote Meesters is er oit geweest, die of in't geheel der konst, of in eenich deel, niet iets byzonders als eygen gehad heeft? ... Rubens [was fixed] op rijklijke ordinantien, Antony van Dijk op bevalligheid, Rembrand op de lijdingen des genoeds, en Golsius op eenige groote Meesters hand eigentlijk na te volgen', Inl. p. 75.
250 Rembrandt to Constantijn Huygens, 12 January 1639; reprinted in Van Rijn 1961, p. 34. For earlier interpretations of this term see Miedema 1973, p. 495, and De Pauw-de Veen 1959.
251 '[I]n het bitter lijden Christi, de moeder Maria, als den Zalichmaker aldernaest, met de grootste beweeging, die ons mogelijk is', Inl. p. 110-111.
252 '[E]en Passie Christi, d'welck soo won derlijck ende uytnemende druckelijck geschildert was, datter niet een versteent hert in een sondighen mensch gevonden en cost worden oft het moest sich beweghen, soo wanneer jemant t'selve werde verthoont', De Bie, Cabinet, p. 269.
253 Junius, TPA p. 265.
254 Huygens, Fragment p. 77.
255 Huygens, Fragment p. 78: '[Rembrandt] uno in homine collegit singula et universa expressit'.
256 Houbraken also mentions St John Preaching, which is striking in its 'natural depiction of the expressions of the listeners', Houbraken 1718-1721, I p. 261.
257 '[A]anwoordtige bedenkeningen der meniger-hande Hartstochten', 'waar door yz verzet, verbaast en verwondert stonden ... den Hartstocht van verwonderinge ... het ver baast staeren met het gezicht op den ledigen stoel, waar in Kristus een oogenblik te voren gezeeten, nu daar uit verdwenen was', Houbraken 1718-1721, I p. 258.
258 '[G]emene luiden ... Misschien dat hy de wellevens wetten, door Gratiaan, beschre-

259 Rembrandt ‘scavoit fort bien qu’en Peinture on pouvoit, sans beaucoup de peine, tromper la vuë en representant des corps immobiles et inanimé; et non content de cet artificé assez commun, il chercha avec une extrême application celuy d'imposer aux jeux par des figures vivantes’, De Piles, Abrégé de la vie des peintres (Paris 1715, 1699), p. 423, quoted in Slive 1953, pp. 216-218.

260 ‘[D]oor een kunstige verdeeling van licht, om dezelven beter te doen uitblinken, gewoonlyk aan zyne eenvoudige beelden spreekende vrolykheden en gemoedsbeweegingen’, L.H. ten Kate, Verhandeling over het denkbeeldige schoon der schilders, beeldhouwers en dichters, (Amsterdam 1720, HS 1436 UBA), pp. 7-8, quoted in Slive 1953, p. 171.


262 Huygens, Fragment, p. 73.

263 On the gift see Bruyn et al. 1989, pp. 192 ff.

264 ‘The subject matter of tragedy is sublime and terrifying, such as the commandments of kings, massacres, cases of despair ... being deprived of one’s family, the killing of parents, cases of incest, fires, battles, the putting out of eyes’, J.C. Scaliger, Poetices libri septem, 1.6., quoted in Smits-Veldt 1991, p. 53.

CHAPTER V

1 On the paragone in Dutch art literature, see e.g. Emmens 1979, pp. 49-51.

2 ‘[L]’alchimia de i pittori Venetiani’, Lomazzo 1584, p. 191; cf. also Weststeijn 2007.

3 Junius, TPA p. 50; Briggs 1989, pp. 69, 70, 95.


5 De bloote Teykening ... heeft nergens na zulk een bewegende kracht, als de verwen: gemerkt dezelve, door het bedroch van een levende gelijkenisse, alleen machtig zijn ons gemoed te ontroeren’, Inl. p. 226; ‘De verwen hebben een sonderlinghe kracht om onse ooghen tot sich te trekken, seght Plutarchus, vermis’t menschelickhe ghe-sicht door de bloeyende liefelickheyd der selvigher krachtigheyt opgeweckt ende ghespjift wordt’, Junius, SKDO, p. 260.


8 ‘Verwe verstout, en verschrikt de persoonen ... Verwe doet verdroeven en verjolijsen’ Van Mander, Grondt XIII,9, f. 51r.; ‘Dan therte rijst uyt swaermoedich bemoeyen’, Van Mander, Grondt XIII,15, f. 51r.

9 Agrrippa’s De occulta philosophia, II I, 49, contains a passage that may have been followed by Lomazzo; see Klein 1970, p. 102. Van Mander writes about colour and the humours, Grondt XIV,29, f. 54v.


11 Inl. p. 223.

12 Each motus of the body is accompanied by a particular colour; melancholy motions are dark, fearful gestures are pale; Lomazzo 1584, Cap XI: ‘Come si compongono le carnii secondo i moti de’ corpi’.

13 Van Mander, Grondt XIII,10, f. 51 r.


17 Cf. the analysis in chapter II of the way Van Hoogstraten conceives the Italian disegno solely as disegno esterno, pp. 97-99.

18 ‘Hoog is het wel teykenen ... maer boven al het wel schilderen of koloreeren, waer toe alles strekt, te achaten. De verwen geeft eerst de rechte volkomenheit’, Inl. p. 216.
'[U]n tinta di carne cosi simile alla vera, che solo a Tiziano solo si deve dare la gloria', Inl. p. 217.

20 't Is dan niet genoeg, dat men schoone kleuren mengelt, maer men moet de waere natuurlijkheyt naspeuren', Inl. p. 227. De chapter dedicated to Terpsichore is about 'colouring naturally', Inl. p. 214. Cf. an expression like 'coloured from life'; the same term is found on pp 218, 229, 241.

21 'Daerom hebben alle groote meesters, by wien de konst van't wel koloreeren in achting geweest is, in naekten en tronien al haere krachten gehebaert, om de natuer voornamelijk hier in nae te volgen', Inl. p. 226.

22 Cf. the 'natural carnation' of Jacques de Bakker, Inl. p. 227; and the 'natural nude', Inl. p. 228; 'het vlees … speelt in duizent veranderlijkheden binnen 't bestek van zijnen aert', Inl. p. 228. Incarnadine is associated with diversity by 'Van Mander, Grondt derlijk hoog achten', Inl. p. 228. The 'natural nude', p. 54; 'life is not more lifelike’ than Titian's portraits, p. 55.


24 Jansen 1995, p. 163.


26 Lehmann described how the two mediums continued to be used side by side for a very long time, and flesh tones were the last element of a painting in which oil was used; symposium Atelierpraktijken in woord en geschrift, Utrecht, 29 October 2004.

27 'Rembrant en andere, die dit konstdeel wonderlijk hoog achten', Inl. p. 228.


30 '[U]n tinta di carne così simile alla vera, che non par dipinto, ma vivo’, ‘che Titiano in quel nudo habbia posto carne, e non colori’, Dolce, Aretino, ed. Roskill 1968, p. 51. Elsewhere he observes in regard to flesh colour that ‘it appears to be not Painting, but real flesh’, p. 54; ‘life is not more lifelike’ than Titian's portraits, p. 55.

31 '[Z]ulk een man, die zich zoo geheelijk had overgegeven, om de natuer, met penseel en verwen, bestiptelijk nae te volgen', Inl. p. 242.


33 See the last chapter in Von Rosen 2001.


35 '[D]er Verwen cracht', 'monden, wanghen, en lieflijcke ooghen', Van Mander, Grondt XIII,16, f. 51v.

36 'Wat ist? ghy maalt wel't lijf, maar niet 's lijs eeuwigheyt,' Noch 't sterck basuyn-gehekelanck, noch 't gheesten onderscheyt', Camphuysen 1638, p. 116.

37 In this context Van Hoogstraten speaks about Parrhasios’ curtain, about Mattia Preti; Zeuxis’s ‘deception’, and Giovanni da Udine's deception of the Pope; Inl. pp. 217, 218, 226, 229.


41 The four virtutes dicendi are latinitas, ornat us, perspicuitas (or evidentia) and decorum.

42 'Quem deum, ut ita dicam, inter homines putant? Qui distincte, qui explicate, qui abundanter, qui illuminate et rebus et verbis dicunt, et in ipsa oratione quasi quemdam numerum versusque conficiunt – id est quod dico ornate', Cicero, De oratore iii. xiv.53.


45 'Quod maxime tanquam stellis quibusdam notat et illuminat orationem', Cicero, De oratore iii.xlii.170.

46 Junius, TPA p. 11; ‘Met sulcken uit-nemende
cierlijkheyt, heeft den overgroten, alwysen Maeker van dit At, de geschapen Wereld, bekleed, dat de Grieken midt-gaders ook de Romeynen deselvighe een-stemmielich sodeaenighen name hebben toe ghepast, die in sijnen eyghen aert een cieraet beteyckent', Junius, SKKO p. 3.


de Bevallighed... [komt voort] uyt een zoet en aanminnig gebaar of bestuur der Oogen, Mont en Handen, die bescheydentlijk de streelende toonen der tong ... ver[ge]sellen', Goeree, MK p. 24.

68 Inl. pp. 228, 291, 268, 273, 306. For these remarks in regard to Rembrandt's studio practices, see Van de Wetering 2001a.

69 Vondel 1927-1937, X p. 630: 'Dus baert de schilderkunst alsoo dat [zij] veel dinghen, die nauwelijcx door gheen Penceelen met verwen zijn na te bootsen, seer eyghentlijck doen schijnen; en als een kint van 't licht gaet in geen scheemring schuil'; quoted by Slive 1953, p. 70.


71 ‘Un tableau dont le dessin et les couleurs locales sont médiocres mais qui sont soutenues par l’artifice du clair-obscur, ne laissera pas passer tranquilemment son spectateur, il l’appellera, il l’arrêtera du moins quelque temps’, De Piles 1708, p. 301.

72 See Ciardi’s comment in Lomazzo 1973, p. 189.

73 ‘Il calor del fuoco che non arde, ma risplende e vivifica ogni cosa col suo caldo’, Lomazzo 1973, cap XII, p. 201.

74 Ci. Zuccari: ‘La particolar sua facoltà [i.e. of painting] è il colorire, ombreggiare e lumeggiare; e questa è la forza sua singolare, che dà talora alle figure tale spirito e tal vivezza, che le fa apparer vive e vere’, Zuccari, L’Idea (Torino 1607, II, 6, 24), ed. Barocchi, Scritti p. 1036.


76 ‘[Z]o[wel] ten opzicht van zyne natuurlykhed, als ook zyne uitsteekende kragt ... was’er ooit een Schilder die de natuur in kracht van coloriet zo na kwam, door zyne schoone lichten [...] En is zulks niet genoeg om de geheele waereld te verlokken’, De Lairesse, GS I, p. 325.

77 Dempsey 2002 has pointed out that both styles recur in Italian and Spanish art theory. The works of Rembrandt and Dou are also contrasted in terms of this dichotomy, see Sluijter 2000c, pp. 250-58.

80 Wybrand de Geest, for instance, writes of ‘a rough Painting, as by Rembrandt’, De Geest 1702, p. 92.


82 ‘De Handelung of the Penseel is tweederly, doch zeer verschillende van malkander, want de eene is een vloeijende, en malsse of gladde; de tweede een wakkere en vaardige, of stoute’, Lairesse, GS I, p. 7.

83 Van Mander discusses this subject in Grondt VII,10, f. 29v ff. Van Hoogstraten, in contrast, attacks Holbein’s precision, preferring a certain ‘looseness’: ‘Ik laet dien grooten meester in zijn verdiende waerde, maar houde meer van de verwe, die’t vlees en hair te zamen maakt met een lossicheit na te bootsen; de glansen en wederglanssen op haer rechte plaets te zwieren, zonder juist hair voor hair aen te wijzen’, Inl. p. 229. De Lairesse expresses a preference for the ‘bold and quick’, although not at the same time wanting to endorse Rembrandt’s radical approach to it, in GS I, p. 324. He also puts up a contrary argument, accusing painters who become ‘enamoured’ of an ‘audacious and quick brush’ of neglecting more important aspects, GS I, p. 137. On this debate see Van de Wetering 1991, Van de Wetering 1997, chapter VII; Sluijter 2000c, pp. 244-54; Gaskell 2002, and most recently Pousão-Smith 2003.


88 Emmens 1979, p. 47.
89 Huygens, Fragment p. 77.
90 ‘Neem dan vry borstels, die een hand vullen, en laet yder streek’er een zijn, die de verwen op veel plaetsen byna onvermengt leggen; want de hoogte en de dikheit der lucht zal veel dingen smeltende vertoonen, die by zich zelven steekende zijn’, Inl. p. 235.
91 ‘t’ En is ook niet ‘altijts van nooden de buytekant door een omtrek aen te wijzen; want somtijts kunnen ook enige duwkens, wijt van elkander, dezelve veel grootser uitbeelden’, Inl. p. 28.
92 ‘Laet u geen kleyne kantigheden van een zachte schaduwe verveelen [i.e. do not bother with a few angular details in a shadow], noch dat een bruindere in’t midden derzelve van nabij iets stoot [nor with a lighter shade in the middle of the shadow which, when the painting is viewed close up, contrasts with its surroundings]; want de [suggestive] kracht zal te grooter zijn, als gy’t wat uit de hand stelt [i.e. if you place the brushstrokes a little way apart], en gy zult gewoon worden deel tegens deel te vergelijken [i.e. leave separate areas of colour unmixed, and learn trust in optical mixing]; en eindelijk meer nuts uit deze wijze van doen rapen, als gy uoit zouden hebben durven inbeelden: daer gy anders, door het zoet verdwijnende gefutsel, gevaer loopt van geheel te verdoolen’, Inl. p. 29-30.
93 ‘[E]ven gelijk men zijn vriend van verre be-speurende, of by schemerlicht ontmoetende, strax als met het verstand zijn gedaente ziet, en bevat, zoo geeft een ruwe schets dijkwijs aan den kenders zoo grooten indruk, dat zy’er meer, dan deze gemaakt heeft, in zien kunnen’, Inl. p. 27.
96 ‘De rechte en slechte eenvoudigeyt deser Konsten heeft den voordgang der selviger benevens andere middelen mede veroor-saekt. Want gelijck wy bevinden dat die ghene allernaest tot de volmaecktheyd quae-men, dewelcke d’aenghenaeme bevalligheyd haerer wercken niet soo seer en stelden in ’t ydele waenkunstighe verw-gesperonck, als wel ... in’t naturell ghebruycyk van weynighe en gantsch ghemeyne verwen; so plaghten ook d’oprechtelick goed-aerdighg Leerlinghen ... sich aen dese gantsch loffellicke eenvou-digheyd stantvastigleyck te verbinden, den voornamsten ernst haerer Aemulatie daer instellende dat sy dese eygenschap der ouder Meesters recht wel moghten treffen’, Junius, SKDO p. 97.
98 This term from Quintilian is explained in Jansen 1995, p. 126.
100 Jansen 1995, p. 110.
101 The painter ‘con lo stile d’argento nota con brevità tali movimenti, e similmente nota gl’atti de’circostanti’, Leonardo 1651, cap. XCV, p. 27.
103 ‘[U]t fluere omnia ex natura rerum hominumque videantur’ (making it appear that everything we say derives simply from the facts of the matter and the characters of the people involved), Quintilian, Inst. orat. 6,2,13, cf. De oratore 1,3,12: the cardinal sin of rhetoric ‘is to depart from the language of everyday life and the use of it that is approved by the judgement of the community’.
105 Huygens, Fragment pp. 53, 58.
106 Huygens, Fragment p. 58.
107 Huygens, Fragment pp. 75-76, Huygens 1994, pp. 82-83.
108 Inl. p. 73.
van de welke *zy* zeyden (die verstanden wat een wonder verstandt, en weeten in hem zat) dat zijne woorden en spreukken even eens waaren als een kas, of taefere, *t welk van buyten heel rou, en plomp gewrogt daar uyt zag, maar dat oopen-gedaan zijnde, men daar binnen zag zulke oover-treffelijke werken, en schilderyen*, Huarte 1659, p. 230.

111 ‘In diergelijk een mis-verstandt staakken

112 '[Paulus, die] door zijne ingebooren kragt

113 Agrippa concludes that ‘[d]e voorschriften daaron by haar niet minder”*, Huarte 1659, p. 230.

114 ‘[Paulus, die] door zijne ingebooren kragt

115 ‘[D]e leugenspraak heeft verblomde woorden van doen, op datze de gemoeiden der menschen bemagtigte, maer de reede des Waerheyds ... is eenvoudigh, na geene opsmukkingen noch beglimpingen uyttzende [...] dat hy yder de voornaemste en welspreekenste

116 ‘[S]ervando in questo la regola dell’istorico, che narra il fatto come è stato, e non dell’oratore, che spesso amplifica et estenua le cose’, Paleotti 1960, p. 344.

117 ‘[C]he ambiscono di essere ritratte con la faccia colorita e graziosa, credendosi pur troppo con questo mezzo di diventare più belle, che è cosa ridicola’, Paleotti 1960, p. 344.


119 ‘Ziet onse Jufferen, verliesen zy niet daar door zelf dat gene *zy* met zoo yverigen be-geerzte zoeken? ... Zoo ziet men ook dat deze al te gedwongene lossigheydt en apen-werk, waar mede *zy* te gunstiger vermoeden omdat te worden, ons doen valgen, vermits wy zien alles gemaakt werk is. Dit zijn de gebreken der gedwongenhuyt, zoo wel van al te beschroomt, als al te overvloeyend, strijende tegen het eenvoudige cieraat, waar mede de harten getogen worden. “Wat ciert de blanke Amaril? ... ’t glimmend voorhoofd gevernist?/ Of roode verwe op’er kaken?/ O neen, ’t en was maar moeyt verquist,/ Haar gezicht oogen ’t hart doen blaken”’, EJ p. 15.

120 Junius, TPA p. 255-56; ‘datmen zijn werk met eenen ruyghen rock bekleede, dan datmen ’t met d’omhangsels van hoerachtighe cieraets ontschoone ... een moedvaerdighe dapperheydt ... sonder ons selven veele ontreent de nettighyd van eenigh de dunne hayrkens en d’uyterste nachelen te kekomen [sic]’, Junius, SKDO p. 278.

121 Vossius translates *actio* as **handeling**: ‘Pronunciatio sive Actio - Uitsprekening oft Handeling is een bequaame toepassing der stem en ghebaerden na de dingen en woorden ... Die deelen der Uitsprekening zijn twee; het eene vormt de stem; het ander de bewee-ghing des lichaams. Van de eerste pligt wordt dit deel Uitsprekening; van de laatste Handeling ghenoemt’, Vossius 1648, p. 30.

122 Jansen 1995, p. 156.

123 Van de Wetering posited this proposition as a central element of Rembrandt’s views on *art*, but without substantiating it with con-temporary observations; Van de Wetering 1996, p. 276.

124 ‘[D]e Schilders de gebreken, die *zy* zelfs in
In his *Microcosmo* Scannelli quite literally associates painters with physical features and compares Raphael with the liver, Veronese with the genitals, etc.; see Sohm 2001, p. 139.

German scholarship speaks about ‘politische Klugheit’ or ‘political intelligence’; cf. Kapp 1990, p. 84, n. 88, and Schröder 1985, pp. 103-104.

Houbraken 1718-1721, I p. 272; Houbraken used the Dutch version of 1696.

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‘[M]et vleken en rouw’ streken’, ‘wat verre ... ghweken ... daer van was’, ‘met groote Const, den arbeyd et verbergende’, Van Mander, *Het leven der moderne, oft des-tijtische doorluchttige Italiaensche schilders*, in: Van Mander 1604, f. 177r. Vasari observes that in Titian’s late ‘manner’ the mastery is so well concealed that his works could no longer be imitated, Vasari 1988, vol. VI, p. 166; on the differing opinions of Titian held by Van Mander and Vasari, see Golahny 2000, pp. 8-17.

145 ‘Meer moeyt isser in als men soude peysen ... den arbeyd daer ondert Groote Const be deckt is ... zyn dinghen sijnjen/ Lichtvver- dich, die doch zijn ghesaden met pijmen’, Van Mander, *Grondt XII*, 22-25, fol. 48r-v.


147 The decorum doctrine posits that youth and age have different styles, cf. Jansen 2001, p. 128.

148 ‘Souvent il ne faisoit que donner de grands coups de pinceau, & coucher ses couleurs fort épaisses, les unes auprès des autres, sans les noyer & les adoucir ensemble ... Quoy- moyst il ne faisoit que donner de grands coups de pinceau, & coucher ses couleurs fort épaisses, les unes auprès des autres, sans les noyer & les adoucir ensemble ... Quoy- moyst il ne faisoit que donner de grands coups de pinceau, & coucher ses couleurs fort épaisses, les unes auprès des autres, sans les noyer & les adoucir ensemble ... Quoy- moyst il ne faisoit que donner de grands coups de pinceau, & coucher ses couleurs fort épaisses, les unes auprès des autres, sans les noyer & les adoucir ensemble ... Quoy- moyst il ne faisoit que donner de grands coups de pinceau, & coucher ses couleurs fort épaisses, les unes auprès des autres, sans les noyer & les adoucir ensemble ... Quoy-

149 ‘[G]েলিক হলে শিল্ডারস সুনের হেতে এই হিমমোনে মিলিয়ের নেওয়ার মতো আর মধ্যে একটি মূল্যবান প্রয়োজনীয় ধার ব্যাপক করে দিতে হবে, শিল্ডারস, দাঁড়ানো মূল্যবোধক না ঠিক না ঠিক, তথ্য কানাডিড এবং নিয়ন্ত্রণ নেয়ার তথ্য এর সমস্তক করে দিতে হবে, শিল্ডারস, দাঁড়ানো মূল্যবোধক না ঠিক না ঠিক, তথ্য কানাডিড এবং নিয়ন্ত্রণ নেয়ার তথ্য এর সমস্তক করে দিতে হবে, শিল্ডারস, দাঁড়ানো মূল্যবোধক না ঠিক না ঠিক, তথ্য কানাডিড এবং নিয়ন্ত্রণ নেয়ার তথ্য এর সমস্তক করে দিতে হবে, শিল্ডারস, দাঁড়ানো মূল্যবোধক না ঠিক না ঠিক, তথ্য কানাডিড এবং নিয়ন্ত্রণ নেয়ার তথ্য এর সমস্তক 


152 In his preface to Junius’s treatise, for instance, Jan de Brune writes that ‘eenige [schilders] souden het in hun vermogen wesende verachten, uyt vreese van dat hun strecken gehouden mochten werden voor wercken van de natuer en niet van de konst’, Junius, SKDO Preface, unpaginated (p. vi).

153 ‘[E]len gedaente, die bevekte is met verschey- den verwen’, Inl. p. 360.


156 ‘Comme il est possible que le pinceau ait couché tant de douceurs sous ces traits si

165 ‘[D]e ongelukkige gedwongenheydt, en loomighheid, in welke men alles gebarst en verdrietig uytvoert, ’ een aart van vrye los-sighheydt, daar ester de kunst onder verborgen is ... en alle zaken, als of men niet daar aan gedachte, aardigh verricht ... dit is ook de oorsaak waarom men zegt, den redenaar geen beter konststuk te hebben, als dat hy zijn reden niet gedwongen, maar als viel hem zoo in, voorstelt, andersints versynt hy een groot voordeel by zijn toeboorders.... dat de al te groote losghheydt ... veel arger is, dan te grooten sorgvuldigheydt’, EF pp. 13-14


167 Inl. p. 233.

168 Junius, SKDO p. 27; TPA p. 35.

169 ‘t Zy dan ... dat het oog in de ruwe schetsen van gevalige voorwerpen eenige vormen uitpikt, gelijk wy aen den haert in het vuer pleegen te doen’, Inl. p. 237.


171 ‘Quanto più i mezzi, co’quali si imita, son lontani dalle cose da imitarci, tanto più l’imitazione è maravigliosa’, ‘quella sorta d’istroni che co’movimenti soli e co’ecceni saperano recitare una storia o favola, che quelli che con la viva voce l’esprimevano in tragedia o in commedia, per usar quelli un mezzo diversissimo et un modo di rappresentare in tutto differente alle azioni rappresentate’, Galilei 1954, p. 34.


175 Breveitas could emark a text as being appropriate for a limited readership, cf. Jansen 1995, p. 110.

176 ‘Onder de Latijnen behoudt Tacitus (na het zeggen der werelt wijzen) de eerste plaats, en wie kan ook beter als hy met weynig woorden zoo veel zaken begrijpen ... Hy is voorwaar verwonderlijk, schijnende als oft hem niet ter harte ging, verricht hy zoo voortreffelijk zonder enige verwarring synne warachtige vertelling, en rust nimmer in sijne ordening al leerende, even gelijk de zijde-stikkers het goudt en zilver in haar werk schikken ... ’t Is waar, dat, dewijl hy diepznin kort en eenigheins duyster is, wel een gauw verstant van nooden is hem te verstaen, waerom hy ook van enige berispt wort’, EF pp. 22-23.

177 Van Hoostraten argues that the ‘rough sketch’ often has greater persuasive impact than the finished drawing, which leads to the view cited earlier that people often base a likeness only on a certain suggestive uncertainty. This is why sketches are so popular with collectors, Inl. p. 27-28.


179 ‘Sommige heeft tans den lust tot netticheyt zoodanich verleyt, dat zy, zelfs in tweespannebeelden ... hyynae onzienlijke dingen zinnelooselijk bestaan uit te beelden’, Inl. p. 240.

180 ‘[The aforementioned painter is] he who loves the small eye, a tiny finger, a finished head, but with the pretext of esteeming nothing but the finest quality. It seems to them that finish is a precious balsam of such substance that it maintains good taste uncorrupted, adapted to the always curious dilettant. They tell me little, these finished pigmies (sti fini Pigmei)’, Boschini, Carta ed. 1966, p. 151-152, cf. Sohm 1991, p. 104.

181 ‘t Welk hem, nevens zijn groot oordeel in het navolgen van’t levende, tot den besten Landschapschilder van de Werelt gemaakt heeft’, Inl. p. 137.


183 ‘S[pezialmente esso Tiziano ha colorito con vaghissima maniera i monti, i piani ... nelle carni ha avuto tanta venustà e grazia con quelle sue mischie e tinte, che paiono vere e vive, e principalmente le grassezza e le tezze que naturalmente in lui si vedono’, Lomazzo 1974, chapter XIII, p. 127.


185 Van Hoostraten calls Titian ‘zulk een man, die zich zoo geheelijk had overgegeven, om de natuur, met penseel en verwen, bestipte-lijk nae te volgen’, Inl. p. 242.
186 Goodchild 1998. See also the collected source material in Torresan 1981.
187 ‘[Z][e]lls d’Italianen al voor lang bekennen
men, dat de Nederlanders hen in landschappen te boven gingen’, Inl. p. 137.
188 ‘Il farsi pratico e valente nelli lontani, dil che ne sono molto dotati gli ultramontani, e quest’avviene perché f ingono i paesi abitati da loro, i quali per quella lor selvatichezza si rendono gratisissimi. ... Questa parte nel pit tore è molto propria e dillectevole a sé stesso, come usano li Tedeschi, è molto al proposito’, Pino, Dialogo di pit turra (Venezia 1548), ed. Barocchi, Scritti p. 1350.
189 Lomazzo 1584, Cap. LXII ‘Composizione del pingere e fare i paesi diversi’. Echoing Van Mander, Van Hoogstraten mentions in the Intleding Patinir (p. 137), Herri met de Bles (137), Van Scorel (255), Gillis Mostaert (39-40), Breugel (141, 176) and Lucas (14 and elsewhere). Patinir and Herri met de Bles ‘raised landscape painting in these lands to a high plane’, while Albert Ouwater ‘won the prize among the landscape painters produced by Haarlem’, Inl. p. 137.
190 This is a key contention in Goodchild 1998. The distinction between ‘Northern’ colour and ‘Southern’ drawing recurs in Van Hoogstraten’s experience in painting landscape; he contrasts the ‘polished’ manner of the painters from Rome and Tuscany with the more lifelike colour of the Northern Italians, who ‘not only adorned art with beautiful colours, and shining varnish, but gave it all life’, Inl. p. 256.
192 Inl. p. 77.
193 ‘Pintam em Flandres propriamente para enganar a vista exterior ... O seu pintar tr apos, maco narias, verduras de campos, sombras de arvores, e rios e pontes, a que chamam paisagens’, De Holanda 1984, p. 29; on this passage cf. Averni 1981.
194 ‘Né digo tanto mal, da flammena pintura porque seja toda má, mas porque quer fazer tanta cousa bem (cada uma das quais, só, bastava por mui grande) que não faz nem huma bem’, De Holanda 1984, p. 29; cf. ‘hi erom zijn de Italiaenen beter in’t gros van de konst: maer onze Nederlanders, die niet zoo vlug van geest en gedachten zijn, maer aerdachtiger en kouder, zullen ’t den Italiaenen in eenich byzonder deel, daer hun natuer toe neigt, zelden wonnen geven’, Inl. p. 13.
195 ‘[O]nze Schilderjucht [mag] trachten ... om meester in alle deelen van onze kunst te worden […] En voorwaer, dezen graet der Algemeenheid in de konst te bereyken, is zoo veel waerdiger dat’m er nae stae, om datze de kroone der gloryen aen haere verwin ners geeft ... Raphaël, zegt men, was in alle dingen universeel of gemeenzaem gracelijck, hy wist overal wech meede: ’t welk in een algemeen Schilder, om goedt te heeten, ver eyscht wort’, Inl. p. 72; for bijwerk see pp. 72-73.
196 In 1639-1640, for instance, Rembrandt also made his self-portraits in emulation of Raphaël’s portrait of Baldassare Castiglione; see White & Buvelot 1999, pp. 170-175.
198 Cf.: ‘Wat juweelen/ Draegt vrouw Natuer in haar veelverwigh kleet!’ , Inl. p. 204.
199 ‘[I]n’t lommerich geboomt, of in de luchtige atmosfer ... O’s Schilderachtich van lantschap hoort zin gewond te worde’, Inl. p. 204.
200 ‘Wiens Schildergeest zouw niet tot wat ongemeens uitspatten, die de Poeten zoo Schilderdachtich van landschap hoort zingen?’ Inl. p. 138.
202 ‘[E]lk in haer eygen aert’, Inl. pp. 139-140.
204 Amer-Lewis 2000, pp. 175-76.
205 ‘Qui l’Ariosto colorisce et in questo suo colorirce dimostra essere un Tiziano’, Lomazzo 1584, p. 299.
206 This is one of the central theses of Beening 1963.

207 Horace, Ars poetica vs. 10: ‘Pictoribus atque poetis/ quidlibet audendi semper fuit aqua potestas’.


210 ‘In queste cose sarà la licenza del pittore: se / According to a remark in the introduction, Van / Hoogstraten started this work in emulation of Sannazaro; Van Hoogstraten 1669, unpaginated. On Sannazaro and the

211 According to an remark in the introduction, Van Hoogstraten started this work in emulation of Sannazaro; Van Hoogstraten 1669, unpaginated. On Sannazaro and the


214 ‘Entre tous les plaisirs que les differens / Als den boomgaert, wit van bloisem, / Sannazaro 1533, ‘Preamble’, unpaginated.

215 Gombrich 1966, pp. 107 ff. reports various views about the beneficial effect of being in a room with landscapes decorating the walls.

216 Junius, SKDO, pp. 54-55.


218 ‘Het bloot gesigt,/ Schyn, in den storm (soo / Junius, SKDO, pp. 54-55.

219 Aretino to Titian (May 1544), quoted in / Junius, SKDO, pp. 54-55.

220 Leonardo talks about ‘allegri siti’, and the / Junius, SKDO, pp. 54-55.


222 ‘Sfoga l’arabbiata sua ira et alcuna volta su– / Junius, SKDO, pp. 54-55.


224 ‘Or tutte queste specie di moti vengono a formare nella pittura il commovimento ... / Junius, SKDO, pp. 54-55.

225 ‘Een heerlijke Schipstorm in een gruwzaem Zee-onweder’: ‘Hier speelt de behendicheyt des Schippers, ’t buigen der riemen door de kracht der roeyers, ’t gewelt der winden, ’t
beweven en breeken der baeren, 't blixe-
men uit den Hemel, en des Schilders hooge
geest, zoo wonderlijk deur malkander, dat
het geheel stuk in't aenzien schijnt te bewe-
gen', Inl. p. 125.

226 Junius, TPA p. 61; ‘soet-ruysschende Beek-
skens die met een aenghenaeme suyselingh
onsen slaep-lust soo gheweldighlick niet
en konnen verweken, of sy houden onse
ooghen noch veel krachtigher open met de
suyvere klaerheyt haerder silver-stroomen’,
Junius, SKDO pp. 54-55.

227 ‘d'Alleraengenaemste verwe ... versterkt en
verheugt het gezicht, door hare levendicheyt
en blyheyt’; ‘een duyzend gebrokeverwich
lantschap ... wanneer de lieve lente beemden
en velden vernieuwt, en het bosch zijn nieuws-
bewasse kruinen opsteekt’, Inl. p. 231.

228 Burton 2001, II 2.4.1.

229 Inl. p. 159.


231 Inl. p. 223. ‘Men moet de ziel in d'ope lucht
laeten wandelen, op dat zij grooter worde,
en met een ongebonde Geest den Hemel

232 Inl. p. 231; cf. Van Mander, Grondt VIII,1,
f. 34r.

233 De Brune, Preface to Junius, SKDO,
unpaginated.

234 ‘De Schilder-Konst [is] veel al-gemeener,
om dat sy de Natuyre veel over-vloede-
lijcker weet na te bootsen: want boven dien
dat sy aff-beelt alderley Dieren, als, Voge-
len, Vissen, Wormen, Vlieghen, Spinnen,
Rupsen, soo kanse ons oock verthooren
onderhalle Metalen: onderscheeydende de
dselve, als Goudt, Silver, Metael, Koper, Tin,
Loodt, en wat des meer is. Men kan door
haar uyt-beelden den Regen-Boogh, Regen,
Donder, Blixem, Wolcken, Waesem, Licht,
Weerschijn, en dierghelijcke dinghen meer’,
Angel, Lof, pp. 25, 54. Van Hoogstraten
uses this term in the context of flesh colour,
Inl. p. 228.

235 Angel, Lof, pp. 25, 54. Van Hoogstraten
praises Ambrogio Lorenzetti who was ‘the
first’ since Apelles to start painting weather
conditions, Inl. p. 123.

236 ‘[V]eranderinge [is] voor alle dingen ver-
maeklijk’, Ripa 1644 p. 453.

praises Junius, TPA p. 61; ‘[De liefhebber] be-
schouwt ... het silver-straellighe licht der Maene
... hoe de groote lampe des Hemels uyt de
Zee 's morghens optijght en 't fletterende
water met een twijfelachtigh bevende licht
verglyukt ... hoe 't gheberghte hoogher op
in een nevelachtigh blaeuwheyt ver-
dwijnt. Hy besichtigt met een sin-wackere
noest[i]ghheyt al 'tgene sich den menschen
hier op d'aerde ende over de aerde aenbiet.
De dampe veel-verwige waeter-wolcken,
voor-naemelick als ons dien wonderbaeren
[regen]boge daer in vertooght word; [...] 
't koele over-welfsel van een dicht beplant
gheboomte, welckers bevende Loof in et-
tellicke plaetsen meer of min doorstraelt

peli dell'uomo e di tutti gli animali, sudori,
spume e altre cose, che non possono fare gli
scultori’, Varchi, Della maggioranza e nobiltà
dell’arti (1549), ed. Barocchi, ‘Trattati vol. I,
p. 37.

240 ‘[L]a maraviglia del colorire [...] rappre-
senta la differenza trà ciascun animale, se
è terrestre, aquatile, o volatile, e distingue
gli huomini di ciascuna ragion [...] e trà gli
elementi mostra le fiamme, l’acque, i fonti,
le nubbi, i lampi, i tuoni, e le pietre, & in
ciascheduna si contengono quasi tutte le
virtù del colorire ... che non vi è cosa alcuna
corporale da Dio creata, che per essa non si
possa rappresentare’, Bisagni 1642, p. 230.

241 ‘[G]eensins dat gout-geel-hayr, noch de
plants van de wapenen, noch een donckere
nacht, noch een onweder van de doot, noch
die lampen en vierige schichten, noch de
brandt van een stad, noch het rijsen van
den dageraet, met haer roosverwige kaken,
uyt-drucken: en om kort te gaen, hy kan
ons den hemel, noch de zee, noch de aerde,
noch de bergen, noch de beemden, noch
de bosschen, noch de rivieren, steden noch
huysen, eygentlijck vertoonen, al het welck
de Schilder doen kan’, Van den Bos 1662, p.
117. In this passage the Italian original also
dealt with flesh tones and the colour of eyes
and the ‘beams’ that they ‘emit’, th sculptor
cannot ‘esprimer la graziosa vista degli oeci-
chi neri e azzurri, col splender di que’ raggi
amarosi’, Castiglione 1528, p. 126.

242 ‘Summa, verwe doet hier sichtbaer be-
trapen,/ Al wat ter Weerelt van Godt is ghe-
schapen ... In den voor-somer, als de velden
bloeyen,/ Vol blijde coleuren, schoon dif-
ferentich’, Van Mander, Grondt XIII,15, f.
51rv.

245.

244 Junius, TPA p. 61; ‘[De liefhebber] be-
schouwt ... het silver-straeligh licht der Maene
... hoe de groote lampe des Hemels uyt de
Zee ’s morghens optijght en ’t flijckerende
water met een twijfelachtigh bevende licht
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noest[i]ghheyt al ’tgene sich den menschen
hier op d’aerde ende over de aerde aenbiet.
De dampe veel-verwige waeter-wolcken,
voor-naemelick als ons dien wonderbaeren
[regen]boge daer in vertooght word; [...] 
't koele over-welfsel van een dicht beplant
geboomte, welckers bevende Loof in et-
tellicke plaetsen meer of min doorstraelt
Ik zwijge van den blossen dageraet, / Zoo heeft de voornaemste Schilders ook altijd iets, dat hun best meevalt. Dezen zal't lusten, wat stof hij ook voorheef, dezelve deur aerdige deelen wonder behaeglijk te doen schijnen, als of hy meer vermaeck had in't vertoonen van een soorte der medewerkende dingen, als in't gros van de zaeh; [...] Een ander zal dezelve deelen door een gedwongener ordre, door schikschaduwe en beeldespring wonderlijk vergrootten. Maer de derde acht alleen een bloote en onbedwonge vertooning en bralt quansuy스 op't ware groots, volgt de Roomsche zwier van Rafaël en Angelo, en houd staande, dat [...] het bedwang der lichten en schaduwen een brose kruk is: en onrecht datmen, om het eene te verschoonen, het andere verduis-tere', Inl. pp. 175-176.

Some examples that painters in the Netherlands could have been familiar with are found in the decorations in St Carolus Borromeus Church in Antwerp. Poelenburgh and Bramer painted on stone.

‘Ik zwijge van den blossen dageraet/ Zoo sierlijk in't veel verwigh pronkgewaet/ De goude Zon en Maen en Starren, zwieren/ In't blauw Auzuur; het goud verheugd Saffieren/ [...] Hoe geestich dat natuur het pluimgediert/ Hoe tegens was beschieldert en versiert/ ’t En belgt zich niet: ‘t eendrachticheyt, in’t schikken/ Der verwen, schijnt onze oogen te verquikken’, Inl. p. 303.

Roskill 1997, p. 78.

Cf. Van de Roemer 2005, pp. 139-173. Some examples that painters in the Netherlands could have been familiar with are found in the decorations in St Carolus Borromeus Church in Antwerp. Poelenburgh and Bramer painted on stone.

Van Hoogstraten contrasts ‘true painterly knowledge of musculature’ with the anatomy of medicine, Inl. p. 52; cf. pp. 153, 218, 263.

Van Mander, Grondt V,62, f. 20v.

‘[H]et minste datmen ter handt slaet, be-hoort een volkomen zin te hebben’, Inl. p. 156.

‘[W]ant vermits de Konst is een afbeelding van al dat sichtbaer is, soo heeft oock de schoonheyt plaets in dat alles, en heeft even wijde palen als de konst selfs. En is dae-rom te betrachten niet alleen in’t menschen beeldt, maer oock in beesten van alle slagh, in gebouw, in landschap, in lucht, in water en alles datmen uytbeelt’, De Bisschop, Paradigmata graphices (1671), quoted in Bakker 1995, p. 156.


‘[W]ant vermits de Konst is een afbeelding van al dat sichtbaar is, soo heeft oock de schoonheyd plaets in dat alles, en heeft even wijde palen als de konst selfs. En is dae-rom te betrachten niet alleen in’t menschen beeldt, maer oock in beesten van alle slagh, in gebouw, in landschap, in lucht, in water en alles datmen uytbeelt’, De Bisschop, Paradigmata graphices (1671), quoted in Emmens 1979, pp. 70-72.

‘[W]anneermen de Schoonheyd alleen in sekere respecten of opsigten neemt, die de dingen tot malkander hebben, en aanmerkt soo alser veel dingen afhangen van de verschillende Zinnelijkheden der Menschen’, Goeree, MK p. 20.

‘[A]erdige leelijkheid, daer Brouwer werks
genoeg mede gehad zou hebben, om hare ongave begaeftheden t'overtreffen', Inl. p. 67.

266 '[In de Taferelen veel dingen schoon kan noemen, welke in 't natuurlijk Leven leelijk en verfoeyelijk, ja mismaakt zijn', Goeree, MK pp. 17-18.

267 'Daer is altoos noch een kleine smette, die het heldere glas van hare spiegels bewalmt', Inl. pp. 64-65. The French title of this slim volume is L'Entretien des bons esprits sur les vanités du monde; cf. De la Serre 1658, pp. 296-97.

268 'Een verstandich keurmeester', Inl. p. 283.


270 Inl. p. 66.

271 '[V]erscheydentheyd [aan menselijke gezichten] [is] soo groot ... alsser gebrokens tussen twee Getallen konnen zijn of bedagt werden; dat is, volgens onse Denkingen oneyndig', Goeree, MK p. 188.


274 Goeree, SK p. 22.


276 '[M]olto furono quelli, che imitarono le cose com’elle sono, e questi [the painters] com’elle appariscono: ma perché le cose sono in un modo solo, et appariscono in infiniti, e’vien perciò sommamente accresciuta la difficoltà per giugnere all’eccelenza della sua arte’, Galileo 1954, p. 34.


278 'Quelle vanité de la peinture, qui attire l’admiration par la ressemblance des choses don’t on n’admirer point les originaux!' Pascal 1963, p. 504. Pascal was translated into Dutch by Frans van Hoogstraten. For the relationship between illusionism and vanitas see Schneider 1989.

279 For Vondel’s text see Bakker 2005.

280 Vondel 1937, p. 34. In this context Vondel names ‘Diagoras, Leucippes, Epicuur, Lucrees and Democrijt’, p. 11.

281 Descartes covers himself against a possible comparison with the classical atomists; Descartes 1657, p. 374.


283 'In spinrag, en in stof.../ Wat openbaren zich verscheydenheên van kringen/ En trekken, zwiër in zwiër!.../ Wat kunstig teekenaar/ Neemt soo veel troniën, soo veel gedaanten waar!/ ... Het schijnt of Rafels geest of Titan verrees./ Of Angelo’s vernunft, Bassaan, of Veronees’, Vondel 1662, p. 23.


285 '[N]oi ... diremo che l’arte è uno abito fattivo, con vera ragione, di quelle cose che non sono necessarie ... Dicesi ‘di quelle cose che non sono necessarie’, perché tutte l’arti si maneggiano intorno a cose contingenti, cioè che possono essere e non essere egualmente, et in questo sono differenti l’arti dalle scienze, perché tutte le scienze sono di cose necessarie’, Varchi, Della maggioranza e nobiltà dell’arti (Firenze 1549), ed. Barocchi, Trattati vol. I, p. 10.

286 'E quelli [i.e. the painters] imitano le cose com’elle sono, e questi [the painters] com’elle appariscono: ma perché le cose sono in un modo solo, et appariscono in infiniti, e’vien perciò sommamente accresciuta la difficoltà per giugnere all’eccelenza della sua arte’, Galileo 1954, p. 34.
vende stant, dan alleenlick den onveranderlijk en blyvende Goût’, Angel, Lof, p. 25. See also p. 105 for the term veranderlijkheid.

290 ‘Dat de wereltse schoonheden en vermakelijkheden niet te pas komen by de schoonheid des Hemels, en de vreugde der Zaligen’, Van Hoogstraten 1682, pp. 11-15.


293 In his study of the concept of pittoresco in seventeenth-century Italian art literature, Sohm suggested that the English word ‘picturesque’ unites within it issues of the choice of subject and of design. He points to the roots of the term pittoresco in the seventeenth-century Italian pittoresco, and to the fact that compositions are also described as pittoresco, see Sohm 1991, pp. 90, 240, 186.

294 Inl. p. 233.

295 ‘Laet uwe penstreeken los en onbedwongen

296 ‘[R]ivolgo gli occhi al cielo; il quale, da che Laet uwe penstreeken los en onbedwongen


298 Inl. p. 31.

299 ‘[R]ivolgo gli occhi al cielo; il quale, da che Iddio lo creò, non fu mai abbellito da così vaga pittura di ombre e di lumi’, Aretino to Titian (May 1544), quoted in Busch 1997, p. 85.


301 ‘[L]ibri sono letti solo dagl’intelligenti, che sono pochi, ma le pitture abbracciano universalmente tutte le sorti di persone’, Paleotti 1960, p. 143.

302 ‘Né in questo ci restringemo più a’libri degli istorici che degli oratori o de’ poeti o d’altri, poi che la pittura ... diffonde in tutti i soggetti la sua grandezza, comunicandosi a tutte le materie, a tutti i luoghi et a tutte le persone, quasi imitando in ciò la divina natura et eccellenza’, Paleotti 1960, p.149.

303 ‘Anzi leggiamo che in un sguardo solo di una pittura molte cose più comprendemo, che con un lungo leggere di vari libri’, Paleotti 1960, p. 143.


305 Beening 1963, p. 95.


307 ‘[N]iets genoegt my [in het landschap], alles mistaagt my. ... De lugt heeft geen schoonheid die zig niet vervaarlijk maakt in een oogenblik: want in een wenk bekleed zig zijn aangezigt met weer-ligten, en donder-buien. ... De Bloemen vleien het gezigt wel: maer men niet lichtelijk komen kan, sonder de kennisse van veel dingen te hebben’, Van den Bos 1662, pp. 112-114.

308 ‘Dat de wereltse schoonheden en vermakelijkheden niet te pas komen by de schoonheid des Hemels, en de vreugde der Zaligen’, Van Hoogstraten 1682, pp. 11-15.

309 Junius, TPA p. 85; ‘niemand[o] soo verdighlick spreken kan, of het valt de nature vry wat lichter te Schilderen; Voornaemelick wanneer sy haer selven inden dertelen overvloed van een broodfroncken vruchtbaarheid meynt te verlusten’, Junius, SKDO pp. 77-78.

310 ‘Non ci è gente o lingua o condizione di persone, che non possa intendere bene quella...
'Cio è ovvio che le ville, le fontane e i palazzi si dipingono per mero diletto degli occhi, noi risponderemo, come di già abbiamo detto, che l'occhio del cristiano deve penetrare più oltre, talmente che col diletto sia congiunto il giovamento presente o subseque, Paleotti 1960, p. 388; cf. p. 384.

CHAPTER VI

1 ‘D[e] gansche natuer bespiegelt'; ‘zuster van de bespiegelende Wijsgeerte'; ‘oneindelijke bespiegelingen', Inl. p. 24-25, p. 70, p. 326. At various points in the Inleyding, Van Hooogstraten discusses the way that mirrors work, and their significance to the painter, e.g. in the context of reflected light, Inl. p. 262, p. 263.

2 Quintilian, Inst. orat. 2, 17, 27.

3 On this image, see Honig 1998, pp. 1-2.

4 The mirror provides ‘slechts den schijn van t'waer wesen, maer de waerheit zelfs niet'; Van Mander, Wijbeelden der figureren, in Van Mander 1604, fol. 133v.

5 De Vecchi 1990.


7 ‘La pittura non è altro che o arbero a uomo o altra cosa che si specchia in un fonte. La differenza che è dalla scultura alla pittura è tanta quanto è dall'ombra alla cosa che fa ombra', Cellini, Paragone, ed. Barocchi, Trattati I, p. 81.

8 ‘[L]’arte di necessità è inferiore alla natura, perché la natura dà il rilevo et il motto alle sue figure, il ch'è impossibile a noi. L'arte nostra fa l'effetto che fa lo specchio, il qual riceve in sé quella forma (senza il motto) che se gli oppone dinanzi', Pino, Dialogo de pit turra (Venice 1548), ed. Barocchi, Trattati I, p. 100; cf. Ossola 1971, p. 239.

9 ‘[T]’zijn spieghels, spieghels zijnt, neen t’zijn geen Tafereelen'; De Heere's eulogy is reproduced in Van Mander, Leven fol. 201r.

10 ‘[L]’è certamente de Natura un specchio', Boschini, Carta ed. 1666, p. 214. He also refers to Titian as a mirror of nature; Boschini, Le ricche minere della pittura veneziana (Venice 1674), quoted in Barasch 1967, p. 61.

11 De Lairesse, GS II, unpaginated, no. a2.


13 ‘[I]l'poeti imitano il di dentro principalmente, cioè i concetti e le passioni dell'animo,... et i pittori imitano principalmente il di fuori, cioè i corpi e le fattezze di tutte le cose', Varchi, Della maggioranza e nobilta dell'arti (Firenze 1549), ed. Barocchi, 'Trattati vol. I p. 55, see also p. 371. For the same distinction in Dolce and Comanini, see Barocchi, ibid. p. 152 ff., p. 261 ff.

14 Varchi, Della maggioranza e nobilta dell'arti
15 Inl. p. 33; see above, chapter II, note 54.
16 ‘Internal’ mental images ‘vertoonen aan de Ziel eenige ingeschaapte Denk-beelden ... en Gedagten van eeuwige Waarheden’; external features ‘kommen van de voor-werpen der sigthbare Wereld’, door Middel of Aandoeningen van de uytterlijke Sinnen ... gheldt deze Denk-beelden in bet Verstand alleen vertoond werden als de dingen in een Spiegel, diegeenzins zelfs maakt’ (italics mine), Goeree, MK p. 348.
17 Agrippa 1661, p. 119. ‘[D]e verbeeldingen, die in den Geesten allen substanck sessehen komen van de voor-werpen der sigthbare Wereld, door Middel of Aandoeningen van de uytterlijke Sinnen ... gheldt deze Denk-beelden in bet Verstand alleen vertoond werden als de dingen in een Spiegel, diegeenzins zelfs maakt’ (italics mine), Goeree, MK p. 348.
19 Observations relating to mirrors can be found in the work of Agrippa, Cardanus, Kircher and Della Porta, among others.
23 Inl. pp. 24-25. Zuccari’s words are also repeated in Romano Alberti, Origine e progresso dell’Academia del Disegno (1604), ed. Barocchi, Scritti p. 1013.
26 See above, pages 84-88.
27 Van Mander, Leven 285v.
28 ‘[D]ewyl onze herstenen zyn als een glaze bol, in ’t midden van een kamer opgehangen, welke door alle voorwerpen, die zich vertoonen, aangedaan word, en een indruk daar van behoudt’; ‘het verbeelden van het geen hem dagelyks voorkomt’, Lairesse, GS II, 3, p. 185.
29 Junius, SKDO p. 33.
31 Van Hoogstraten refers to perspective (deur-zichtkunde) as deception; Inl. pp. 274-275; he describes artistic deception by Fabritius and by himself, p. 308. He discusses the art of painting in terms of seeming or deception: ‘De glans der kunst bedriegt/ Ook dikwils’, p. 23; he tells anecdotes relating how kings and queens have been ’deceived’ (p. 218), and refers to the painterly ‘[b]edroch van een levende gelijkenisse’ (p. 220); painters are capable of giving their work a great ‘appearance of truth’ (p. 168).
33 ‘[E]en schaduwe van t’rechte wesen, en den schijn van het zijn’, Van Mander, Leven fol. 61v.
34 ‘[S]emper citra veritatem est similitude’, Huygens, Fragment p. 75, with a reference to Seneca, foreword to the Controversiae and Tacitus’ Annales, IV, 58.
35 E.g. Boschini, Carta ed. 1966, p. 86.
38 ‘[U]na bugia sì bella e sì dilettevole che cer-
39 ‘[La pittura] diletta in doi modi: l’uno pro-
40 ‘Hoe verr is waerheit van de Logen?/ Soo verr als Ooren staen van d’Ogen’, Emmens 1981b, p. 71.
41 ‘[L]a pittura] diletta in doi modi: l’uno pro-
42 ‘De glans der kunst bedriegt/ Ook dikwils’, p. 23; he tells anecdotes relating how kings and queens have been ‘deceived’ (p. 218), and refers to the painterly ‘[b]edroch van een levende gelijkenisse’ (p. 220); painters are capable of giving their work a great ‘appearance of truth’ (p. 168).
42 ‘[E]yghen-schijnende gedaente’ or ‘schiijn-eyghentlicker kracht’, Angel, Lof, pp. 24-25, 41.
43 ‘[E]en schaduwe van t’rechte wesen, en den schijn van het zijn’, Van Mander, Leven fol. 61v.
44 ‘[S]emper citra veritatem est similitude’, Huygens, Fragment p. 75, with a reference to Seneca, foreword to the Controversiae and Tacitus’ Annales, IV, 58.
45 E.g. Boschini, Carta ed. 1966, p. 86.
46 Haydocke, A Tracte Containing the Artes of Curious Paintinge (1598, pp. 188-89), cf. Norgate on spatial landscape paintings as ‘nothing but Deceptive visions, a kind of cunning [cozening] or cheating your owne Eyes, by [y]our owne consent and assistance’, Norgate, Miniatura or the Art of Limning (1627-1628, p. 51); both quotations taken here from Gilman 1978, p. 133.
47 ‘[C]he la scultura è tanto superiore alla pit-
48 ‘[U]na bugia sì bella e sì dilettevole che cer-
49 ‘[La pittura] diletta in doi modi: l’uno pro-
50 ‘Hoe verr is waerheit van de Logen?/ Soo verr als Ooren staen van d’Ogen’, Emmens 1981b, p. 71.
51 ‘[L]a pittura] diletta in doi modi: l’uno pro-
e tocca alquanto dello intelletto. ... Ma tal meraviglia non è nella scultura, la quale imita il corpo col corpo, e non con manco dimensioni; ... perché qui non è similitudine, ma identità essenziale, perché e l’uno e l’altro è corpo in genere substantiae’, Speroni, Discorso in lode della pittura (1542), quoted in Barocchi, Scritti, pp. 261-262.

42 ‘[C]osi come a ben dipingere la mia effigie è assai a vedermi, senza altramente aver con-tezza de’ miei costumi ... dipingendo l’ artefelice null’altra cosa di me, salvo la estrema mia superficie, nota agli occhi di ciascunudo; similmente a ben orare in ogni materia basta il conoscere un certo non so che della verità, che di continuo ci sta innanzi’, Speroni, Dialogo della Rhetorica (1596), quoted in Barocchi, Scritti, pp. 261-262.

43 [Sculptors] ‘imitano le cose com’elle sono, e questi [i.e. painters] com’elle appariscono’, Galilei 1594, p. 34.

44 See Sluijter 2000c, pp. 210-211, n. 47.

45 Poems inspired by paintings also make fre-quent allusion to the ‘unreal’ nature of a portrait in comparison to the sitter; cf. Em-mens 1981a.

46 Junius, TPA pp. 50-51; ‘Nnoch soo wordt de Schilder-Konst seer wel met de Poege daer in vergheleken, dat soo wel d’eene als d’andere met een dapper vermaeckelicke beweginghe in onse herten insluypen, alwaer sy ons ver-slaeghen ghemoedt door d’aenlockelickheydt van een aenghenaeme verwonderingh soo gheweldigh beroeren ende ontstellen, dat wy ’t ghene nae-gheboetst is voor’t waere vergaepen, als ofse waeren; ende vande die dinghen dewelcke niet en sijn sich soo de ooren doen’, Junius, SKDO, p. 104.

47 The full passage, derived from the story of David and Bathsheba, in which David is deceived by desire, describes the ‘begeerlijkheid, die door d’oogen in Davids hart quam ... Om dees bedrieghelikeids wil, is het goed zijn oogen wijsselik te beteugelen. ... “Si secutum est cor meum oculos meos”, zeit [Job] Dat is, Indien mijn hert mijn oogen gevolght heeft: waar uit hy klaarlik te ver-staan geeft, dat ons hart bochtigh is tot het gheen d’oogen beschouwen. “S’occhio non mira, cor non sospira”, zeggen d’Italianen. ... t’Is vreemt om zien, dat d’oogen, die leden van’t zelfde lichaam, met het hart zijn, dat voornaamste deel zo deerrlik bedriegen ... Ik weet geen andere deelen van ons li-chaam die malkaar zoodanige ondiensten doen’, De Brune 1994, pp. 276-277. Sluijter notes that both Camphuysen and Van de Venne express similar views; Sluijter 2000d, pp. 157-169, p. 200, and Sluijter 2000b, pp. 118-131.

48 ‘De oogen bewegehen de innerlicke sinnen, met veel meerder kracht en naer-druck, als de ooren doen ... De ooren strijcken het vies van de hersens, maer de oogen rae-cchen het breyn, en deur-booren het blaesken van het herte’; De Brune 1657, p. 180, par. CDLXXIV.

49 De Brune 1994, p. 34.


51 Love’s Labour’s Lost, IV, iii.


53 Cf. De Bie, Cabinet p. 23.


57 Sluijter 2000b.


61 ‘[G]ieft het vermoeden van eenige overna-tuurlijke kracht’, Inl. p. 357. On p. 211, Van Hoogstraten is more critical of the ‘villainous delusions and Sorcery’ with which the art of painting can be compared.
He compares the image to a dream (Soöst 266c), to an image (eídon, 236a) and to a phantasm (phantasma, 236g). For the Sophist tradition in relation to early modern views, see Schroeder 1997, p. 24 ff.

De Sophisten noemden de wensheid dwaas, schandelyk, en eerloos, De Lairesse, GS II, p. 189.


‘[G]elyk ook die oude Man met de Globe de ydele betrachting veerbind: want wie kan in de geheimen van God en de Natuur indringen? ... Weshalven dan de rechte en eige gedachte van dit voorwerp alleen daar op uit komt, dat alles yddeleheid is ... gelieve te weeten, dat de Wyzen zelf, door zommige, voor dwaazen geacht worden’, De Lairesse, GS I, pp. 192-93.

‘[C]ome il dialettico cerca di sodisfare con la ragione et il sofista attende col falso a contrafare il vero, così i pittori delle grottesche, lasciando il vero et appigliandosi al falso, non cercano altro, a guisa de’ sofisti, che ingannare chiumque gli s’accosta’, Paleotti 1960, p. 443.

‘Un peintre qui ne s’attache point à la vérité de la nature ressemble à un philosophe qui met toute son étude à former des raisonnements pour prouver que l’être n’est rien et que le corps n’est que l’ombre, et à faire des arguments pour surprendre sur une fausse apparence l’esprit des ignorants’, Address to the, Akadénie, 26 April 1697; quoted in Lichtenstein 1989, p. 206.

‘Zeker daer is geen soort van toeredinge, of van blanketsel, of vleiery, of hetovering, waer door die ruwe en onbedreven toevoorders, waer uit geheele staten bestaan, lichter kunnen ingenomen worden dan door de sieraden dezer kunst, als ze te regt te passe gebracht worden. Dit niet tegenstaande hebben beide die Filosofen [Plato and Aristotle] lof gezagt uit de lessen dezer kunst, en door het bestraffen der zelve haer gemaakt tot een koningin der menschen, wanneer ze haer den naem gaven van ‘Zielroerster’’, Van Hoogstraten 1725, pp. 1-2.

‘Nam et mendaciam dicere etiam sapienti et veriti non contradirà già alla verità, perché quella non verisimile sarà quella pittura, la quale non contraddirà già alla verità, perché quella saria falsa’, Paleotti 1960, pp. 365-6.


Boschini, Carta ed. 1966, p. 322 r 15.


See Brusati 1999.


For this theme in the sixteenth century, see Van Stipriaan 1996.


‘Hacer y hacer parecer. Las cosas no pasan por lo que son, sino por lo que parecen. ... Son muchos más los engañados que los avertidos; prevalece el engaño y juzganse las cosas por fuera ... La buen exterioridad es la mejor recomendación de la perfección interior’, Gracian, Arte de prudencia (Obras completas, 1967, p. 188), quoted in Schröder 1985, p. 103.

‘Het is niet genoeg dat men achtens waert is, maer men moet sijn waerdely soo schikken, dat se geacht wort’, EJ p. 54.
101 'Finalmente ogni oggetto schifoso e laido, s’ode senza schifiltà, quando con pellegrine forme si rappresenti. Peroche, come il rappresentato sia noioso: nondimeno il mezzo rappresentante è piacevole', Tesaurino 1670, p. 124; in another part of his Cannocchiale, Tesaurino discusses humorous subjects ("Trattato dei ridicoli"), dwelling at length on the representation of the ugly and insig-429
ificant: *Comedia est peiorum imitatio*, p. 351 ff.

102 'Jae een groot behendich listich bedriegher/ Van s’Menschen ooghen, oock een cluchtich liegher', Van Mander, Grondt VII, 55, f. 33v.

103 '[Caravaggio] con falsos y portentosos milagros, y prodigiosas acciones se llevará tras de si a la perdición tan grande número de gentes, movidas de ver sus obras, al parecer tan admirables (aunque ellas en si engañosas, falsas, y sin verdad, ni permanencia) ... Assi este Ante-Michelangel con su afectada e exterior imitación, admirable modo y viveza, ha podido persuadir tan grande número de todo género de gente', Carducho, *Diálogos di pinta* (1633), quoted in Bologna 1992, p. 73.


105 'Michiel Agnolo Caravaggio zeyde, dat alle Schildery *Bagatelli*, kinderwerk en beuzeling was, wiens werk het ook zijn mocht, die niet na't leven geschildert was. Vermits’er niets beter, niets goet, als alleen de natuur te vol- gen zijn kan. Des wegen schilderde hy noit een streek anders, als na’t leven. Het onder- werp der Schilderkonst is, gelijk te vooren geroet is, alles na te beelden: haer voorwerp dan is de geheele zichtbare natuur, waer van zich niets in onze oogen vertoont, of het heeft zijn eyge vorm en gedaentie', Inl. p. 217.

106 '[I]l primo capo de*naturalisti*'; Scannelli 1657, p. 197, and 'Michelangelo da Carav- aggio nel teatro del Mondo, unico mostro di naturalezza, portato dal proprio istinto di natura all'imitazione del vero... con tal verità, forza, e rilievo, che bene spesso la natura, se non di fatto egualitata, e vinta, appor- tando però confusione al riguardante con istupendo inganno, allatava, e rapiva l'uma*na vista,* p. 51.

107 Inl. p. 75.


109 De Piles 1699, p. 423.

110 '[I]l est vrai que c’est un fard; mais il serait à souhaiter que tous ces tableaux qu’on fait aujourd’hui fusssent tous fardés de cette sorte'; De Piles 1708, p. 27f.

111 'Il y a des faussetés déguisées qui représen- tient si bien la vérité que ce serait mal juger que de ne s’y pas laisser tromper', La Roche-


115 '[O]gni pittura o scultura regolarmente è falsa, però che mostra di essere quello che non è, essendo ella veramente una tavola disegnata o un sasso o un bronzo, e non un uomo vivo, come rasseemba’. Paleotti 1960, p. 359.


117 ‘Want wat is de Schilderye? De wijze man zegt, een gedaente, die bevlekt is met ver-

118 [E]en werck dat in hem selfs maar treck en schaduw is’; ‘doeck of planck/ met verw besmeerd’; painted figures ‘niet uyt vleysch en bloet [zijn]/, maer gom en aarde’; Camp-


122 ‘N]iet anders als een stuk hout, aan malkander gelijm’t, De la Serre 1658, pp. 163, 164-165.

123 Camphuysen 1638, p. 115.


125 ‘Dus zien wy dat de Konstenaers allenthal-

126 For the attribution to Van Hoogstraten see Ember 1999.

127 [L]a Metafora ... in miraculoso modo gli ti fa travedere l’un dentro all’altro’, Tesuaro 1670, p. 301; see Gilman 1987, p. 75.


129 After listing eleven kinds of ‘Argutezza’, Tesuaro notes: ‘Togli da queste undici Ar
gutezze ideali ciò che vi è di falso, e quanto vi aggiugnerai di sodezza, e di verità: al-
trettanto lor torrai di bellezza e di piacere: divellendone la radice dell’Argutezza’, Te-
sauro 1670, p. 491.

130 Tesuaro 1670, p. 266, ‘metafora ottava, di deccetione’.

131 ‘[L]’ingegno consiste ... nel ligare insieme le remote e separate notioni degli propositi obietti: questo apunto è l’officio della Meta-

132 ‘Ma perche la maggior parte de’Concetti Po-
etici, e Oratorij, è fondata nella Simiglianza. Vogliot’io qui darsi un saggio delle varie

133 ‘Et fra le sensibili ti si presentano nel primo luogo i coloriti obietti dell’occhio, onde tu sugli dire, li teneri

134 ‘[M]a principalmente della Luce, obietto più gradi-

135 Ortelius applies the Pliny quotation to Bruegel; see Bakker 2004, p. 203.

Cf.: ‘Figure ironiche’ son metafore d’Hipotiposi, rappresentanti all’occhio alcun Suggesto invisibile, e astratto, per mezzo di corpi Humani’, Tesauro 1670, pp. 445-446.


Wat is anders het gene, dat noit genoeg geleert en wort, dan de veragtinge van de selve ghelycke by een bloem, wel wetende dat ons leven niet anders is als een weeke Veldt bloem ende de selve ghelycke by een bloem, wel wonderende waardig zijn’, De Bie, Cabinet pp. 23-24.

‘Met hoe veel nieuwe Narcissen is de werelt niet bevloekt! ... Maar ik zoude my nimmer konner inbeelden van wat natur hare oogen zijn, dewijl zij dingen zien die niet en zijn. Het valt haar ligt lighamen aan haare harzenbeelden te geven, en gevoelige voorworpzelen vaare inbeidingen te maken ... Zy bespeuren aanlokzelen, zoetigheden, trek-azingen [i.e. haunt] en bevalligheden die onzienlijk zijn, en die niet bestaan als in hare wangedachten: ik laat u bedenken of zy verwondering waardig zijn’, De la Serre 1658, pp. 145-46.

Diego de Estella, The contempte of the world, and the vanitie thereof; ed. 1975, p. 32.

See Brusati 1991 and Sluijter 1998, p. 184 ff. with references to work by Dou and Bailly (e.g. fig. 30), and more in general about the vanitas iconography in self-portraits, Raupp 1984.

On this theme, see Sluijter 1998, p. 179. Cf. the vanitas scenes by a follower of Honthorst (Ashmolean Museum, Oxford) and Bigot (Galleria Nazionale d’Arte Antica, Rome),
155 ‘[Q]uelle pitture che si chiamano vane; il quel nome potria rendere forsi dubitazione, essendo che ogni pittura in certo modo si può dire vana, per essere come ombra e figura della verità,’ Paleotti 1960, pp. 382-83.


159 ‘‘t Malen is der Ydelheen algemeyne malle Moeër; ‘Maar (och!) al ydelheydt. door ‘t kamerspeelsche wesen/ Van’t koude vyur uws hels verdwint het ware weesen,’ Camphuysen 1638, p. 116; cf. Sluijter 2000a, pp. 10-14.

160 ‘[D]e ydelheyd der menschen... ‘t bederf des levens’, Agrippa 1661, p. 115.


162 ‘[Z]oo vero verzieren de Schilders Historien en verdichtselen, en aller dinghen afbeeldelen, ligt, glans, schaduwene, yntsteeksel, neerdellingen [i.e. things that come to the fore or recede], drukkenze uyt: dit heeft de Schilderkonst, daarenbooven [as compared fore or recede], drukkenze uyt: dit heeft de Neerdellingen [i.e. things that come to the fore or recede].

163 ‘Gelijkerwijs de geschicht-schrijvers, van de schilders Zeuxes en Parrazius vertellen; die alsze van de voortreffelijkheid van de Konst in twist geraakt waeren, en d’eerste, druyven, met zulk een overeenkoming geschildert, dat de voogelen toefloogen, voort gebracht hadde; bragt de andere een geschilderden doek voort, zoo in der waarheid schijnende, dat hy, die door ‘t oordeel der vogelen opbobbelde [i.e. he swelled in self-conceit], zeyde men zou de doek wegh schuyven, om’t werk te toonen: eyndelijk zijn dwaling gewaar wordende, was genootzaakt den anderen den eerkroon over te langen, dewijl hy-zelf de voogelen bedroogen hadde, maar Parrhazius, den Konstenaer’, Agrippa, 1661, pp. 113-114, cf. the Latin in De vanitate, Barocchi, Scritti p. 752.

164 ‘Wat is al ‘s Werelts doen? een ydelheid, een niet./ Wat anders, alsze schijnt, voor deze regt beziet/ Dat leerde my dit Boek, maar Schilder! als daar by/ Uw hand quam, riep ik uyt, ‘t is maar een Schildery./ Een buyten-verw alleen; die ‘t Werelts-Kint verheught./ ‘t Bestendig is alleen in ‘t oefnen van de Deugt’, introductory poem by S. Simonides to De la Serre 1658, unpaginated.

165 ‘Versiert met pracht van schilderij/ Uw ruime zaal;/ ‘t Is niet dan verf en maar kopij/ Van’t ijde principaal’, Brom 1957, p. 266.


169 On the rhetorical background of the picture-in-a-picture procedure, see Weber 1998.


171 The serpent creeping out from beneath a stone also graces the frontispiece of De Geest’s Kabinet der Statuen; Van Hoogstraten may be referring to a print by Goltzius, cf. Czech 2002, p. 367.


174 ‘E’cosi morte e vita;/ contrariev, insieme in un picciol momento/dentro a l’anima sento’, Saslow 1991, No 168, p. 326; cf.: ‘[Michelangelo’s] world is profoundly dualistic in the sense of a great division in the universe between opposing forces of good and evil, flesh and spirit, earth and heaven... love, both earthly and divine; time and death, the enemies of worldly fulfillment; art, which can counteract the transience of physical beauty; and God, whose eternal realm and laws hold out hope for the spirit’s

175 The full text reads as follows: ‘Mijn levens Schaip bouwvalig komt vast [i.e. steadfast] drijven./ Door ’t woeste Meir, ter haven, daer elk een/ Wort afgeëischt en rekenschap en reën/ Van al zijn doen, gedachten en bedrijven./ Dat ’s werelts gonst my vleyend toe wouw schrijven/ Een Godt te zijn, dat ik de konst alleen/ Begrepen had, zijn yd'le zotticheen/ En valscheên, die den mensche niet beklijven./ Wat is’t doch al, wat ik op aerd genoot./ Indien ik hier ontfang een dubble doodt?/ d’Een ben ik wis, en d’ander dreigt te prangen.// Genoeg gedicht, gedouble doodt?/ d’Een ben ik wis, en d’ander moet hem verwonderen dat noch de kasse is van onreyne stoffe’, De Mornay 1646, fol. 45r.

176 Saslow 1991, p. 476, no. 285, cf. no. 43 v.12 (‘bouwvalig’), no. 293 v.3 (‘l’una e l’altra morte’).

177 Goeree describes the human condition such that ‘de noodwet des doodts ... onse lichaem mens eens tot verderflijkheydt in den schoot der aarden moet gezayd worden [d.i. ten grave gedragen worden], om met een on-verderflijk lichaam wederom uyt te botten’, Goeree, MK p. 8.


181 Van Hoogstraten 1666, p. 53.

182 ‘Niemant en moet hem verwonderen dat soo grooten Const is gesproten uyt een schaduwe (die in haer selven Niet en is) aengesien wy altemael voorts kommen van slijn der aarden ... daerom behoorden wy wel met reden de Hemelsche dinghen meer te beminnen als te trachten naer de ydelheydt des werelts’, De Bie 1661, pp. 23-24.

183 Czech has drawn attention to the complex theological background of Van Hoogstraten’s decision to give his two books the titles of ‘The Visible World’ and ‘The Invisible World’, and concludes that it is ‘more than likely’ that this two-part division alluded to a pronounced theological background. He notes that Van Hoogstraten refers to the Bible about forty times in the Inleyding and that he was baptized into the Dutch Reformed Church as an adult; during the preparation for this he was ‘thoroughly instructed in religion’ according to the parish register, Roscam Abbing 1993, p. 52, no. 47; cf. Czech 2002, p. 67.

184 ‘De Platonici stellen twee werelden, eene die wy met de sinnen begrypen, waer inne wy leven. d’andere, die meten verstande alleen begrepen wort dat is, de Schepper der vorighe werelt’, De Mornay 1646, fol. 45v, marginal note.


186 Augustine’s doctrine did much to determine artistic culture in the early modern period, insofar as he offered a counterbalance to the neoplatonic views that were fairly common by that time; Bouwsma 1975, Czech 2002, p. 67.
192 Bryson 1990, pp. 119-120.

193 ‘[D]ewyle onse ooghen de klaerheyt van een zoo groot [i.e. Divine] licht niet en konnen verdraghen, ons zy ghenoegh dit licht in zijn schaduwe te beschouwen. De werelt, die wy met onse sinnen begrypen, ende daer inne wy lewen, is de schaduwe van die werelt, die metten verstande alleen te beschouwen. De werelt, die wy met onse sinnen begrypen, ende daer inne wy leven, is de schaduwe van die werelt, de navolghers van Platonis leere, Godt verstaen’, De Mornay 1646, f. 45v.


196 Bouwsma 1975, p. 37.

197 ‘Ghelijckerwijs, na dat de ooghen ende verwen, ende schijnbare dinghen verscheyden zijn, ende het licht der Sonne verscheyden ghewercken voorbrenght: alsoo is GODS teghenwoordigheydt verscheydentlijck by verscheyden dinghen, sonder nochtans verscheyden te zijn’, De Mornay 1646, f. 26r.

198 ‘[W]y zullen Godt beschouwen ... inde ghebreken, die men in alle dinghen kan schouwen, als veranderlijck, onmachtigh, met stoffe behangen te zijn, etc. welcke dinghen wy moeten houden vele verder, dan eenigh verstant, die met zyne ghedachten soude konnen afsonderen, van Gode verscheyden te zijn’, De Mornay 1646, f. 26r.


200 ‘[A]en alle kanten sal ons soo overvloedige stoffe van sijn blinckende heerlijckheyt gegeven worden ... waer dat gy maer u oogen sult keeren, gy sult overal klare spiegels sien, daer in Godts macht en Majesteyt wort, klare schilderijen daer in Godts wezen en macht gelijck als in geschildert en uyt gedruckt is’, Van Blijenberg 1671, p. 59.

201 On this theme, see Bakker 2004, p. 153.

202 Calvin 1949, p. 18.

203 ‘Veel zulcke spiegels heeft hier onze ziel te baet,/ Die zy gebruikt, wanneer zy haer verluchten gaet/ Haer oog verneemt, daer’t in der Schepslen spiegel ziet;/ De macht en wijsheid Gods, die alles schiep uit niet;/ Maer in het Heilboek ziet zy ’t groote wonder staen/ Van ons verlossing, en den Hemel opgedaan;/ Ja al zyn glory ons tot erffnis toegezeyd;/ Zy word gewaer door ’t glas van Gods weldaedigheid.’ Hall concludes that ‘my nimmer zulck een heldre zon of dag/ In d’oogen straelt, of ’k ben met eenen bril ge-


205 The reader must ponder: ‘Wat noch in’t last voor ongeval/ Dees zichtbre wereld treffen zal,/ Als welkers neigen tot vergaen/ En on-

206 Van der Goes was a friend of Luyken’s and played a key role in the circle surrounding the Van Hoogstratens. Frans van Hoog-

207 ‘f [T]egenwoordig zichtbaar leven … met al wat vlugtig is, omgeeven’; ‘het groote boek der dingen’; Luyken 1711, p. 54.

208 ‘Dewyle wy niet en aanmerken de dingen die men ziet, maar de dingen die men niet en ziet. Want de dingen die men ziet zyn tydelyk, maar de dingen die men niet en ziet zyn eeuwig’.

209 ‘De Schildery is maar een schyn,/ Van Ding-

210 ‘Al wat het oog besiet,/ Ist prinsepaal nog niet./ De Kunst steld ons een Schijn te vooren./ Hoe’t in het Weesen staat beschoo-

211 ‘Het eeuwig Niets,/ iets boven alle zinnen,/ Een Al, daar’t al af kwam/ Wat ooit begin-

212 The Inleyding refers to the Second Epistle to the Corinthians, Inl. p. 106.


215 Falkenburg 1989, p. 56.


Blankert’s comment that Vermeer saw ‘earthly reality’ as transcendental therefore seems to me incorrect: earthly reality has no other metaphysical significance than confronting the viewer, through a sensory stimulus, with its transcendental foundations; the ephemeral and sensory elements of the visible world serve as elements of a rhetorical ‘argument’ designed to convince us of the perpetuity of the invisible world.


Bomford 1998.

The theory of anamorphosis was expounded in the seventeenth century in Kircher’s Ars magna lucis et umbrae (1671), with which Van Hooogstraten may have become acquainted in Vienna, where he claims to have visited the Jesuits.

Cylinder anamorphoses are quite common, but I know of no other examples of reflecting cones.


‘[L]es inventions de perspective, où certain beaux dessins ne paraissent que confusion, jusqu’à ce qu’on rapporte à leur vrai point de vue’, Leibniz, Monadologie (1711), quoted in Gilman 1978, p. 97, p. 254.

‘[C]e qui paraît souvent ressemblant dans ces portraits médiocres n’est moins que cela ... Du moment que par quelque signe il se forme dans notre esprit une image qui a du rapport à une chose que nous connaissons, nous croyons aussitôt y trouver une grande ressemblance, quoiqu’a la bien examiner, il n’y eut souvent qu’une légère idée’, Entretiens sur les vies et les ouvrages (Paris 1668-1688, Entretien VII, pp. 483-454), quoted in Lichtenstein 1989, p. 188.


The Dutch translation has been taken as the source text here, since this is the text that Van Hooogstraten is most likely to have read himself: ‘Gelijk men ziet dat de prenten, in koper of hout gesneden, en met een weinich inkt hier en daar op’t papier gezet, boschien, steden, menschen, ja ook strijden en stornen aan ons vertonen, hoewel van een grote menigte van verscheide hoedanigheden, die zy in deze voorwerpen ons doen bevatten, geen andere is, dan de gestalte alleen, van de welken zy eigentlijk de gelijkheid hebben. En dit is noch een zeer onvolmaakte gelijkheid, dewijl zy op een heel platte vlakte lighamen, die verscheidelijk gerezen en ingezonken zijn, aan ons vertonen; en dewijl zy, volgens de regels van de Deurzichtkunde, dikwijls beter kringen door langgronden, dan door andere kringen, en vierkanten beter door scheve ruiten, dan door andere vierkanten vertonen, en dus met alle d’andere gestalten: in voegen dat zy dikwijls, om in hoedanigheid van beelden volmaakter te wezen, en een voowerp beter te vertonen, dat niet moeten gelijken’, Descartes 1659, pp. 81-82.

‘[V]an zulk eenen, die die gewisheyt nevens een verzekerde hand verkregen heeft, zal niemant der lichaemen afmetingen afvoeren. Want de oogen, door de konst bereyt zijnde, vangen aen een Regel te zijn, en de hand volgt de konst met een verzekert betrouwen’, Inl. p. 63.

Wheelock 2007, p. 87. Wheelock construes the still life in the foreground with an oyster and a clock as a vanitas still life, in which the oyster alludes to the temptations of the senses, pp. 274-277.

Wheelock 2002, p. 129; on similar works, see Heuer 1997.

Ember 1999.

Huygens translated some of Donne’s poems; see also De Brune 1994, p. 358, pp. 361-363.


‘[W]at anders, alsze schijnt, voor dieze regt beziet’; ‘Een buyten-verw alleen; die ’t Werelts-Kint verheugt/ ’t Bestendig is alleen in ’t oefnen van de Deugt’, liminary poem by S. Simonides to De la Serre 1658,
unpaginated; see above, Chap. VI, n. 164.


243 See Brusati 1995, pp. 136-137 on this self-portrait.

244 Erasmus, *Enchiridon militis christianii* (1515), par. XIV; quoted in Bakker 2004, p. 204, n. 511.

245 ‘These diagrams are compiled and presented in Andrej Pilgoun, *Representing the Medieval Cosmos* (publication forthcoming).

246 On the Tarocchi see Westfehling 1998.

247 Cf. *Christus als Salvator Mundi* (Pinacoteca Ambrosiana, Milan, 16th century) and Caravaggio’s fresco in the Casino di Villa Ludovisi (Rome) for scenes depicting the firmament as a transparent sphere with a globe at its centre; Bosch’s *The Flood* (‘Madrid Triptych’, Prado), with the firmament as a sphere containing a flat disc.

248 Atlas, Moses and Hermes Trismegistus were the first three philosophers, according to Augustine, *De civitate Dei* XVL, 39. Atlas was the first to teach human beings about the heavens, according to Pliny, *Naturalis Historia* II, 63; see Bentini & Agostini 2004, p. 258.


250 Van Hoogstraten refers to the floor mosaic, Inl. p. 335.


252 ‘[E]en ronde kloot of kogel vertoont een ronde kring, en een eenigen Orizont of zichteind, hoewel wy met hand en verstandt een oncyndich getal begrijpen’, Inl. p. 34.


259 De la Serre 1658, p. 325.


261 Zeuxis laughs at the vanity of the old woman who wants her portrait painted; on the theme of vanity in self-portraits, see Sluiter 1998.


263 The ‘storiette’ in stucco in the Capella Orsini of Santa Trinità in Rome were lost at the end of the eighteenth century, cf. Romani 2003, cat. no. 15, p. 85 ff.


266 Calvin, *Institutes* 2.7.


268 ‘Als ge in een Spiegel u beschout/ En ziet uwe eertijds gladde wangen,/ Gerimpelt, en uw huid veröud;/ Dan leert gy hoe ... Niets ... het noodlot [kan] wederstreven’, Vaenius 1683, p. 93.


**Excursus**

1 Miedema argues that the structure of Van Mander’s art theory ‘is based on analogy with cosmic ideal structures’; this ‘is in line with the thinking of Van Mander’s time ... Van Mander’s “ars” thus becomes an instruction model between the macrocosm (the universe) and the microcosm (man), so that its importance extends far beyond painting alone’, Miedema 1973, pp. 308-9; on the ‘astro-psychological implications of the *Grondt*’ see also pp. 307-8, 351, 354, 447, 510, 512, 514, 534.

2 My thanks to Professor Wieb van Bunge for his expert comments on this chapter, with particular reference to the passages on Van Blijenberg and Spinoza.

3 ‘De schors’ ist die ghy soeckt, uw’ oordeel is ellendigh:/ Recht anders onse Godt: die siet maar op ’t inwendigh’, Camphuysen 1638, p. 115.

4 ‘[I]l fine ... della pittura è fra tutte l’arti es-
sere imitatrice della natura ... non però compitamente, ché allora non sarebbe immitatrice, ma simile l’un all’altra; ma nel miglior modo che sia possibile a noi, cioè almeno quanto all’esterno nella superficie accidentale’, Zuccheri, L’Idea, ed. Barocchi, Scritti p. 1038.
7 Czech 2002, pp. 77-80.
8 Descartes 1657a, p. 89.
9 ‘Welke vertooningen aan het Verstand ook tweesints konnen zijn; want sy zijn of inwendig, of van buiyten komende’; ‘De uytwendige komen van de voor-werpen der sichtbare Wereld’, Goeree, MK p. 348; see Chap. VI, n. 16.
10 Brusati 1996, esp. pp. 91, 92-94, 224, p. 93: ‘Van Hoogstraten’s printed Academy has closer ties to the interests and projects of the Royal Society for the Advancement of Learning than to the classicist ideals of the French and Italian academies that his treatise is usually presumed to reflect’.
14 Inl. p. 207; Klever 1990, p. 50.
15 Inl. p. 263.
16 ‘Elen recht natuurlijke Schildery’, Inl. p. 263.
17 Leibniz (Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain, II, 12.1) and Locke are quoted in Vermeir 2003, pp. 120 ff.
20 ‘Na wat zijde of Oord een voor-werp dat in onse Oogen gevormd, en van ons gesien werd, gekeerd is, of in welke stand-plaats het sig bevind... Men moet voorwaar niet meenen dat dit geschied door een Daad of Beeldnis die uyt het Gesiene voor-werp komt, maar alleen door de stand der deeltjes van de Herssenen uyt welke de Senuwen haar oorsprong nemen’, Goeree, MK p. 366.
21 ‘[D]at men niet onderstelt dat de ziel, om te gevoelen, enige beelden behoeft te beschouwen, die door de voorwerpen tot in de harssenen gezonden worden, gelijk onze [aristotelische] Wijsbegeerigen gemenen doen ... [die], ziende dat onze geest lichelijk door een schildery opgewekt kan worden, om’t voorwerp, dat er op gesigneerd is, t’ontvangen, gemeent hebben dat onze geest op gelijke wijze moest opgewekt worden, om de dingen te bevatten, die door enige kleine beeltjes, de welken in ons heeft gevormt wierden, onze zinnen treffen’; Descartes 1659, pp. 81-82.
22 Goeree, MK p. 367.
24 ‘Hier zyn ons’ oogen bogen/ En schieten stralen uyt: daer is ’t een’ grove logen/ Daer is ’t maer spiegel-glas, en neemt de dingen in’, Huygens 1984, stanza 885.
25 Inl. p. 53; see chapter II, note 54.
26 Cf. Vermij 1999a, n. 17.
27 [V]an desen Alder constichsten Beeldenaer en Schilder’, Van Mander, Grondt XIII,1, f. 50r; Van Mander associates the colours with the elements, Van Mander, Grondt XIII,4, f. 50v.
28 ‘[N]aer’t leeven’; for example, when he saw a reversed rainbow in sea-spray and in a fountain, Inl. p. 304.
29 Boyle 1664, pp. 84-85.
30 Boyle 1664, pp. 85-86.
31 La Dioptrique, par. 6:91-2. Cf. Descartes’ painting metaphor in the Méditations 7:20, which he uses to demonstrate that only geometry and arithmetic are reliable sciences.
34 ‘De koleuren of verwen zijn veranderlijk door onderschede verlichtingen’, Inl. p. 257.
35 Van Hoogstraten says that ‘no illuminated
thing is present near a shadow, but that it shares its light and colour with it', Inl. p. 263; he devotes a chapter to 'How Shadow, Reflection and the Thickness of the Air Change Colours', commenting: 'Colours can be changed by the interruption of any bodies that shade them, or by reflections', Inl. p. 264.

36 Inl. p. 263.

37 Van Mander, Grondt from VII, 27, f. 31r, esp. §§ 50-52.

38 ‘[H]et behoort voornamentlijk tot de Hou-

dinge, dat men verscheyde lichten, en ver-


43 ‘[Z]oo leyt een volmaekte Schildery ook reets op uw palet’, cf: ‘Kunt gy de breekin-
gens de verwen, die gy voor hebt na te vol-
gen, maer wel met het verstant bevatten,
gy zultze zonder grooten arbeit wel uit uw

44 ‘[H]et oog en het oordeel’, Inl. p. 235. See
also above, pages 72-90.

45 ‘[T]he very same obiect must appeare of
different colours, whensoever it happeneth
that it reflecteth light differently to us ...
accordingly painters are faine to use almost
opposite colours to expresse them. In like
manner if you looke upon two pieces of the
same cloth, or plush, whose graines lye con-
trawise to one an other, they will likewise
appeare to be of different colours’, Digby


47 Translated from the Dutch. ‘[D]at er geen
beelden zijn, die in alles met de voorwerpen,
de welken Zy vertonen, gelijk zijn ... ja dat
dikwijls hun volmaaktheid hier in bestaat,
dat Zy hen niet zo naau, als Zy wel konden,
gelijken’, ‘in voegen dat Zy dikwijls, om in
hoedanigheit van beelden volmaunter te
wezen, en een voorwerp beter te vertonen,
dat niet moeten gelijken’, Descartes 1659,
pp. 81-82.

48 Inl. pp. 35, 63, 308.

49 ‘[P]ure con la differmità deve l’occhio
rimaner ingannato e deve la perfezione con
l’imperfezione apparire’, Boschini, Breve Istru-
zione, ed. 1966, p. 750.

50 ‘[I]l Pittore forma senza forma, anzi con for-
ma d’forme, la vera formalità in apparenza’,
Boschini, Breve Istruzione, ed. 1966, p. 750.

51 Digby 1970, p. 2. ‘[L]et vs consider, in what
consisteth the likenesse vnto a man, of a
picture drawn in blacke and white repre-
senting a man ... it will be but a likenesse or
representation of a man, because it wanteth
the warmeth, the softnesse, and the other
qualities of a liuing body, which belong to
a man: but if you giue it all of these, then it
is no longer a likenesse or image of a liuing
creature, but a liuing creature indeede ... if
the likenesse were complete in every regard,
then it were no longer to be called like, but
the very thing it selfe’, Digby 1970, p. 357.

52 For the identification see Ekkart 1997,
p. 133, Brusati 1995, p. 296, n. 126, and
Millner 1946. Ekkart cites Van Blijenberg’s
anti-Spinozism as an argument against the
identification; in the late 1660s, however,
Van Blijenberg was still full of praise for
the philosopher and sent him his own first
philosophical work.


54 On Van Blijenberg’s fascination with Spino-
za’s philosophy and his role as one of the
first critics of Spinoza see Van Bunge 2004.

55 As far as writings in the vernacular are con-
cerned, the important ones in this early
phase of radical philosophy are those by
the Koerbagh brothers, Franciscus Van den
Enden and Lodewijk Meyer; cf. Israel 2001,
p. 314.


57 ‘[C]ort en claer toonen ... dat in ons behal-
vent lichaem nog iets anders is, dat niet al-
leem geen lichaem is, maar een eygen en op
sigh self bestaende selfstandigheyt, welk
blijkt, om dat als ick naertigh een lichaem
examineer, daer niet in vnde als een spacye
en uytbreydingen’, ‘laet alles dat in de ge-
schapen nateur [sic] is door uwen gedagten
loopen, gy sult in alles een lichaem en een
uytbreydinge vinden, maer laet dan uwe ge-
dagten oock eens door uwe gedagten loopen,
gij sult er geen lichaem nog uytbreydinge in
vinden’; ‘dencken [is] van lichaem [onders-
scheiden] soo veel als licht van duysternis-
sen’, Van Blijenberg to Van Hoogstraten, 10
January 1661, in Roscam Abbing 1993, no.
65, pp. 56-57.

58 The Tractatus was not published until 1677.

59 In the text itself the whole is referred to by
the title Principia van Godt en godts-dienst, cf.
Thissen p. 138.

60 For the relation between Van Blijenberg’s
Kennis en early Spinozism see Van Bunge
2004, p. 111.

61 ‘[D]at onse ziel wat anders is als het lichaem’,
‘Wy zetten ons selven tot een eynde of oog-
wit voor, om te bewijzen dat er een Godt is, en dat hy de werelt regeert, dat onse ziel wat anders is als het lichaem, en dat die onsterfelijck is'. Van Blijenberg 1671, p. 1.

62 ‘Kom dan hier ô Atheisten, en laet u leeren dat Godt niet verde is van een yeder onder ons, dat hy met ons verstand kan geraeckt en gelijck met onse handen getast werden, en dat soo menig ding als er in de werelt is, wy soo menig argument en soo veel-voudige overtuyinge hebben van dat er een Godt is’, Van Blijenberg 1671, p. 67.


65 Van Blijenberg wrote to Spinoza: ‘Ghy stelt ... dat scheppen en onderhouden is een en het zelfde ... en dat God niet alleen de zelfstandigheden, maer oock de bewegingen in de selfstandigheden heeft geschapen ... aengesien dat er buyten God geen oorsaeck van beweginge is, en soo volcht dan dat God niet alleen oorsaeck van de selfstandigheyt van de ziel is, maer oock van ydere Beweginge of poogingen van de ziel’, Spinoza 1677, p. 529. Cf. Klever 1997, pp. 72-73, on a letter from Spinoza to Van Blijenberg.

66 Van Bunge 2004, p. 111, states that Van Blijenberg was certainly fascinated by Spinoza’s work at first, a fascination that drove him to his eventual criticism.


70 Zijlmans 1999, pp. 154, 169. Even before the publication of Spinoza’s Ethics there were various ‘reading groups’ in the Republic in which his ideas were discussed, as we learn from a letter from Simon de Vries to Spinoza dated 24 February 1663, see Spinoza 1977, p. 105.


72 Poem in Adriaan Verwer, ‘t Mom-aensicht der atheistery aferukt (Amsterdam 1683), quoted in Freudenthal 1899, p. 212.


74 Roscam Abbing 1993, chronology no. 129, pp. 78-80.


76 The Inleyding was largely written in the 1660s, in an environment where optics played a major role – especially in Rotterdam and Delft – and painters like Fabritius, Vermeer and Van Hoogstraten himself were experimenting with illusionist tricks and devices such as the camera obscura; Vermeer actually owned two works by Van Hoogstraten, as is revealed by the inventory of Vermeer’s house on the Oude Langendijk in Delft, which was drawn up on 29 February 1676. For the relationship between Vermeer’s illusionism and Van Hoogstraten’s ideas, see Wadum 1998, pp. 208, 212; for the interest in optics among Delft artists, see Wheelock 1977.


78 Goeree 1705, p. 673.

79 Junius, TPA p. 85; Junius, SKDO p 77.


81 ‘Spinoza in veel dingen met Aristoteles, Epikurus en andere Ouwde Filozofen onder de Stoicynen, over een stemd’, Goeree 1705, pp. 665, 674.

82 ‘[G]eopenbaert, ende in alle dinghen afghe-maelt’, De Mornay 1646, fol. 1 r.


84 Israel 2001, p. 323.

85 Goeree 1705, p. 673.

86 Spinoza, Ethics I, proposition 29.

87 ‘Yder bezonder ding, of dat eindig is, en een bepaalde weezentlijkheit heeft, kan niet wezentlijk zijn, noch tot werken bepaalt worden, zo het niet van een andere oorzaak, die ook eindig is, en een bepaalde wezentlijkheid heeft, bepaalt word tot wezentlijk te zijn, en tot te werken’, Ethics I, 28, Spinoza 1677, pp. 28-29.

88 ‘Uit het volgende volgt klarelijk dat de dingen naar hun opperste volmaaktheid van God voortgebracht zijn; vermits zy uit de gestelde volmaakte natuur van God noodzakelijk zijn gevolgt. Dit wijst ook in God ook geen onvolmaaktheid aan: want zijn volmaaktheid heeft ons gedwongen dit te bevestigen: ... dat de dingen op geen andere wijze, en in geen andere ordening van God, geschapen hebben konnen worden ... dat alleenlijk van Gods besluit en wil afhangt dat yder ding het geen is, dat het is’, Ethics I, 33,

'Enige nieuwe Philosophoef zijn van gevoelen; dat de Schoonheyd niet soo seer een hoedanighheid, of volmaaktheid is van 't Voorwerp 't welk men siet, als wel een gewrogt, of daad daar af in den geenen die ziet: ... De Schoonste hand door een vergroot-glas gesien, sal verschrikkelijk schijnen. Invoegen dat de dingen in sich selven aangebracht, of tot God betrokken, noch Schoon noch Leelijk zijn', Goeree, MK p. 20.

'Alles, dat'er is, drukt op een zekere en bepaalde wijze Gods natuur, of wezenheit uit: dat is al't geen, 't welk is, drukt op een zekere en bepaalde wijze Gods vermogen uit, dat dooorzaak van alle dingen is. Dieshalven, uit al't geen, dat is, moet enig gewrocht (effectus) volgen', Ethics I, 36, Spinoza 1677, pp. 37-38.

There are, though, different kinds of modes: infinite (such as God's intellect) and finite (such as the human intellect), and within the infinite there are 'indirect' and 'direct': cf. Ethics I, 20-23.


'Dat wy by naturende natuur het geen moeten verstaan, dat in zich is, en door zich bevat, of zodanige toeëigeningen van de zelfstandigheid, die een eeuwige en oneindige wezenheid uitdrukken; dat is God, voor zo veel hy als een vrije oorzaak behoort, en zonder God niet konnen werden, noch bevat worden', Ethics I, 25, 29, Corollary, Spinoza 1677, pp. 28, 31.

Spinoza 1999, pp. 156-157, see Excursus, n. 93.

'Spekticismus is gesproten, of tot God betrokken, noch Schoon noch Leelijk zijn', Goeree, MK p. 20.

In illustration of this Panofsky quotes Ficino's conception of beauty as a 'ray from the face of God... that first reaches the Angels, then the human soul, and ultimately enlightens the world of corporeal matter', from Ficino's De amorre, quoted in Panofsky 1927, p. 28.

Inl. p. 18, p. 77; see chapter II, notes 10 and 15.

Spinoza 1999, pp. 156-157, see Excursus, n. 93.

'Al't geen, 't welk, als wezentheit van zelfstandigheid stelling, van een oneindig verstand bevat kan worden, alleenlijk tot een enige zelfstandigheid behoort, en by gevolg, dat d'uitgestrekte, en de denkende zelfstandigheid (extensa et cogitans substantia) een en de zelfde zelfstandigheid is, die nu onder deze, en dan onder die toeëigening (attributum) begrepen word. In dezer voegen is ook de wijze (modus) van d'uitstrekking, en het denkbeeld van die wijze een en dezelfde zaak, doch op twee wijzen uitgedrukt ... Tot een voorbeeld, de kring, die in de natuur wezenlijk is (existere), en het denkbeeld van de wezentliche kring, dat ook in God is, is een en de zelfde zaak, die door verscheide toeëigeningen verklaart word,' Ethics II, 7, Corollary, Spinoza 1677, pp. 52-53.

'Dat wy by naturende natuur het geen moeten verstaan, in dat zich is, en door zich bevat, of zodanige toeëigeningen van de zelfstandigheid, die een eeuwige en oneindige wezenheid uitdrukken; dat is God, voor zo veel hy als een vrije oorzaak aangemerkt word. Maar by de genatuurde natuur versta ik dit alles, 't welk uit de noot-zakelijkheid van Gods natuur, of van yder van Gods toeëigeningen volgt, dat is alle de wijzen van Gods toeëigeningen, voor zo veel zy als dingen aangemerkt worden, die in God zijn, en die zonder God niet konnen wezen, noch bevat worden', Ethics I, 25, 29, Corollary, Spinoza 1677, pp. 28, 31.


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van denken bevat werd’, Goeree, MK pp. 359-360.

103 ‘Wy begrypen twee onderscheyde Denk-
beelden in ons namelijk een van een den-
kende Geest, en een van een uytgebreyd

104 ‘[W]y syne bekommerd met dien vermetelen
Ikarus soo hooge te vliegen, datwe den on-
begrijpelijke Majesteyt Gods, van soo na by,
 en boven ‘t geen van hem geopenbaard is,
in dit Leven souden beschouwen’, Goeree,
MK pp. 359-60.

105 Klever 1990.

106 This is ‘On the Rainbow’, written in part in
response to Descartes’ Meteores.

107 This even applies to human blood circu-
tlation, to which the passions are closely
related.

108 Letter 2, Spinoza 1677, p. 75; Klever 1990,
p. 58.

109 Ethics II, 48.

110 ‘Het kan ook niet anders wezen, of de men-
 sch moet een deel van de natuur zijn, en der
zelfder gemene ordening volgen’, Ethics IV,
Appendix 7, Spinoza 1677, p. 253.

111 ‘En echter zullen wy de dingen, die ons te-
gen ‘t geen overkomen, ‘t welk de reden van
 onze nutticheit vereischt, gelijkmoediglijk
verdragen, zo wy meewustig zijn dat wy
onze plicht hebben voltrokken, en dat het
vermogen, ‘t welk wy hebben, zich niet zo
wijt heeft kunnen uitstreken, dat wy hen
konden schuwen, en eindelijk dat wy een
deel van de gehele natuur zijn, welker or-
dening wy volgen’, Ethics IV, Appendix 32;
Spinoza 1677, pp. 261-262.


113 EJ, pp. 20-21; see chapter II, note 152.

114 ‘[D]e goddeloosheyt zoo uyt komt te weyen,
dat sy ‘t gene de vogelen onder den Hemel,
de onvernuftige dieren, en de ongevoelige
dingen verkondigen ... in twijfel trekken ...
De vreeze Gods is den aenvang der waer-
achtige wijsheydt, welke alle onderrichtin-
gen der Philosophie, van hoe men behoort
te leven in sich begrijpt’, EJ, ‘Van de religie’,
chap. VIII, pp. 29-30.

115 Inl. p. 232.


117 ‘[D]e gevoelens van Spinosa maar al te ver en
te veel door alle oorden en orden van men-
schen verspreid en geworteld zijn; datse de
hoven de grooten ingenomen, en verschei-
dene der beste verstanden verpeest hebben;
dat luiden van seer burgerlichen wandel door
de selve als godlijx tot ongodisterye verrukt
zijn’, Bekker, Kort begryp der algemeene ker-

kelijke historien (1686), quoted in Israel 2004,
p. 15.

118 ‘[W]ie Spinoza is geweest en wat ketterye
hy heeft gevolgd? gelove ik niet dat aan ye-
mind onbekend kan zyn. Syne schriften zyn
over al te vinden, en worden in dese jeuke-
rigie eeuw om hare nieuwend, by na in alle
boekwinckels verkocht’, anonymous preface
to Christopher Wittichius, Onderzoek van de
Zede-konst van Benedictus de Spinoza (Am-
26.

CONCLUSION

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